[QUOTE=Corky;35335]Dang Johnebe, why didn’t you bring this to BP’s attention when they were looking for practical solutions to effectively cap this well?? Kind of hard to do the calculations in my head, but off the cuff. . . . . I would say that might replace the mass of a 5000+/- ’ column of 16 ppg OBM. :-D[/QUOTE]
I tried I tried, BUT with the success of the relief wells NOT [I]guaranteed[/I], Rlanasa said his wife just wasn’t willing to volunteer for such an open-ended amount of time…
[QUOTE=tengineer;35419]Remember the Texas City disaster? [/QUOTE]
Did any of you catch the head of BP’s HS&E department, Steven Tink, during the hearings? Towards the end he’s asked what lessons BP learned from the Texas City disaster… he replied with a blank look.
OSHA citations against BP: 760. Against ExxonMobil: 1.
That’s about all anyone needs to know about BP’s safety culture.
[QUOTE=company man 1;35414]Where are you coming from with all the foreign bashing ? Can you point to a post from today which says anything about foreigners. The only bashing has been by yourself & ALCOR & that has been American bashing. If I didn’t know better, I would say you are one of the don’t let anyone drill in the gulf anymore crowd. Is it because you may work overseas & want America to be even more dependant on FOREIGN OIL ? I am in the don’t let BP drill anywhere in America crowd. I am in that crowd because it is very obvious to everyone else but you & ALCOR that it wasn’t just the BP representatives on the rig, it was the BP representatives in the office. It was the BP representatives before congress, & it is a BP representative named Tony Hayward now.[/QUOTE]
BP, will most likely lose much of their business in the USA because of the DWH outcome. This is inevitable. Why? Because people like you wish to label them with the full blame for the DWH tragedy.
I do not lend my hand to hearsay! I speak of facts.
The Co Man is supposed to seek the advice of those personnel ,on the rig, with expertise in their own roles. Devine, failed in his responsibilities. He is in a position to make judgement on procedure and when the procedure appears to be deficient, he must rise up and question the plan. He, did not do this.
He allowed operations to continue after failing to understand the basics of pressure testing. Did he have a ‘hunch’ all was ok? Was he prepared to gamble?
Here’s a thought: Imagine a scenario where you test the Casing followed by positive test of the Seal Assembly. Imagine, repeating the test because the results were ‘inconclusive’. Eventually, you decide to carry on anyway and Rih to 8300 ft to perform displacement and negative test. The hole is displaced to SW as far as the BOP. Then the BOP is shut in. SPP reads 1400 psi. Are you accepting this pressure reading which should be 1000 psi? How shall I explain the extra 400 psi? Perhaps our displacement figures are ok. So, we elect to negative test the well. After performing this job, the cementer advises you that the test is a failure. Do you elect the rig to perform the tests?
Everything, that this well threw at the TO crew was handled with expertise until it came to the decisions made by the company man. At 67, you can be quite sure he is ‘old school’. It appears he qualified the rig’s own test as a good test. Who gave him the power to interpret information and data so poorly?
He, must have issued the order to open the Annular and to continue displacing to SW, despite the signs of gas in the well…1400 psi SPP. He must oversee all the testing, and be present at the cement unit or DF. He made huge decisions with unbelievable consequences. Naturally, the TP and Driller missed the expected static pressure value.
They all got it wrong.
The BP personnel in town also got it wrong. They sent out an email on the best way to proceed with the remaining plans for the final 2-3 days of operations. It’s simply incredible to think that they were using this email to interpret plans for the conclusion of the well.
Why is it that the Co Man won’t make an appearance at the hearings? We all know why. Because He knows his own guilt.
By the way, Tony Hayward, was sitting in the UK when this accident happened, totally oblivious to the shortcuts practiced in the GOM. Do you disagree with this?
As for operations in the Gulf, I believe all Operators can successfully drill without spill, but as you know, all wells pose a multitude of threats and risks. I wish the GOM all the best with continued drilling operations
[QUOTE=company man 1;35349]BULLSHIT ! You are the biggest cop out artist on this sight. Eleven years. BP has had eleven years to make whatever changes needed to be made to address your unfounded accusations. I don’t know but can pretty well assume that half of the people with AMACO who had any power when the merger took place are either retired or dead by now. Good heavens do you know how stupid you sound when one does actually take into account your accusations & considers it was in the last millenium when this acquisition took place ?
Edit: I had a brother-in-law who I have mentioned in a previous post not going into detail about his past work experience & it just dawned on me. He drilled almost exclusively for AMACO for some 20 years until the end of 1999 when he was informed that BP was “making changes to the drilling unit in the GOM.” They would be using another directional drilling firm that was approved by BP’s engineering group. The reason I haven’t mentioned this before is becasue I just thought about it. The reason I just thought about it is because my brother-in-law retired in 2000 & he died last year & isn’t here to opine on this himself.[/QUOTE]
Wait for the trial to get going. You’ll be shocked by the outcome when you see who the characters are who made the poor decisions.
[QUOTE=alcor;35428]BP, will most likely lose much of their business in the USA because of the DWH outcome. This is inevitable. Why? Because people like you wish to label them with the full blame for the DWH tragedy.
I do not lend my hand to hearsay! I speak of facts.
The Co Man is supposed to seek the advice of those personnel ,on the rig, with expertise in their own roles. Devine, failed in his responsibilities. He is in a position to make judgement on procedure and when the procedure appears to be deficient, he must rise up and question the plan. He, did not do this.
He allowed operations to continue after failing to understand the basics of pressure testing. Did he have a ‘hunch’ all was ok? Was he prepared to gamble?
Here’s a thought: Imagine a scenario where you test the Casing followed by positive test of the Seal Assembly. Imagine, repeating the test because the results were ‘inconclusive’. Eventually, you decide to carry on anyway and Rih to 8300 ft to perform displacement and negative test. The hole is displaced to SW as far as the BOP. Then the BOP is shut in. SPP reads 1400 psi. Are you accepting this pressure reading which should be 1000 psi? How shall I explain the extra 400 psi? Perhaps our displacement figures are ok. So, we elect to negative test the well. After performing this job, the cementer advises you that the test is a failure. Do you elect the rig to perform the tests?
Everything, that this well threw at the TO crew was handled with expertise until it came to the decisions made by the company man. At 67, you can be quite sure he is ‘old school’. It appears he qualified the rig’s own test as a good test. Who gave him the power to interpret information and data so poorly?
He, must have issued the order to open the Annular and to continue displacing to SW, despite the signs of gas in the well…1400 psi SPP. He must oversee all the testing, and be present at the cement unit or DF. He made huge decisions with unbelievable consequences. Naturally, the TP and Driller missed the expected static pressure value.
They all got it wrong.
The BP personnel in town also got it wrong. They sent out an email on the best way to proceed with the remaining plans for the final 2-3 days of operations. It’s simply incredible to think that they were using this email to interpret plans for the conclusion of the well.
Why is it that the Co Man won’t make an appearance at the hearings? We all know why. Because He knows his own guilt.
By the way, Tony Hayward, was sitting in the UK when this accident happened, totally oblivious to the shortcuts practiced in the GOM. Do you disagree with this?
As for operations in the Gulf, I believe all Operators can successfully drill without spill, but as you know, all wells pose a multitude of threats and risks. I wish the GOM all the best with continued drilling operations[/QUOTE]
So you are saying that it is not Tony Hayward’s responsibility to make sure the operations carried on under his watch are being done in a safe manner? DO you know what Tony Hawayrd’s background is ? WHen you do come back & opine . You have stated part of the obvious about 15 times & left out all of the other obvious every time. YOU NEED TO CHECK TONY’S PERSONAL BACKGROUND WITH THE COMPANY & TELL ME AS PRESIDENT OF THE COMPANY HE DIDN’T HAVE POWER TO MAKE WHATEVER CHANGES HE WANTED. Infact he had over 3 years himself & could have done it but chose stock preformance over safety. That is why BP has paid a better dividend percentage wise than any other big oil company over the past 5 years. Not because they’re smarter than Shell, Exxon, Chevron, Etc. Because they have skimped on big ticket items which must be approved by upper management in order to give themselves nicer bonuses. Now I have answered your question answer mine. Can this comapny, given their history ever be trusted to operate in the US ever again ? Why won’t you answer me?
Edit: Hold the phone. It seems Tony Hayward was appointed the very first VP over BP/AMOCO production & exploration ( that’s drilling to you & me ) & has the sole authority over those operations ever since. That again was eleven years ago. So who was responsible for the cowboy mentality ?
Ok, we’vew been at this long enough for you guys to have a pretty educated opinion about this disaster. It aint a spill. A spill is what happens when you knock over a cup of coffee. A spill is what happens when someone accidentally leaves a valve open on a tank. This is a still out of control 24/7 F - 6 tornadoe that just won’t quit. It is Pandora’s box. The gift that just keeps on giving.
Having said that, I would appreciate by your log in vote whether you think BP should ever be trusted again to commit this kind of crime against the citizens of the United States considering their history of putting profits ahead of safety ?
b/p, along with mms,and also T.H., and Gold. Sach’s, who sold shares prior just to the Accident.
company man one, you are loosing perspective to venom. Personally I think there are a lot of other US oil companies who are saying there but for the grace… US/UK 40% of BP’s capital assets are US based, 20% European. Its a global company in 80 countries.
Safety, from what I can see most of the big Oil companies are getting better, both in terms of employee safety per 200,000 and in terms of the annual number of oil spills.
Should BP be allowed to continue with their US operations? At the end of the day its your call.
We suspect that Exxon are veting their captains better after the Valdez incident, and I would expect BP to perform better after this incident.
It looks to me as if the way forward is to examine the technical issues, which must include rig management certification and supervision issues, as well as some real research to put in appropriate modifications to the current safety regime to take account of the novel risks arising in a deep-water situation where you have a mile of pipe from the BOP to the rig floor.
[QUOTE=Laurence Cuffe;35438]company man one, you are loosing perspective to venom. Personally I think there are a lot of other US oil companies who are saying there but for the grace… US/UK 40% of BP’s capital assets are US based, 20% European. Its a global company in 80 countries.
Safety, from what I can see most of the big Oil companies are getting better, both in terms of employee safety per 200,000 and in terms of the annual number of oil spills.
Should BP be allowed to continue with their US operations? At the end of the day its your call.
We suspect that Exxon are veting their captains better after the Valdez incident, and I would expect BP to perform better after this incident.
It looks to me as if the way forward is to examine the technical issues, which must include rig management certification and supervision issues, as well as some real research to put in appropriate modifications to the current safety regime to take account of the novel risks arising in a deep-water situation where you have a mile of pipe from the BOP to the rig floor.[/QUOTE]
It’s a simple question. Do we trust BP to make the changes you say they’ll make & stick to them, considering the way they have acted & continue to react to this disaster ? Do you trust them based on their history to ever drill again in the United States ? I’m not asking for a synopsis on the industry. The industry didn’t cause this disaster BP did. Can you provide evidence that a LOT of US companies SHOULD be in this position ? The fact is they aren’t in this position.
Edit: The only venom being spewed is the venom from Macondo #1. Courtesy of guess who .
[QUOTE=cmjeff;35422]Did any of you catch the head of BP’s HS&E department, Steven Tink, during the hearings? Towards the end he’s asked what lessons BP learned from the Texas City disaster… he replied with a blank look.[/QUOTE]
Try this from BP’s website on lessons learned from Texas City: http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=98&contentId=7017238
Here’s the summary… anything sound familiar? (Unfortunately, it sounds familiar to me about a lot of companies I’ve been involved with, not just this one)
In the end we identified five main underlying causes:
* Firstly, over the years the working environment had eroded to one characterized by resistance to change and lack of trust, motivation and purpose. Expectations around supervisory and management behaviour were unclear. Rules were not followed consistently. Individuals felt disempowered from suggesting or initiating improvements
* Secondly, process safety, operations performance and systematic risk reduction priorities had not been set nor consistently reinforced by management. Safety lessons from other parts of BP were not acted on.
* Thirdly, many changes in a complex organization – both of structure and personnel - led to a lack of clear accountabilities and poor communication. The result was workforce confusion over roles, responsibilities and priorities
* The fourth cause focused on poor hazard awareness and understanding of process safety on the site - resulting in people accepting higher levels of risk.
* And finally, poor performance management and vertical communication in the refinery meant there was no adequate early warning system of problems and no independent means of understanding the deteriorating standards in the plant through thorough audit of the organisation.
Another interesting item: Failure to Learn: the BP Texas City Refinery Disaster - Book by Andrew Hopkins.
J
[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;35416]Frarig, you know a lot about who and what’s going on, so can you give me some info please? We saw the Sr. Drllg Eng who designed both the casing and cement jobs on that well be interrogated by BP, T.O., Halliburton, and MMS at the Coast Guard hearing. He knew that some higher ups approved both those designs, but under oath he didn’t know how high it went nor who it was up higher. Please tell me.
If you can help me out with that I’ve got another one for you, thanks.[/QUOTE]
If I remember, the rhyme goes something like this…
"The Head Bone (Drilling Manager) is connected to the…
Neck Bone (Drilling Operations Manager)
The Neck Bone’s connected to the…
Shoulder Bones (Left: Well Team Leader(s)) (Right: Head of Well/D&C Engineering)
The Shoulder Bones are connected to the…
Arm Bones (Left: Operations Drilling Engineer) (Right: Senior Drilling Engineer(s))
The Arm Bones are connected to the…
Hand Bones (Left: Well Site Manager) (Right: Drilling Engineer(s))
The Hand Bones are connected to the…
Finger Bones (Left: other rigsite personnel)"
… or something very similar.
During the latter part (approx 3/4 way thru’) of this testimony (http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/293776-1), a lawyer presented a 200+ page document (Well Drilling Plan for the Macondo well). It may have a page at the front listing the correct naming of All The Bones!
Does anyone know if this document is now somewhere in the public domain?
However, if you listen very closely to that particular section of the testimony, you will hear the names of several Bones mentioned.
Could this be what you are looking for … from the Head down to both of the Hands?
Also, if you listen to the first five minutes or so of this testimony (http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/293776-6) you will understand how the Neck Bone developed.
Alf, once again your true understanding of how it works is right on time. I have to interject something for those who continue to say it was homegrown cowboyism. The original head bone was none other than Tony Hayward. It seems as though he was the very first vice president appointed specifically over BP/ AMOCO operatins for production & exploration & has had the sole authority over all those operatrions ever since. Wow ! Could you please explain how Toiny didn’t have any responsibility for this disaster again Alcor ? I just can’t figure it out myself. [QUOTE=Alf;35446]If I remember, the rhyme goes something like this…
"The Head Bone (Drilling Manager) is connected to the…
Neck Bone (Drilling Operations Manager)
The Neck Bone’s connected to the…
Shoulder Bones (Left: Well Team Leader(s)) (Right: Head of Well/D&C Engineering)
The Shoulder Bones are connected to the…
Arm Bones (Left: Operations Drilling Engineer) (Right: Senior Drilling Engineer(s))
The Arm Bones are connected to the…
Hand Bones (Left: Well Site Manager) (Right: Drilling Engineer(s))
The Hand Bones are connected to the…
Finger Bones (Left: other rigsite personnel)"
… or something very similar.
During the latter part (approx 3/4 way thru’) of this testimony (http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/293776-1), a lawyer presented a 200+ page document (Well Drilling Plan for the Macondo well). It may have a page at the front listing the correct naming of All The Bones!
Does anyone know if this document is now somewhere in the public domain?
However, if you listen very closely to that particular section of the testimony, you will hear the names of several Bones mentioned.
Could this be what you are looking for … from the Head down to both of the Hands?
Also, if you listen to the first five minutes or so of this testimony (http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/293776-1) you will understand how the Neck Bone developed.[/QUOTE]
As a general theme in this thread we keep hearing about people needing to put their job on the line in order to enforce safety, and when faced with a potential conflict between the two, lacked “backbone” to “do the right thing”.
This is completely contrary to the effective safety cultures I have (thought I) worked in. An example would be the Pine Bend refinery owned by Flint Hills Resources (then Koch Refinery). They screwed up big time on some safety issues (fatalities involved) and also on environmental issues. These issues threatened the existence of the company, and came back big time with a strict structure which divorced production responsiblity from safety enforcement. If a company is serious about enforcing safe operations, I’m coming to the conclusion that they can’t have the same people in charge of maximizing production also tasked with making sure that production proceeds safely. The two roles are inherently in conflict, especially when economic incentives are provided for one, but not the other. In FH’s model, in order to initiate a proceedure, a safety officer has to sign off on it. In the instance at hand, there would be a “Company Man”, but also a Safety Officer whose approval is needed first for the plan of operation, then for each step of the operation to be initiated. So, the Company Man needs to confer with the Safety Officier and say this: we intend to pump concrete, in this manner and here are the readings we are getting, or we plan to pump mud out and replace it with sea-water, we want to pump that mud to another boat, we plan to use this diameter of casing, wall thickness, etc…
I’m just a lowly geologist, I’m not even a health and safety person, and even I know this stuff. So even I can see that BP is grossly negligent in their management and administration of safe operations.
[QUOTE=alcor;35429]Wait for the trial to get going. You’ll be shocked by the outcome when you see who the characters are who made the poor decisions.[/QUOTE]
Since Frarig and Alcor are stereotyping Cowboy philosophy from a European perspective, it helped me chill a little to take time out to reflect on another brand of good ‘ol Cowboy philosophy, and take large artistic license to interpret this good ‘ol Cowboy tune: when you listen, change the perspective about the relationship to fit this here, by thinking of the singer as being the “casing and cement design” and the one sung about as the “pay zone”, it’s a sad story of abuse, disrespect, and now longing, and might have something philosophical to say in a Cowboy sort of way about the psyche at play here if you are so inclined…. Since we’ve all screwed up at one time, or cut corners, or whatever, shorting Mother Nature who refuses to be shorted,
I’ve listened to this bumbling, dissembling, BP Bahgdad Bob lick-spittle long enough. Just because somebody has a deep, commanding voice doesn’t make them less inept. Maybe Obama thinks because his deep voice got him in office that another deep voice will solve this problem? Just throw enough deep, commanding voices at it and it will all go away?
Again, Allen was on Face the Nation this morning saying the 11,000-19,000 (or 25,000, he isn’t sure) bbl/day number is the total range from low to high. He was pressed on this, and kept putting out this blatantly wrong “factoid”. Luckily, somebody later said on the show that this is just false.
Then on CNN, he was still saying the containment is a success (while live video of the billowing plume is running behind him), then he wasn’t sure how he would make sure that skimmer boats are on hand to collect the oil that is detained by boom operations, even though he says the CG is in charge of coordinating this kind of spill response (which BP must pay for).
As he just got done saying, he is on the job “until the President says otherwise”.
Please Obama, get somebody competent in there.
The correct 2nd link should read…
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/293776-6
Here’s an interesting thread that is slowly developing.
Sometime back I spotted a reference to "… a BP manager who made key decisions in the hours prior to the Deepwater Horizon explosion told investigators that he was there to “learn about deep water” and had limited offshore experience."
This was part of a news report.
Until today, I have not come across any other reference to this.
It did however re-surface again today (in another news article). Also, another news article quoted Mr Vidrine’s age as 67 years old.
A testimony by Vidrine to US officials a day or so after the 20th (again a news report) stated something along the lines …“that Vidrine had gone outside to check on the displacement, confirmed all was OK, and then returned to his office”.
As we all know Mr Vidrine did not testify recently “due to health reasons”.
OK, apart from maybe the testimony to US officials, the rest are just news reports, so use your own judgement.
I have already joined the dots.
[QUOTE=alcor;35428]I do not lend my hand to hearsay! I speak of facts.
[B]He[/B], did not do this. [B]He[/B] allowed operations to continue after failing to understand the basics of pressure testing.
It appears [B]he[/B] qualified the rig’s own test as a good test. Who gave him the power to interpret information and data so poorly?
The [B]BP personnel in town[/B] also got it wrong. [B]They sent out an email[/B] [B]on the best way to proceed[/B] with the remaining plans for the final 2-3 days of operations. It’s simply incredible to think that [B]they[/B] were using this email to interpret plans for the conclusion of the well.
[/QUOTE]
Please feel free to speak all the facts you would like sir.
We are all about facts here, that is why the rest of us routinely include links to the information & data we are basing our opinions & observations on. When the rest of us pass on opinion or rumors we label it as such so the rest of the members of the forum can make their own judgement as to how much credibility to give that information. To date you have never, not once, backed up anything you have had to say with any factual evidence. You drop in here & tell us we are all imagining things & that only YOU deal in facts not hearsay when all you have spouted since you showed up on this board has been hearsay. Just because you hear it on the news or around your cubicle at BP headquarters doesn’t make it true my friend. Put your money where your mouth is. If you have facts, prove them as such and we will all appologize for doubting you.
I’m sure we are all VERY surprised to hear you say everything which happened in its entirety was Don Virdine’s fault [Not sure who this Devine you are talking about is . . . the BP well site leaders on the rig were Donald Virdine & Robert Kaluza http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/oil_spill_hearings_bp_man_on_d.html ]. I mean it’s such an original thing to point the finger at the easiest target (funny how it also absolves the company of having to make any changes. . . . .That way you can just tell yourselves that your operations are safer & more efficient than anyone else’s & that it was just that one guy who wouldn’t listen that casued ALL of your problems – You know, [B]the one[/B] at Texas City, or [B]the one[/B] up on the North slope who was pumping things under the ice layer, or . . .oh yeah, that nasty Don Virdine character). I certainly do not believe that Mr. Virdine bears no responsibility I don’t recall anyone here ever trying to shovel that nugget past the rest of the board. He was the well site leader so he certainly bears a large portion of the blame & you can bet he understands that things are not looking up for him any time in the near future but I have not seen him on the international news trying to convince us all that “it’s really just a drop in the bucket” or whinning that “he just wants his life back”.
I am also sure that you are correct in your assumption that Tony Hayward was in the UK when the accident occured. I would go so far to say that until the night of 20 April the Deepwater Horizon was a tiny blip on his radar if it even registered on his screen (let’s assume he did at least recognize the name though since the rig had won the company-wide safety award multiple times and had just garnered BP all kinds of accolades by drilling a new world record depth well). Being the CEO of a major corporation is kind of like being the captain of a ship, it doesn’t make a hill of beans if you were on the bridge when the new third mate slams into a bridge abbutment (or a bunch of rocks ripping holes in your cargo tanks full of crude oil). You are the man in charge & because of that fact, you are held accountable (unless you happen to run a major bank. . .in which case the US government will actually give you a ton of money for conducting business in an unethical manner). I do have to wonder at your sense of logic though my friend. In one sentance you swear it was all Don Virdine’s decision & that he acted alone and in the next sentence you agree that he was consulting with the engineering staff in town and you guys sent him detailed email instructions. Which is it, you can’t have it both ways & when you try to do so, with absolutely no proof to back your confusing tirade, all you succeed in doing is making the rest of us think you are a very confused, deluded individual.
Short answer, yes I do.
Longer answer, broadening the context and terms of reference. Consider the airline industry, many players, strung regulation, and a culture of open analysis of each safety failure. This is a combination which has made airtravel, despite our misaligned perceptions of risk, one of the safest ways to travel.
It didn’t get that way by saying every time there’s a major disaster, we put the airline out of business.
We’ve got to move on and build a system which is better than what we have, and do so by incorporating what we can learn from this.