Merry Christmas, Alcor. Enjoy while it lasts. Warranty Expires in 90 days,
BP: Halliburton destroyed Gulf disaster evidence
BP says Halliburton destroyed critical cement test results
Published on December 5th, 2011
Written by: Jennifer A. Dlouhy
BP on Monday accused Halliburton of destroying potentially damaging internal test results that showed that the cement it used to secure the Macondo well that blew out in the Gulf of Mexico last year was unstable.
BP made the allegations today in a 310-page legal filing before a New Orleans-based federal district court that is overseeing a broad class action lawsuit tied to the 2010 oil spill.
BP accused Halliburton of “steadfastly” refusing to turn over its internal results from testing on the cement mix and subsequently destroying the data from those examinations. BP also insisted that Halliburton failed to turn over computer modeling that might demonstrate that channels did not form in cement at the well.
“Halliburton intentionally destroyed the evidence related to its non-privileged cement testing, in part because it wanted to eliminate any risk that this evidence would be used against it at trial,” BP said in its filing.
Halliburton spokeswoman Beverly Stafford said in a statement that the company is reviewing details of BP’s filing, but that “we believe that the conclusion that BP is asking the court to draw is without merit and we look forward to contesting their motion in court.”
It is the latest gambit in the legal fight over who bears liability for the Deepwater Horizon disaster — a battle that also has involved fast-flying accusations of fraud and defamation, as the firms that worked on the site seek to distance themselves from the accident that killed 11 workers and unleashed the nation’s worst oil spill.
The viability of the cement used to isolate oil and gas at BP’s Macondo well has emerged as a major issue in investigations into the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Halliburton has argued that the cement mix it prepared and applied at the site was stable, which would allow it to adequately coat the outer edges of the Macondo well and keep oil and gas at bay.
But Halliburton also insists that some of BP’s choices — including the oil company’s decision to use fewer so-called “centralizers” to properly position pipe in the well — caused channels to form in the cement, allowing hydrocarbons to flow to the surface.
By contrast, BP argues that depositions from Halliburton witnesses _ as well as internal documents from the company _ demonstrate the cement slurry was not stable, and therefore may have broken down after being applied at the Macondo well, causing vulnerabilities.
BP is asking federal district judge Carl Barbier to allow forensic firms to scour Halliburton’s computer for the missing results from its internal modeling. BP also is asking the court to issue a finding that Halliburton’s cement was unstable _ a conclusion that could help the oil company in court.
This isn’t the first time BP and Halliburton have traded accusations in connection with the oil spill.
In September, Halliburton sued BP, arguing that the oil company hid key information about the Macondo well that may have prevented the disaster. Halliburton accused BP of fraud and defamation and said the London-based oil giant provided inaccurate information about the location of oil and gas producing zones in the well before Halliburton applied cement at the site.
The final cement job in the well was meant to push cement at least 500 feet above the deepest geological formation that contains hydrocarbons. Halliburton claimed BP failed to inform it of several formations in an effort to save money by preventing costly changes to the well design.
Without knowing the proper locations of the formations, Halliburton argued, it wasn’t able to design a cement mix appropriate for the conditions at the site.
BP’s filing Monday relies on depositions of several Halliburton witnesses, including one Oklahoma-based employee who said he ran tests on samples of the cement slurry used at the Macondo well but then “destroyed” the results to ensure they weren’t “misinterpreted.” Under the testing, the Halliburton worker said, the cement mix broke down and seemed thin.
BP says Halliburton destroyed critical cement test results
This post is intended to supplement NOLA’s post #6582 and I assume it to be a Link to the actual 310-page legal filing before a New Orleans-based federal district court that is overseeing a broad class action lawsuit tied to the 2010 oil spill.
(note that portions of this version of the document are redacted)
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;58685]Merry Christmas, Alcor. Enjoy while it lasts. Warranty Expires in 90 days,
BP: Halliburton destroyed Gulf disaster evidence
http://thepoliticalcarnival.net/2011/12/05/bp-halliburton-destroyed-gulf-disaster-evidence/[/QUOTE]
You will recall that I always said Halliburton have nothing to answer for other than their contractual obligation to BP to perform successful cementing procedures. We don’t know if contamination of the pumped cement occurred at surface etc…
Blowouts do not occur because of failed cement jobs. If cement doesn’t set you simply do not have one of the barriers in the well and action will be taken to remedy this situation, but not with 1000 Bbls unnoticed.
In the Macondo case, the blowout occurred because no-one was able to recognise that 1000 Bbls of hydrocarbons had entered the well! Now, some people may accept nice and pretty descriptive words, 'Management Failures", but if you ever want facts concerning who maintains a watchful eye on the well it is supposed to be the Drilling Contractor’s personell and the logger. This is especially the case when a negative test has apparently passed, essentially confirming the cement barrier exists, when the test is performed correctly! A failed cement job must be recognised, and in the event that it passes we still monitor volumes knowing from past experience that many failures occur while displacing or other reasons. The construction of the well is always monitored. Perhaps, not on this vessel! And perhaps, MMS failed with enforcing standards. Certainly, it appears as if incompetence existed on the vessel amongst leading personnel, but they are a product of TO/BP training! The characters on the vessel are responsible for the blowout, and they had it in their own hands to intervene. But, management control was missing on the vessel!
We always have to verify cement through pressure testing. But, we know that these barriers can fail at any time, especially in the case of withdrawing the overbalance in the well. Monitor the volumes and you’ll recognise ‘GAIN’ in volume. Shut the well in and all is well.
Two parties guilty from my point of view, BP and TO, and a large responsibility rests with the MMS. The bulk of the responsibility lies with TO. Naturally, BP will pay because they are contractually responsible for any spill. The cause of the blowout and spill is not BP’s, unless TO’s management system suggests that it is ok to displace without monitoring volumes and pressure. I believe, TO are contracted to be the eyes and ears working in collaboration with the Sperry logger. This also suggests that Sperry have enormous input into the blowout. They may feel that they were excused from monitoring (by the TO assistant driller), but they are employed by BP to watch the well collectively with TO Drillers. Simply put, the logger should have informed the BP rep that he was no longer able to observe volumes, and therefore, he would not be one of the two observers of volume control. One thing it did not excuse him from performing is observing the pressure trends and my understanding is that he did not perform this function because the Asst Driller gave him the time off! That’s a tough one for the logger which should implicate him unless he has grounds to stand on i.e. he informed BP and they sanctioned the lack of control.
Regardless of whether BP and the logger had no control, TO must always be in control.
This blowout occurred because TO leading personell did not follow their own procedures for monitoring volumes and interpreting pressure anomalies. The Co Man failed in the negative test interpretation. But, that is never the end on the monitoring process. And the well has not Blown! We still have time to recognise any anomalies and take action.
And, I guarantee the Rigs in the GOM are no longer displacing without and consideration for volumes. Guaranteed…Unless stupidity abounds!
The legal experts had better get the facts right regarding who has responsibility for activities on the vessel and when it is deemed correct for the Driller to intervene in the process. This is clearly defined in both the BP and TO procedures manuals, in case they need any help with direction!
Again, the cementers have no responsibility for the blowout. But, they may be guilty of ‘recipe failure’ resulting in the cement not setting up. No Problem, remedial action will be taken in the form of another cement job.
DOW JONES (WASHINGTON)–US regulators have issued additional violations to BP Plc (BP) for its role in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, raising the level of fines that the company is likely to pay.
The rule violations announced Wednesday represent the second set of charges issued to the company. The first set, also identifying violations by contractor companies Transocean Ltd. and Halliburton, was issued in October.
The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement announced Wednesday it issued five non-compliance violations to BP, saying the company failed to conduct pressure integrity tests at the Macondo well and suspend drilling operations when safety became compromised.
“Further review of the evidence demonstrated additional regulatory violations by BP in its drilling and abandonment operations at the Macondo well,” BSEE Director James Watson said in a statement.
The violations lay the foundation for civil penalties that are likely to be imposed by the federal government.
-By Tennille Tracy, Dow Jones Newswires
Did BP cause a blowout by putting together a shoddy well plan? No!
Did the BP Co Man not recognise a flowing well during the negative test? Yes, he failed to recognise the failure.
Do TO senior personnel have a duty to monitor and verify the negative test? Absolutely,
Do Senior drilling contractors have a responsibility to understand and verify all the steps taken in the wellbore construction are acceptable to them on their vessel? 100% absolutely.
Is the driller expected to understand all action that takes place on the drill floor regarding starting mud pumps, checking volumes, observing pressure? It’s absolutely 100% required.
Do operations stop if the driller or attending Toolpusher don’t understand what’s happening? Yes.
Who stops the action? The driller or TP or anyone else who feels unsure of the job.
If the Operator says it’s ok to continue do you continue without your own verification? When collective agreement is ascertained, the operation continues.
Do you displace without any consideration for volume or pressure? Never. Never.
Are you able to close in a flowing well? Absolutely.
How do you recognise if it’s flowing? Volume and pressure control.
In the absence of vol and press control how do you recognise a flowing well?..Eh! The logger…Eh! Um!..Aghhh!
Did BP tell you to ignore volume control? ???
And, did you listen to BP or follow your procedures? ???
Are BP onshore responsible for failing to observe for volume control? ???
Are TO onshore responsible for volume control? ???
Did either TO or BP tell you to ignore volume control? ???
Do MMS control volumes and pressure? ???
Does the logger have a major input in observing the well’s volumes?
If the logger and driller had been watching volumes and pressure would they have been able to detect hydrocarbons entering the well? Absolutely, Yes!
Would there have been a blowout if they had managed to shut the well in after 100, 200, 300 0r 400 Bbls had entered the well? Absolutely.
Would this have been a major well control situation? Yes.
Would there have been a blowout? No.
If a pre-job meeting had adequately described the displacement and the functions of all the individuals in the team would there have been a blowout? No.
If the logger had observed pressure fluctuations would he have informed the driller? I’d like to think so.
Is there another example of a drilling crew failing to shut the well in after taking a 1000 Bbl influx? No.
According to standards in the industry at the time of the displacement on the Macondo was there any requirement by Gov’t, BP or TO to control volumes and observe pressure for anomaly indication? ??? This is a good question for all the lawyers.
After a barrier has been proven intact is there any requirement for volume control…in the GOM? ???
The list goes on. It’s the questions we ask that are vital. One thing for sure is that responsibilities are well defined in the industry, and though people lost their lives in this terrible accident, we have a responsibility to those still working in it. Therefore, some of you won’t like my style because it doesn’t sympathise enough with they who perished. Believe me, I sympathise, but if I can help, in some small way, to get a truth that the offshore drilling industry understands and which make our operations and responsibilities better defined then I’m happy to question all events of that night. Hopefully, I don’t upset folk with my pursuit of fact over fiction!
One big concern is the displacement at 8300 feet. It could have been done at 5500 feet. But, the purpose of the test was to verify the cement barrier. The only criteria for success would have been ‘0’ pressure on the guages and no flow from the Kill line. Remember, everyone on the drill floor were uncomfortable with the results, and the tests were repeated. And, for some reason, they all agreed that the test had passed. This is a critical point. But, no blowout has occurred.
Taking into account that they had spent hours over a test which usually passes in 45 mins, we need to seriously question their collective judgement. They came up with explanations which are not known to others in the drilling industry. They, collectively made a very big mistake. But, there’s no blowout.
So how should they have proceeded? And who was going to give the crews guidance on the displacement, which had been delayed (often happens). Do we know if BP authorised ignoring volumes and pressure. I can’t believe that’s possible. Nevertheless, TO should have followed their own procedures where well volumes are ALWAYS controlled and monitored. You never know when one of your barriers fails.
I don’t think it’s a good idea for TO to continue with their line of blaming BP exclusively. Other Operators and Contractors will be alarmed by their stance and it could affect their ability to secure future contracts. Either they accept their failure to monitor volumes was the biggest issue in the blowout or they learn nothing whatsoever, in the interests of saving their reputation. They will receive much criticism for rejecting any blame.
Do any of you remember this commentary from the NYT?
The central cause of the explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig was a failure of the cement at the base of the 18,000-foot-deep well that was supposed to contain oil and gas within the well bore. That led to a cascade of human and mechanical errors that allowed natural gas under tremendous pressure to shoot onto the drilling platform, causing an explosion and fire that killed 11 of the 126 crew members and caused an oil spill that took 87 days to get under control.
[B]Incorrect. Cement fails on many wells. They don’t end up in blowouts. Why not? Because there is remedial action available but the failure must be recognised.[/B]
The two-part report, compiled by a joint task force of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement and the Coast Guard and covering more than 500 pages, is the most comprehensive to date on the April 2010 disaster. Its findings largely mirror those of other investigations, including the inquiry by a commission named by President Obama to determine the causes of the calamity. That panel issued its findings in January.
“The loss of life at the Macondo site on April 20, 2010, and the subsequent pollution of the Gulf of Mexico through the summer of 2010 were the result of poor risk management, last-minute changes to plans, failure to observe and respond to critical indicators, inadequate well control response and insufficient emergency bridge response training by companies and individuals responsible for drilling at the Macondo well and for the operation of the Deepwater Horizon,” the latest report said.
[B]Poor risk management applies to all involved, especially they on the vessel performing the task. We don’t just do things because others have decided that’s how they should be done. Procedures, are in place, to ensure the ‘wild’ actions of the rig’s ‘dictators’ are avoided. Last minute changes, did not cause a blowout. Failure to observe and respond to critical indicators speaks for itself. Inadequate well control response is obvious. Bridge response, I feel, should not be included. They did all they could in the circumstances. Overall, TO take up a big chunk of these conclusions. Did BP fail to articulate the importance of the displacement? Isn’t it already a part of TO procedure to police the well? It’s certainly part of the contract. So, legally, TO won’t have a leg to stand on.[/B]
The report concluded that BP, as the well’s owner, was ultimately responsible for the accident. But it also said that BP’s chief contractors, Transocean, which owned the mobile drilling rig, and Halliburton, which was responsible for the cementing operations, shared the blame for many of the fatal mistakes.
[B]Why? Because they are the owner they are ultimately responsible!! Strange! I suppose the whole set-up of Operators using Contractors should cease in the US sectors of offshore drilling. What is the point in having a contractor if he can’t be found to be guilty? Perhaps, the Operators need to buy up all the drilling vessels and pursue drilling operations themselves. That way there won’t be any confusion with who to blame. And, we could blame the drilling personnel in this case, because they’d be BP…who can afford to pay![/B]
The study goes further than previous reports, citing seven violations of federal regulations as factors. Among them were violations of laws that required BP and its contractors to operate in a safe manner, to take measures to contain oil and gas for the protection of health and the environment, to conduct reliable tests of well pressures and to notify federal regulators of changes in drilling plans.
[B]Federal regulators, were apparently commonly allowing Operators to continue with ops regardless of any sanctioning on their part. However, this is no excuse. No doubt about it, BP did make last minute changes, but it is questionable if any of these caused a blowout. The fact still remains, the cement failed, they verifying the negative test failed, and then everyone went to sleep during the displacement. It’s not complicated![/B]
The Justice Department is conducting a criminal investigation that could bring indictments and heavy fines.
David M. Uhlmann, a professor at the University of Michigan Law School and former chief of the Justice Department’s environmental crimes section, said the Justice Department almost certainly reviewed the findings of the study before it was released.
“Today’s report increases the likelihood that BP, Transocean and Halliburton will face criminal charges for their roles in causing the gulf oil spill,” Mr. Uhlmann said in an e-mail. “The Justice Department may have outside experts for both its criminal and civil cases, and it could develop additional information about the causes of the spill in those investigations, but it will be hard for the Department to distance itself from the findings of the Coast Guard and Boemre.”
[B]They ‘may’ get experts! You need them badly! Most of the buffoons from the coast guard still don’t even understand a well getting underbalanced!! Shocking![/B]
The well blowout unleashed a spill of nearly five million barrels of oil, fouling the gulf and hundreds of miles of beaches, marshes and fish habitats and causing billions of dollars in damage.
The three companies have pointed fingers at one another and are engaged in multibillion-dollar litigation to try to spread the enormous costs of the accident. Families of crew members are suing the companies in federal court, seeking compensation and damages.
BP said in a statement that it had long acknowledged its role in the accident and had urged its drilling partners to accept their share of the blame.
“BP agrees with the report’s core conclusion — consistent with every other official investigation — that the Deepwater Horizon accident was the result of multiple causes, involving multiple parties, including Transocean and Halliburton,” the company said. It added that it had taken steps to improve its safety practices and strengthen oversight of its contractors.
[B]I still find Halliburton completely innocent! They just make a recipe for cement. It either sets or it doesn’t. Folk on the rig have to verify its integrity. They didn’t.[/B]
Lou Colasuonno, a Transocean spokesman, said that the report identified the cement failure as the primary cause of the accident and defended the actions of Transocean crew members.
[B]Doesn’t he just find it quite convenient to agree that the cement was the failure. Perhaps, that’s why his company are where they are because of the very fact that this blowout went completely unoticed. He’s trying to get off the hook. I hope he’s not preaching this gospel to the other TO Drillers. Wake up man![/B]
“We take strong exception to criticisms of the Deepwater Horizon drill crew, nine of whom perished fighting to save their fellow crew members and the rig, for the actions they took in the face of such an unprecedented emergency,” he said in a statement.
[B]We have to be critical if we want the truth, even if its hard for some to stomach. It’s ok to challenge they who are apparently guilty but don’t touch this ‘area’.[/B]
A Halliburton spokeswoman said that BP was to blame for poor well design and that at least some of the cement set by Halliburton did not fail. The company absolved itself of any blame. “Every contributing cause where Halliburton is named, the operational responsibility lies solely with BP,” the statement said.
A reminder of the events that night as told by the NYT
I had been having problems accessing and/or posting on the forum since last Wednesday.
I would like to publically thank Mike Schuler with GCAPTAIN technical staff for his prompt attention (40 minutes to resolution) to my technical problems.
I think I was starting to suffer withdrawal symptoms. Ha ha.
Thanks Mike
.
.
Alcor,
Welcome back.
Just wanted to say that I concur with most of your most recent observations and comments. We need Your input and viewpoints as a person who is currently involved in the industry.
Thanks for taking your time to contribute to this knowledge base
infomania
Halliburton Says BP Mischaracterizes Post-Incident Test In Deepwater Horizon Rig
(RTTNews) - Oilfield services company Halliburton Co. (HAL:News ) Wednesday said BP Plc (BP) is trying to mischaracterize the results of the post-incident tests related to Deepwater Horizon oil rig and the oil spill in Gulf of Mexico. On Tuesday, oil giant BP in its court filing alleged that Halliburton destroyed evidence of post-incident testing of the foam cement slurry and requested for sanctions against Halliburton.
In its statement, Halliburton noted that by criticizing its work and reputation, BP is attempting to divert attention from its own poor decisions and practices. The services company also said the post-incident testing referred was not conducted on rig samples or in a manner approved by it. Rather, the informal testing was used off-the-shelf materials that yielded results. Halliburton said these results have little or no relevance to the case, particularly when pre-incident testing using rig samples and formal lab processes showed that the cement slurry was designed to be stable
Halliburton Responds to BP Motion for Sanctions - MarketWatch
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/halliburton-responds-to-bp-motion-for-sanctions-2011-12-07
(snippet)
HOUSTON, Dec 07, 2011 (BUSINESS WIRE) – Halliburton responded today to court filings by BP saying: BP recently filed a motion for sanctions against Halliburton alleging that Halliburton destroyed evidence relating to post-incident testing of the foam cement slurry. BP has been aware of post-incident tests for some time, but has chosen this late date in the litigation to mischaracterize the results of such tests.
Contrary to BP’s assertions, the post-incident testing referred to in its motion was not conducted on rig samples or in a manner approved by Halliburton. Rather, the informal testing BP refers to used off-the-shelf materials that yielded results which Halliburton believes have little or no relevance to the case, particularly when pre-incident testing using rig samples and formal lab processes showed that the cement slurry was designed to be stable.
In September 2011, the U.S. Department of Interior reported testing done on the actual Deepwater Horizon rig sample, confirming Halliburton’s position that the slurry was designed to be stable. The Department further concluded that the cement likely did not fail in the annulus part of the well.
BSEE Issues 2nd Set of Deepwater Horizon Violations
08 Dec 11 - 18:07
The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE)issued a second set of regulatory violations arising from operations conducted in connection with the Macondo well. The violations were issued as Incidents of Non-Compliance (INC). A total of five INCs were issued by faxed letter to BP; four of the INCs were violations of one regulation in different sections of the well.
“Our federal regulations exist to ensure safe and environmentally-responsible activities. We will continue to be vigilant in enforcing those regulations,” said BSEE Director James Watson. "Further review of the evidence demonstrated additional regulatory violations by BP in its drilling and abandonment operations at the Macondo well.“
The following is a listing of the federal regulations and INCs issued today to BP:
One violation of 30 CFR 250.427 - BP failed to conduct an accurate pressure integrity test at the 13-5/8” liner shoe.
Four violations of 30 CFR 250.427(b) - BP failed to suspend drilling operations at the Macondo well when the safe drilling margin identified in the approved application for permit to drill was not maintained.
BSEE’s regulations governing the issuance of regulatory violations provides for a 60-day appeal period. Once the appeal period has ended, BSEE will consider the imposition of civil penalties.
DoJ attacks Transocean spill protection move
http://m.financialexpress.com/mobile_story.php?storyId=886003
By Ed Crooks in New York
The US Department of Justice has attacked an attempt by Transocean, the offshore drilling contractor, to protect itself against penalties arising from the Deepwater Horizon disaster last year, accusing the company of “wilful misconduct”.
The move suggests the US government will seek the maximum possible penalties against Transocean, and also possibly against BP, potentially implying fines and damages running into the tens of billions of dollars.
In a filing at the New Orleans court that will hear the case for damages against BP and other companies involved in the spill, the DoJ said: “At trial, the US respectfully believes it will establish that Transocean’s acts and omissions in this case amounted to wilful misconduct.”
The DoJ’s plan to establish wilful misconduct by Transocean implies it might try to do the same with BP, which was in overall charge of the disaster-hit Macondo project and has been more extensively criticised by US regulators.
The DoJ filing was made in response to a motion from Transocean for a summary judgment from the court that would compel BP to meet any damages, penalties and other costs faced by Transocean.
The contract signed for the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, following standard industry practice, included a commitment by BP that it would “defend, release, protect, indemnify and hold harmless” Transocean against all costs “without limit and without regard to the cause or causes”.
Transocean was encouraged by a ruling from the court last month that BP could not use $750m of insurance taken out by Transocean to help cover the costs of the spill.
In his conclusion, Judge Carl Barbier argued that “Transocean did not assume the oil pollution risks pertaining to the Deepwater Horizon incident - BP did”.
However, in its filing, the US DoJ argued that a summary judgment before any evidence had been heard would be “premature” and argued that if Transocean were found to have acted with wilful misconduct, then the indemnity in its contract with BP would not cover any resulting liabilities.
It added that Transocean’s attempt to avoid civil penalties under the Clean Water Act should be rejected because it was contrary to public policy.
“A party may not take on responsibility for the safety of a sophisticated and potentially dangerous operation like Deepwater Horizon, engage in gross negligence and wilful misconduct, and then expect another party to pick up the tab when civil penalties are imposed,” it said.
“Tolerating indemnity in these circumstances would eviscerate Congress’s endorsement of stiff penalties under the CWA.”
The DoJ added: “Transocean seeks … to avoid civil penalties regardless of who is at fault. However, just as equity demands [post-violation] that the wrongdoer pay penalties for causing harm, public policy demands that a pre-violation indemnification agreement is void, when its implementation would relieve the wrongdoer of the responsibility to pay civil penalties for its actions.”
http://www.boemre.gov/pdfs/maps/AppendixG_MacondoProduction.pdf
The MISwaco plan for displacement has no indication on how to verify volumes while displacing. This proves to me that the practice of displacing without any consideration for volumes is/has been a widespread procedure in the GOM. Perhaps, all the other Operators should form an orderly queue to report on their standards.
The Ops note, sent by brian Morel: The “Ops Note” sent by Brian Morel on April 20, 2010 at 3:36 p.m. (BP‐HZN‐MBI00129108). It appears to me that this procedure is 100% ok, as long as MISwaco calculated correctly with volumes required and pump strokes to displace the heavy fluid above the BOP. We know this probably didn’t happen. And, we know that they estimate 60 Bbls of heavy mud passed through the Annular because it didn’t seal. This means that when they went to perform the operation of negative testing on the vessel 60 barrels had to be received either into the trip tank or back to Halliburton, a very major cock-up. They should have had no more than 5 barrlels back, the volume of fluid required to release the pressure in the well due to heavy mud above the Annular and SW in the DP/Annulus as far as the top of the BOP.
Table tennis is China’s national sport,in my childhood, my mother say me looks fat, taught me to play table tennis. In order to play it more professional.my mother also bought me a pair of [B]Nfl Jerseys[/B]. Until nowi i still cherish it .Mother first taught me to take the beat. At first,I could not play well, my mother take away the ball. I would cry in the sports arena, anyone can not persuade me.
Mother to see me so like to play table tennis, table tennis would send me to a regular training base for a semester, not my mother really expected, I get beat France into a horizontal positionfrom the Pen, the action is the standard of play a lot, my mother saw the situation was so surprised, keeps complimenting me smart. I praise my mother and it seems to me the addition of a strong, usually on weekends, and more willing to go with her mother practiced sports, exerciseand more hard and more hard up. Once again, I order to save, even a fall, but I actually strong enough to climb up, usually I suddenly become so fragile strong, table tennis made me a more manly spirit.
I started playing table tennis skills, but also remember my mother taught me hands, I will be a move is the first: footed. First ball to the left, resort to the right, repeated several times, the opponent will be struggling to cope with, losing the ball. Blink of an eye a few years, the past few years I have been practicing table tennis skills seriously hard. “Hard work pays off.” My strengthhas always been more than I “teacher” mother, mother to the others I mention table tennis, she always gushing praise me, this is really “excel the predecessors”!
BP responds to accusations that former Halliburton engineer gave up secrets
Louisiana’ Legal Journal
Dec. 13, 2011
By Steve Korris
12/6/2011 10:29 AM
http://www.louisianarecord.com/mobile/story.asp?c=240146
BP claims it has nothing to hide in the case of a former Halliburton engineer who switched sides in Deepwater Horizon litigation, but BP’s proclamation of innocence hides almost everything.
BP blacked out all but formalities and generalities in a Nov. 23 response to Halliburton’s motion for disqualification of Michael Viator and his employer, CSI Technologies.
BP lawyer Don Haycraft of New Orleans accused Halliburton Energy Services Inc. of mischaracterizing evidence and testimony, and he blacked out the next four lines.
He prepared a two-page chart with mischaracterizations on the left and sworn testimony on the right, and he blacked out the right side.
“These are just selected examples,” he wrote below the chart.
One sentence almost worth reading states, “BP inadvertently placed Mr. Viator’s name on a list of potential visitors,” but black bars cover the rest of the sentence.
When Halliburton lawyers saw his name on the list, they deposed him and asked U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier to kick him and CSI owner Fred Sabins off the case.
Halliburton and other companies defending personal injury and economic damage suits seek to minimize their liabilities by shifting blame to other defendants.
BP claims Halliburton botched the cementing of the rig, and Halliburton claims BP brought disaster on itself.
In Halliburton’s disqualification motion, Donald Godwin of Dallas alleged that Viator revealed confidential information to Sabins and CSI.
He wrote that Viator resigned in March.
He wrote that he began working for Sabins in April without Halliburton’s knowledge.
He wrote that Viator transferred confidential files to a thumb drive which he still has.
“Shortly after Viator began working for CSI and Sabins, BP suddenly turned its attention to gaining access to HESI’s proprietary software and the data inputs,” Godwin wrote.
“BP’s abrupt focus on accessing HESI’s modeling software was occasioned by Viator’s disclosure of HESI’s work product, his post incident modeling.”
Though BP responded behind black bars, Sabins and CSI openly took offense.
“Mr. Viator has performed no work related to this litigation while at CSI other than the literature review previously disclosed,” Loretta Mince of New Orleans wrote on Nov. 23.
“During his testimony, Mr. Viator recalled that he might have a personal thumb drive and that, in addition to personal files such as his resume, the thumb drive may have some files on it that were saved to the thumb drive in the normal course of his employment with HESI,” she wrote.
“Mr. Viator testified unequivocally that he has not allowed any person to have access to that thumb drive since leaving Halliburton,” she wrote.
She agreed that he should delete Halliburton files from the thumb drive.
She wrote that Halliburton assaulted the character of Viator, Sabins, and herself.
She wrote that Viator and Sabins would appear before Barbier to answer any questions.
On Nov. 30, Halliburton claimed CSI and BP didn’t dispute their main allegations.
Godwin wrote that CSI and BP failed to even address how Viator was assigned to access Halliburton’s software or why his name was on the list.
“An expert cannot switch sides over the protests of the first retaining party,” he wrote.
“The court may reasonably infer that confidential information was disclosed to Sabins and CSI because Viator’s memory of confidential information is difficult to purge or effectively shield,” he wrote.
“BP seeks to hold HESI responsible for the largest oil spill in history,” he wrote.
The National Academy of Engineering report on Deepwater Horizon has just been released. Press release at:
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=13273
and prepublication PDF at:
National Academies reports typically carry great weight with Congress.
Cheers,
Earl
Cameron Appeals BP Gulf Spill Trial Plan, Wants Case Before Jury- Bloomberg
By Margaret Cronin Fisk and Laurel Brubaker Calkins
December 14, 2011 12:01 AM EST
(snippets, long article)
Cameron International Corp. (CAM) told a federal appeals court its right to a jury trial would be infringed under a plan to have a judge determine which companies should be blamed for the 2010 BP Plc oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
Cameron, which made the blow-out prevention equipment used for the Macondo well, asked the U.S. Court of Appeals in New Orleans to throw out the existing trial plan and rule that claims against the company should be tried before a jury. U.S. District Court Judge Carl Barbier, who is overseeing much of the spill litigation, has scheduled a nonjury trial for Feb. 27 in New Orleans to determine liability and apportion fault.
Barbier plans two subsequent nonjury phases on the size of the spill and efforts to contain it. Test jury trials on damages to victims would follow, the judge has said. Cameron said that trial plan violates its constitutional rights.
‘Free-for-All’
The trial plan “invites” the plaintiffs’ lawyers “to participate in a potentially riotous free-for-all over fault on behalf of an undifferentiated mass of unidentified plaintiffs,” wrote David Beck, Cameron’s lawyer.
Cameron also contends that Barbier chose the wrong laws to govern the spill litigation and that claims against the company fall under the federal Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which allows for a jury trial.
Facts and Conclusions
Barbier is entitled to utilize the structure to determine facts and conclusions he’ll need to apply in further phases of the spill litigation, Stephen Herman and James Roy, liaison counsel said in the filing.
Halliburton Co. (HAL), which provided the cementing services to the well, said it supported the challenge to the trial plan.
“The current trial plan purports to address liability issues in isolation from actual claims and causation issues,” Donald Goodwin, Halliburton’s lawyer, said in a Nov. 7 filing at the appeals court.
Any attempt to use the judge’s liability findings in individual claims “violates the district court’s limited pre- trial jurisdiction over MDL cases,” Goodwin said. Houston-based Halliburton supports the use of maritime law to govern the lawsuits, he said.
[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;59200]The National Academy of Engineering report on Deepwater Horizon has just been released. Press release at:
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=13273
and prepublication PDF at:
National Academies reports typically carry great weight with Congress.
Cheers,
Earl[/QUOTE]
Industry, has always welcomed the considered view of new thought and consideration provided by the universities and their great scholars. Much of this study is produced from the midst of various classrooms where brilliant minds gather to highlight what may have gone wrong on the Macondo well based on their understanding of events, purely theoretical, and yet, a fool dismisses their considered approach. I have only read the first two sections of their report but feel immediately that there are many observations which we on this site alone have already concluded. Nevertheless, fresh thought and input is always welcome, especially with the emphasis being on safety system engineering.
The big question is: Where was safety system engineering absent on the Macondo well? At what point did the Macondo well fail?
This is a question no-one wishes to answer, they prefer to allow the lawyers, government, and perhaps demonstrators, the opportunity to vent their anger first. I always fret when people without knowledge of the industry suddenly show or display ‘the evidence to convict’! I hate the journalists who misrepresent truth to suit their own purposes, and US journalists provided the public with panic, lies, false understanding, and accusations sourced from the whitehouse offering direction on who to find guilty prior to any trial having taken place.
Who is noble? Perhaps, none! But, when did you last get a Company the size of BP admitting to their legal obligation?? It has never happened where a Company is prepared to downsize 25% willingly. Why did they do it? Their obligations for exploration are clear, and the Gov’t knew that by allowing them to do the ‘deepwater’ they had a company prepared to cover the costs.
BP assumed that by the time the casing was set and cemented the main obligation on design was accepted. The long string was accepted by MMS.
The time the cement was in place is the relevant part of the investigation. All was fine up until this point, allowing for the fact that the conversion of the Shoe/float was mistakenly accepted. No damage done to the well at this point. Our hydrostatic pressure exerted by the mud column still provides the primary barrier.
Does anyone disagree?
The well planners onshore cased the hydrocarbon zones.
They then cemented these zones, successfully or not, is irrelevant at this point.
Was all well up until this point? Yes or no? It was, from the point of view that the casing was set, and positive tests were conducted.
Was the positive test successful? It was.
Was the negative test successful?
To the people on the rig it was.
How many attempts should the negative test have taken and what was the bleed off volume expected for a successful test?
They, on the vessel, conducting this test allowed ‘fantastic’ volumes to be bled from the well…without accountability. This is 100% an Operator responsibility, but if anyone expects me to believe that the Contractor, lending their vessel for exploration, is not participating…considering the fact that they are lining up all the valves to perform the validation, suggets to me that the contractor is running the show. The University don’t know the responsibilities of Contractor versus Operator versus Government. They, are aware of modelling and suggested practices. Government provide the interaction detail between the Operator and Contractor, but Gov’t have never defined any responsibility to the Contractor in the event that historical values of pollution occur. Or they were ‘numb’ to the fact that potential for widespread pollution was possible, but not impossible! We explore, and their is danger as revealed by the risks highlighted by various universities, and independent authorities. They were there before the finger pointing and they exist today!
Up until the ‘Macondo’ they were all working within the practices known and adhered to in the industry. Since then, with the Whitehouse ‘pointing fingers’ we have a situation where all the engineers around the world are offering their advice on how to run deepwater exploration wells. The truth is that BP are most probably the most experienced in deepwater…but the truth is, we should never abandon our barrier philosophy. A well’s barriers can fail at any time. The Contractor is placed to police this possibility and resct accordingly with a vessel providing operational and tested BOP FAILSAFES.
The big question all the universities and engineers need to attend to is: what went wrong on this well where the Contractor’s personell allowed a vast quantity of hydrocarbons to enter the well without even knowing the event was taking place!!! The systems contractually agreed between BP and TO to ‘police’ the well were ignored completely.
All is well when we monitor. The well is constantly ‘speaking’, not that I expect any engineer to understand this phenomena, which is quite particular to drilling wells with a variety of formations to ‘battle’ with. The practitioners, the contracted personnel, are constantly interpreting volume, pressure, torque, weight of string etc… And, believe me, there are no two wells the same…the very reason we need people monitoring what’s happening…or might be occurring in the well. We need instant interpretation…not a two year study after the event… and even then, not all is completely understood by the theorists!
I may sound somewhat frustrated, but all wells are in the control of contractors, and no-one in any University seems to accommodate/verify this fact. Perhaps, they are also persuaded by the initial outpouring of dissent against the Oil Company by apparent ‘journalists’ in the US (a serious case of dumbing down engineering processes gone wrong)!
I’ll read more, and perhaps change my opinion!
In the meantime, all the conclusions provided by valued sources indicate that the Contractor was innocent in the case of the Blowout on the Macondo. I hope you don’t offer this conclusion to the rest of the world. They may relax and use the ‘get-out-clause’ mimicking the behaviour on the vessel, lack of well control, by ignoring volumes and pressure.
I wonder if we could have a study by an impartial University concerning the responsibilities of ‘they’ monitoring wells.
After all, that’s why we had a blowout!!! Prior to this it was just another well with expensive remedial action required to isolate the hydrocarbon zones…and then, produce!!! Shouldn’t have been a major drama!