Something I was going to mention; in the past we have added officers but sometimes stuck to 6/6 (not my idea). Extra officer but not adjusting the watch. Perhaps some guidance will come from this?
[QUOTE=z-drive;134477]Something I was going to mention; in the past we have added officers but sometimes stuck to 6/6 (not my idea). Extra officer but not adjusting the watch. Perhaps some guidance will come from this?[/QUOTE]
MLC 2006 fixes the 12 -12 and the 6-6 and if you arrive in a country that enforces it you will find out
From the report;
- Tow planners for the February 2013 KULLUK tow based the bollard pull requirements of the MODU on weather exceedance levels as provided in Metocean studies for the proposed route in order to ensure the tow would not encounter winds or seas that may threaten to overwhelm the bollard pull of the towing vessels involved. As a part of the planning process, a new tow resistance study was conducted for the KULLUK, yielding higher initial tow resistances for the vessel, due primarily to a slight increase in draft (11.5m vs. 9.5m) and basing their report on open water test results from a study conducted in 1983. For this tow, planners wanted to ensure sufficient bollard pull was available for tow resistances anticipated during a weather event equivalent to that anticipated at the 10% exceedance level in accordance with the Metocean study conducted for that route and month. As a result, the criteria by which the planners determined the necessary bollard pull for the tow included what was necessary to maintain position in 43.7 knot winds and 8.7 meter seas. The result was a bollard pull requirement for the KULLUK of 282 metric tons.To maintain some “overhead” for this bollard pull requirement, three vessels were chosen to tow the KULLUK, totaling over 350 tons of bollard pull.
interesting Shell must have known how fast you could tow the Kulluck therefore knew they would meet the storm…
Fuel tank vents…ha thats what I guessed, bayou boat out in waves, who’d a thought? ( Class doesnt get that as an issue certainly not ABS) A sister ship to an AHTS I worked on had that towing back from Sakhalin, all fuel tanks vent under the crash bars but only 4 feet off the deck DOH!
Any mention of the surge gear?
…and they only had 1 shot of 3" chain for surge gear? Our 3,000 hp tug tug towing a 335’ barge in the winter usually uses a shot and a half, sometimes that doesn’t seem like enough.
[SIZE=3][QUOTE=tradsailor;134485]…and they only had 1 shot of 3" chain for surge gear? Our 3,000 hp tug tug towing a 335’ barge in the winter usually uses a shot and a half, sometimes that doesn’t seem like enough.[/QUOTE]
The two issues with the Kulluk were the weight obviously but also it’s behavior while being towed. Evidently it was known to be difficult to tow. For the tow back to Dutch Harbor after the grounding they used 315 feet of 3 inch chain.
[/SIZE]54.
The planners for the tow of the KULLUK from Kiliuda Bay, Kodiak to Dutch Harbor,
Alaska following the grounding of the KULLUK recognized the need for significant shock
protection for the towing lines.
“The inclusion of a significant amount of chain surge gear,
properly positioned, on each towing arrangement is critical to the success of this operation. This
is the only way to provide adequate shock-loading protection to the towing gear in extreme
conditions where deep water is available. Whist the tow wires will be shortened for departure
and arrival, the three tow wires (and in particular the lead tug’s towing wire) must be veered to
the maximum safe length wherever and whenever practicable.”
315 feet of three inch chain was deemed sufficient for this towing operation. This towing operation safely reached its destination of Dutch Harbor despite experiencing gale conditions during a portion of the voyage.
My understanding is the towing gear was set up for the tow to the Arctic in summer conditions. For the tow from Dutch to Everett in winter they depended upon the one surveyor from GL Noble Denton who they expected to approve the gear as being suitable for the tow but instead signed off that the gear as rigged matched the gear as described in the tow plan which had also not been updated.
The odd thing is that someone would eyeball that huge rig and the one shot (90 feet) of surge gear prior to crossing the Gulf in winter and think, yup, looks good.
In the case of the KULLUK, the towing gear was developed prior to the KULLUK’s 2012 drilling season by a number of experienced personnel, including a Shell employee who had considerable rig moving experience, Noble Drilling, Edison Chouest, an experienced Tow Master; with the overall arrangement found acceptable to a warranty surveyor. In the case of the KULLUK’s December 2012 departure from Dutch Harbor, the towing arrangement was not assessed or redesigned to account for the anticipated weather along the route. In testimony, the Shell Marine Manager “had no doubt with respect to adequacy of the tow, or towing arrangements.” The GL Noble Denton warranty surveyor did not conduct an assessment of the towing configuration to ensure it met guidance provided in his companies’ policies.
According to the contract between Shell and GL Noble Denton, GL Noble Denton was hired to “provide warranty survey and certificate of approval for the tow
Is there any officially sanctioned “white-washing” going on here ?
[QUOTE=+A465B;134510]Is there any officially sanctioned “white-washing” going on here ?[/QUOTE]
Nothing was said aboutthe decision, made by the Unified Command in Anchorageto tow the Kulluk to Port Hobron Kodiak instead of ducking into a lee somewhere.
Thearmchair quarterbacks on here that were watching it real timeall were surprised that they made that decision given the weather forecast at the time.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;134513]Nothing was said aboutthe decision, made by the Unified Command in Anchorageto tow the Kulluk to Port Hobron Kodiak instead of ducking into a lee somewhere.
Thearmchair quarterbacks on here that were watching it real timeall were surprised that they made that decision given the weather forecast at the time.[/QUOTE]
I do not know about any official whitewashing. There are too many eyes on this, and it looks to me like the USCG has told ECO and Shell that they are going to have to take their lumps in public on this one.
As several of us pointed out at the time, they should have towed west around Sitkalidik Island into the safety of Old Harbor, during the lull in the weather, instead of towing east closing on a lee shore when it was very doubtful whether they had enough time to get inside before the next heavy weather. If they had gone west to shelter at Old Harbor, Kulluk, and more importantly, future Arctic Oil Drilling would have been saved.
[QUOTE=tugsailor;134520]I do not know about any official whitewashing. There are too many eyes on this, and it looks to me like the USCG has told ECO and Shell that they are going to have to take their lumps in public on this one.
As several of us pointed out at the time, they should have towed west around Sitkalidik Island into the safety of Old Harbor, during the lull in the weather, instead of towing east closing on a lee shore when it was very doubtful whether they had enough time to get inside before the next heavy weather. If they had gone west to shelter at Old Harbor, Kulluk, and more importantly, future Arctic Oil Drilling would have been saved.[/QUOTE]
USCG Captain Paul Mehler III, was the incident commander for the Kulluk’s grounding, When did he take over? My understanding is that it was before the grounding.
From the Report
During this period with the KULLUK in tow of both the AIVIQ and NANUQ, progress was made to tow the KULLUK in a generally southerly direction, increasing distance from shore. The AIVIQ was on the port leg of the tow when looking forward from KULLUK out towards the towing vessels. At approximately midnight on December 29, the NANUQ and AIVIQ received direction from the Unified Command to head east and then north in an attempt to bring the KULLUK to a safe harbor , identified as Marmot Bay on the northeastern side of Kodiak Island
.
This would take them around the eastern end of Sitkalidak Island.
As this maneuver was being conducted, the wind began shifting to the east, causing the KULLUK to begin to be set slowly to the west, despite the AIVIQ’s and NANUQ’s efforts. By 0600 hrs on the December 30, the wind had shifted again more from the south, allowing the KULLUK to make forward progress to the east.
Throughout the tow, the NANUQ had difficulties while towing with the AIVIQ. The Captain stated that on several occasions his towing wire would “tight wire”, indicating excessive loading of the towline. Seas and winds were also building as the towing operation continued
As this maneuver was being conducted, the wind began shifting to the east,
- It was forecast at the time to become East 50 kts, with 30 ft seas. At the time we all thought the should run for a lee. I don’ t know what the crew on the boats were thinking or how much they had to do with the decision but it was made by the Unified Command.
when we originally towed the kulluk back from Dutch in 2011 we used 3 shots of 3" chain towed it along with the ECO boat nanuq 8,000hp and our tug 5,500hp tractor with a escort tug following the whole way we avg 4kts
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;134522]USCG Captain Paul Mehler III, was the incident commander for the Kulluk’s grounding, When did he take over? My understanding is that it was before the grounding.[/QUOTE]
Yes he did.
The USCG forgot to ask if the Shell people were old enough to shave…
copy of the report here as well
http://media.adn.com/smedia/2014/04/04/13/09/1uUqrG.So.7.pdf#storylink=relast
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;134434]As far as the details, it pains me to say it but c.captain (and others) pretty much nailed it. [/QUOTE]
why on earth does it “pain” you? Just asking is all…
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[QUOTE=powerabout;134550]copy of the report here as well[/QUOTE]
GOD BLESS YOU! I finally have the report now so I can read it!
Thank you, thank you, THANK YOU!
I have only been reading the summary and the findings and cannot believe the lack of towing knowledge present by all parties in this! STAGGERING to say the least. ECO better hire Foss to operate the AIVIQ in the future (just like Superior Energy did) if they know what’s good for them.
Diagram 75 (page105) shows wave heights and wind speeds with a time line of which tug had a line on the Kulluk. It looks to me that the tow lines consistently parted at a sea ht of 20 feet.
Posters here and the Coast Guard report talk about experience in Alaska as being required but I don’t think that’s true necessarily.It’s a question of knowing how to plan a tow. (I don’t know how to tow, I do know how to plan)
If you have the info that in 20 foot seas you choices are to part the wire or get towed backwards (requiring sea room) and knowing how much wire you can put out at what depths and so forth it doesn’t matter what part of the world you encounter 20+ foot seas and shallow banks. A lee shore is a lee shore regardless if it’s Kodiak Island or the Great Barrier Reef.
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[QUOTE=c.captain;134555]why on earth does it “pain” you? Just asking is all…[/QUOTE]
Your confidence in your guess that the surge gear was too light seemed unwarranted but was evidently based on your prior experience with Shell. Your post about missing flight ML 370 seems equally confident but you don’ t know jack shit about it.
sure based on knowing Shell but also being an experienced Alaskan and towing mariner. There was quite a bit of anecdotal evidence available to all of us at the time to be to render my opinion which I am proud to say was all born out to be accurate. It was more than surge gear too btw…it was the entire make up of the tow which in my opinion was certain to fail on that voyage at that time of the year. EVERYTHING WAS DONE WRONG!
Your post about missing flight ML 370 seems equally confident but you don’ t know jack shit about it.
yeah, in the meantime they’ve found all that floating debris in a month of searching! I guess the plane ditched and sank in one piece without a single bit floating free? SHAZAMM! AMAZING!
We need to keep in mind that the crew did all they could when the situation arose. The Master of the Aiviq at the time is a Damn fine Captian as well as the 3rd mate. People like to sit back and talk about what they would have done or not done, but until you are in the exact same situation you can not judge.