Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

[QUOTE=alcor;37195]Correction: I believe all well blowouts are preventable. Some of the other commentators were alarmed by this comment.[/QUOTE]
Yes, I understood that and I think a lot of others reading your post would as well. It was a killer question. Certainly you can’t start to drill unless you have that as a basic premise.

Next - Bigmoose went to different places on the EXPRO site. He highlights an excellent feature (internal inspection of BOPs) which, whilst it makes my untimely comment look dumb in one sense, adds to the point I made. The capability to do wonderful things is there. It just needs to be applied in a whole through-project manner with some proper FMEA. Analysis of the BOP is useless if it takes 5 hours to undo a single nut and you need to undo 12 nuts before you can start to intervene.

[QUOTE=DDdon;37174]I have seen far too many companies in my oil-patch carreer who only “talk-the-talk”. That is to say, everybody has an HSE department and preaches safety, but when it comes down to safety versus cost or scheduling, somehow safety is always the loser. I would like to say that I am fortunate that the company I currently work for - Schlumberger - actually “Walk-the Walk” when it comes to safety. Are they perfect? No. But their culture of safety is the best I’ve seen in over 30 years in the industry.[/QUOTE]

Could I ask that those with experience make a point of naming names, either of the good actors, as above and Taylor, or calling out the bad? Given how oil distribution works, it is hard to support the good and penalize the bad, but we all need to start somewhere…

Next - Bigmoose went to different places on the EXPRO site. He highlights an excellent feature (internal inspection of BOPs) which, whilst it makes my untimely comment look dumb in one sense, adds to the point I made. The capability to do wonderful things is there. It just needs to be applied in a whole through-project manner with some proper FMEA. Analysis of the BOP is useless if it takes 5 hours to undo a single nut and you need to undo 12 nuts before you can start to intervene.

I agree with your ‘systems’ premise when it comes to maintainability, however relying on ROV intervention is questionable as weather etc can cause problems. Personally, I would prefer we didn’t have to manipulate bolts with an ROV, sounds way too much like working on a steam engine 200 years ago.

It is possible to make a BOP system both far more modular and far more redundant, and recoverable and maintainable in increments.

The annulars detaching with the LMPR is one step along the way, it is certainly feasible to move much farther down this path.

[QUOTE=alcor;37195]Correction: I believe all well blowouts are preventable. Some of the other commentators were alarmed by this comment.[/QUOTE]

Not all well control situations are avoidable, but I agree with you Alcor that drilling operations should be designed such that all loss of well control is avoidable, this entails that the right tools are in place and are in good working condition, and there is no human error.

Can you or someone else tell me if the displays the driller on the DWH was looking at are derived from the exact same sensors the Halliburton chart was using? If so, is there a direct calibration between the displays? Is it possible the driller was looking at slightly different displays than we are using to analyze?

A Cook- should we stop airline flights because we don’t know a fail safe method to safely deal with all the engines quitting at the same time? ROV tech improvement needs emphasis, an emphatic yes, but re: the socket & nut, either they needed a swivel joint, a different size/shaped impact to work in the space, or they had the wrong size socket or scale had built up on the nut.

[QUOTE=company man 1;37170]Edit: It sounds as though the BOPs as well as mixture of cement will come into play. Would like to hear more from pumping jack on the cement nitrogen form his research.[/QUOTE]

Am in the process of accessing some of the fifty references at the end of the chapter written by David Lewis, Blade Energy Partners and Richard A. Miller, Viking Engineering. Sorry it’s taking so long, the more I learn the less I know. Deepwater technology seems to be progressing exponentially.

[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;37201]Not all well control situations are avoidable, but I agree with you Alcor that drilling operations should be designed such that all loss of well control is avoidable, this entails that the right tools are in place and are in good working condition, and there is no human error.

Can you or someone else tell me if the displays the driller on the DWH was looking at are derived from the exact same sensors the Halliburton chart was using? If so, is there a direct calibration between the displays? Is it possible the driller was looking at slightly different displays than we are using to analyze?

A Cook- should we stop airline flights because we don’t know a fail safe method to safely deal with all the engines quitting at the same time? ROV tech improvement needs emphasis, an emphatic yes, but re: the socket & nut, either they needed a swivel joint, a different size/shaped impact to work in the space, or they had the wrong size socket or scale had built up on the nut.[/QUOTE]

The logger’s display would have been right in front of the driller’s eyes as well as an equally good rig monitoring system. Two independent systems available for perusal. Some data may have been relayed to the logger. And, the Rig data may not have had an online connection, so the rig data may have been lost.

[QUOTE=alcor;37203]The logger’s display would have been right in front of the driller’s eyes as well as an equally good rig monitoring system. Two independent systems available for perusal. Some data may have been relayed to the logger. And, the Rig data may not have had an online connection, so the rig data may have been lost.[/QUOTE]

Do you know what the various DWH driller’s displays looked like exactly, was it a graph exactly like the chart we’re looking at, or digital LED, or dials? Recently calibrated? Cross checked with the mud logger’s readings? Do we know for a fact that it was working correctly at the time? There’s been mention of some things not working in various reports and presentations. The reason I’m wondering is because in other areas you are saying we need to wait for the investigation to unfurl, but here you assume you know enough to make a determination. I think it’s great to hammer in the points for basic well control, but there were a lot of things going wrong at the same time out there, so are you 100% sure of your assumption?

RE: earlier question by MikeDB concerning the notion that this well may have penetrated the Moho, may prove the russian hypothesis of abiotic petroleum, may kill the Peak Oil Hypothesis, Etc…

[QUOTE=MikeDB;37184]I hate to quote myself, but has anyone here given this any thought?[/QUOTE]

MikeDB,

I suspect the reason you have gotten no response to your questions is twofold. First, most of the folks following this blog are offshore marine community, not the geology community, so the expertise to comment intelligently on geologic themes is probably thin. Second, the small minority of us who do have a geologic background consider the kinds of ideas you are mentioning to be so long disproved that they are not worth distracting the main threads of this discussion about the safety of deepwater drilling. But for the sake of the rest of the audience, who may never have seen the arguments, let me summarize the key points against your various notions.

Did the well penetrate the Moho?
The answer is definitively NO. The Moho is the boundary between the crust, made up of rocks dominated by quartz and feldspar minerals, and the underlying mantle, made up of rocks dominated by olivine. The chemical differences between crust and mantle result in fundamental differences in the physical properties of the rocks, such as the difference in seismic velocity which was first documented by Mr. Mohorovicic more than a century ago. This boundary typically sits from 3.5 to 6 miles below the top of the oceanic crust, which itself sits below all the thick pile of sediments in the Gulf of Mexico which are roughly 10 miles thick at the well site. The well didn’t even get half way through the sediments overlying the crust, so the 4 miles covered by the well (roughly 1 through water and another 3 through sediments) obviously did not penetrate the Moho, which is probably still more than 10 miles below the bottom of the well.

The abiogenic hypothesis for the origin of petroleum.
This was a popular idea back in the 50’s and was strongly advocated by the ruling authorities of the russian geological community. Since the late 50’s and early 60’s the onset of the revolution in geologic thinking due to the theory of plate tectonics has largely swept aside most of the original arguments, but there are still a few diehard advocates who will go to their graves clinging to the idea (much as there are still advocates of the expanding earth hypothesis even after satellite telemetry has definitively disproved the notion). For those reading this blog who are not familiar with the debate, the currently accepted biogenic theory for the origin of petroleum states that petroleum is generated from the breakdown of organic matter trapped in sediments under the influence of the high pressures and temperatures imposed by burial. In essence, the alternative abiogenic theory suggests that a significant fraction of petroleum has its origins in methane trickling out of the mantle. The scientific evidence for the biogenic theory is abundant, ranging from the strong correlation of worldwide petroleum discoveries to proximity to organic rich source rocks, to a strong correlation of the degree of burial of those source rocks to the chemistry of the resulting petroleum generated, to precise chemical fingerprint matching between many oils and the source rocks which generated them, to geochemical fossils which can be dirctly tied back to exotic organic molecules in the evolutionary progression of species which died to produce the organic matter. The evidence is far greater than it would be possible or appropriate to review in this blog.

As far as I can gather, the abiogenic theory rests on a series of “Yeah, but…” statements attempting to refute the prevailing biogenic theory. The major points typically raised are that traces of methane are seen in the mantle, petroleum is occasionally found in the crystalline rocks of the crust underneath the sediments, and petroleum occasionally is found below the source rocks from which they could be sourced. All of these are true, but none of them are anything like the “smoking gun” to kill the biogenic theory that abiogenic proponents suggest. The traces of methane found in mantle rocks are real, but are in miniscule quantities and their carbon isotopic signatures do not match those found in petroleum. The presence of petroleum beneath the source rocks, whether in deeper strata or in the underlying fractured basement rocks, is also not a contradiction of their biogenic origin. The conversion of buried organic matter to petroleum creates added volume (solids converting to liquids and gases) and results in elevated fluid pressures. As we’ve seen vividly demonstrated in the recent top kill operation, when you increase pressure at a point the fluids are forced both upwards and downwards. If the upward path is easier, then most of the flow will go that way (as seen in the recent top kill attempt). If the upward path is impeded, as would be the case if strongly impermeable rocks overly the source beds (or in the case of the top kill, if the junk shots had succeeded in plugging the pipes), then fluid will be driven downward. Even if one were to accept one or more of these “Yeah, but…” arguments as support for an alternative to the biogenic theory, you would still be scientifically obliged to explain how all of the massive evidence in favor of a biogenic origin can be explained by your alternative. I have yet to hear anyone even attempt this with an abiogenic theory. As for all the gas coming from the current blowout having any bearing on the biogenic/abiogenic debate, the gassy oil seen here is exactly what traditional basin modelling, based on a biogenic origin for petroleum, would predict at these depths.

Could this well disprove the Peak Oil hypothesis?
I doubt it. In a nutshell, the Peak Oil hypothesis states that petroleum is a finite resource that was built up over geologic time and at some point, unless our consumption stops growing and starts to fall, we will be unable to find and/or produce as much of it as we consume. The peak of discovery of oil in the US happened back in the 70’s and for the world happened in the late 80’s. However, due to the long lag time between discovery and production, which often stretches to many decades for giant fields, and also due to the discovery of methods to squeeze more oil out of existing fields, the peak in production comes significantly later. But Pak Oil production has clearly already happened in the US and may currently be happening for the rest of the world. As for natural gas, we are currently experiencing a boom in production as liquified natural gas technology allows formerly trapped gas already discovered in remote places to be delivered to market. This has also been boosted by recent advances in our ability to extract gas from tight shales onshore, which was previously thought to be unrecoverable. But both of these are not new discoveries and simply reflect technology improvements to allow more to be extracted from what’s already been found. This spike in gas production will be a blip on the larger trend of rising and then falling production of total petroleum. In the long run we have no choice as a species but to find alternative ways to generate energy if we hope to maintain even our current standard of living, never mind lift the third world up to the standards enjoyed currently by the developed world. The other side of the peak will not be a sudden catastrophe as the last drop is extracted, but rather a long progression of rising prices for petroleum products as the cost of the advanced technology to produce more of the currently unextractable remaining resource continues to rise. Sadly, the fight to control that dwindling resource is likely to have more impact on most individuals than the actual market price. And the risks taken to extract it will only grow.

While I would personally love to talk about geology issues ad nauseum, I suspect this is not the appropriate forum. I have said my piece and will leave it there. Thanks for those who were interested. Sorry to those who weren’t.

[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;37201]
A Cook- should we stop airline flights because we don’t know a fail safe method to safely deal with all the engines quitting at the same time? ROV tech improvement needs emphasis, an emphatic yes, but re: the socket & nut, either they needed a swivel joint, a different size/shaped impact to work in the space, or they had the wrong size socket or scale had built up on the nut.[/QUOTE]

Designed in safety. Both engines fail - 65 miles from any land. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Transat_Flight_236
I have no idea if they had fitted out the ROV with the wrong socket (!), I hope not, because it went up to the surface and and came down again and was not much better. I think if my memory serves me right (and I was not watching for the several hours it went on for) - first they could not get alignment so some hours later we saw it re-appear with white marks on the outside of the socket to match where the corners of the hex socket were inside, so they could get a visual with the head of the nut and there was some grey gaffer tape allowing for some relative movement between the ROV and the socket so alignment on the nut did not have to be absolutely perfect. Hours in still no socket on nut. Development on the run while the crisis is ongoing. Sorry, some are not going to like it, but that was bungling amateurism. As I stated, I am entirely confident the talent exists within the industry to design a fastener system and access arrangements to make it compatible with ROV technology as it exists today. It is just that land based solutions have not been sufficiently re-engineered for maintenance on the bottom of the ocean. And that raises the question of why ? Which then gets back to Alcor’s fundamental question. You don’t start until you are confident that you can deal with the consequences of a blow out. The plane lost all engines. Flip down the ram air turbine electrical generator. Emergency electrical power restored. We can go 65 miles without engines. Compare that with a plan that is so detailed that they know how to deal with all the walruses in the GOM. The cliche has it - one has planed for failure the other has failed to plan. Sure there is a plan in place. As several are saying here. They talk the talk. If it ever happens we will go down and sort it out with an ROV and if that does not work first time, we have a roll of grey sticky tape and some rubber to try again later.

It is a plan. It is just not a very good one.

[QUOTE=MikeDB;37190]I believe the abiotic oil theory is true and this disaster is likely to prove peak oil as a scam brought to us by the oil companies.

“The modern Russian-Ukrainian theory of deep, abiotic petroleum origins is not controversial nor presently a matter of academic debate. The period of debate about this extensive body of knowledge has been over for approximately two decades (Simakov 1986). The modern theory is presently applied extensively throughout the former U.S.S.R. as the guiding perspective for petroleum exploration and development projects. There are presently more than 80 oil and gas fields in the Caspian district alone which were explored and developed by applying the perspective of the modern theory and which produce from the crystalline basement rock. (Krayushkin, Chebanenko et al. 1994) Similarly, such exploration in the western Siberia cratonic-rift sedimentary basin has developed 90 petroleum fields of which 80 produce either partly or entirely from the crystalline basement. The exploration and discoveries of the 11 major and 1 giant fields on the northern flank of the Dneiper-Donets basin have already been noted. There are presently deep drilling exploration projects under way in Azerbaijan, Tatarstan, and Asian Siberia directed to testing potential oil and gas reservoirs in the crystalline basement.”
(http://www.gasresources.net/index.htm)[/QUOTE]

Do you know of any basement production in the US you could point me to? There is precious little Pre-Cambrian and even less Cambrian, but of all the wells drilled through the basement in the US, I know of none being O&G productive.

[QUOTE=A Cooke;37206]Designed in safety. Both engines fail - 65 miles from any land. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Transat_Flight_236
I have no idea if they had fitted out the ROV with the wrong socket (!), I hope not, because it went up to the surface and and came down again and was not much better. I think if my memory serves me right (and I was not watching for the several hours it went on for) - first they could not get alignment so some hours later we saw it re-appear with white marks on the outside of the socket to match where the corners of the hex socket were inside, so they could get a visual with the head of the nut and there was some grey gaffer tape allowing for some relative movement between the ROV and the socket so alignment on the nut did not have to be absolutely perfect. Hours in still no socket on nut. Development on the run while the crisis is ongoing. Sorry, some are not going to like it, but that was bungling amateurism. As I stated, I am entirely confident the talent exists within the industry to design a fastener system and access arrangements to make it compatible with ROV technology as it exists today. It is just that land based solutions have not been sufficiently re-engineered for maintenance on the bottom of the ocean. And that raises the question of why ? Which then gets back to Alcor’s fundamental question. You don’t start until you are confident that you can deal with the consequences of a blow out. The plane lost all engines. Flip down the ram air turbine electrical generator. Emergency electrical power restored. We can go 65 miles without engines. Compare that with a plan that is so detailed that they know how to deal with all the walruses in the GOM. The cliche has it - one has planed for failure the other has failed to plan. Sure there is a plan in place. As several are saying here. They talk the talk. If it ever happens we will go down and sort it out with an ROV and if that does not work first time, we have a roll of grey sticky tape and some rubber to try again later.

It is a plan. It is just not a very good one.[/QUOTE]

I see your point. [I]I’m glad they could find a runway, but what if they weren’t in range of a runway? Over the ocean? On land more than 65 miles from a landing strip? Or how about driving, should we stop driving because we ca’tn guarantee someone won’t run a stop sign and pull out in front of us? I haven’t thought of a parallel to an environmental disaster…… yet.[/I]

[I]You can get certain kinds of very good hands on info from these web forums, but if I understood your post correctly and you really looking to get an idea of the technology you just criticized your time would be well spent also reading the technology journals, books, and papers. And also think in general about the psyche of people in this industry in the big picture, for instance several people including BP’s Sr Drllg Eng have mentioned it’s not worth spending money on a CBL because it’s unreliable sonic data, but then this well and all other deepwater wells are drilled and spend hundreds of millions of dollars based on seismic data which is just as unreliable sonic data or possibly more unreliable than a CBL.
[/I]

[I]So please do come up with a better concept! My concept 16 years ago was to develop a closed loop submarine drilling system operating beneath the hurricanes, beneath the floating ice, but you say that ROVs are still clumsy machines at even the simplest tasks, so a rational conclusion might be that we will develop alternative energy before we deploy a submarine closed loop drilling system. Alternative energy may be the concept you are reaching for. Drilling for oil has always been, and may always be, a dirty job. Anytime you crank up a combustion engine you are saying yes to dirty work.[/I]

[I] Another way to phrase the questions you are asking about deepwater drilling might be, “why are we needing to try to do something that is so difficult?”[/I]

[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;37204]Do you know what the various DWH driller’s displays looked like exactly, was it a graph exactly like the chart we’re looking at, or digital LED, or dials? Recently calibrated? Cross checked with the mud logger’s readings? Do we know for a fact that it was working correctly at the time? There’s been mention of some things not working in various reports and presentations. The reason I’m wondering is because in other areas you are saying we need to wait for the investigation to unfurl, but here you assume you know enough to make a determination. I think it’s great to hammer in the points for basic well control, but there were a lot of things going wrong at the same time out there, so are you 100% sure of your assumption?[/QUOTE]

I wasn’t there. You asked if the driller could see the display as we all see the printed version. On 100% of rigs I’ve worked on the display is visible right in front of the driller. Additionally, the rig have an independent system with the data displayed in a similiar way. Hopefully, all are calibrated. A very big question mark would be associated with any volume control which isn’t in working order. Shut down and fix it.

[QUOTE=A Cooke;37206]Compare that with a plan that is so detailed that they know how to deal with all the walruses in the GOM.[/QUOTE]

I had to take this picture of a sign that was at the entrance to Grand Isle State Park.

[ATTACH]989[/ATTACH]

[QUOTE=alcor;37209]I wasn’t there. You asked if the driller could see the display as we all see the printed version. On 100% of rigs I’ve worked on the display is visible right in front of the driller. Additionally, the rig have an independent system with the data displayed in a similiar way. Hopefully, all are calibrated. A very big question mark would be associated with any volume control which isn’t in working order. Shut down and fix it.[/QUOTE]

Shut down and fix it. But in another post I’m not sure I understood you, Re: rig down time. Did you imply it is too tempting for a drilling contractor to fudge the results on a BOP test because it will cost 3 days downtime if needing maintenance, and your solution to that is for the operator to pay for that rig downtime? Or please clarify what you said, maybe it’s applicable here to maintaining surface readouts, etc.

Question for Alcor:

What would have happened on this well if the BOPs had effectively worked, as designed?

I thank you in advance for your answer.

Geodude, thank you for your reply. I had questions more than answers but I still lean more toward oil being abiotic. Again, thank you for replying.

Does anyone know the damage of the well casing or how far down it is?
If they can remove the shear rams on the BOP then would it be possible to run an expandable Bridge plug or a hydraulic packer plug on coiled pipe down to the bottom of the well.
After it is engaged then fill the bore with cement??
Is there any reason that would not work?

http://www.omega-completion.com/downhole_hex_bridge_plug.html
http://www.omega-completion.com/downhole_me_bridge_plug.html
I am sure you are aware of similar hydraulic packers that are of similar design.

[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;37212]Shut down and fix it. But in another post I’m not sure I understood you, Re: rig down time. Did you imply it is too tempting for a drilling contractor to fudge the results on a BOP test because it will cost 3 days downtime if needing maintenance, and your solution to that is for the operator to pay for that rig downtime? Or please clarify what you said, maybe it’s applicable here to maintaining surface readouts, etc.[/QUOTE]

When our BOP doesn’t pass tests we pull it and fix it. Zero day rate. I can’t comment on others. What I would say is that the Operator should bear the expense if they witnessed all tests at surface, and a reasonable amount of usage on bottom has transpired. Therefore, if it’s been good for three months without failure, then the contractor should stay on full day rate if the BOP has to be pulled. This would be the ideal world. Contracts are different.

[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;37208]
[I] Another way to phrase the questions you are asking about deepwater drilling might be, “why are we needing to try to do something that is so difficult?”[/I][/QUOTE]

I think everyone knows why so many are committed to working so hard, in difficult conditions, to get something that is significantly more than the lubricant of modern life. I don’t doubt the talent. I know there are some strong words said here on this forum but there is also a great deal of exchange of knowledge on this and other threads and there is the potential to make sure the likelihood of DWH2 is highly remote and the impact far less serious, were it to happen. I feel sorry for the ROV guys trying their hardest. It is just that the time and effort has not been put into planning for disaster. Similarly I have confidence that the systems can be designed to provide multiple layers of defense. I am just saying, as a person external to the industry, it is appears that technology has been applied effectively in some areas and other areas appear devoid of anything approaching forward thinking or a plan that would justify that name. That blindness to lack of planning is obvious when Kent speaks about “solutions”. BP are not deliberately trying to look like fools in their operations on the ocean floor. What they are doing appears to be what other operators would/could do in the same circumstance. Others might like to think that they would never get into the situation in the first place but hold on - why not develop the technology and put it in place so that should you happen to encounter failure - you can deal with it. Nobody will predict all modes of failure, humans are very ingenious at finding different ways to do what should be a straightforward task. When you see this - hit the red button and do that. It is never usually that simple. Why was a BOP connected up differently ? OK it could work, provided…
I liked reading the posts about comparisons with the nuclear industry. Not all lessons and practices will read across, but a some vital ones may.

[QUOTE=MikeDB;37181]Wouldn’t that be all blowouts are preventable provided the equipment can handle the pressure of the well and every safety precaution was taken?[/QUOTE]

My point exactly, provided the equipment and the well design can handle the pressure of the well and every safety precaution is taken, then every blowout indeed [I]is[/I] preventable.

However:
The design of this well casing and construction was obviously flawed.
It was bp’s design.*
The completion of the well as per the design was obviously flawed (such as cementing).
Bp was in charge of the decisions that flawed the completion (lack of centeralizers, lack of time letting cement set, etc.)**

Those are all acknowledged facts.

Now for my speculation:

The minute they started to remove mud from the well, they were doomed because there would be no way to regain control as the design of the well failed. Even if they saw what was happening, and starting pumping mud again, once the casing and annular seals failed, it was game over. The question was asked about closing the BOP: even if they were able to close the BOP and it operated flawlessly, the pressures were so high that although the BOP itself may not have failed, the improperly designed casing completion would have blown apart and the situation would be even worse than it is now (if you can believe that).

So Alcor can blame the rig crew for failing to “listen to the well”, but even if they heard what it was saying, they couldn’t do a damn thing about it. The real lapse occurred somehow, somewhere in the design phase, or in the redesign phase when the initial exploratory well was converted to a production well completion. That was purely in bp’s court, and too bad (for all of us) that their partners and the government trusted bp and didn’t save the poor, incompetent largest petroleum company in the world from their own stupidity.

Again though, Alcor put forward the preposterous idea that the dirlling operator should incur rig downtime costs for their client’s design errors. That tells you all you need to know about Alcor.

  • and TOI and MMS deserve blame for trusting and aquiessing to bp.
    ** and TOI and Halliburton and MMS deserve blame for trusting and aquiessing to bp.