That’s correct, Exxon’s own policy required that either the chief mate or master be on the bridge to assist the watch officer in that area. Also federal regulations required that an officer with federal pilotage be on the bridge which the third mate did not have.
Pilotage required twenty trips, the third mate had only made six.
The tankers Brooklyn and Arco Juneau had both left earlier that day during daylight and the masters had remained on the bridge.
Capt Hazelwood likely could have navigated by eye/radar without a plot but likely the third mate could not so he was taking six minute fixes. Likely didn’t have the cognitive bandwidth to maintain a plot, conn a loaded tanker through the 0.9 mile gap between the ice and Bligh Reef and supervise an inept helmsman.
Captain Hazelwood was found Not Guilty on every charge brought against him. Blanket statements like “The Master was Drunk” is an unfair statement since none of us were there or even involved in the investigation.
Times were different back then and context is important when relating to a case as old as Exxon Valdez. It brought a major change to the Maritime Transportation Industry. The major oil companies went to stealth mode. Exxon and the rest of the big players in the oil industry effectively removed their name from the water. Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Shell, logos were never seen on tankers again, at least here in the U.S. The incident revealed the pitiful response plan of Exxon which was non-existent. Major changes in safety and response procedures were written. The Exxon Valdez initiated the huge spill of paper work we “enjoy” today. A few years later, the Scandia Incident occurred and our fate was complete with the advent of OPA 90.
that’s true, he was never found to be drunk. if memory serves, the uscg neglected to bring a alcohol test kit on their initial response, so he wasn’t tested for quite a number of hours…funny thing was there was a test kit aboard the ship, but Capt. H didn’t offer that information to the CG…, probably understandable.
Besides everything else the Valdez brought to the industry, as an old guy I can speak to this, is it washed most of the liquor out of the industry, it was way more tolerated back in the day.
That started several years before Exxon Valdez. When they bought the Arco Endeavor in 1984, it was renamed the Syosset. They did change Mobil Meridian to Seminole after EV, but both Syosset and Seminole were names Mobil had used in the 40s and 50s. What they did do after EV was to take their name off the stack. As if that would disguise who owned /operated the ships with the distinctive light blue paint job.
You’re right. Come to think of it the names I was thinking of weren’t even Mobil ships, but vessels sold by Mobil to American Bulk Carriers in the early 80’s.
I do recall seeing the Seminole, in that distinct baby blue paint… kinda hard to hide who she worked for.
As I recall, the Exxon Valdez had the SRP2000 steering system by Sperry. I sailed on several ships with that system. You can control the rate of turn and I heard that the Valdez had it set for a maximum 5 degrees. Also, and most importantly, you inputted the new course, but if you didn’t press the Accept button, then the ship would continue heading on it’s initial course. I suspected then as I do now that there may have been a time lapse before the new course was accepted and if in fact the SRP2000 was set up for only 5 degrees of rudder (mostly used as an ocean setting), that this wasn’t even rudder to bring the ship to the new course quickly enough. The female lookout 3/m also (twice I believe) warned the 2/m of being in Bligh Reefs Red sector which was acknowledged but apparently dismissed. Poor seamanship: not ascertaining that the new course ordered is having it’s desired effect; not checking on positioning based on reported red sector light; and not calling the Captain if in doubt. And if the 2/m wasn’t in doubt, then he should have been. Finally poor seamanship by the Captain for not remaining on the bridge (or at least monitoring) the turn back to the channel from the ice flow. The Captain wasn’t found at fault, BUT he was responsible!! I think things would have worked out better if the lookout was the mate on the watch and the 2/m was acting as lookout. Not to be overlooked, the CG monitored VTS were found to be smoking grass and not monitoring since they had the radar on the wrong scale (I think 6 nm) to monitor the Valdez exiting Bligh Reef which I believe should have been either 12 or 16 nm scale. It was only when their watch was over and the Valdez called them via VHF, that their reliefs switched radar scales that they saw the Valdez hard aground. It’s usual not one mistake that gets you in trouble but a chain of cascading events. In any case, this brought about real change in our industry, and in most cases for the better.
Hm, the ice in the fairway was spotted and the change of course 20° port to avoid the ice took place at 23.39 hrs local time and then the tanker continued on the wrong course for 30 minutes to ran aground miles off the fairway. So somebody forgot to change the course back 20° starboard at 23.41 hrs to continue the trip.
So who was ultimately responsible for the error? Of course the ship owner. But no, poor Master Hazelwood was made a scapegoat, etc, etc. He was drunk!
As I remember all were drunk on all the ships at that time apart from the people on the bridge. What else could you do at sea on your spare time in 1988?
I always enjoy reading comments about this topic. I suggest everyone read the NTSB report. You will better understand the facts and this discussion will be much improved.
Let’s get the personnel right. The female lookout was an AB who had a 3rd mates license. (She was a recent academy graduate.) The Mate on watch at the time was the 3rd Mate who happened to have a 2nd mates license.
I second the recommendation of reading the NTSB report.
It would have been safer to let the third mate navigate alone through Valdez Arm where a pilot, captain and mate are required than letting him pilot the tanker through the gap between the ice field and Bligh Reef.
Of the two, transiting Valdez Arm and maneuvering the tanker between the ice field and Bligh reef, the latter would be more difficult for a third mate given that both require piloting by eye, the Arm is simpler by eye and only a bit more narrow.
I did read the NTSB report albeit many years ago when it first came out. Forgive me for saying that the 3/m (who I know was sailing as an AB) was standing lookout. When does a 3/m ever stand lookout? You need a 2nd lookout? You call the Bosun out or another AB. The fact that she saw & identified Bligh Reef red (hazard) sector, reported it, and that was ignored by the watch standing mate whether he was a 2/m or a 3/m is unimportant, what is important is that he did nothing with the information that she provided. A watch standing mate should be able to listen to the lookout’s report, ascertain it’s value, affix a position, & determine if the ship is in danger or not and either get the ship out of danger or call someone who can! Giving a command to change course and then not monitoring it and not ascertaining whether or not your command is understood, being followed, and having it’s desired effect is really poor seamanship! And negligent!!
This is not correct. The first time the lookout reported Bligh Reef light it was while Busby Island was still forward of the beam, before the planned turn. The second time the lookout reported it was after the third mate had already gave the helm command to change course.
And not only that, but Bligh Reef light had no red sector. It was just a red flashing buoy. CaptJim has been drinking too much Jim B. Please do go back and read the report.
That a third mate would make this mistake is exactly the reason that third mates are not allowed to conn a loaded supertanker at night in restricted waters.
IMO it was not that he left the bridge. Joe left the bridge with the ship steaming into danger, the ship needed to make a turn at a specific time. It is fine to leave the bridge, what is not fine is not checking that the turn was made. If he was at his desk he should have checked that the world was moving outside his window at the appointed time. If it was not moving, it was time to go get a cup of coffee on the bridge and see why not. I place 100% of the blame on Joe, because as Capt of the ship it was his duty to make sure the vessel make that turn. It is fine to challenge junior officers and let them learn and grow. But if you leave the boat standing into danger, it is your job to make sure the turn in made.
The big unanswerable question is if spending the day ashore, and drinking some, effected his judgement, allowed himself to be distracted by paperwork and lose track of time, or the like.
NOTfine. Procedures at that point in the transit were ignored.
See KC’s post # 21 above:
Exxon’s own policy required that either the chief mate or master be on the bridge to assist the watch officer in that area. Also federal regulations required that an officer with federal pilotage be on the bridge which the third mate did not have.
Pilotage required twenty trips, the third mate had only made six.
The tankers Brooklyn and Arco Juneau had both left earlier that day during daylight and the masters had remained on the bridge.
Capt Hazelwood likely could have navigated by eye/radar without a plot but likely the third mate could not so he was taking six minute fixes. Likely didn’t have the cognitive bandwidth to maintain a plot, conn a loaded tanker through the 0.9 mile gap between the ice and Bligh Reef and supervise an inept helmsman.
