El Faro - What was the Captain Thinking is the Wrong Question

Professional Mariner Forum
141

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;196124]In this case the right move was Old Bahama Channel, giving the company the resultant ETA. The wrong move (without hindsight) is the direct route with an inaccurate ETA and then having to back-track.

Captain has two choices, tell the company he can’t read a weather map and go around, losing time and blowing his ETA or take a gamble with a TC.

That’s the pressure, to make the right move, every time.[/QUOTE]

And if he had gone via the Old Bahama Channel, it was likely that he would have made it to SJ, albeit late. . . been admonished and possibly disciplined for his actions and no one would know that he was responsible for saving all of those lives. . .

142

[QUOTE=cmakin;196128]And if he had gone via the Old Bahama Channel, it was likely that he would have made it to SJ, albeit late. . . been admonished and possibly disciplined for his actions and no one would know that he was responsible for saving all of those lives. . .[/QUOTE]

Maybe, what we don’t know is how sophisticated TOTE was on this. There is still a lot of space between not understanding the ships are taking too much risk and not recognizing risk at all.

My own view, FWIW, is that likely TOTE understood a TC might impact the schedule and would be OK with a justifiable diversion. They may not be sophisticated enough to understand uncertainly in the forecast.

143

[QUOTE=captjacksparrow;196116]Bus drivers, indeed.[/QUOTE]

To be clear I was referring to responsibilities and limits to authority, not to skill sets. A ship captain on the JAX/SJU run has route/schedule restraints more comparable to a bus driver than to a 19th century sailing warship master.

Of course it should go without saying a ship captain is responsible for the safety of ship, cargo and crew. But likewise the bus driver has similar responsibilities as well.

144

Thanks KC for your persistence and analogies; I am just beginning to see where you’re coming from. But I still find it hard to believe that your industry is so messed up that a ship could find itself where El Faro ended up, given the communications equipment on board, and therefore aware of what the weather was doing.
One question: I have heard it said that many fleets are basically run from shore based control centers, which inform Captains what route to take (based on fuel costs, piracy alerts etc.). Does this only apply to long haul shipping companies? Would Tote have operated any vessels this way? Because this assumes comprehensive monitoring of a vessel’s movements, and various factors that might change and impact a vessel’s optimum route. Surely weather would be one of these factors? I find it incredible that given the weather situation as it was when the ship sailed that no one would have had any responsibility for monitoring the ship’s progress relative to the storm. But this apparently is what we are to believe.
One other observation: the idea that the Old Bahama Channel would have been safe is only valid with the benefit of hindsight: if the storm had defied the forecasts for longer than it did, and continued further SW, that Channel too could have become a dangerous place to be. So the same decision to back track might have been required even if they had started heading down that course earlier on. Your suggestion that a requirement to reassess & consult should be implemented somehow if certain weather criteria were met (the 34kt wind field for example) could have helped prevent an accident in such a case too.

145

^ Mat - My guess is that TOTE is strong on the accounting side and weak on the operation side. Depended on the captains for ops expertise.

  • I don’t doubt for a second that TOTE was not paying attention. This is a holdover from back in the day when captains had far more authority then today. This authority has been eroded by technology, email and so forth.

  • How it’s done where I work depends on who I’m working for. Most often under charter I have a routing program where the route and weather can be seen by the PIC in the office and by the weather routers. I can enter a proposed route and all three of us, me, the person-in-charge and the wx routhers can review it.

When working for a smaller outfit it’s much more primitive. I can see more risk at times but it’s tough to explain to the spreadsheet boys.

As far as the [I]El Faro[/I], any number of ways to look at it.

First, the Plan: I suspect the captain’s plan was to go the direct route and responded to each worsening forecast by moving the track-line further away till he ran out of room and then just take whatever wx got thown their way. Didn’t want to move off that plan. But it’s a bad plan.

Second, monitoring the plan; evidently he never told anyone his plan, just had the waypoints moved. Saying they were going to pass 60 miles south of the TC is not a plan but a description of the expected results of the plan. How can the mates tell if the plan is still valid if they don’t know what the plan is?

  • It’s almost impossible to sort this out, hindsight bias seems unavoidable. The 1-2-3 / 34 kts rule is a bit crude but it could be used to bump things up to the next level.

The captin’s plan also seemed to be to be on the bridge to monitor but for unknown reasons he didn’t come up till about 0400. Fragile plan, night orders are critical. Everything should have been laid out. That’s how I do it but only after getting bit too many times.

146

Here is a description (written for non-mariners) of how Carnival follows the 102 cruise ships.
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=140690&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2253456
It is a still ongoing process, started after the Costa Concordia disaster.

Captains of cruise ships are even more “bus drivers”. Their “freight” does not just sit in the holds and wait. The passengers are upset, when a promised marvelous stopover is cancelled, and they will ask for compensations.

On shore, they see the difficulties with the rare slots to dock their delayed mega-ships, reserved more than a year ago.
And they see the possible injuries (or worse) of passengers in bad weather. What may be acceptable bad weather for freighters may be inacceptable for cruise ships. The passengers are not mariners and the ship’s interior is not designed for moving around in rough seas.
Injured passengers will ask for very big compensations.

147

If you look at the command structure in the wheelhouse

  • The AB lookout/helsman is supervised by the watch officer. The watch officer is right there in the wheelhouse and can observe if commands and instructions are carried out.

  • Next the watch officer is supervised by the captain. Sometimes directly but more often with written and verbal instructions and by such things as track-lines.

  • Finally there is the captain who represents the owner’s intrests aboard ship.

Back in the day the owner would give the captain general instructions and might not communicate with the captain again until the end of the voyage. This situation has gradualy changed over the years and today owners are in more or less constant communication with the captain. Because of the realities of modern communicatons the relationship between owner and captain is now less old-time owner/captain and much more like captain/watch officer.

But the traditional way of thinking still holds as does the legal structure. The issue is that shore-side now has the real power to direct the ship and are eager to use that power to its limits but are understandably very reluctant to accept any additional responsibility.

This is why shore-side can indirectly “cause” the ship to take on high risk but not feel that they have to monitor the ship when it’s at sea.

148

The comparison of the Master of a ship with Bus drivers keeps on occurring here.
In Singapore Bus drivers had held the title of Bus Captains for many years now:

P1080028.jpg768×1024

149

[QUOTE=ombugge;196193]The comparison of the Master of a ship with Bus drivers keeps on occurring here[/QUOTE]

The comparison was meant to convey a specific idea.

When I worked on the Aleutian Freighters the only comms were VHF and HF/MF radios. We didn’t need linehandlers, pilots or tugs. We picked our own routes, entered and left port on our time and stayed alongside if we wanted.

We once anchored off St Petersburg Alaska on the way to the Aleutians to watch the Super Bowl. - [U]We were Uber drivers[/U]

At the other end of the spectrum is a ferry captain. His schedule and route are both fixed ashore. [U]They are bus drivers.[/U]

Today I have some control over my route, no control over schedule- [U] I’m a taxi driver.[/U]

150

There are two seemingly separate things that have been confusing to me but they may be one.

For one the plan did not use adequate margins. The second is that the monitoring of the plan was so poor that not only was there a failure to adjust for the changing forecast but that failure was so severe it was not even recognized that the TC had crossed in front of the ship.

The close margin and the failure to monitor can both be explained if the captain purposely disabled the monitoring process. A example of this is disabling a tank level alarm set for 85% so it can be filled to 90% and then over-filling it.

This was true on the Bounty. The captain was said to hold a “capstan meeting” to disscuss with the crew pior to an operation. On the final voyage he did not, instead he said anyone that wanted to get off could. The normal process to control and monitor risk was disabled.

151

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;196216]There are two seemingly separate things that have been confusing to me but they may be one.

For one the plan did not use adequate margins. The second is that the monitoring of the plan was so poor that not only was there a failure to adjust for the changing forecast but that failure was so severe it was not even recognized that the TC had crossed in front of the ship.

The close margin and the failure to monitor can both be explained if the captain purposely disabled the monitoring process. A example of this is disabling a tank level alarm set for 85% so it can be filled to 90% and then over-filling it.

This was true on the Bounty. The captain was said to hold a “capstan meeting” to disscuss with the crew pior to an operation. On the final voyage he did not, instead he said anyone that wanted to get off could. The normal process to control and monitor risk was disabled.[/QUOTE]

All explained by the Captain minimizing the possible risks associated with the hurricane and likely effect.

The Captain made a fatal decision at or around 1400-1430 the day before the encounter with the center. Even with the discrepancies between the BVS and INMARSAT C tracks, the master set a rendezvous with the center of an unpredictable and by his statements ‘erratic’ storm track. The only common feature joining all these disparate elements is minimizing the likely storm effects. A lax monitoring plan is a symptom of the same.

you use the tank alarm metaphor. That’s a fine one but I favor the metaphor of a low lube oil pressure safety system on the turbine. Oil pressure is the parameter to be monitored so there is a gauge. There’s an alarm to signal evaluation and possible intervention, maybe also a low low alarm to show more extreme condition and finally safety shutdown, automatic intervention to prevent damage. The master should have set practical barriers like these settings, where risks turn from green to yellow to red as it were. He had an alarm setting, did make adjustments to course, but He established no shutdown setting. This would be set ideally on a turbine to shutdown with no (or minimal) damage. In making voyage plan, he should have set a ‘shutdown’ that could be implemented before too late. He didn’t. Since he didn’t it was also a consequence that the parameter was not monitored (well). No reason if the parameter wasn’t going to change anything. He didn’t set one due to lack of regard for the negative consequences generally.

152

I agree that there was disregard for the power and uncertainty of a tropical system.

Prior to 01/0400 I don’t think the captain intended to enter the dangerous semi-circle. Not so much to avoid the higher wind speeds (system was moving 4 kts so would have been about 8 kts more wind) but to keep winds aft.

There seemed to be a disregard for wind speeds or distance to center but nowhere in the transcript do I see where they expected to enter the dangerous semi-circle. The seemed to expect to have favorable winds.

The second mate says at some point she thinks the winds may be coming around to the west.

153

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;196219]I agree that there was disregard for the power and uncertainty of a tropical system.

Prior to 01/0400 I don’t think the captain intended to enter the dangerous semi-circle. Not so much to avoid the higher wind speeds (system was moving 4 kts so would have been about 8 kts more wind) but to keep winds aft.

There seemed to be a disregard for wind speeds or distance to center but nowhere in the transcript do I see where they expected to enter the dangerous semi-circle. The seemed to expect to have favorable winds.

The second mate says at some point she thinks the winds may be coming around to the west.[/QUOTE]
I look at the 1400-1430 plot and track and I see someone planning a meeting situation, with the navigable semicircle and a close CPA. His bias was that a northerly and afterward quicker movement to storm was ‘due’. He also was probably putting faith in significant wave height forecasts more than wind and evaluating ship ride over anything else.

154

[QUOTE=Jamesbrown;196220]I look at the 1400-1430 plot and track and I see someone planning a meeting situation, with the navigable semicircle and a close CPA. His bias was that a northerly and afterward quicker movement to storm was ‘due’. He also was probably putting faith in significant wave height forecasts more than wind and evaluating ship ride over anything else.[/QUOTE]

Yes, seems that way to me as well. Not much point in focusing on BRM/BTM here. The crew was not in position to correct this type of situaton. Needs some kind of shore-side controls.

155

This is at the end of the C/M 16-20 watch on the 30th. - the waypoints have been adjusted to give more distance from the TC.

Changing the ETA at the pilot station from 0600 to 0800 means no 0800 cargo start time - Cargo work is typically by shift, so they are no longer trying for that. 0600 pilot means 0800 cargo start. A 0800 pilot means the first shift has been missed. Not sure if this is true in this case but it does seem to indicate the captain is not obsessed with a schedule.

CM
19:27:40.yeah. yeah we’d have to do twenty-one knots to make that. that six o’clock.

CAPT
19:27:45.4 that’s (why/where) I sent them eight.

  • Here the C/M and Capt discuss back-up plans

CAPT
19:28:32.6see there’s all sorts of t– you don’t necessarily have to go down the Old
Bahama Channel. there’s lots of places to duck in to.

CM
19:28:38.6 sure.

CM
19:28:39.3 so yeah I was even– I was gunna say may– maybe if we had to we
(should/could) go Crooked Island (passage/passed it) * * * (Long)
Island * * there’s a lot of time…

CAPT
19:28:47.8 if (this/it) doesn’t work out we can use San Salvador as the uh– a lee.

CM
19:28:51.9 mhmm.

Here the C/M and Capt seem to be looking at the BVS - wx program, plan to say outside the 5/4 meter wave contour.

CM
19:29:10.2 so I mean that) this this wave height line.

CAPT
19:29:14.3 mhmm.

CM
19:29:15.2 that’s for us.

CAPT
19:29:15.9 that’s gunna change from five meters to four meters.

CM 19:29:21.2 I mean that’s good though.

CAPT
19:29:22.2 we’re adjust(ing) accordingl

156

[QUOTE=Jamesbrown;196220] He also was probably putting faith in significant wave height forecasts more than wind and evaluating ship ride over anything else.[/QUOTE]

Wave height is typically the primary parameter used by weather routers for mid-latitude cyclones, second being wind speed. I’ve never seen guidance with specific wave height limits as it would depend on the ship, cargo, route and so forth. Normally in a mid-latitude system ship survival would not be at risk if wave height margins were violated as the ship would adjust course and/or speed.

Tropical cyclones on the other hand are of fundamentally different nature than mid-latitude systems as you know. The amount danger a vessel faces can be directly related to the wind fields.

Unlike the mid-latitude systems there is specific guidance for tropical systems. It comes with caveats of course but avoiding the 34 knot wind field is the standard for mariner training.

The captain may have been using his experience with mid-latitude systems which would be misleading. The company should be required to provide guidance and should closely monitor masters to ensure that the guidance was followed.

157

On monitoring weather in the office -
Here the witness is the DPA. Over and over in his testimony this guy uses the word “awareness”. “We just do that for you know, awareness”. He speaks of it as if awareness is the end point, the ends not the means to safer operations. As if there I sent my email, all are aware, tick off that box. No critical thinking involved or real decision making. With regard to the actual capability of in the office tools he seems only vaguely aware of what is available but that it is different on different ships. Weather awareness does not seem controlled by a procedure for office staff.

Mr. Fawcett:
So from a safety perspective, does anybody in the company have a specific task with monitoring tropical weather?

WIT:
No, sir.

Mr. Fawcett:
As part of the audits, have you ever assessed the vessel specific heavy weather plans for any Tote vessels?

WIT:
Not that I can recall.

CDR Odom:
Earlier one of your Captain’s testified that he considered weather a risk to the vessel. One of – in your Exhibit 6, page 18, it states that one of your jobs is to identify risk to personnel, the environment and to ships and recommend corrective action to senior management when necessary. Have you identified weather as a specific risk to the vessels?

WIT:
Not outside of it being listed within our manuals as instructions, but there’s been no separate specific risk assessment done on that that I’m aware of.

CDR Odom:
Can you walk us through, from the
company side, if a hurricane becomes an issue, what is the company required to do to
support the vessel if it’s at sea or if it’s getting ready to get underway and a hurricane
– is there any specific actions on the shore side that the company does?

WIT:
Only if the vessel requests it. It’s the vessel’s – the Master’s responsibility for preparing for a storm and for getting – doing his voyage planning. I mean again as we said, you know the overriding authority to deal with anything, you know, we don’t tell the Masters what to do. However, you know if they ask for our support we have quite a large experienced team in the office that would be – definitely be able to assist them with whatever information he would need.

CDR Odom:
So there’s no type of increased profile within the company structure that you go to, to track a storm or to track the vessel while they’re on the voyage or anything like that shore side?

WIT:
Case by case we may do so. Again more for the awareness within the various operating departments of the office. And again in case support is needed or if we, you know, know that the vessel may be, again having to change her stay in port or she may be needing some type of assistance, recommendations or assistance from us in the office, again really just on a support mode and just our own awareness obviously. It’s our vessel and we’re operating the vessels and you know we want to be aware of
what’s happening out there as well.

Mr. Kucharski:
Just to be clear, I think the question was asked about if anyone while the ship was in a storm or approaching bad weather if anyone plotted positions or looked at the position of the storm relative to the ship. Did anybody do that?

WIT:
I don’t recall plotting positions, but we typically would, and this is a case by case, I should reword that, look at weather online in
the office and at times we would print that out and post it. And actually Patty Finsterbusch would do that for me and post it next to the Director of Ship Management’s area just so they could see updates on it.

Mr. Kucharski:
And was the storm plotted against the position of the ship just to see relatively how they were doing?

WIT:
Not necessarily. You know we know the position at times based on their noon position. Some of our fleet, the American roll-on roll-off, we have a different weather routing system. So you can go online, you can see how where these ships are and you can actually see where the storms are and there as well so. There’s different tools that
we have and various tools I should say we
have. But those are the tools we have available to us and obviously we can look at it if we so desire.

The more I read the testimony the more I suspect the SMS was not a very mature or effective system. Discussions of audits, evaluations, tracking issues seem fairly disorganized. More than one witness claims communication was good because the office was arranged with an open floor plan.

158

Here is another sequence. They are discussing email sent to El Faro at time of Erika. It shows the office recognizing the hazard of weather and even requests feedback…”please send me”.

Mr. Fawcett:
Okay. In there in the second line you said, however, to ensure we are all on same page and nothing is missed in the risk assessment and action area, please send me a detailed email
with your preparedness/avoidance plans and update daily until all clear.

WIT:
Yes.

Mr. Fawcett:
And what caused you to send that message?

WIT:
I’m not 100 percent sure as far as my recollection of at the time of sending this. I
do remember sending it. But to me it was more of a communication with the vessel just
to let them know I’m here for support as well. I think there’s some other communications with the owners and with other people in the office. And I knowing of Erika out there I felt that I hadn’t been fully apprised of the situation at this time there, so I vaguely remember that’s the reason I sent it to the Captain.

Mr. Fawcett:
And so the line about risk assessment.
What does that specifically relate to?

WIT:
As I said before, risk assessment to me is about a voyage planning. So I – as a – just a general reminder and a communication to the Captain just letting him know more of an awareness situation and my support, just tell him that this is the, obviously the type of things that you know keep communications with us of anything you may change or anything you may do in voyage planning due to this storm.

Then at the time of last voyage. He can’t fathom why the Captain is writing to him about changing the route. Here and elsewhere he discounts the idea that the Captain was reaching out for actual permission or even feedback.

Mr. Fawcett:
So on September 30th, Captain Davidson sent you an email talking about a request to take, well it wasn’t a request, but he told you that he was going to take, you know the ship’s condition and then he had a question about a return route. Do you recall that message?

WIT:
Yes, sir.

Mr. Fawcett:
Why didn’t you respond to that message?

WIT:
I didn’t respond because I received that
while I was traveling, I was at that National Safety Council meeting. Going back
to the time I think it was sent late morning. And I don’t recall if I read it during the meeting or in route at the airport. But the main reason I didn’t answer because I was surprised he was asking permission, to me, to take a different route on the way back on the return trip. And so I saw no reason to answer at that time because we still
a couple more days before he would even be starting that route. And I, again see I was traveling I felt I wanted to take a closer look at this before immediately answering it and I was going to wait until I got home and then further – and when I got home I saw that Jim Fisker-Andersen, the Director of Ship Management had already answered him. So then I didn’t follow up any further.

Mr Fawcett suggests maybe he is sending this message about Joaquin because in the past the office has asked for feedback on their plans - to wit the Erika message mentioned above.

Mr. Fawcett:
That’s correct. Was he sending that to you directly because he had been told to keep you advised of your preparedness avoidance plans and update daily?

WIT:
Well I mean he sent this to me because
I asked him to keep me updated after – at the point of this email. Just for the same reasons we stated before.

CAPT Neubauer:
Mr. Fawcett can you read the email that was sent from Captain Davidson?

The witness seems confused by relating the earlier message contents to the captain sending a message about Joaquin. So having been asked Mr Fawcett reads the complete email and he says:

Mr. Fawcett:
Okay. So the topic areas are he got the latest weather file, and I’m paraphrasing it for the sake of remedy (sic). He has his position, the position of the storm as reported through the different weather sources and he says, I’ve monitored Hurricane Joaquin tracking erratically for the better part of a week. Sometime after 0930 – 0200 she began her Southwesterly track,
that’s abbreviated. Early this morning I adjusted our direct route in a more South, Southeasterly direction towards San Juan, Puerto Rico which would put us 65 plus or minus nautical miles South of the eye. Joaquin appears to be tracking now as forecasted and I anticipate us being on the back side of her by 10/01/0800. Present conditions are favorable and we’re making good speed. All departments have been duly notified as before. I have indicated a later than normal
arrival time in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Anticipating some loss of speed throughout the night period. I will update the ETA tomorrow morning during our regular pre-arrival report to SJP, etc. Question, and it’s asterisks on both side. I would like to transit the Old Bahama Channel on our return North bound leg to Jacksonville, Florida. This route adds an additional 160, abbreviation for nautical miles to the route for a total of 1261 abbreviated nautical miles. We will need to make around
21 knots for our scheduled 10/05/1045 arrival time at Jacksonville pilot station. This precaution will take the uncertainty of Joaquin’s forecasted track and as you can see she really develops into a formidable weather pattern on 10/03-05/15. I’m confident that Joaquin will track in a Northerly direction once reaching the Gulf Stream current. I will await your reply before
transiting Old Bahama Channel on our return leg to Jacksonville, Florida. Should you have any questions or concerns kindly contact this vessel. Best regards. Do you recall that message?

The captain seems perfectly able to make decisions and inform the office. What doesn’t seem so clear is what does the office do with their “awareness” of his intent? I don’t have a warm fuzzy feeling about the state of the resource management going on that bridge but having had the engine version of that training I know I too have a long way to go to create the ideal work place. But what role does the office, should the office have in this? No inquisitiveness about what they received? No comparison of his analysis with what they could see in the office? Possibly saying “hey Cap I see you are using some old forecasts there” or “we would like you to provide even more margin with the storm”. The El Faro seems caught between the old way of doing things and the new way, not having weather routing even when it was identified by Tote themselves as having value (see the testimony about the west coast ship with the shaft damage).

After reading more of the testimony and interviews, if the board does not seriously question Tote’s actual performance within their own SMS I would be shocked but that would implicate the external auditor as well so we shall see if the ISM regulatins and the SMS will actually live up to the continuous improvement aspect of the theory.

The testimony about dangling that position on the new vessel in front of him then jerking it back does seem like it could possibly have effected the background against which all future decisions he was making took place. It does not sound like that decision was communicated in a way to retain his loyalty or in a way to provide clear understanding of how it was reached. They actually used terms like “we decided to go a different way”. Passive, weasel words.

159

^Good find KPC.

The question came up before, why the difference in response between Erika and Joaquin.

This graphic shows why there high awareness of Erika. It was going to impact both SJU and JAX. - The warning light was lit.

800px-Tropical_Storm_Erika_2015_forecast_advisory_14.GIF800×640

Like you said, not a mature system. It can solve problems that enter their domain of awareness but no process in place for checking if there are problems they are not aware of.

160

This is from the hearing

Mr. Morrell, - his title is Vice President Marine Operations, commercial.

He states that his primary focus is Vessel maintenance.

Mr. Fawcett: Do you have any experience with what I would classify as Deck
2 Operations? And when I talk about Deck Operations I’m talking about voyage planning,
3 anchoring procedures, shipboard maneuvering or any of those similar areas that are
4 Deck Operations?

5 WIT: No.

6 Mr. Fawcett: Have you, for your present position, have you had any specialized
7 training directly related to the position as Vice President of Operations for what you
8 normally do?

9 WIT: I don’t quite understand the question.

10 Mr. Fawcett: Well the title, your position is operations. So have you had any
11 specialized training, I know you have a background with shipbuilding, ship construction,
12 ship repair, anything related to, for example oversight of marine operations?

13 WIT: No.

Mr. Fawcett: So when it comes to ships such as the El Faro, the Tote Maritime Puerto
16 Rico, how does it – how does it dictate the movement of the ship and the operations of
17 that vessel?

18 WIT: Well the Master is in charge of the voyage plan and voyage preparation. Tote
19 Maritime Puerto Rico provides or establishes like an itinerary of schedule for the vessel
20 when they arrive in Jacksonville and when they’re to arrive in San Juan and that
21 program.

WIT: The operations is a broad term. No I would not say direct, I mean, primarily
2 maintenance and repair and regulatory compliance to make sure we’re in compliance
3 with our ABS surveys, our Coast Guard inspections, in that area of the operations.

4 Mr. Kucharski: So then who would, in your organization handle the operations of the
5 vessel outside of these areas?

6 WIT: Well we have, if you look in our chart we have, we have this HR crewing matters
7 and there’s ISM safety matters. And as whole that would be operations, technical
8 operations. So I would break it into different buckets depending on the area of what the
9 subject matter would be. If it’s crewing it would be going to the HR department. If it’s
10 ISM and safety it would go to the safety ISM, safety and operations.

11 Mr. Kucharski: So then what would be your interpretation of marine operations
12 specifically?

13 WIT: I would say, you know, the requisitioning of spare parts, again, making sure the
14 Port Engineers are attentive to the needs of the ship and the requirements of the Chief
15 Engineer and the Captain and the Mate, on maintenance items. We do our surveys,
16 we’re scheduled – we have our – make sure that we are scheduled, how are dry
17 docking is properly scheduled in advance. We prepare the required budgets and capital
18 expenditures for improvements. In that focus.

Mr. Fawcett: And I think that Mr. Kucharski was asking a line of questions about your
10 title having the operations designation in it, and who would be the nautical, the person
11 that has oversight within the company for nautical operations?

12 WIT: Well if they are nautical related questions, in our program and the way it’s laid out
13 in our ISM book, is that they should go up through John, Captain Lawrence if there are
14 nautical related questions.

15 Mr. Fawcett: Okay. But not for questions, just for routine day to day operations. Not
16 like when a question arises, but to assure that the nautical operations are being carried
17 out the way you expect them to be. Who has the oversight for that function?

18 WIT: Are you referring to like nautical department deck maintenance, or?

19 Mr. Fawcett: Anything related to the operation such as voyage planning, anchoring,
20 maneuvering, pilot Master exchanges, the route ships are taking at sea?

21 WIT: Well in our – that’s managed on board by the Captain. And from those area like
22 voyage planning, anchoring, the detail that’s all managed on board by the Captain. He
23 has total responsibility for all of that work. We have a requirement that if there’s a change of course or a different course than normally taken the Master needs to notify
2 the office and that’s in accordance with our ISM. And that’s just to advise our
3 customers that, or Tote Maritime Puerto Rico that the vessel had a taken a different
4 voyage which add some time And usually the Master’s doing this for weather
5 avoidance or for a safer ride. So the expected on time arrival would be not probably
6 what is posted so they could reschedule tugs and pilots and stevedores.

Mr. Fawcett: So for the El Faro and the El Yunque, what are the Tote expectations as
21 to how those ships are operated by the Master?

WIT: Well the safety is first, that’s our first top line goal in our organization. And it’s
23 also our requirement in our ISM guide the Master is responsible for the safety of the
1 vessel and the crew. And he has the ultimate responsibility for voyage planning. So
2 that’s our – that’s the beginning, he sets the voyage, he sets the plan.

3 Mr. Fawcett: Is that all of your expectations?

4 WIT: I don’t know, I’m sure there are others, but I’m just trying to understand the full
5 question that you’re ----