Re your #3178. My experience is that culture [B][I][U]can[/U][/I][/B] be changed, [I]but[/I] it takes a [U]dedicated, CONSISTENT, persistent effort from top management[/U] to do it. Walking the walk, not talking the talk (no bonuses payable for not utilizing maintenance ‘budgets’). Most important, personnel changes. The dinosaurs either seriously get with the new program or are put out to pasture. Firing a few for behavior alien to the new culture is highly instructive. Meanwhile, the new style, the new consciousness gets promoted, gets ahead, gets modeled, gets mentored, sinks into the organization’s DNA. Eventually, even the dense get the message.
Someone said if it isn’t done in 5 years, clean out at the top. Without being disagreeable, I disagree with that. Having now seen one of these done successfully in one (major) respect in one organization, I think it takes more like a decade before the change is pervasive–and it is the pervasiveness that is what matters. You’ve got to drive it far enough into the organization that the guy who made the 6/21 centralizer call doesn’t even [I]think[/I] about cutting the corner–it’s just something that [B][I]we[/I][/B] don’t do.
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;37151]Alvis, how did you feel after wittnessing the aftermath of the explosion[/QUOTE]
I feel sad. And angry. I absolutely hate that oil is impacting all of this beautiful environment, marine life, and wild life. And I’m p*ssed off that something like this happened to begin with and we are powerless to stop it. We have got to ensure that something like this never happens again.
I’m even more pissed off now than I was before having seen into such a small window of a giant tragedy.
[QUOTE=Snowman03782;37149]hey guys- dont lose the importance in this issue, diesel air intakes need to be investigated.[/QUOTE]
I agree, esp. since I spent a number of years offshore working as an Instrument and Electrical Tech, a Mechanic, and a Fire Supression tech. I’ve worked for a company doing USGS/MMS safety device testing and certification. I’ve worked in the combustible gas systems industry. Much of my work has been around safety training and systems.
Emergency Shutdown Systems are absolutely critical to Life Safety. And since I see very little attention given to it in the media, or what I hear coming out of the various hearings, I intend to run this dog down.
Questions for you, Alcor: do you know for sure that the driller had the exact same information the Halliburton chart is showing you/us? If not, what exact information are you absolutely sure that the driller did have during this time?
Why do you think it happens that BP always has more profit to share with investors than other majors?
Wouldn’t it be ironic if the nitrogen pumped in the nitrogen cement job coalesced and caused the pressure that blew out the unlocked seal?
>> Nitrogen Gas Cushion .…. Nitrogen is typically placed as a foamed spacer ahead of the primary cement job…. Finally, there is risk that nitrogen may coalesce and rise in the annulus. If the annulus is trapped, then the nitrogen bubble has little room to expand, resulting in the migration of high BHPs back to the mud line. With deep strings and high mud weights the possibility of gas migration raising mudline pressures may outweigh any benefit of APB mitigation.<<
[QUOTE=Alf;37137]yes it is possible to be off from vertical/horizontal… I incorrectly call it pilot error… but in fact everyone who does it will get slightly different results.
When an ROV is working or moving it needs some kind of reference to vertical/horizontal. The pilot’s only view to the outside world is via cameras. These cameras need a reference point. ideally something fixed to the seabed.
In addition, the pilot needs to know where his ROV is relative to what he’s looking at, hence the quick camera movements up/down/left/right to verify the camera view relative to fixed vertical/horizontal points on the ROV.
Normally, there would be a [B]minimum[/B] of 4x bullseyes used: 1 on the 36" wellhead, 1 on the main frame of the BOP, 1 on the LMRP and 1 on the flex joint. These are installed from day 1 so to speak and monitored regularly with the ROV. Changes in readings are easy to see.
The ROV should be flying pretty close to horizontal although currents and other things can affect it.[/QUOTE]
One way to tell if it is the ROV or the well head is looking at the oil comoimng out. The oil & gas are going to rise horizontally no matter what the tilt of the pipe. the oil is definitely telling us there is lean & the cap is leaning heavily. There is also quite a bit of corrosion happening at the bottom of the cap.
[QUOTE=OldHondoHand;37155]I agree, esp. since I spent a number of years offshore working as an Instrument and Electrical Tech, a Mechanic, and a Fire Supression tech. I’ve worked for a company doing USGS/MMS safety device testing and certification. I’ve worked in the combustible gas systems industry. Much of my work has been around safety training and systems.
Emergency Shutdown Systems are absolutely critical to Life Safety. And since I see very little attention given to it in the media, or what I hear coming out of the various hearings, I intend to run this dog down.[/QUOTE]
I will be looking forward to your reports on this.
[QUOTE=alvis;37142]BP said that it took them a day to figure out one of the controls on the control panel was miswired to the SSTV (test ram). Which is why the ram they were trying to activate wouldn’t activate. Early on in this catastrophe, I had read where they were looking to see if the deadman switch could have been wired to the SSTV. Have they said whether this was or was not the case? If the bop control panel was mistakenly wired to the SSTV, could any of the safeties topside been wired to the SSTV and not have activated when they were commanded to?[/QUOTE]
I am not in drill industry. Agree excellent questions. Have not read any relevant testimony re deadman switches, except others had Qs whether deadman switch was manual or automatic, or was even present. [If I recall correctly DM sw. works to release rig from LMRP or BOP?].
Surely, reconfigure of BOP rams resulting in miswire/crosswire of 2 sets of rams makes suspect all wiring for other errors.
Dare to say, the[B] fact[/B] that alteration of a standard BOP resulted in [B]unknown[/B] miswiring of ram controls [B]because there was no post-alteration testing[/B] is criminal neglect by management. It disabled BOP operation [ram pincers apparently, not the shear rams].
The no-oversight of multiple, [B]critical[/B] steps begs the outrageous possibility such was deliberate. Do not mis-estimate the subtle games ThePowersThatBe can play. The fact of Bernie Madoff meant TPTB, or their not-so-underlings, were involved.
I’m a craftsperson in nuc power generation. [B]Critical steps[/B] are backed-up relentlessly and reviewed by all participating employees before every job…still there is no absolute control. [E.g. a crane operator has a long and powerful “reach” that very quickly can make spectcular short-circuits…not to even mention other consequences. Such are individually and continually monitored… and the monitors are monitored.] All are liable to direct, gov’t, regulatory acton [ 3-letter agencies]. [I exaggerate?]
Certain kinds of drilling in DW GOM can have horrendous [mass] consequences…so must be treated with special procedures, say, like the handling of nuc/bio materials. Isn’t it so?
Welcome to the universe of horrendous consequences.
Sorry to interrupt, but …if you are looking for critical EmergencyShutdown or EDS history and went to the Nuclear Power Industry, it would do nicely. See my post just before this one.
[QUOTE=alcor;37136]All well control schools will tell you that all blowouts are preventable. It’s a very simple statement. Operators and drilling contractors have to anticipate the highest pressures that the well can throw at them. And act accordingly. I repeat, all blowouts are preventable.[/QUOTE]
Here we go again. You fail to address anything substantive yet again.
Blowouts (or any well failure) is only preventable if you don’t drill a failed well construction plan in the first place. If that is what you are saying, then Mozoltov! We agree!
Therefore, if bp designed a well completion that was doomed to fail (and current events have proven that), there was no way to “close it in”, period. If they had a failed cement job (as it appears they did), or failed casing (as it appears they did), leading to execution of a failed well design, there was no way to prevent a blow out (short of complete abandonment, and even that would be sketchy since failures in the casing and design, i.e. formation losses, would have potentially prevented complete abandonment).
You keep on spouting off about how TOI should have “listened to the well” and shut the BOP. Even if they had, the shit bp well design was going to explode out of the casing since the casing design itself wasn’t capable of handling “the highest pressures that the well can throw at them”. Therefore, the main culpability that TOI (and anyone else associated with this disaster of civilization-changing proportion) had was [I]trusting bp to not be incompetent, greed-head, criminally negligent morons of cosmic proportion that should never be trusted by any government or partner in the industry[/I].
Hardly a ringing endorsement, and in fact, clearly agrees with CM1’s point that the US should never trust bp to even push a pocket penetrometer in the United States ever again.
[QUOTE=company man 1;37159]…the oil is definitely telling us there is lean & the cap os leaning heavily. There is also quite a bit of corrosion happening at the bottom of the cap.[/QUOTE]
Don’t forget also, that the flex jt ontop of the BOP is designed to move +/-15 degrees ie it’s similar to a ball joint. So whatever is above it will also affect the angle of it.
[QUOTE=OldHondoHand;37067]This it it, in a nutshell. BP set the stage and played the tune that everybody danced to. Remember what was at risk, there on the Rig: Money. Lots of it. Money was used as a carrot and a stick so EVERYBODY would dance the way BP called it.
Vast sums of money create powerful dependancies. Think of all the money as being a source of electrical current. In this case, the power in this operation was immense, so much so that everybody who grabbed onto the bare wires of this operation lost their ability to let go. TOI became dependant on their contracts with BP. The OIM became siezed with his dependency on BP. Even the Drilling Crew became addicted to the money that BP was handing out, like a crack dealer to his addicts. Wasn’t it the Driller who had a will drawn up and taught his wife how to run their RV while on his last days home? Didn’t the Rig Mechanic say he heard the Toolpusher acquiese to the BP’s man to displace the riser prematurely by saying, “Well, I guess that’s what the pinscers are for?”
It seems like everybody got blinded by the money. Same dynamic which wrecked our economy, by the way, with the creation of sub-prime mortgage bonds and derivatives. Money Blindness is a real, powerful, potentially deadly thing. Terminal Greed.
Because it is so, and because BP held the purse strings on this entire operation, and because they were in a position to know both how money affects those they dole it out to, and what affect it would have on them, and what the risks were in cutting corners on this well, then I hold them 100% responsible for this disaster.
BP’s Greed killed the Gulf, and eleven hands, and wrecked countless lives.
Next time you are in the position of power, think about it, before you use that power to influence somebody to do something that otherwise, they would not do.[/QUOTE]
I’m reminded of a classic saying that "Men do stupid things for two main reasons: money and women.
[QUOTE=peakoilerrrr;37110]CompanyMan1 re list of errors:
Thanks. You might add
[a] BOP ram arrangement altered to accept test instruments
[b] BOP knowingly partially-disabled
[c] BOP ram re-configuration thus altered control-panel operation
[d] BOP operating in manner no longer understood by personnel
[e] thus a non-standard BOP fraudulently used as a true [fail-safe] BOP.
[f] thus BOP used in unauthorized manner, voiding any Cameron liability?
The small people will spend their energies thrashing in misunderstood darkness. Ask the Nigerians et al. They have more direct experience with the BigOilies.
The real settlement of this affair will be secret and between governments. Like U.K. will not withdraw troops from Afghan., etc but will supply even more, or deals involving central banks, foreign adventures, meddling, or whatever.[/QUOTE]
Peakoiler, Would you mind going to the post I made & doing a reply with quote on it. I haven’t been really involved on the BOP investigation because a red flag came up on it immediately when I heard fingerpointing so quick without evidence. There are several experts following this thread to confirm or deny the validity of evidence of this BOP system. What I would hope for, is we bring up pertinent evidence. Discuss the facts & where they fit into the chain of events, then apply responsibility based upon sound reasoning. Several may have already discussed this previously & I missed it. I would like to do this for this respected court of public opinion. I believe there are enough people with connnections looking at this sight & this thread, that this will eventually make it to investigators & decision makers who will decide the fate of a BP. It will hopefully help make their job a little easier & speed up the judicial process & educate as many people as possible. I would like to have the items added to or challenged & removed by evidence & discussion. The main thing is not to let those decision makers loose focus on the root cause & address the guilty & move on to allow the good responsible people to flourish & go back to work.
[quote=“
Originally Posted by [B”]
alvis[/B]
BP said that it took them a day to figure out one of the controls on the control panel was miswired to the SSTV (test ram). Which is why the ram they were trying to activate wouldn’t activate. Early on in this catastrophe, I had read where they were looking to see if the deadman switch could have been wired to the SSTV. Have they said whether this was or was not the case? If the bop control panel was mistakenly wired to the SSTV, could any of the safeties topside been wired to the SSTV and not have activated when they were commanded to?
Originally Posted by [B]peakoilerrrr[/B]
I am not in drill industry. Agree excellent questions. Have not read any relevant testimony re deadman switches, except others had Qs whether deadman switch was manual or automatic, or was even present. [If I recall correctly DM sw. works to release rig from LMRP or BOP?].
Surely, reconfigure of BOP rams resulting in miswire/crosswire of 2 sets of rams makes suspect all wiring for other errors.
[/quote]
It’s a possibilty. Rams and annulars had been used successfuly days before and on that day.
EDS, Deadman etc were/are not tested as a matter of course after the BOP is run.
The fact that the hot stabs were incorrectly plumbed in suggests to me that they were never tested on surface before running the BOP. Which then raises the bigger question of how effectively was the BOP tested on surface?
It took a day to find out the problem (so say bp)… so bp and TO were not talking to each other at that time, or the “modification” was only known to people on the rig, or TO are hidng info, or…, or…??
[QUOTE=company man 1;37168]Peakoiler, Would you mind going to the post I made & doing a reply with quote on it. I haven’t been really involved on the BOP investigation because a red flag came up on it immediately when I heard fingerpointing so quick without evidence. There are several experts following this thread to confirm or deny the validity of evidence of this BOP system. What I would hope for, is we bring up pertinent evidence. Discuss the facts & where they fit into the chain of events, then apply responsibility based upon sound reasoning. Several may have already discussed this previously & I missed it. I would like to do this for this respected court of public opinion. I believe there are enough people with connnections looking at this sight & this thread, that this will eventually make it to investigators & decision makers who will decide the fate of a BP. It will hopefully help make their job a little easier & speed up the judicial process & educate as many people as possible. I would like to have the items added to or challenged & removed by evidence & discussion. The main thing is not to let those decision makers loose focus on the root cause & address the guilty & move on to allow the good responsible people to flourish & go back to work.[/QUOTE]
Edit: It sounds as though the BOPs as well as mixture of cement will come into play. Would like to hear more from pumping jack on the cement nitrogen form his research.
[QUOTE=Alf;37169]It’s a possibilty. Rams and annulars had been used successfuly days before and on that day.
EDS, Deadman etc were/are not tested as a matter of course after the BOP is run.
The fact that the hot stabs were incorrectly plumbed in suggests to me that they were never tested on surface before running the BOP. Which then raises the bigger question of how effectively was the BOP tested on surface?
It took a day to find out the problem (so say bp)… so bp and TO were not talking to each other at that time, or the “modification” was only known to people on the rig, or TO are hidng info, or…, or…??[/QUOTE]
It would be good to discuss these things with the new position in mind that BP is not quite as smart as they claimed to be. And what most people thought them to be. With that said, new confirmation from sources other than BP would seem to be the most credible.
[QUOTE=company man 1;37171]It would be good to discuss these things with the new position in mind that BP is not quite as smart as they claimed to be. And what most people thought them to be. With that said, new confirmation from sources other than BP would seem to be the most credible.[/QUOTE]
Agreed. As far as I have seen, the only reference/info to this has come from them.
I guess i should have finished with…" or…, or…, or it’s a lie."
…a promise then-BP President Robert Malone made to Congress in September 2006.
“We recognize that there has been a series of troubling problems that are unacceptable to us and contrary to our values,” Malone said, referring to revelations following the largest oil spill on Alaska’s North Slope, that the conglomerate, among other things, failed for more than a decade to inspect its pipelines for corrosion and retaliated against employees who raised safety concerns. “I commit to members of Congress that I have been given the authority, the resources and the people to assure you that BP America will overcome and ultimately be strengthened by this challenge.”
My God! This sounds almost word for word what BP spokesman are spewing to the media and government committees today after DWH. How long has this culture of cover-up, denial and feckless assurances - without a real commitment - been going on?
A comment made by a senior Shell employee after Piper Alpha - “we have some of the most stringent safety regs on the books, but if the guy in the field doesn’t follow them…”
I have seen far too many companies in my oil-patch carreer who only “talk-the-talk”. That is to say, everybody has an HSE department and preaches safety, but when it comes down to safety versus cost or scheduling, somehow safety is always the loser. I would like to say that I am fortunate that the company I currently work for - Schlumberger - actually “Walk-the Walk” when it comes to safety. Are they perfect? No. But their culture of safety is the best I’ve seen in over 30 years in the industry.