Costa Concordia Disaster - What happened?

[QUOTE=c.captain;61772]I don’t see how a non fuctional VDR would have been a contributory factor to the hull being ripped open by the grounding yet if it was in the US, I can see the laywers just having a woodie over that one!No, the accident belongs to the master and if he had a waiver in hand for the non functioning VDR might just give him one milligram less feces on his face than he already deserves.Calling his handler at Costa right after the accident and saying “I screwed up”…what an imbecile! He should have been managing the emergency not making phone calls trying to explain that he made a booboo and was a bad captain! What a pultroon![/QUOTE]

It’s absolutely not a contributory factor to the hull being ripped open by a rock, but the lawyers (and the media) would go INSANE! He’s the one that ran aground and having a good VDR or not doesn’t matter, but you know the media would sensationalize it - much like they reported the Deepwater Horizon spill in gallons instead of barrels - the number is bigger!

Just remember that the Master is always wrong or at fault in the eyes of the office when something bad happens. There’s SWA in some parts of the offshore industry that gives the Master a way out
before the bad shit can happen.

A Flag state can only wave a [B]SOLAS [/B]requirement if there is equivalent [I]safety [/I]provided, e.g. if a lifeboat is damaged you may sail with extra rafts provided (and the certificate endorsed to this effect and IMO informed).
If a watertight door is not functioning, the Flag state will require that it is permanently locked, and if escape is then restricted alternative arrangements must be provided to maintain safety.
The only watertight doors allowed are between manned engine/service spaces. If there are watertight doors on a passengership between passenger/crew compartments below the bulkhead deck, the ship is incorrectly designed and certified (and not seaworthy).
If the VDR is not functioning the Flag State must require it is either repaired or replaced by a temporary unit before sailing (as you cannot sail around w/o VDR). A good way to avoid problems is to provide permanent back-up/redundancy.

Re [B]Costa Concordia[/B] topic I suggest there are two incidents!

  1. First there is the [B]contact [/B]hull damage at 21.42 hrs causing hull leakage and flooding of watertight compartments. It seems the ship survived it as it is upright or with small trim/heel and neither sank, nor capsized and was anchored (or grounded?) outside Porto Giglio. I can understand that Master then did not immediately evacuate the ship but it was successfully done later.

  2. Second incident is many hours later when vessel [B]capsized[/B] onto the rocky shore and was stopped at 90° list by the rocks. Then superstructure and hull were flooded and the ship sank onto the sea floor and the list was reduced to abt 45° as seen on latest photos. Ship is 60% above water. Why capsize (the big loss) occured must be clarified.

It is embarrassing that the VDR was not working as we will never know what W/T-doors were open/close, what bilge alarms were activated, what compartments were flooded and when, what bilge pumps were started, conversation on bridge, action taken to save ship, etc.

In retrospect it would have been best to run the ship solidly aground to prevent capsize/sinking and to remain aboard high up (on the port side) as the ship never sank completely - only listed 0-90-45°. I have further thoughts at http://heiwaco.tripod.com/news8.htm

[QUOTE=New3M;61774]It’s absolutely not a contributory factor to the hull being ripped open by a rock,![/QUOTE]

Actually in my eyes it is part of the overarching chain of errors that led up to this event. Recall this from BRM? if only one thing had been changed, it would NOT have happened. In this case, the broken VDR is symptomatic of a cest la vie (let it live, it’s all good) feeling. Shittino sort of confirmed this when he mumbled to the magistrate there something to the effect: There have been repetitive problems with the VDR for some tome. This was further confirmed when the passengers were NOT given a Lifeboat drill within 24 hours of embarkation as Solas requires too. Also, it appears that there was evidence of undocumented passengers, guests or (friends) aboard. The woman who was a ‘past barmaid’ who was ‘riding’ who jumped to Schittino’s defense is an example. As is often mentioned, once the facade is cracked, and more and more anomalies are found, the investigators will delve deeper into the morass and find a web of unprofessional conduct and operations which contributed to and caused this accident. But for now the press will be happy having Shittinos head on a pike.

It will be interesting to see what else has fallen by the wayside (not just with Shittino’s navy, but the cruise industry as a whole) as a result of the coming investigations.

[QUOTE=Heiwa;61780]

  1. First there is the [B]contact [/B]hull damage at 21.42 hrs causing hull leakage and flooding of watertight compartments. It seems the ship survived it as it is upright or with small trim/heel and neither sank, nor capsized and was anchored (or grounded?) outside Porto Giglio. I can understand that Master then did not immediately evacuate the ship but it was successfully done later.

  2. Second incident is many hours later when vessel [B]capsized[/B] onto the rocky shore and was stopped at 90° list by the rocks. Then superstructure and hull were flooded and the ship sank onto the sea floor and the list was reduced to abt 45° as seen on latest photos. Ship is 60% above water. Why capsize (the big loss) occured must be clarified.[/QUOTE]

These twp statements seem to contradict each other, having seen the IR video of HUNDREDS of passengers evacuating the ship down the side, crawling, climbing down the side of the hull on jacobs ladders and shimmying down ropes into lifeboats. It would appear you have the timeline wrong about when, how the evacuation was accomplished.

Personally I believe the crew (whomever ordered it) tried to level the ship with ballast. and free surface increased so much that it caused the ship to capsize to the opposite side of the damage. Time will tell what happened, and VDR or not, soon enough crew will be interviewed to get to the truth. I didn’t think it possible for a vessel to ‘sink herself’ but after the Tug Valor incident, I see it is a real and ever present possibility on ALL vessels when the chain of errors is left to continue for ever.

[QUOTE=cappy208;61782]Personally I believe the crew (whomever ordered it) tried to level the ship with ballast. and free surface increased so much that it caused the ship to capsize to the opposite side of the damage.[/QUOTE]

Which direction was the ship heeling before the final grounding? Was she still afloat while this photo was taken?

[QUOTE=c.captain;61790]Which direction was the ship heeling before the final grounding? Was she still afloat while this photo was taken?

[/QUOTE]

I believe I read she listed slightly to port for over an hour. The abandon ship never sounded. Then she took an abrupt list to Stbd that only worsened with time. This sounds like an induced heel. Have you seen the photos of the Port turn of the bilge? The huge tear and boulder sort of show where damage occurred. This would explain the initial Port list. Apparently she was manuvering for over an hour prior to final grounding position.

I hate armchair quarterbacking, but so much is so out of whack it begs explanation here. Since I am SUCH an un opinionated and SO modest Individual lets me make a few unproven assertions and allegations here in the Peoples Court of G Captain!

[QUOTE=cappy208;61782]These twp statements seem to contradict each other, having seen the IR video of HUNDREDS of passengers evacuating the ship down the side, crawling, climbing down the side of the hull on jacobs ladders and shimmying down ropes into lifeboats. It would appear you have the timeline wrong about when, how the evacuation was accomplished.

Personally I believe the crew (whomever ordered it) tried to level the ship with ballast. and free surface increased so much that it caused the ship to capsize to the opposite side of the damage. Time will tell what happened, and VDR or not, soon enough crew will be interviewed to get to the truth. I didn’t think it possible for a vessel to ‘sink herself’ but after the Tug Valor incident, I see it is a real and ever present possibility on ALL vessels when the chain of errors is left to continue for ever.[/QUOTE]

It seems the ship was generally, 99%, abandoned between the first incident (the [B]contact[/B]) and the second incident (ship at anchor, heeling 90° starboard on side = [B]capsize[/B]). It is agreed some persons (crew?) are seen on the IR video walking on the horizontal, port, upper side, (you wonder what time it is) but there are many photos of the ship upright/little starboard list before/after all lifeboats (except 3 on port side) were launched and it seems most pax used the lifeboats. Of the 3200+ pax a 99%+ majority seem to have come ashore without getting wet! Quite good, actually. And note - ship never sank! Weather was very good! No hurry to get off, actually. Master was perfectly right to wait with Mayday, Lifeboat alarm, abandon ship, etc.

Lack of VDR and Voice recordings is very bad. All crew is back in Asia/S.America and can hardly be interviewed.

Hopefully we can agree that the hull [B]contact [/B]damage was very severe - port side pushed in 3 meter over 35 meter leaving a 50-100 m² opening and that affected hull watertight compartments were flooded at once - minutes. But the ship survived that - it trimmed on the stern and was floating stably and upright. Quite good actually. So maybe only two (or three) w/t compartments were flooded?

Then it took several hours for the ship to trim more on the stern - watertight doors opened, bilge pumps not running? - but the ship was still upright and then capsized to starboard onto the shore (how many w/t compartments were then flooded), superstrucure came under water and flooding from above could take place, list was 90°/port side a floor and the ship sank on the shallow sea floor - 60% of the ship still above water and list became 45°.

So it was clearly two separate incidents - first [B]contact,[/B] later [B]capsize[/B]. Had the ship remained afloat, it would have been easy to tow it away for repairs.

Maybe one of the flooded compartments contained crew cabins and that crew, when leaving, opened w/t doors allowing more w/t compartments to be flooded causing the [B]capsize[/B]? I assume at least 300 crew were asleep to start working early next morning, etc.

A] It is possible that the ship wasn’t doomed after the inital damage but these questions need be answered:

  1. At what point did the list change from port to starboard?

  2. When she was flooding and afloat how far did she list to port?

  3. If she was afloat and listing to starboard before the final grounding, why did she not become upright as the starboard bilge grounded?

B] It is possible through that was doomed due to loss of stability (how much reserve righting arm does SOLAS require for a passenger ship in the damaged state?)

  1. did wind heel flip the ship from a port list to a starboard while drifting?

  2. was there a hamfisted attempt to counterflood without knowing the satnility implications? (not like this has never happened before!)

If there is no VDR data, we’ll possibly never what really happened :frowning:

[QUOTE=Heiwa;61780]In retrospect it would have been best to run the ship solidly aground to prevent capsize/sinking and to remain aboard high up (on the port side) as the ship never sank completely - only listed 0-90-45°. I have further thoughts at http://heiwaco.tripod.com/news8.htm[/QUOTE]

Thank you, an excellent presentation …
Mistakes were made, lots of them.
c.captain has made an interesting suggestion concerning the possibility of wing ballast tanks, but the only power was from the emergency generator, doubtful any water could be pumped anywhere.
It appears to be a good assumption that watertight doors were left open.
~~ and the band played on ~~

No hurry???

Lack of VDR and Voice recordings is very bad. All crew is back in Asia/S.America and can hardly be interviewed.

Who the heck is in charge? and WHO let the crew leave the country???

Hopefully we can agree that the hull contact damage was very severe But the ship survived that - it trimmed on the stern and was floating stably and upright. Quite good actually. So maybe only two (or three) w/t compartments were flooded?
Agreed. but this is NOT what caused the vessel to sink.

Then it took several hours for the ship to trim more on the stern - watertight doors opened, bilge pumps not running?

Where was the crew? why are they not sequestered for interview? I guess this is why these companies use ‘flag of convenience’ states, huh?

So it was clearly two separate incidents - first contact, later capsize. Had the ship remained afloat, it would have been easy to tow it away for repairs.

Not arguing the separate incident concept. Just that VDR or no VDR, the crew knows what went on. Even if the Capt didn’t ( because he was ashore having dinner at a restaurant) the crew knows what they did. Why would ANY maritime nation allow these witness’ to leave? Gheesh, they wouldn’t let Amanda Knoxx leave for Killing ONE person, but they let a whole crew leave after a dozen or more people are killed?

Maybe one of the flooded compartments contained crew cabins and that crew, when leaving, opened w/t doors allowing more w/t compartments to be flooded causing the capsize? I assume at least 300 crew were asleep to start working early next morning, etc.

I got who/what you are Mr Bjorkman. You are a conspiracy theorist, who believes in your own conjecture and vilify anyone who dares to contradict or argue. Maybe the US Government placed explosive charges there so when the Concordia went by they would launch the boulder into the side to the ship and cause this accident? Good bye! Since you doubt the WTC really happened why don’t you look up “Telescope Train Wrecks” to understand how so much kinectic energy can be ‘directed’ in one general direction being guided by only a thin aluminum tube. After that learn about ‘shock loading and release of energy’ in steel frame construction.

[QUOTE=cappy208;61799]No hurry???

Who the heck is in charge? and WHO let the crew leave the country???

Not arguing the separate incident concept. Just that VDR or no VDR, the crew knows what went on. Even if the Capt didn’t ( because he was ashore having dinner at a restaurant) the crew knows what they did. Why would ANY maritime nation allow these witness’ to leave? Gheesh, they wouldn’t let Amanda Knoxx leave for Killing ONE person, but they let a whole crew leave after a dozen or more people are killed?[/QUOTE]

One can imagine the corporation’s influence upon the Italian Government played a significant part. Since there is no Black Box interviews with pertinent crew members, if not all crew members, should have been an important objective but then again that very well might be an embarrassment to the corporation, who is in total Damage Control to save their ass.

[QUOTE=cappy208;61799]I got who/what you are Mr Bjorkman. You are a conspiracy theorist, who believes in your own conjecture and vilify anyone who dares to contradict or argue. Maybe the US Government placed explosive charges there so when the Concordia went by they would launch the boulder into the side to the ship and cause this accident? Good bye! Since you doubt the WTC really happened why don’t you look up “Telescope Train Wrecks” to understand how so much kinectic energy can be ‘directed’ in one general direction being guided by only a thin aluminum tube. After that learn about ‘shock loading and release of energy’ in steel frame construction.[/QUOTE]

cappy, we all have different slants on the disaster, and as it’s impossible to connect all the dots I take everyone’s opinions with interest and respect, including yours, Sir.
Perhaps one day we will know exactly what happened and on an accurate time line. Now, we don’t.

[QUOTE=c.captain;61796]If there is no VDR data, we’ll possibly never what really happened :-([/QUOTE]
Exactly and IMO that’s the reason the crew was allowed to fly away. If one thing is clear, Management doesn’t want crew interviews, cats might be escape the bag and the curtain might get pulled back.

[QUOTE=Sweat-n-Grease;61803]
cappy, we all have different slants on the disaster, and as it’s impossible to connect all the dots I take everyone’s opinions with interest and respect, including yours, Sir.
Perhaps one day we will know exactly what happened and on an accurate time line. Now, we don’t.[/QUOTE]
My comment was directed at the author, after doing a little google on him. He appears to masquerade as a world reknowned ‘expert’ for hire, self promoting his advice/opinion. thats fine.

But when another hit on an earlier publication about his suspicions on the 911 ‘conspiracy’ surfaced all credibility is lost. I saw the second plane HIT. I felt the towers fall. Conspiracy my ass. But you are correct. I will respect your views and others. But NOT ones put forth by theorists who try to make a living off of self promoted bunk. Maybe Mr, Bjorkman also thinks all mariners should have a license to carry concealed weapons too?

The fundamental cause of the disaster was quite simple. The captain, planning on another close pass of the island (300-500 yards or meters), was 30-60 seconds late in turning (causing a location error of 250-500 yards at 15 knots) and then failed to realize in the dark that he badly missed his turn until he hit the island and didn’t correct. Distractions on the bridge? Very likely. Not paying enough attention to the navigation instruments. Probably. Everything else is just reaction, not causal of the accident.

The visual analysis of where the hull damage was, and the compartments opened to the sea (5) matches the engineer’s testimony for rapidly flooded compartments. They were sinking gradually.

I’ll argue that watertight doors probably weren’t left open, and if they were, would not cause the list. Most ship designs keep their watertight doors at the centerline, and flooding from one would tend to flood large central compartments, and not cause the list. The argument that it was bad counter flooding combined with free surface is possible but where would the pumps, controls and power supply be found if only the emergency generator was working and the engine and main controls were flooded? What if anything did the engineers say about this? (How can we get their court testimony?) The wing tanks, side tanks or empty double bottom tanks argument has more weight since it would or could easily be unbalanced.

Wind, maybe a contributing factor. 12 knots isn’t much but the ship has close to 100,000 square feet of “sail area” for windage in the massive sides with a CE 50 feet above the waterline. Combined with loss of 30% or more of its stability from flooded compartments? Combined with a “tripping” effect from running aground with a list. Could be. Anchor grabbing and pulling it over? Possible. AHT’s know how powerfully an anchor or heavy chain can effect stability. At the point she capsized, there wasn’t a lot of margin of stability.

Conspiracy? Oh Please. Stupidity, lack of attention and error is vastly more common and far easier regardless of the significance of the outcome. Lets stick with observable and analytical facts.

[QUOTE=cappy208;61809]My comment was directed at the author, after doing a little google on him. He appears to masquerade as a world reknowned ‘expert’ for hire, self promoting his advice/opinion. thats fine.

But when another hit on an earlier publication about his suspicions on the 911 ‘conspiracy’ surfaced all credibility is lost. I saw the second plane HIT. I felt the towers fall. Conspiracy my ass. But you are correct. I will respect your views and others. But NOT ones put forth by theorists who try to make a living off of self promoted bunk.?[/QUOTE]

I understand.

[QUOTE=cappy208;61809]Maybe Mr, Bjorkman also thinks all mariners should have a license to carry concealed weapons too?[/QUOTE]

We don’t?
Just kidding :smiley:

The jerk to the left just after grounding the first time was probably due to both the stern of the ship hitting the island while in a hard right turn. The stern is hanging out 200-300 feet to port of the track in a sharp right turn. Whammo, and the ship briefly pivots to the left (watch the line of momentum). The other explanation in the course video, is that the captain tried to make a quick short left turn as soon as the bow was clear of the point of rocks to swing the stern out of the way, but the ship reacted too slowly to clear by about 100-200 feet.

Our best info is 12 knots of NNE wind, not a lot. Currents unknown, but they don’t run horizontally into islands, they usually run parallel, and the med is not known for a lot of strong currents except in major straits.

A few observations which are my own conjecture on the circumstances here (so could easily be wrong, they are just the interim conclusions I’ve been able to reach so far).

One of the questions raised here is approx “why did they not start the pumps / did they start the pumps?” I’d say from the scale of the damage there’s very little chance that they could have conducted any really meaningful pumping in the areas of the main flood. My basis for that conclusion comes from a couple of places:

  1. The MAIB report into the flooding of the QE2’s aft engine room in 2002 - http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/qe2.pdf It’s reasonable to assume that despite being pre SOLAS 74, the QE2 was both built and maintained to an exceptional standard overall, and this was after major refit and modernisation (where I believe that the newer SOLAS regs would apply, since the engine rooms were essentially a full rebuild). The MAIB concluded that while the pumps easily coped with the perforated 250mm sea pipe, they would have likely been overwhelmed had the pipe flange detached completely. CC’s water ingress was vastly beyond that scale of flooding.

  2. There are reports in the web-media that the duty engineers observed at least 1 of the engine rooms essentially fully flooded, and the main switchboard room well on the way to being fully flooded within 5 minutes of the original damage. Translation and reporting by non-technical journalists make it less than clear, but it also sounded like the duty engineer attempted to start the pumps and they did not respond. I believe that the emergency generator & swtichboard are supposed to supply some pumping ability, but nowhere near enough to really come close to making any meaningful impact on this type of situation.

As for the sideways track from the point where she finally lost way to her final resting place, I find it very hard to believe that there was any heroic use of thrusters there. With the main engine room(s) fully flooded and offline, plus the main switchboard, I’d be very surprised if the emergency generator could be used to power the thrusters, or that they would actually provide that level of control under the circumstances. What I consider far more likely is that the she was basically blown sideways across the water after stopping broadside to the wind. The hull design has no meaningful keel in hydrodynamic terms, relative to the immense windage of the superstructure.

As for the final slow capsize, the most likely explanation to me at this stage is that the initial damage exceeded the capability of the remaining hull structure to remain afloat for any length of time and occurred progressively and naturally once the flooding took hold above the bulkhead deck (possibly compounded by the blackout preventing any meaningful controlled flooding of the decks below the bulkhead deck).

While the initial navigational error appears to have basically been terrible seamanship, the thing I find entirely unacceptable as a qualified Master & GMDSS operator is the failure to get a MAYDAY call out at the first opportunity (which was 100% justified the moment the duty engineer reported the engine room & switchboard fully flooded, even if they had yet to determine that the ship was actually sinking). It was also entirely justified the moment they knew they were drifting on emergency power and zero propulsion in close proximity to land, with little hope of restoring main power very quickly (i.e. even if the bridge did not get a report quickly from the ECR, they should have declared an emergency within 10-15 minutes unless they had reason to believe that power was about to be restored imminently). Had I been in command of a vessel in close visual range to CC when she was clearly drifting sideways towards a lee shore, I would have taken the decision out of their hands and declared a MAYDAY for them (and have been thanked by the coastguard for doing just that in the past on behalf of a vessel that was clearly in trouble and had not declared their own MAYDAY).

The delay in launching the lifeboats, that’s a tricky one for me to fully reconcile, as I’m very much of the school of thought that the best way to enter a lifeboat is to step upwards from a deck becoming awash, into the lifeboat, and not downwards. The only thing I think is inexcusable at that point is not sounding the general alarm early and having everyone ready and prepared at muster stations. Deliberately deceiving the passengers (it’s ok, just electrical, go to your cabins), and the SAR authority, that’s just pure gross negligence at its very worst. If there was a calculated decision to delay launching until the ship was closer to the port, that could be considered reasonable, but failing to sound the general alarm early cannot be considered reasonable.

In the case of putting out a MAYDAY and sounding the general alarm, it’s absurd to waste time seeking approval from or even discussing it with head office (but they should be called shortly after the emergency is declared). In these situations, the chain of command stops with the highest ranking officer who is actually present and mentally fit, never extending to anyone ashore. It is always better to declare an emergency (if there seems a fair chance it will be justified), then cancel it when circumstances have improved, than to delay. In that regard, I would consider the officer of the watch and any other senior officers present on the bridge at the time to share some of the blame with the captain.

"Tourist Navigation"
Can you imagine such a foolish term, such a foolish undertaking?
All the dots will very likely never be crossed. Enough information, however, exists to place the blame squarely upon the Captain and his handlers.
Mistakes were made!

[QUOTE=Sweat-n-Grease;61836]"Tourist Navigation"
Can you imagine such a foolish term, such a foolish undertaking?
[/QUOTE]
Well… actually I can. IIRC, tourist navigation meant (to me at least) when I was the deckhand, to go ask the hottest women aboard if they wanted to come to the wheelhouse to meet the Captain. Then later it became the game of watching for the beauties who were about to finish off their beer to race to get another one (from the Captain of course) and then escort them to the bridge. Then later it became my job as Captain to try to do subtle course changes to change the apparent wind to get skirts to blow up, or blouses to blow open (like they were really trying to keep them closed) Heck, I even got a guys Toupee to blow off that way! now I don’t care who you are… THAT’S funny!

Little did I know that i would be expected 20 or 30 years later that I needed to impress people by putting the vessel in jeopardy!!! My how things have changed in the industry!