I was making some calculations. It seems that Houston Ship Channel is 525’ between buoys. The Carla Maersk is 600’ x 106’ and the Conti Perdot is 623’ x 106’. That means that when these two vessels meet, there is a 100’ left between ships and a 100’ to the channel limit. If you add a big 2° set for cross winds, there would be something like 75’ clearance left on each side. Into a bend, you shake hands upon meeting. According to what I know, safe speed would then be something like 3 knots over the ground. Man ! that channel is damned too narrow!!! I really don’t know how the pilots can manage to survive such a level of concentration and attention. Do you realize what it would be in dense fog ! I raise my hat and I’m running outta of here …
Pilots in the Houston Ship Canal use what they call the “Texas Chicken” maneuver. Ships stay more or less in the middle of the channel until they are close then each turns to starboard. Interaction between the ships and the banks keeps them apart and off the bank. After they pass each ship turns to port and regains the center of the channel. Often they overshoot a bit and end up on the port side of the channel.
That’s why the down-bound ship was out of shape and on the wrong side of the channel, it did not recover quickly enough from the first encounter.
I would play Texas Chicken in good vis on a 80 foot beam vessel at 6 knots max, but certainly not on a foreign 106 beam footer at 9 knots in dense fog! My blood pump and bladder are too small for that kind of exercise. Run for your life … 
[QUOTE=Topsail;158965]I would play Texas Chicken in good vis on a 80 foot beam vessel at 6 knots max, but certainly not on a foreign 106 beam footer at 9 knots in dense fog! My blood pump and bladder are too small for that kind of exercise. Run for your life … ;)[/QUOTE]
In decent visibility it’s routinely done at full sea speed.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;158966]In decent visibility it’s routinely done at full sea speed.[/QUOTE]
And make no mistake, it is VERY routine. And not actually a terribly difficult maneuver to pull off, just takes practice, timing, and confidence. Which makes me wonder, did either or both of the two pilots in question get overly confident based on previous successful executions of this maneuver, in other words get complacent?
Even in a ship’s bridge simulator, I would request a letter of indemnity. No, I’m going back deep sea on a VLCC equipped with an elevator to go to the bridge, as second mate on 13,500nm leg trips, but no overtime.
[QUOTE=awulfclark;158969]And make no mistake, it is VERY routine. And not actually a terribly difficult maneuver to pull off, just takes practice, timing, and confidence. Which makes me wonder, did either or both of the two pilots in question get overly confident based on previous successful executions of this maneuver, in other words get complacent?[/QUOTE]
Some of the meetings go smoothly, sometimes not so much. It’s woudn’t take much for things to go wrong in dense fog. Pilot not on top of his game, fatigue or distraction, helmsman putting the wheel over wrong, gyro error, a little curret.
Like most incidents probalby more then one contributing factor.
I think the application of standard risk assessment would led to the conclusion that if there s a high probability of fog then a tanker with 200,000 bbls of MTBE ought to stay tied up until the forecast changes, is proven to be wrong or it clears up.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;158984]Some of the meetings go smoothly, sometimes not so much. It’s woudn’t take much for things to go wrong in dense fog. Pilot not on top of his game, fatigue or distraction, helmsman putting the wheel over wrong, gyro error, a little curret.
Like most incidents probalby more then one contributing factor.
I think the application of standard risk assessment would led to the conclusion that if there s a high probability of fog then a tanker with 200,000 bbls of MTBE ought to stay tied up until the forecast changes, is proven to be wrong or it clears up.[/QUOTE]
Absolutely. It’s always that chain of error bit, break one link and the probability of the incident goes way down. In this case, some of those links are less controllable than others–weather, current, poor helmsman, undetected error from the electronics. The one link that is easily broken, however, is the go/no go decision. Which is where I think complacency started creeping in.
[QUOTE=awulfclark;158985]Absolutely. It’s always that chain of error bit, break one link and the probability of the incident goes way down. In this case, some of those links are less controllable than others–weather, current, poor helmsman, undetected error from the electronics. The one link that is easily broken, however, is the go/no go decision. Which is where I think complacency started creeping in.[/QUOTE]
I see what your getting at. Some complacently has got to be in the mix.
I think the best approach is a rule based one. In certain conditions (visibility, wind, current, traffic whatever) the plug gets pulled on some movements. Pilots and captains should have some discretion but a rule based approached eliminates the reluctance everyone has to cancel a move on their own. Make a decision not to go and the phone is going to ring. Usually within about 60 seconds, and it’s a know nothing office puke with nothing to lose in the event of an incident. On the other hand if its rule based known in advance they know not to call.
I would not bet my shirt on that one.
According to that AIS video, Carla looks to be quite well positioned to meet. But have a very close look to the Pedidot. She closes by the port bank easily then, comes back to the center. She then closes by the port bank again but faster. As she tries to come back quicker to the center, her port stern seems to suck the bank and she then swings rapidly to starboard. As she tries to come back once again to the center, her starboard stern now seems to suck the bank and she then swings rapidly out of control to port. At that point, there was nothing else to do other than a full astern, which would’ve helped to slow down the rate of turn to port, slow the speed down and hopefully, minimize damages. On the other side, the Carla could not help much more if it is not to call a full astern as well. But both ships went instead full ahead !
Q. What was the tidal current direction? Why was the Peridot zigzagging like a heel? (Speed, draft, trim, squat, interaction, helmsman, gyro precession, god knows)
Yes, I had the ships mixed up. It was the in-bound ship that was catawampus. I"d guess inattention. If it hadn’t been foggy likely they would have noticed the ship was wandering.
Sorry but, you will have no success in holding vessels alongside due to expected fog forecast. On the other hand, you can certainly implement compulsory speed limits to vessels who have no choice but to transit through fog. Speed limit as it is safe to do so and does not create another hazard to navigation, like transiting into cross wind conditions. My 2 cents !
[QUOTE=Topsail;158994][B]Sorry but, you will have no success in holding vessels alongside due to expected fog forecast.[/B] On the other hand, you can certainly implement compulsory speed limits to vessels who have no choice but to transit through fog. Speed limit as it is safe to do so and does not create another hazard to navigation, like transiting into cross wind conditions. My 2 cents ![/QUOTE]
And why not? It’s already been stated that the Coast Guard routinely shuts down vessel traffic in Houston. Why couldn’t the pilot association draft their own rule stating that they simply won’t move vessels in fog or if fog is forecast during the transit time? For that matter, the COTP could well do the same thing. I’d agree that such a rule might have a harder time gaining traction somewhere like Puget Sound, but in Houston where the channel is fairly narrow, going outside the channel is pretty much not an option, and a relative lack of places to go to anchor, such a rule is IMO quite justified.
The CG delays departures in ‘‘certain’’ ports when there is ‘‘actually’’ fog. If they want to close these ports when there is a possibility… of such a percentage… or whatever, it’s up to them to carry the burden of such a decision. But the industry lobby will knock at their door sooner than later. The pilotage authority will not do the job of the CG and is not interested to pay the price of holding down vessels alongside for expected; I’m not too sure about what. But, if a pilot decides that a certain type of vessel, in that specific condition and weather forecast would be safer to delay, he can do it but the phone is going to ring and many times. I think that the best way to deal with it is to let the pilot take the decision whether to get underway or not. But if he gets stuck in fog during transit, I think that the speed should be compulsory reduce to a safe and agreed level.
The Coast Guard regulators worry about two things. Number one is that they might not jump high or fast enough when industry tells them to jump. The second thing is if there is a spill of ethyl methyl bad shit they worry that the public will be howling for some heads and they may not be able to shift all the blame to the mariners involved.
WIth regards to fog in the Houston Ship Channel, if goes to zero visibilty it can be a clusterfuck. Whether it is safe (relatively speaking) to proceed depends on the destination It gets tighter and tighter further up. There is a lack of places to anchor or moor. The normal practice in some cases is to drop anchor in the channel and let the stern swing into the bank. For some ships that’s not a good option and there is not always a tug available to hold you off. So its possible to get stuck, and the pilot will explain to you, strictly in his capacity as an advisor miind you, that you are F.U.C.K.E.D. Which of course leads to the question of why did the did you enter the channel when the chance of fog is close to 100% in the first place?
Doesn’t seem like prudent seamanship. The operation needs to be given a little more thought.
I hope that you will not be surprise if I reveal that on too many vessels, you’re not an adviser but a commander and the crew call you captain, good vis or not while the Oldman is doing paperwork in his cabin.
If you board a 1985 rust bucket bulker equipped like the Noah’s Arc and crewed by a bunch of Bonobos, then I would probably think twice before throwing myself in a narrow channel when fog is likely and there is a loaded Aframax coming down. But if I board a 2015 ECDIS space shuttle along with my own ECDIS PPU and I proceed with the full collaboration of the crew at reduced speed against other space shuttles, I see no problem. Someone as to judge the situation and that someone is a pilot. But getting underway during fog is like I said not the clever decision to take.
[QUOTE=Topsail;159007]I hope that you will not be surprise if I reveal that on too many vessels, you’re not an adviser but a commander and the crew call you captain, good vis or not while the Oldman is doing paperwork in his cabin.
If you board a 1985 rust bucket bulker equipped like the Noah’s Arc and crewed by a bunch of Bonobos, then I would probably think twice before throwing myself in a narrow channel when fog is likely and there is a loaded Aframax coming down. But if I board a 2015 ECDIS space shuttle along with my own ECDIS PPU and I proceed with the full collaboration of the crew at reduced speed against other space shuttles, I see no problem. Someone as to judge the situation and that someone is a pilot. But getting underway during fog is like I said not the clever decision to take.[/QUOTE]
Space shuttle or rust bucket you can’t continue your transit when the channel is blocked by anchored ships.
We are not allowed to anchor ships all over the place and block the channel except in case of force majeure. The case be, I will just anchor myself and go to bed fully paid. What the eck !
In the Houston Ship Channel, which is where the collision we are discussing took place, when heavy fog sets in, numerous ships will anchor in the channel.
You better make sure that the traffic proceeding along with the current is clear before closing or blocking down that channel. You may not help your case and create much more problems or incidents. Just riding over an anchor can hole a fuel cofferdam and make a spill. Twisting a rudder stock in the mud can happen so easily…
