[QUOTE=ombugge;179188]All the wonderful tools that exist for route planning and weather routing from shore based sources obviously doesn’t absolve the Master from making his own decisions based on his experience and knowledge of that particular ship, it’s condition and seakeeping characteristics.
The decision should also change with the type cargo carried and other considerations that is not static.
When discussion routing for heavy lift vessels, especially if weather limitation is imposed, I frequently get met with the argument that “we got weather routing”.
I always tell them that weather forecast is just that. Forecast and weather routing is not always correct. You need to be prepared to divert from the planned route, alter course, reduce speed or “heave to” to reduce the motions to within the allowable limits.[/QUOTE]
Many people seem completely flabbergasted as to why a captain would “sail into the middle of a storm”. The only feasible scenarios seems to be commercial pressure or incompetence. I’m trying to broaden the discussion and bring up some other possibilities based on my experience. I’m not trying to justify the decisions made as much as trying to come up with some plausible explanations as to why they were made at the time.
Shore-side people who work the hardest to undermine a captain’s authority before an incident are often the quickest ones to pivot and start preaching about the captain’s responsibility after an incident.
This chart shows the steep wave height gradient (the tight spacing on the wave height contours) on the west side of the system in contrast to the gradient on the east side. If your track is on the east side and there is a, say 60 miles error in the forecasted track, you still will not find yourself in dangerous situation. By contrast on west side, a planned track in acceptable conditions may become dangerous conditions even with just small errors in the forecast. The fact the coast blocks tracks further west worsens the situation.
In this case on the east side of the center of the storm there is plenty of sea room to stay well clear of the dangerous portion of the system and use a wide range of tactics to keep motions within allowable limits. There is lot of spacing in time and distance between business as usual (say 5 meter seas) and a dangerous situation (say 10+ meters). The ship will face gradually diminishing conditions and will have plenty of time and opportunities to make adjustments.
Not so on the west side. The ship may find itself in a situation where conditions are acceptable to a quick change where the options are very limited.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;179190]
Shore-side people who work the hardest to undermine a captain’s authority before an incident are often the quickest ones to pivot and start preaching about the captain’s responsibility after an incident.[/QUOTE]
Personally, I wouldn’t have sailed that far east since the storm was forecasted to move in a northeasterly direction. There was sufficient sea room area between New York and Hatteras to steam slowly while the worst of the storm would go by. I would’ve stayed in the Labrador Current that flows in the same direction as the north wind in the west quadrant. If you overpass that region, you will meet the Steam that flows against the northern wind and it will be remember. I think that they did not believe that a dry continental depression would become such a furious storm in such a short time when it would hit the ocean. Local knowledge teaches that such a depression will be propelled by warmer and humid air carried by the Stream. That is what the captain said; «the depression exploded».
Once the captain realized that his plan didn’t obviously worked, he hove to. We are talking of a yacht of about 370 meters long by 70 meters high, equipped with 4 bow thrusters of 4,500 hp each and 2 ZPods of 27,000 hp each. That means a total thrust of approx 700 metric tonnes, 450 tonnes if you lose a pod.
If we calculate the beam wind thrust at a gusty 70 knots, we found:
Force (tonnes) per 1000m² = (L x H ÷ 1000) V²m/s ÷ 18
Force (tonnes) = (370 x 70 ÷ 1000) x {70 ÷ 1.85}² ÷ 18 = 2000 tonnes
From those approximate calculations, I can tell you that the master had a lot of pleasure of trying to hold his cruiser into the wind and following seas. That’s the video that I would like to see. If he did not believe NOAA at first, I am certain that he now does.
Furthermore, that area of tight gradient of wind and seas would, or should, be expected to be amplified additionally when in proximity to the west/north wall of the Gulf Stream, a known additional hazard area anytime the weather gets up, and especially from the NE-E-SE quadrant near Hatteras.
So why willingly box yourself in, take away options, and potentially get caught in a lethal squeeze between storm and shore? They didn’t have to sink the ship for it to become lethal: just get caught badly out of shape long enough to start seriously rag-dolling the passengers around their cabins. The old folks wouldn’t handle that so well.
Obviously different outcomes, but I see shades of the S/V Bounty here yet again.
Commercial adhere-to-schedule pressure, incompetence, arrogance, failure-to-appreciate…, what else is left?
We have more than enough capability packed in our smart phones to literally and completely blow the minds of Columbus, Magellan and Cook combined.
It would seem that we’re misusing our technology to simply cut things closer because we trust it too much and think we know more, and with a higher degree of certainty, than we actually do.
[QUOTE=captjacksparrow;179212]It would seem that we’re misusing our technology to simply cut things closer because we trust it too much and think we know more, and with a higher degree of certainty, than we actually do.[/QUOTE]
That’s the issue, and its nothing new. A WWII admiral wrote a great article about complacency due to precise “modern” forecasts.
It would seem that we’re misusing our technology to simply cut things closer because we trust it too much and think we know more, and with a higher degree of certainty, than we actually do.[/QUOTE]
There is no question that technology and better forecasts are mostly being used to cut things closer rather then reduce risk.
[QUOTE=Topsail;179210]Personally, I wouldn’t have sailed that far east since the storm was forecasted to move in a northeasterly direction. [/QUOTE]
I wasn’t trying to say that passing east of the storm was better, just trying to make the point that just looking at the expected conditions along the ship’s track is not sufficient. There also has to be consideration given to forecast error. If the the wave height contours gradient is steep (like on the west side) a small forecast error can led to a significant difference in actual conditions encountered. If the contours are less steep then errors in the forecast storm track have less effect on the encountered conditions.
The other point is that even if a quick evaluation of the weather confirms expectations it is still important to evaluate the weather situation in depth. Process not outcome as they say.
Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions.
Rule 8
Action to avoid Collision
(d) Action taken to avoid collision with another vessel shall be such as to result in passing at a safe distance. The effectiveness of the action shall be carefully checked until the other vessel is finally past and clear.
(e) If necessary to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the situation, a vessel shall slacken her speed or take all way off by stopping or reversing her means of propulsion.
Quite the same set of rules to avoid a collision with a hurricane!
Somewhere along the way the managers, and some of the masters, got confused into thinking our job is to treat storms, and bad weather generally, as something easily “risk-managed” into submission.
But getting cute and toying with weather at sea is a lot more like the way a bullfighter gets in close and toys with a bull to play to the crowd. Proximity usually equals danger, more of the former gets you more of the latter, and it doesn’t always end well for the bull fighter.
Unless you’re crazy or an idiot, wire boats force you to play it more conservatively than an ATB or a ship might need to play it. But, regardless of vessel type, I prefer to keep my distance. Distance equals more time, space and options with which to avoid.
I would imagine that if it were hurricane season and a tropical storm was blowing towards New Jersey with all the hoopla the news media puts out concerning hurricanes the ship would have never set sail due to public perceptions. As it were the ship set sail into a building near hurricane thinking they had a good route and could stay on schedule. They rolled the dice and lost a little, it could have been much worse. They are cruise ships not ocean liners. They were lucky.
I agree that they could have taken a better route, but how is it possible that a ship of that size does not have any measures taken for bad weather. I mean, exercise equipment moving around the room? Where are the sea fastenings we see on other ships?
On every ship I sailed on we had the possibility to tie down chairs and other equipment. Do they believe that cruise ships are never going to encounter bad weather?
[QUOTE=Mark Osterloh;179248]I agree that they could have taken a better route, but how is it possible that a ship of that size does not have any measures taken for bad weather. I mean, exercise equipment moving around the room? Where are the sea fastenings we see on other ships?
On every ship I sailed on we had the possibility to tie down chairs and other equipment. Do they believe that cruise ships are never going to encounter bad weather?[/QUOTE]
Apparently that is the case. Cruise ships are supposed to look like what people are used to at home, not like something that may encounter a storm at sea. As close to a high class hotel, restaurant or shopping mall is the ideal image.
Having visible means of lashing loose equipment may scare passengers into believing there may be a need to do so at some time on their cruise. They may even conveyed that perception to their friends, causing them to shy away from cruising.
They are selling dreams of blue skies and calm seas, even if the cruise originate in areas with high winds and heavy seas.
The fact is that in this case there were no serious injuries or damages, but a lot of sensational reporting and the inevitable claim of incompetency on the part of the Captain. Who would guarantee that they would have done better, or stayed in port?
[QUOTE=ombugge;179250]The fact is that in this case there were no serious injuries or damages, but a lot of sensational reporting…[/QUOTE]
No serious damages! It’s like believing the statement of Royal Caribbean that publicly reported superficial damage to the vessel on February 8. “The ship has sustained some damage to the public areas and guest staterooms, which in no way affect the sea-worthiness of the ship,” said Royal Caribbean spokeswoman Cynthia Martinez on Monday.
All 4 self-arming torque overload clutch provided on the shaft between each steering motor and reduction gear burned out. That means that the Azipods were weather-beaten to keep the hove-to position to such an extent, that all four port Azipod overload clutches burned out. Very luckily, the Stbd one held on fast. That vessel wouldn’t have been allowed to sail if he had a defective Azipod. She would’ve then been considered unseaworthy. If you follow my logic, she had no other choice but to come back embarrassed to port due to her unseaworthiness. Sorry but I think that it was on the contrary a very serious damage.
[QUOTE=Topsail;179254]All 4 self-arming torque overload clutch provided on the shaft between each steering motor and reduction gear burned out. That means that the Azipods were weather-beaten to keep the hove-to position to such an extent, that all four port Azipod overload clutches burned out. Very luckily, the Stbd one held on fast. That vessel wouldn’t have been allowed to sail if he had a defective Azipod. She would’ve then been considered unseaworthy. If you follow my logic, she had no other choice but to come back embarrassed to port due to her unseaworthiness. Sorry but I think that it was on the contrary a very serious damage.[/QUOTE]
WOW! Talk about downplaying a major mistake on the part of RCCL…that damage is going to cost them millions to repair and leave that ship out of service for months. BONE FUCKING HEADS!
[QUOTE=ombugge;179261]ETA PORT CANAVERAL / Jan 16, 10:30[/QUOTE]
WOW! They got those repairs completed but quick like. Nothing like facing the refund of many millions of dollars to pax for cancelled cruises to grease the wheels. I assume she was drydocked for fix the azipods?
