They aren’t classed but the ABS is involved.
https://www.motorship.com/news101/industry-news/abs-and-navsea-sign-naval-vessel-rules-agreement
Not to mention that the fact the ship burned for 4 days and a great deal of the smoke was not black shows there was a large amount of non-oil fuel available.
I was alluding to USCG senior leadership moving over to ABS and not wanting to piss off industry when coming out so they can take lucrative office jobs and continue the “old boy” network, no the Navy.
The Navy is like the USCG, they can do what they want but an fire like this was easily avoidable when not using the departure date as the most important part of the dockside.
After inspecting some burned out vessels, I’ve found that the the hottest burning, common Class-A material on commercial ships is rubber. Yokohamas, fueling hoses, etc. They go up like blow torches. Wouldn’t be surprised if this had occurred on the BR.
Not to be argumentative, but the fact that the vessel burned for four days, and the smoke wasn’t black, could also indicate that watertight doors were kept closed and other fire closures were maintained. The smoke was “white” (i.e. not black) because of lean combustion, as little air could reach the compartments.
As heat in one set of compartments is conducted through the plating to another section, it sets that section ablaze. When the oxygen level in those “sealed” rooms drops below 16% the flames go out, but the Class-A material still smolders with as little as 3% O2. Eventually heat causes steel work to distort, and air slips past doors and ventilator dampers, until the 16% O2 level is re-established, and the flames spring up again, sometimes resulting in explosions as large amounts of smoldering combustibles spring into flame all at once.
The progression goes on day after day, compartment after compartment, the fire cycling, growing and dwindling, the destruction traveling upwards more than side to side.
The only way to extinguish the fires at this point is direct attack, but direct attack means letting air in, so really it’s a race to put the fire out before your own actions burn the ship up. And few marine firefighters of any background train for this knock-down, marathon firefighting, because it requires enormous supplies of SCBA air, and intensive regular training.
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So where are the senior USCG management supposed to find work after they leave the service? Leave the industry and become Walmart Greeters? Their commodity is their knowledge, experience and who they know. Some are hired by Class Societies, others aren’t. They either fully retire or find other work in the industry. Don’t you think whomever hires them is going to shell out the $$$ for their knowledge, experience and contacts?
A very small market for retired tug captains as well. Wasn’t looking for a job when I retired.
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An interesting thing about this photo from the BR fire. At least in this compartment, the barrels don’t appear to be a source of fuel. The barrels are un-distorted, and the paint on most of them is intact.
If this particular area was involved in a very hot fire, the barrel would be rust-colored (as part of one is in the photo) and heavily distorted.
Of course, this is just one corner of a very large ship.
Well the “old boy network” is the issue.
There have been so many incidents in the past ten years that were caused because of when regulating industry, “My classmate would never allow anything bad to happen.” does not cut it. It is good for industry because they are given a pass, but the Mariners themselves are stuck because if they report anything, they are fired, and if they do report
Ride the Ducks (2), DEEPWATER HORIZON, CONCEPTION and I would bet BOUCHARD all have retired USCG Officers involved.
- Ride the Ducks has NTSB recommendations to stop using those beacause of safety and unseaworthiness.
- DWH, where do I start?
- CONCEPTION, a 35 year old boat that keeps getting passed over and over again with escape hatches that both took you to the fire AND you need to be a circus contortionist to use one of them.
- BOUCHARD, either they knew or were so incompetent they did not know what they were looking at.
All these cost lives, 35 civilians in the case of the CONCEPTION.
If these officers are so wise and such a fountain of knowledge;
- How did they not see these situations?
or - Did they see them and ignore them?
Either way it is criminal. In all four, commercial mariners saw these issues but their hands were tied because they wanted to feed their families. Either Masters need to be supported when they self-report or you need to get people in those positions that know the rrisks and are will to deal with them.
Obviously former USCG Officers are NOT the solution and if they are, we are screwed.
Here is a question; If former USCG Officers are good at the commercial side, especially in ABS, why are some US Companies switching from ABS to DNV for classification and inspections?
I have an answer. What is yours?
Not saying the premise is incorrect, but you have to show whether or not the actually were former USCG members involved. Otherwise, your theory holds no water.
Since a lot of the discussion revolves around owners/operators trying to avoid compliance, it would seem that switching from ABS to DNV doesn’t say much about DNV. I would imagine there are a lot of vessels constantly changing class for many reasons.
Truckie, OK. Let me do some research. I saw the fingerprints.
However, without even opening a browser and search engine:
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DWH, the Inspectors had no idea what they were looking at as far as the BOP Inspections and readiness were concerned.
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The same MSO Inspection Office was doing the inspections on the CONCEPTION since almost day one. I understand wanting to promote commerce but safety is safety. Sometimes you have to say NO and the USCG involved should have said NO.
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BOUCHARD is right in NYC where they do most of the commercial inspections. The moorings are right down the street and the office is out on Long Island. I will state it again. It was right in their backyardin NYC when the barge blew in SINY in 2001/2002 and since that occurred they SHOULD have been looking at BOUCHARD closely. The pump they were using that morning that caused the explosion had been repaired that morning. I am curious if the USCG inspected it or relied on a "phone call.
This happened two years ago and no result form the investigation yet BUT, the USCG pulled all the paper on BOUCHARD’s Vessels and Barges. They NEVER done that before so that tells they are covering up old mistakes or cutting connections, probably both.
The Ducks, the USCGreceived the recommendation from NTSB almost a year ago. It takes almost a year to read and respond to NTSB? I think NOT.
Also, take a look at who sits on the board for the Coast Guard Foundation and the board for the COast Guard Museum in New London and take a look at the big contributors and tell me their is no connection there.
If it looks, smells, tastes and quacks like a duck…
The discussion was originally centered around USCG top brass moving to ABS and other class societies. Now you’re talking about the local USCG Inspectors not being up to par. I missed the part where we switched tracks.
Nah CG didn’t have anything to do with this. You’d be on firmer ground substituting in the El Faro and its material condition in place of the DWH.
I disagree. Would not safety drills and equipment readiness involving the BOP be part of a USCG inspection back then?
BTW, I know none of this is going affect anything at all. The fix is already in at a way higher level. This just a version of the Monty Python argument sketch in its outcome.
I usually submit o being hit on the head lessons. It is less painful.
It all goes back to inspections and the USCG not wanting to push too hard with industry and trusting industry while holding back to not get a reputation of following the law too harshly. In the short term it is not bad but in the long term it causes issues like the 4 I mentioned.
Convoluted thinking I know. If that was switching horses midstream, I did not intentionally.
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Back at DWH times MMS would have been the regulatory body concerned with drilling systems and equipment. CG and ABS both had duties for ship systems. ABS did class and flag state (Marshal Islands) inspections. CG would perform what are PSC type inspections. They reconfigured MMS after Macondo to split leases from enforcement.
The quality of inspection by any reg body is wildly variable.
Thank you for the clarification. Coast Guard still did safety inspections because of a foreign vessel in US waters and could look at anything including things related to class and drilling.
Maybe forbidding USCG Officers to work in industries they regulated for two years like the Navy working for some contractors or similar to the lobbying ban for three years after retirement would make me feel better. But being in charge of licensing or Inspections at HQ and then switching to ABS or something similar does not sit well with me.
So…
You set yourself for a good retirement job by not ticking off your future employers by regulating them the way they should be at the expense of the general public and the working mariner?
BRILLIANT!
You’ve basically just described the military industrial complex’ revolving door 
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Did I? What a surprise! 