First glance at the report…
Pages 86-87 - Not true. The deadwaeight survey was done in 2006 by Noble Denton, witnessed by ABS, and TOI’s own architect, concurrent with the 1st Special Survey (5 year class survey). The discrepancy was about 300 tons, less than 1% of the displacement.
“Without the results of a recent deadweight survey, the actual weight of DEEPWATER HORIZON may have increased in the 10 plus years since it was last evaluated, possibly allowing the crew to unknowingly overload the MODU.Without the results of a recent deadweight survey, the actual weight of DEEPWATER HORIZON may have increased in the 10 plus years since it was last evaluated, possibly allowing the crew to unknowingly overload the MODU.”
“DEEPWATER HORIZON did not have a deadweight survey conducted every five years as
required by the applicable 1989 International Maritime Organization (IMO) Mobile Offshore
Drilling Unit (MODU) Code and the Republic of the Marshall Islands’ Publication MI-293.”
Overall I think they did a good job with this. Still reading but I like the attention given to the limitations of the MODU Code, STCW, and lack of appreciation for ISM. Also it’s nice to see the note on inspector skills being diluted by ACP and turning things over to Class. This started with downsizing in the mid-90’s.
I’m still not convinced on a few things. Fast rescue boats and diesel fire pumps may be nice to have, but who will maintain them? Safe Manning doesn’t cover enough people to stand watch, let alone take care of all the things we’ve added over the years.
I disagree with the comment on MOB drills. I know DWH did them. Also liferaft training was scheduled every hitch (although it was lectures, not actually inflating rafts.). Also the note that people didn’t understand the consequences of defered maintenace. The hard part is convincing the client and Rig Manager to accept downtime, provide enough crew, or divert maintenance crews from downtime critical equipment. It’s also wrong to single out the Captain. You don’t save 115 people, under these extreme conditions, without adequate training and well maintained lifesaving equipment.
[QUOTE=Orniphobe;48931]Overall I think they did a good job with this.
I. The hard part is convincing the client and Rig Manager to accept downtime, provide enough crew, or divert maintenance crews from downtime critical equipment. It’s also wrong to single out the Captain. You don’t save 115 people, under these extreme conditions, without adequate training and well maintained lifesaving equipment.[/QUOTE]
I also think they did a pretty good job. They pointed out the deferred maintenance as being a big issue and this surprises no one in the business. It cost money/profits to maintain properly and absent regulatory enforcement from either the flag state, MMS, USCG, ABS, DNV and a lot of other intials profits take precedence. Sure Transocean looks bad in this report but they just got by with what they were allowed to get by with, just like BP did. All the regulatory and advisory bodies were complicit in this disaster.
As far as the captain goes; Someone testified that the captain said to leave an injured man behind. That certainly didn’t help the captain’s cause much.