Alcor wrote:
The truth is that if hydrocarbons were entering the well the Driller would know. He is the man! He is literally interpreting all the signals from the well. If someone from onshore told him to continue can you provide that name?
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REPOSTING POST #6203 for your review
(last paragraph)
Mr. Kaluza, who had little experience in offshore drilling, also seemed doubtful, witnesses said. He called a stop to all work until Mr. Vidrine came on duty at 6 p.m.
When Mr. Vidrine arrived, he grilled Mr. Kaluza about the first test for about an hour, Mr. Pleasant recalled.
Mr. Vidrine told BP officials that some members of the Transocean team found his questioning of Mr. Kaluza and his worries about drill-pipe pressure odd. They found it kind of humorous that I talked about it for a long time,he said, according to the notes.
Still, Mr. Vidrine insisted on a second test that would be done slightly differently, measuring the upward flow in a smaller line running from the wellhead to the rig known as the kill line.
According to the notes, Mr. Vidrine’s theory was that if the pressure in the drill pipe was evidence of a surge of gas deep in the well they would see similar pressure in the kill line.
In addition, notes from an interview he gave to BP officials investigating the blowout, obtained by The New York Times, show Mr. Vidrine raised concerns about the possibility of a surge of gas, or a kick, with a superior in Houston before going ahead and replacing the mud in the riser pipe with seawater.
Mr. Vidrine said the superior, Mark Hafle, an engineer, responded, “If there had been a kick in the well, we would have seen it.”
Infomania’s comment:
Don Vidrine and Wyman were suspicious that something was wrong. Basically almost all others disagreed with him. Eventually he capitulated. He was out numbered both on the rig and from the bank.