Exxon Valdez Grounding

I might quibble with @texastanker about the wording that it was “OK” for the captain to go below, that’s in hindsight of course, stuff like that does happen. I agree on the general point that far worse and more difficult to understand is how the captain while once below apparently lost track of the ship’s perilous situation, it’s a simple matter of taking a quick look out the window.

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Those Moussy’s will do that to you…

Yes obviously. Based on his reported behavior when he was called to the bridge, it’s possible he missed noticing the obvious clues because he had been snoozing.

What’s a moussy?

Hazelwood’s interview with a state trooper the morning after his ship ran aground was played for jurors at his trial today. The trooper, Michael Fox, testified that he found more than 100 empty bottles of a brand of a very low-alcohol brew on the ship after the grounding.

On the tape, Hazelwood described how the accident occurred and was asked by Fox whether he had been drinking.

“Well, I had one of these phony beers, ‘Moussy,’ and I’d been ashore,” the captain said. “I had lunch . . . drank iced tea.”

Fox asked whether Hazelwood had anything to drink before returning to the ship. The skipper said he stopped to pick up pizza for other crew members and later had "a beer with a piece of pizza.

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10 posts were split to a new topic: Uscg - dhc - dod

as a state and fed pilot for a zillon years, I can’t even begin to count how many times the capt has left the bridge, sometimes for hours, while I have the conn, night, day, zero viz., didn’t matter. Captains of all nationalities, including American. I kinda take it as a compliment, but still, they don’t know me or my skills as all. They rely on their mates . Poor guys are drowning in paperwork I guess.

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I would BEG you to go back and read the actual NTSB report, as voluminous as it is. The fact that YOU are a mariner and YOU still don’t know the facts as others have commented here in this thread, underscores the gross misunderstanding of the accident by not only the public, but even within our industry. This accident has been the most exhaustively studied accident in our history.

The VALDEZ accident changed our industry forever with the outcome of OPA90 rules.

After the EL FARO went down with 33 people, what has changed, been modified, or improved in our industry today?

Crickets.

Everyone should ask themselves, ”why?”

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The Pilots were getting off ’early’ because the energy industry wanted them off, convinced the state of Alaska authorities and USCG it would be fine, and who were the pilots to argue against US flagships with US Masters that had their own Pilotage endorsement?

Joe Hazelwood’s ONLY fault was walking off the bridge to send a message to his office during a critical moment in the pilotage waters transit. He was sending a message nobody would bother to read until the next day. If they even cared.

Don’t blame the pilots for not being there at a time & place where authorities agreed and sanctioned them to be gone. Even though it flew in the face of any common sense.

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Wrong on crucial points. Gregory Cousins was the male mate on each. AB on lookout was female . Man on wheel was inexperienced helmsman with galley slave making up the bulk of his experience.

I’m going to disagree here and in particular with the Exxon Valdez scenario. The radar return in Valdez Arm is so recognizable that one can take a good look at the radar and plot a fairly accurate position mentally. What happened there should not have, yet it did. Extreme complacency and carelessness leading to a complete loss of situational awareness.

The problem with that argument is that it’s contrary to foundational ideas about bridge manning. Namely setting watch conditions in accordance to workload and the underpinnings behind the skill/experience requirements of company, state and federal pilotage and mariner licensing.

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The whole idea that a third mate “should” be able to handle a loaded supertanker in restricted waters seems absurd to me. It’s not done because it’s a bad bet. The ship was three minutes from the turn when the captain went below.

As far as the radar picture, the vessel was outside the lanes, off course and the area was clogged with ice. The radar picture would not have been what the mate was used to seeing.

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Lots of shoulds in this case; 3m should have been plotting fixes, 3m and bridge team should have recognized Bligh Reef buoy on the “wrong” side, etc., etc. but the overriding should is the Master should not have left the bridge under those circumstances. Tanker life might be a bit different than it is now.

According to the report the third mate did take a fix when abeam Busby Island. After that according to the third mate he was using radar ranges to monitor the turn.

The captain put Bligh Reef buoy on the stbd side when he made the course change to 180 to go around the ice so the lookout’s report was not new information. The third mate told the NTSB he had identified the buoy on radar. He was fully cognizant that the buoy was on the “wrong side”. The more salient issue was third mate didn’t recognize that the tanker’s rate of turn was not sufficient to clear the reef till too late.

image

If what the third mate told the NTSB was correct he really didn’t do that badly. Better than I would have expected from a third mate especially considering fatigue.

His biggest error was not watching the helsman closer, the other error was not keeping an eye on the heading change. He seemed to be watching the radar exclusivity. That’s a very common error for third mates.

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No mention of the helmsman repeating the heading change either; another “should have” been SOP given the circumstances and close quarters. Perhaps another bit of mandated procedure not followed.

That’s a good point. Another point is that the helmsman was 12x4 and the 3rd mate was 8x12. Maybe never had a bad helmsman before so not expected.

One thing about poor helmsmen is they do not like high rate of turn because it makes it much more difficult to steady up. If you give a helmsman a rudder order, say 10 degrees, as soon as you give them a course to steady up on an incompetent helmsman will immediately take off rudder or even opposite rudder to reduce the ROT to make it easier to steady up. They like to creep up on the new course nice and slow otherwise they can’t steady up.

It looks like that’s what happened in this case but without the third mate giving a heading.

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Details about the Accident

Dock to grounding

The ship was under the direction of pilot Murphy and accompanied by a single tug for the passage through Valdez Narrows, the constricted harbor entrance about 7 miles from the berth. According to Murphy, Hazelwood left the bridge at 9:35 p.m. and did not return until about 11:10 p.m., even though Exxon company policy requires two ship’s officers on the bridge during transit of Valdez Narrows.

The passage through Valdez Narrows proceeded uneventfully. At 10:49 p.m. the ship reported to the Valdez Vessel Traffic Center that it had passed out of the narrows and was increasing speed. At 11:05 p.m. Murphy asked that Hazelwood be called to the bridge in anticipation of his disembarking from the ship, and at 11: 10 p.m. Hazelwood returned. Murphy disembarked at 11:24 p.m., with assistance from Third Mate Cousins. While Cousins was helping Murphy and then helping stow the pilot ladder, Hazelwood was the only officer on the bridge and there was no lookout even though one was required, according to an NTSB report.

At 11:25 p.m. Hazelwood informed the Vessel Traffic Center that the pilot had departed and that he was increasing speed to sea speed. He also reported that “judging, ah, by our radar, we’ll probably divert from the TSS [traffic separation scheme] and end up in the inbound lane if there is no conflicting traffic.” The traffic center indicated concurrence, stating there was no reported traffic in the inbound lane.

The traffic separation scheme is designed to do just that - separate incoming and outgoing tankers in Prince William Sound and keep them in clear, deep waters during their transit. It consists of inbound and outbound lanes, with a half-mile-wide separation zone between them. Small icebergs from nearby Columbia Glacier occasionally enter the traffic lanes. Captains had the choice of slowing down to push through them safely or deviating from their lanes if traffic permitted. Hazelwood’s report, and the Valdez traffic center’s concurrence, meant the ship would change course to leave the western, outbound lane, cross the separation zone and, if necessary, enter the eastern, inbound lane to avoid floating ice. At no time did the Exxon Valdez report or seek permission to depart farther east from the inbound traffic lane; but that is exactly what it did.

At 11:30 p.m. Hazelwood informed the Valdez traffic center that he was turning the ship toward the east on a heading of 200 degrees and reducing speed to “wind my way through the ice” (engine logs, however, show the vessel’s speed continued to increase). At 11: 39 Cousins plotted a fix that showed the ship in the middle of the traffic separation scheme. Hazelwood ordered a further course change to a heading of 180 degrees (due south) and, according to the helmsman, directed that the ship be placed on autopilot. The second course change was not reported to the Valdez traffic center. For a total of 19 or 20 minutes the ship sailed south - through the inbound traffic lane, then across its easterly boundary and on toward its peril at Bligh Reef. Traveling at approximately 12 knots, the Exxon Valdez crossed the traffic lanes’ easterly boundary at 11:47 p.m.

At 11:52 p.m. the command was given to place the ship’s engine on “load program up”-a computer program that, over a span of 43 minutes, would increase engine speed from 55 RPM to sea speed full ahead at 78.7 RPM. After conferring with Cousins about where and how to return the ship to its designated traffic lane, Hazelwood left the bridge. The time, according to NTSB testimony, was approximately 11:53 p.m.

…cut out a section about fatigue

Accounts and interpretations differ as to events on the bridge from the time Hazelwood left his post to the moment the Exxon Valdez struck Bligh Reef. NTSB testimony by crew members and interpretations of evidence by the State of Alaska conflict in key areas, leaving the precise timing of events still a mystery. But the rough outlines are discernible:

Some time during the critical period before the grounding during the first few minutes of Good Friday, March 24, Cousins plotted a fix indicating it was time to turn the vessel back toward the traffic lanes. About the same time, lookout Maureen Jones reported that Bligh Reef light appeared broad off the starboard bow - i.e., off the bow at an angle of about 45 degrees. The light should have been seen off the port side (the left side of a ship, facing forward); its position off the starboard side indicated great peril for a supertanker that was out of its lanes and accelerating through close waters. Cousins gave right rudder commands to cause the desired course change and took the ship off autopilot. He also phoned Hazelwood in his cabin to inform him the ship was turning back toward the traffic lanes and that, in the process, it would be getting into ice. When the vessel did not turn swiftly enough, Cousins ordered further right rudder with increasing urgency. Finally, realizing the ship was in serious trouble, Cousins phoned Hazelwood again to report the danger - and at the end of the conversation, felt an initial shock to the vessel. The grounding, described by helmsman Robert Kagan as “a bumpy ride” and by Cousins as six “very sharp jolts,” occurred at 12:04 a.m.

Not necessarilyy a bad thing depending on the circumstances. To maintain a steady course on unreps or open water surveying, a novice would look at the helm movements and be torally confused. A good helmsman can anticipate the effects of the next swell or wave.

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There are two basic ways of giving the helmsman steering orders to make turns. One is to give rudder commands, for example “starboard ten” In this case the helmsman has no discretion with regards to rudder amount.

The second is to give courses, “Come right, steady on course xxx” In this method the amount of rudder used is left up to the helmsman.

In the case of the Exxon Valdez grounding the third mate claims that the helmsman was given the order "starboard ten’ but according to the report the helmsman did not maintain 10 degrees rudder, instead the helmsman reduced or put on counter rudder on his own.

Because the Kagen was known to be an incompetent helmsman it’s possible the reason he reduced rudder on his own contrary to his orders is that he was concerned that a high rate of turn on the loaded supertanker would make it too difficult to steady up on the new course. Behavior I have observed in other inept helmsman.

Nothing to do with wind, waves, surveying or unrep.

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