Summarising my post #225 above itemising my experiences:
1st incident (Berg) had alarms going from everything but pitch system,
2nd (SKL) had no alarms, just no response to pulling back pitch control,
3rd (KaMeWa pic) shows multiple alarms and back ups all over.
I.e. in my experience - no common safe standard!
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KC,
Additionally, throughout all of the detailed incidents and simulations in the thesis……not once was the ES activated.
On two occasions the duty engineer rang the bridge to ask them whether they were aware that one of the props had been running astern for some time.
As a naval vessel isn’t it exempt from SOLAS regs?
Generally exempt but encouraged to comply. What this has highlighted is the SOLAS black hole in the commercial arena.
Again, lots of talk about mechanical failure but I’m thinking this is probably human error, control station issue, just like the Manawanui sinking. In the thread below from '21, many folks on the forum assumed the Tug Courageous & Tanker Polar Endeavor collision was due to mechanical failure too. Read comment #94 & the Professional Mariner magazine follow up article afterwards. Below is a quote from that article. I say 80% chance it was human error.
"The mate on watch guided Courageous across the Port of Valdez toward the docked ship using the tug’s autopilot feature. At one point, an alarm began sounding in the wheelhouse. The other mate helped address the alarm. Meanwhile, the mate helming the tug used manual throttle controls to bring the tug to a stop near the tanker to await further orders. Then, he released the throttle controls.
“At that point, the tug reverted to auto … and worked forward until it hit the ship,” Morales said. Attempts by the mate to avoid that collision weren’t successful.."
So is this a human failure or a mechanical failure. At least IMO, within reason, not knowing what the engine and rudder are actually doing is almost always human error.
To qualify that a bit - when exactly you know may not be as prompt as working gauges and alarms - but those conning should always have the responsibility to know what rudder/tugs/engines are actually doing.
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Both.
The problem with CPP installations is you do not get the same auditory signals which accompany a fixed pitch installation and this is compounded by a lack of alarm functionality.
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thanks - but at some point in time you should know you are not getting what you ordered, without alarms, or gauges.
The skill, training, experience etc. is in how long that takes IMO.
Does that make it human error ? Maybe not, but again IMO one very big reason Pilots and Senior Officers get paid is their ability to respond quickly, and effectively when it all goes to hell.
One reason they pay senior engineers is to prevent mechanical failures. And to respond to them quickly and effectively when they happen.
When they finish their investigation, I am pretty sure there will some degree of human error attributed to someone.
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If you read the link provided by @Kennebec_Captain you will note, within both the documented incidents and simulations, that not one single failure was picked up by the bridge team. In one instance the failure was finally noted when a team member looked at the stern camera and saw that the wash was going the wrong way in another the duty engineer rang the bridge.
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Absolutely……..without a doubt. Hopefully, we all take something away from this.
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Certainly the docking pilot knew he didn’t intend to go upriver backwards at 6 knots. And probably the river pilot did too. And I’m sure somebody thought about the air draft issues on the bridge team. I’m fairly certain they all knew there was some issue. Maybe not what the issue was, but there’s no chance that they thought everything was hunky dory.
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In the one instance I have seen of CPP failure (I was standing on the dock), the Captain had no idea that pitch control had failed to give astern propulsion when he backed down. When the vessel did not slow he added power which instead accelerated her into the vessel in the berth ahead. CRUNCH.
The USCG twisted his arm to admit “negligence” and take a letter of warning in lieu of a suspension. Total bullshit.
That captain has been shoreside as a risk assurance manager for many years.
Sailed on the Coast Guard 378’s for years with CPP - I know we had a gauge showing the pitch - but for the life of me can’t remember it, or how it looked - old age catching up with me.
The comments so far remind me of an allision in Swanson Dock, Melbourne, Australia. A container vessel tested main engine before picking up the pilot. Manoeuvred without incident in the Yara river and with tugs fast forward and aft moved stern first into Swanson Dock.
At some point the Main Engine was stopped from an astern movement and an ahead movement was ordered. The engine failed to start and despite the tugs efforts she came into contact with a moored vessel.
The anchors were not used because the bridge team were unable to precisely locate the forward tug.
The failure was traced to a blocked line that monitored oil pressure and prevented the engine starting. There was not maintenance procedure for checking this line.
The master was censored for not having a contingency plane for engine failure.
Another loss of thrust control sea story: I saw a video where a modern tractor tug (I assume it was ASD,) was escorting a ship out of the channel at the end of a very long lead on the bow. Something happened, and tug started to spin in place with as much force as it possessed, causing it to wind up its line around the wheelhouse glass. It made almost two complete turns before contact with the stacks burned through the line. The operator could have been badly injured or killed, and my takeaway was to always know where your e-stops are and plan to use them. Never heard what caused the malfunction.
Reg 31
Reg 51
Now. If the bridge team is unaware of an impending issue despite existence of regs as above , than from my chair looks like inadeqate control/monitoring of provided for such purpose monitoring/alarming equipment.
The above tools I had on the bridge as far as I could remember and it is not a new "disturbing " technology but good old and tested stuff.
Having said that , and witnessing such impossibility of performance regarding proper monitoring, I am wondering how present and future ship handlers /navigators will cope with monitoring more complex AI aided systems if they can not cope with old less complex systems.
If the level of attention is so poor and/or inadequate one can imagine how poor is the monitoring/control of ECDIS , ARPAs let alone complex NBSes . Beats me really. If one ads to it an abandonment of all ancient ayeballing methods discussed in other thred the picture looks rather gloomy.
What else is required to maintain adequate situational awareness and familiarity ?? What the “ship” is going on here??? 
Spo,
“the design of the remote control system shall be such that in case of its failure an alarm will be given. Unless the Administration considers it impracticable the preset speed and direction of thrust of the propellers shall be maintained until local control is in operation;”
This Is ill defined. In this regulation they are not referring to the failure of the CPP system such as a hydraulic pump or other component……they are referring to failure of the remote control system. This explains why none of the incidents and simulations documented in the Standards for Handling CPP Failures thesis (dated 2023) alerted the bridge teams via audible and visual alarms.
The regulation applies to all propulsion systems in general.
I think it would be good to find some Class rules on that CPP thing.
When You give command port 10 what do you do?
You check if your command was executed by glancing at the helm indicator( I remember at least three on the bridge + two on each wing ) and You do it despite master/oow → helmsmen repetition of your command ( close loop communication)
With for example fixed prop there is somebody ( often chief mate , oow) standing at the telegraph. He executes your command half ahead and there is at least one indicator showing /indicating the revs going into green ( forward) sector reaching the final value. So he is the guy minitoring it .You may check it or the master if he is on the bridge. Same applies to astern commands.
In case of cpp the m/e revs are constant ( my experience) but the telegraph looked identical like with fixed propeller. There is an indicator showing how the blades are configured ahead /astern and it must be monitored with same degree of diligence as in the case of fixed propeller.
You do not need an alarm to tell You while watching/monitoring the analog /digital indicators . You may need one in case their indications are false meaning : you ordered half ahead , the indicator shows the proper positionintg ( fwd) of the blades but the actual position is quite opposite. You still have a speed ( water/ground) as tale telling sign sth is abnormal as the bow movement and it’s ROT are same irrespective if you order ahead or astern.
I have not read yet the thesis busy with Class research .
added 28052025 at dawn , when birds started to sing 
Aus.
Can not understand why there is such a focus on this CPP alarm .
Below is your answer to my simple question . It should shut down the whole conversation .You have encapsulated all that was needed to protect young lives and the property using the bare minimum resources due to proper risk analyses. And I am am sure in case of CPP screw up U would not need any alarms to allert You as You have been allerted in your scenario before letting go first line. I think so.
