Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

Offshore
821

I have gone to the oildrum website & confirmed this story myself. When it first broke a couple of days ago their was a lot of drama attached which led me to believe it was not true. The confirmation of this news now removes any doubt that could have been left in my mind that BP was absolutely, undeniably beyond any shadow of a doubt guilty of gross neglegance leading to the disaster which occured on the eveing of 4/20/10. They had a substandard cement design which had to have been made or at least approved by their engineers. They had a wireline crew ON BOARD that they chose not to use to determine the strength of the cement bond & the undermining of it by nitrogen gas bubbles at extremely high temperatures. They had evidently approved or excused the jerryrigging of BOP tests that could not have occured without their knowledge as they had represintatives on baord the rig during this time. They disregarded the warning signs of failed negative hydrostatic tests against the casing hanger seals & cement job. They had to have lied to the MMS about those test results & sought approval for premature removal of the 14.3 PPG mud which they displaced with 8.7 PPG seawater causing the well to become underbalanced & allow for the migration of gas bubbles to destroy whatever strength the cement held & allowing oil to destroy the ability of the cement to cling to the casing & shale walls. They evidently continued to order the continued pumping of displacement fluid even though gauge pressures indicated they were already recieving a kick & had removed some if not all of the killweight mud from the rig which is required by indusrty standards & to be self enforced by MMS regulation.
Anyone that is still a BP apologist after these damning pieces of evidence have been brought forth is not worthy to hold a job in this industry & should seek employment at a bologna sandwich factory, because you have decieved yourself beyond the point of being helped. BP executives, engineers, drilling supervisors on sight & in their chain of command that had any thing to do with anyone of these actions should be brought up on charges of neglegent homicide & multiple counts of neglegant destruction to private, state, & federal property & have to answer for these indefensible decisions. Unless people like this are held accountible we can expect that no matter how many laws, techniques, safety devices, & standards are implemented, this stands an all to good chance of happening again.
As I have said before, I work here. I LIVE HERE. This is my home. I adhere to the recommended practices as set forth by the API & adhere to MMS requirements & do not appreciate the black eye all of us in this industry are recieving over this disaster caused by BP’s systematic lack of respect for the citizens of the gulf coast, colleagues in this industry, the recommended practices of the american petroleum institute, & the laws of the government of the United States. [QUOTE=peakoilerrrr;33170]KABOOM ! [B]Schlumberger confirmed they were there[/B] to do CBL and left hours before DH exploded.

Reuters: Schlumberger says its crew left Horizon day of fireSAN FRANCISCO, May 19 (Reuters) - Schlumberger Ltd (SLB.N), the world’s largest oilfield services company, said on Wednesday it had a crew on the Deepwater Horizon that departed only hours before the explosion and fire that engulfed the rig.The company, which had not previously revealed its work on the Horizon, said in an emailed statement that it performed wireline services for BP Plc (BP.L) on the rig in March and April, completing the last services on April 15 and leaving a crew on standby in case any more were needed.

“On the morning of April 20, 2010, BP notified the Schlumberger crew that it could return to its home base in Louisiana,” Schlumberger said in a statement, which a spokesman for the company confirmed by phone.The crew departed the rig at about 11:00 a.m. on April 20 on one of BP’s regularly scheduled helicopter flights, Schlumberger said. The explosion occurred at about 10:00 p.m. that night, and the rig sank two days later, which led to a massive oil spill off the Gulf Coast. [ID:nN19188461] (Reporting by Braden Reddall, editing by Bernard Orr)

[This story was developed from 2 posters at theoildrum.com as follows:]http://www.thomhartmann.com/forum/2010/05/smoking-gun-bps-deep-horizon-messI expect this to lead to a few days of breaking news. The truth is most welcome.Here’s how story developed from 2 key persons at theoildrum.com asking that rumors be investigated and, if not clearly denied, pursued.

http://www.thomhartmann.com/forum/2010/05/smoking-gun-bps-deep-horizon-mess[/QUOTE]

822

[QUOTE=geodude;33197]I’d hazard to guess that this other company which you claim performed a top kill in a week was not in 5000 feet of water, with a badly damaged BOP, and risking making a bad situation worse by unleashing unrestricted flow from the wellhead where a bent riser was thankfully restricting the flow…[/QUOTE]
You are right. they were in 1500’ of water with a subsea stack. the rig up & operation are basically the same. The difference is they still had more control of the well because of well seal at the surface. That however does not mean if BP hadn’t screwed around for so long, they could not have pumped or could not still pump this job by overcoming flow rate & forcing the hydrocarbons back from whence they came. The thought that they have waited this long to take the necessary steps to hook up flow lines & repair or hot tap damaged valves that may be on the stack & have boats loaded & on location to perform this task at the earliest possibe moment is just one more sign of their having been neglegant without regard to the consequences of their actions.
I am sick of people saying they could make things worse. Read my previous post & point out to me how things could possibly get worse. One thing is for sure. While they continue to sit around & waste effort to contain & recover that could be put into killing the well, things are certainly getting worse.
Can you explain how they are restricting flow now. I can explain how gas under the pressure that well is flowing under will continue to cut through the stack like a knife & probably already has & that’s why there is so much controversy about the difference in flow rates from day to day. BTW, I saw the flare video today & once again there is no F>>>ing way there is anywhere close to 13 MMCFD coming out of that thing. a million & a half at the most.

823

Company man 1,

You have some strong opinions. I am not familiar with the MMS rules in GOM ( I work in North Sea). Could you tell me, with link if possible what rules they have violated in the well design and during operation ?

824

You can google mines & minerals service or go to www.mms.gov/& check. To check API Recommended practices which the MMS has adopted as their standard guidelines for compliance you need to go check out their sight. I get all my materials & manuals concerning my operations from my local MMS office.

825

[QUOTE=Oil_and_Gas_person;33180]I don’t mean to make enemies, but…
I find it unbelievable that anyone would think that BP wants to let this oil flow and that doing so could somehow be “profitable” for them.
I also find the arm-chair quarterback talk to be pathetic; as if BP (and all those assisting) are nothing but morons.[/QUOTE]

For a the CEO of BP to come out and say that the size of the spill is “TINY!” compared to the rest of the gulf is not only pathetic but Grossly Moronic. Perhaps this guy never traveled out of Coronation street until after he joined BP. If you are a budding university graduate and depending on your values, like if you honestly passed or cheated during exams, chose wisely the company you are going to keep with for a career.

826

[QUOTE=RiverPirate;33168]First of all, Thanks to all you guys for some some great input. My knowledge on all this is not very good but I’m greatly interested in all of this as I live in Florida and work In La.

I do have a question if you don’t mind. Is there enough money to be made from their other interests in the area that would offset what it’s gonna cost them to cover the damage they’re causing? Or, do they really not care because they won’t have to pay for it all anyways?[/QUOTE]
It seems as though that’s going to be the 64 billion dollar question. I am seriously considering this to be my last post. I hate having to make opinios about neglegence concerning colleagues in my industry like this. Some people I may know could be part of the group I have opined about. But good God man, can’t you guys see what this type of shoddy decision making can lead to? It gives me no pleasure & tears my guts up to have to speak up like this, but if not people like me, then who? We can’t do these types of things to ourselves as people & hope to survive as a society. It is not more important to make an extra barrel of oil a day than it is to protect our way of life. I fully understand the need of America for fossil fuels & understand that this country was built & became the mightiest nation on earth because of our ability to mine the resources God has given us & put them to mostly good use. But it is incumbent upon us as an industry to do everything we can to protect the places we work & keep a good name among those who are caught in the middle between those who revile us without regard or understanding of what we have to face as individuals & an industry to bring them the very comforts of life they take for granted & ourselves.
Catastrophes like this one which in my present opinion will be proven to have been totally avoidable, do nothing more than serve as ammunition for those who would revile the whole industry & make our business that much harder to perform. I hope those who read this can at least try to understand why as a proud member of the oilfield fraternity, I have taken the stand I have based upon the preponderence of the evidence that is now coming forth.

827

Question: Does anyone think having a back up surface bop (in addition to sub sea bop) atop a high pressure riser with pressure relief ports staged at various depths would be a bad idea? A good idea?

828

[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;33221]Question: Does anyone think having a back up surface bop (in addition to sub sea bop) atop a high pressure riser with pressure relief ports staged at various depths would be a bad idea? A good idea?[/QUOTE]
I think it is time for fundamentally new ideas in BOP tech. The current stuff is not going to cut it going forward. There’s no good reason not to design an actual fail-safe system.

829

[B]China National Offshore Oil Corporation[/B] ([B]CNOOC[/B], will be or is already drilling off Venezuela and Cuba, stay tuned!

830

[QUOTE=peakoilerrrr;33170]KABOOM ! [B]Schlumberger confirmed they were there[/B] to do CBL and left hours before DH exploded.

Reuters: Schlumberger says its crew left Horizon day of fireSAN FRANCISCO, May 19 (Reuters) - Schlumberger Ltd (SLB.N), the world’s largest oilfield services company, said on Wednesday it had a crew on the Deepwater Horizon that departed only hours before the explosion and fire that engulfed the rig.The company, which had not previously revealed its work on the Horizon, said in an emailed statement that it performed wireline services for BP Plc (BP.L) on the rig in March and April, completing the last services on April 15 and leaving a crew on standby in case any more were needed.

“On the morning of April 20, 2010, BP notified the Schlumberger crew that it could return to its home base in Louisiana,” Schlumberger said in a statement, which a spokesman for the company confirmed by phone.The crew departed the rig at about 11:00 a.m. on April 20 on one of BP’s regularly scheduled helicopter flights, Schlumberger said. The explosion occurred at about 10:00 p.m. that night, and the rig sank two days later, which led to a massive oil spill off the Gulf Coast. [ID:nN19188461] (Reporting by Braden Reddall, editing by Bernard Orr)

[This story was developed from 2 posters at theoildrum.com as follows:]http://www.thomhartmann.com/forum/2010/05/smoking-gun-bps-deep-horizon-messI expect this to lead to a few days of breaking news. The truth is most welcome.Here’s how story developed from 2 key persons at theoildrum.com asking that rumors be investigated and, if not clearly denied, pursued.

http://www.thomhartmann.com/forum/2010/05/smoking-gun-bps-deep-horizon-mess[/QUOTE]

To be accurate: neither Reuters (just covered SBL press release) nor some other person posting on Thom Harman’s website actually confirm the original rumor version.

However, the New Orleans Times Picayune dug into this story and reports on that and on Halliburton witness Tim Probert regarding BP’s well design that Halliburton followed, which appears to have been defective.

What the story does confirm it seems, was that no acoustic cement bond log test was done.

However, a couple of elements of the original rumor, that SBL crew knew the well would blow, and called HW for own helo off rig, appear to be false.
[I]
Costly, time-consuming test of cement linings in Deepwater Horizon rig was omitted, spokesman says
By David Hammer, The Times-Picayune
May 19, 2010, 10:30PM

[Some excerpts from the story]BP hired a top oilfield service company to test the strength of cement linings on the Deepwater Horizon’s well, but sent the firm’s workers home 11 hours before the rig exploded April 20 without performing a final check that a top cementing company executive called “the only test that can really determine the actual effectiveness” of the well’s seal.

A spokesman for the testing firm, Schlumberger, said BP had a Schlumberger team and equipment for sending acoustic testing lines down the well “on standby” from April 18 to April 20. But BP never asked the Schlumberger crew to perform the acoustic test and sent its members back to Louisiana on a regularly scheduled helicopter flight at 11 a.m., Schlumberger spokesman Stephen T. Harris said…

But while politicians and media have focused on the finger-pointing by BP, Transocean and Halliburton executives in congressional hearings over the past 10 days, Halliburton’s representative at those hearings, Tim Probert, has quietly provided some clues about what might have gone wrong.

First, he went into detail in two committee hearings May 11 about the tests that were done to check his company’s cement job – called positive and negative pressure tests – and a third test that BP never asked for. That test is called a “cement bond log,” which records data collected from wires run down the well to measure sounds that indicate whether there are any weaknesses or spaces in the cement.

Probert told a Senate committee last week that the cement bond log is “the only test that can really determine the actual effectiveness of the bond between the cement sheets, the formation and the casing itself.”

Gregory McCormack, director of the Petroleum Extension Service at the University of Texas, called the cement bond log the “gold standard” of cement tests. It records detailed, 360-degree representations of the well and can show where the cement isn’t adhering fully to the casing and where there may be paths for gas or oil to get into the hole.

Schlumberger’s Harris said the contractor was ready to do any such wireline tests, but was never directed to do so. The team had finished doing tests on the subsea layers of earth being drilled five days earlier and hadn’t done any work since, Harris said.

In fact, Harris said there was no time to get the company’s wireline testing equipment off the rig before it exploded.

According to internal BP and Transocean documents released to the public by a U.S. House committee, the rig crew made sure a plug placed in the bottom of the well was set properly and then conducted the positive and negative pressure tests. Those measure the integrity of the well casing and of various seals placed between different lengths of pipe to close off spaces that run up the sides of the well.

According to Probert, government regulators at the Minerals Management Service don’t require a well owner like BP to order a cement bond log unless it feels uncertain about any of the earlier tests. It’s not clear what the results of the positive and negative pressure tests were.
Probert also presented Congress with a schematic of BP’s cementing plan, which he repeatedly said his firm followed to a T. Although he never mentioned it in his written or verbal testimony, the drawing Probert attached to his prepared testimony May 11 shows what drilling experts say is a key design flaw that could easily have allowed a blast of natural gas to shoot to the surface undetected and destroy the rig before the crew of 126 knew what hit them.

oil-halliburton-cement-052010.jpg View full size

The graphic shows the wellhead 5,067 feet below the water’s surface and the bottom of the well more than 13,000 feet below that. It diagrams how the drill pipes telescoped down in sections – some about 2,000 feet long, some shorter and others longer.

With each section, one metal tube fits inside another, leaving a space called an “annulus” where heavy drilling mud can circulate and carry the drilled-out material back up to the surface. According to the diagram, one of the spaces between different-sized pipes was not closed off – a no-no, according to some experts.

“It looks pretty on paper, but you can’t accomplish that successfully and have a good cement job,” said Tom McFarland, a cementing consultant from Marrero who has decades of experience cementing oil wells. “The chance of getting a good cement job on that is nil.”

McFarland said the diagram indicates the space was completely open to the reservoir of oil the Deepwater Horizon had just tapped, and he is convinced that is why the well blew.

No O-ring seal depicted

McCormack, the University of Texas professor, isn’t so sure that the blowout went through the annulus, rather than breaching the center of the well and blowing out the top. But either way, he was baffled by the diagram Halliburton gave to Congress. He was so surprised by the lack of an O-ring seal that he wondered if it was an error.

“There’s a free path all the way to the top of the well bore. Normally you wouldn’t do that,” he said. “If the well was completed as designed, I think that would be an issue the way it’s shown there.”

McFarland said a cement bond log is costly and takes time, but it would have told the crew right away whether the annulus was exposed to hydrocarbons. He and McCormack said that if the log showed problems, the crew would have done what’s called a “perf and squeeze,” perforating the weak spots in the liner and squeezing more cement in to defend the well against the gas pressure of the earth formation around it.

BP spokesmen did not respond to repeated requests for comment on the decision to send Schlumberger home without conducting a cement bond log or on the cementing schematic Probert gave the Senate committee. And Halliburton didn’t respond to questions about the accuracy of Probert’s diagram.[/I]

831

The BP company man on the DWH had to give the OK on all of the ops before the blowout so wouldn’t he be responsible for what went wrong.
Who was the BP co. man ?

832

[QUOTE=AHTS Master;33230]The BP company man on the DWH had to give the OK on all of the ops before the blowout so wouldn’t he be responsible for what went wrong.
Who was the BP co. man ?[/QUOTE]
Don Vidrine

source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748704414504575244812908538510.html

833

Greetings all,

OK, companyman1, I guess I have enough energy left to try to explain a few things although the fact that I have to makes me tremble for anyone on a rig upon which resides a company man.

  1. So far, with respect to the magnitude of the blowout and NOT with respect to lives lost, what you have seen is peanuts. It took[B] 295[/B] [B]days[/B] to shut in the Ixtoc well in the western GOM. The Montara 1 well (Timor Sea) blew out on [B]August 21[/B] and wasn’t shut in until[B] November 3rd[/B].

  2. What could be worse ? For starters, an early season hurricane coming in on a well flowing free because a company man ordered a kill program without understanding all the risks and ended up losing the wellhead and allowing unrestricted open flow, which could easily be more like 40,000-60,000 bbl/day plus the gas at a GOR of 300 or so. THAT would be special, wouldn’t it ?

Your kill program (mud) can only work if the mud is able to act on the borehole wall. You have no information available to you that indicates that a set of tubulars full of mud will solve the problem. It may very well be that the 16 inch casing hanger seal, or the landing hanger for the tapered liner, failed, both of which are high up in the tubulars string. If that is the case, a well full of mud will be useless because the mud in the tubulars would be [B]below[/B] the leak. Mud can only kill when the hydro head is sufficient to overcome flowing pressure.

But of course, you knew that.

The choke and kill lines are kinked and other hot stabs have failed. So, just where, exactly, do you propose to introduce the mud in sufficient quantity to get into the borehole, without a preliminary top kill. You are against the top kill, an interesting stance. Flowing mud into the well through any wellhead connection - without a top kill first - will just result in mud being blown out the leaks not closed by the not top kill.

But you knew that as well.

My suggestion ? Dial back on the angry rhetoric. You can bet your butt that anyone who made a bad call on this well AND is still alive already feels like crap. Yes, it’s a mess. And it will be for some time, and people and critters will suffer, which is a) sad and b) preventable. This was also true for the Exxon Valdez and if you went up there today you wouldn’t even know it happened. It’s also true for dozens of other accidents, from which we all learn. Most accidents are not repeats of prior events. As I stated much earlier, some very good people got caught by surprise here. A quick look at the drilling log will show you that.

But you knew that, too.

Regards

834

Transocean to Make $1 Billion Dividend Payout to Shareholders

http://www.themaritimelawyer.com/transocean-to-make-1-billion-dividend-payout-to-shareholders/

835

[QUOTE=27182;33232]Don Vidrine

source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748704414504575244812908538510.html[/QUOTE]

Would it make any sense to have someone on board (MMS?) who had authority to hit the Stop! button until “changes”, like the one talked about in this pissing contest between TO and BP, could be reviewed as safe?

836

[QUOTE=company man 1;33204]You can google mines & minerals service or go to www.mms.gov/& check. To check API Recommended practices which the MMS has adopted as their standard guidelines for compliance you need to go check out their sight. I get all my materials & manuals concerning my operations from my local MMS office.[/QUOTE]

I was hoping you could be more spesific based on the strong opinions you present. Here in the North Sea I have free acess to all the information I need but I need to but API standard it would be nice to now what to buy since I am not familiar with all of them.

837

[QUOTE=nomad;33235]Greetings all,

This was also true for the Exxon Valdez and if you went up there today you wouldn’t even know it happened.

Regards[/QUOTE]

The damaged caused by the Exxon Valdez spill might not today be apparent from a shallow minded cosmetic perspective. Several species of wild life have never bounced back to their numbers prior to the spill. Others perished or went extinct for good in that area. Immunity systems have been weakened due to toxins. It is the unseen damaged that still prevails and will do so for god knows how much longer. Unlike non manmade disasters such as Mount St Helens or Tsunamis, where once devastated areas now team with new life, ecological niches affected by oil spills remain permanently damaged. And what of the social damage like unemployment and alcoholism and the follow on effect on family units ? Compensation took decades and got knocked down to 10% of the original figure. You need to separate Hollywood from reality before making flippant remarks like this. The damage is still there if you chose to see it. Even a myopic snake-oil salesman can see this.

838

FYI from theoildrum.com today:

dolfijn on May 21, 2010 - 11:21am

We should look at it more in detail: (everything below assumes a 13.7 ppg equivalent reservoir pressure)The differential pressure is what counts, meaning, if the cement was leaking:There could have been 13,000 psi reservoir pressure in the 16" x [9-7/8" x 7"] annulus with 2,240 psi inside the [9-7/8" x 7"] casing, filled with seawater, giving a differential of 10,760 psi which is too high in design terms and for sure in real life, if the 9-7/8" 62.8 HCQ-125 casing collapse pressure is 13,840 psi theoretically, but (13,840 - 30%) = 9,690 psi including design & safety factor.Now for the 16" if we assume the strongest casing, the [B]theoretical burst pressure is 10,900 psi[/B].For design we subtract again 30% leaving 7,630 psi.In the annulus 16" x 22" is filled fresh water of 8.345 ppg for a minimum.This gives at 5,067’ wellhead depth x 0.052 x 8.345 = 2,200 psi.

Differential over the 16" casing is 13,000 - 2,200 psi = 10,800 psi which is far too much.So if the 16" would burst the 13,000 psi pressure could get to the wellhead seals of the 22" & 28" causing them to burst, since they have a much lower rating normally, ending-up in a blow-out at wellhead.

Another senario could have been a blow-out via the 18" liner top to the 22" shoe and then up to surface.

Even if the expected reservoir pressure was much lower or even zero, still the whole design of the casing programme is wrong.

  • first of all it seems they never heard of ‘buckling’ since they leave a heavy casing string 9-7/8" 62.8 ppf x 7" 41 ppf hanging free over 12,100 ft on the casing hanger???

  • What do they think will happen when they run completion and start flowing the well and is warming-up?

  • if you have so many strings/liners,each with minimum cement behind it, for sure you will do a CBL at the end to verify you have isolated everything

  • why is only the upper prt cemented back into the previous casings and the rest not, weak zones which cannot support cement column? never heard of external casing packers or stage cementing, specially for the production casing?

  • the reservoir is probably drilled in 8-1/2", if they would have had a 13,000 psi kick, even with the BOP functioning properly and ultra heavy casing everywhere, how where they going to control this? Certainly not with the 7,500 psi max. WP mud pumps, remaining the Halliburton HP unit (probably 15K rated) but at which flow rate??? Pissing against the wind! This design is so wrong I almost cannot believe that the data provided by Halliburton are correct.

Now next is why to have a 9-7/8" casing on the top? Of course you will answer: to allow to run a 7" completion string! Why they would like to run a 7" completion? Because there is plenty oil. 5,000 barrel/day can be easily produced through a 3-1/2" completion string. Now if there is plenty oil they could have invested a little bit more money in the well isn’t it [so]?

VERY IMPORTANT REMARK: [B]THEY DID NOT WAIT 20 HOURS TO TEST THE CEMENT[/B] - in the drilling report one can read that already at 10h30 AM [this is only 10 hours after completion of the cement job which was at 00h35 as per the same report] they closed the BOP and pressured-up to 2,500 psi through the kill line in order to test the casing for 30 minutes, this test finished at midday. Now when cement is setting it is not smart to put this on since the casing is ‘ballooning’, when the pressure is bled-off the casing will come-back to its original position and micro cracks may remain, allowing gas to migrate through them.

839

[QUOTE=KASOL;33246]I was hoping you could be more spesific based on the strong opinions you present. Here in the North Sea I have free acess to all the information I need but I need to but API standard it would be nice to now what to buy since I am not familiar with all of them.[/QUOTE] I’m at the house now & have had a little time to unwind & take care of other stuff. I had considered making my last post…well… my last post. Since I have been called out again by people who contnue to defend BP & are challening my analysis & my overall knowledge & understanding of API industry standard practices & MMS rules & regulations, here goes. You can go to www.api.org & find all the standard practice manuals you wish. If you are truly sincere you can go to their sight & order standard practice manuals on everything from pipelines, production facilities, crane operations, etc. etc. etc. There are in fact over 200,000 different punlications which the American Petroleum Institute has written over the years in conjunction with the department of labor & the department of the interior I.E. MMS to establish guidelines & regulations for it’s members to adopt & adhere to. I will point specifically to API RP 65-2 & API RP 76. One covers proper cementing for zonal isolation & the other covers drilling rigs. Now this may not be the only one that covers drilling rigs & any drilling hands who are more familiar with actual drilling guidelines & regulations are welcome to join in & correct me on any info I may have wrong . Please point out RP number & section if you can. API guidelines dictate that while a rig is on location & hooked up to a BOP stack & well that has 1’ of penetration in the gorund, that rig is to have at least the volume of kill weight mud IN ITS PIT SYSTEM to match or exceed the total volume of mud of the hole volume of that well. Don’t ask me for chapter & verse, because I don’t know it right off hand. If you are sincere about finding out for yourself, you will do your own research & correct me if need be. If you do not understand how it works this it in a nutshell. Until now, the MMS has allowed API to make the rules. That way the industry can police itself. All members who are granted leases in the outter continental shelf of the Gulf of Mexico are SUPPOSED to be bound through agreement to adhere to all of these standards. The MMS uses these standards when writing incidents of non compliance or INCs for short. The MMS will use these INCs to set civil penalties or even shut down an operation if it sees the people on sight are not abiding by these guidelines. The only problem is the cops are not always there when a crime is comitted.
This system has worked rather well for the last 25 years or more until now. I believe that due to this catastrophe, this system will end up being scrapped & replaced by overseers with no practical experience & will have no common sense to make rational judgemnents. The paperwork to document every move made will become endless & the ability to get work done & move from one process to another on jobs without having to shut down completely will likely become impossible. The risks of getting pipe stuck in the hole & being able to make decisions on the fly to deal with kicks, reversing & circulating out solids, could become a thing of the past. & making GOOD NECESSARY CHANGES that lead to a safer more efficient operation will take an act of congress to adopt.

840

FYI re BP not know leak flow-rate
http://www.kansascity.com/2010/05/20/1959836/low-oil-spill-estimate-could-save.html

[LEFT]That decision, however, runs counter to BP’s own regional plan for dealing with offshore leaks. “In the event of a significant release of oil,” the 583-page plan says on Page 2, “.”[/LEFT]

[LEFT] [/LEFT]