244,
Yes, I had a similar reaction.
We understand the issues and the reasons for this terrible incident……..we do not need to wait for the NTSB.
There are some positives. I have contacted some former Check Pilot colleagues and suggested that they now introduce a new scenario into their simulation matrix…….a jammed CPP. I never saw this during my entire training period.
In a couple of months, it will all be forgotten…….just like the “Dali” and the “Ever Forward”.
The feedback will be interesting.
I just saw a video from one of the NYC news stations that basically said the Mexican navy is throwing the pilot under the bus. But I don’t think that dog will hunt.
I think I saw the same clip, bumbling local news reporting at its worst, “Now hear this!! New Info, Investigators going in a totally different direction!! Wasn’t at all related to the engine!!! Mexican navy says it was the Pilot!!! You can see the USCG on there, I know because his shirt says USCG”.
Cue to the quote from the Mexican navy mentioning simply that the vessel was following the orders of the state required pilot from the time she left the berth until she hit the bridge. News reporter not knowledgeable enough or caring to understand that giving orders matters very little if the propulsion plant isn’t following them.
I’ve had two incidents with loss of pitch authority, told the stories here years ago. One was water damaged auto pilot jamming up the shared pitch / rudder hydraulics, which happened in close quarters and resulted in a slight accdent. The other was a disintegrated support bearing that allowed the shaft to move axially, and only resulted in an elevated heart rate, mostly because it was the second time it happened to me.
CPP mechanisms are rather involved, with lots of variety both in construction, control and failure modes. The same can be said for reversing gearboxes. In my time as a yard mechanic I’ve seen a fair bit of damage from snapped shifter cables and the like, mostly small craft with significant low speed acceleration, and always because the situation was not recognized in time.
The fact of the matter is that loss of thrust reversal does happen, and the only effective mitigation is to train and plan maneuvers accordingly.
Used a few VPP (Hundested) and quite a few CPP systems.
In mid Atlantic, Berg system failed on one shaft when power supply went. Pitch reduced to zero and rpm to idle. Other engine pushed us into a turn faster than autopilot could react - lots of alarms, including radar/AIS etc collision alarm as we were now pointing at the first ship we had seen in a week! All resolved.
Ex- E German Navy Ice-Class tug, converted, but stiil SKL etc systems (Russian!) arriving in Sardinian anchorage from Ustica, pulled back pitch - stuck in full ahead and entering busy anchorage at full speed! Quick swerve out to open water, hit the big button, drop a pick. That took a team from Wolgast to fix.
Pic of a more recent KaMeWa CPP combiner control I ran around with for a couple of years.
A staggering number of videos have been filmed regarding ARM Cuauhtémoc (BE-01) striking the Brooklyn Bridge. To make a change, here is a video showing the docking of the three-masted barque filmed at the Marina Real in Valencia, Spain, on December 27, 2021. Noting that the Cuauhtémoc among other data is LOA 300ft, LWL 222ft, Air Draft 160ft, Displacement 1,800 tons and 1,125hp propelling a likely RH CCP. The Brooklyn Bridge clearances go from 126ft down to 116ft at MHW.
The Valencia marina is more constrict than the area surrounding Pier 17 in the East River. The wind at the time seemed to be blowing more moderately than gently since the windage of the three-masted barque made her heeling over down wind. Consequently, two tugs, the VB Poder and the VB Furia, were used to bring the yacht safely alongside. The twin tugs built in 2005, were 5,440-hp Z-drives pulling 57 tons on the bollard. Both tugs were securely fastened to the Cuauhtémoc via a sturdy fairlead.
On May 17, 2025, the ARM Cuauhtémoc (BE-01) was setting sail from Pier 17 in the East River. However, a flood tide of nearly one knot added by a 10-knot westerly wind, both driving the three-masted barque toward the Brooklyn Bridge 850 feet away, under which the clearance did not allow her to pass freely. A double-kort nozzles tug, the Charles D. McAllister, built in 1967 with a power of 2,800 hp allowing her a 25-ton bollard pull, was called in. For some reason, the tug was not made fast to the barque.
Admittedly two different manoeuvres, nonetheless two debatable levels of precautions…
In 2000, the 540ft / 21 knots RoRo ferry P&O SL Aquitaine was entering Calais harbour for its berth. The master of 39 years experience at sea, felt that his ship was going faster than usual. He then reduced the combinator controlling the twin CPP. The RoRo took a sudden sheer to starboard, so the threw his double bow thrusters of 4,000hp full to port. The vessel kept turning and at high speed. So he then thrust the combinator levers to Full Astern. The ferry slammed the berth at 7 knots while swinging to starboard against the 4,000hp bow thrusters full to port. Out of 1,850 passengers, 209 were injured, 200 vehicles and the RoRo herself badly damaged.
Broken rotary vanes made a pump unable to produced sufficient pressure in the CPP systems that cause the port propeller blades to lock in 70% pitch ahead. Nobody really knew or been warned by alarms of what was going on at the time.
The traditional European method of ship docking was to tow with a line up from the stern of the tug to the bow of the ship, and for a second tug to have a line up to the stern of the ship. There was little or no pushing against the hull of the ship (like we typically do in the States).
With European ASD tractor tugs, the tugs put their lines up from the bows of the tugs to the ship. There might be some pushing in, especially when more than two tugs are required for large ships, but it’s not the primary means of docking and undocking ships.
So, comparing how an American pilot would handle a ship with a conventional twin screw to tug to how a European pilot would handle the same ship with two ASD tractor tugs, that is an apples to oranges comparison because of different local customs.
Why didn’t they undock the Mexican sailing ship in New York with two tractor tugs?
The simple answer is: cost. And it normally isn’t necessary, unless the ship is reporting machinery deficiencies.
Docking pilots and tug companies are happy to sell and use the services of as many as possible of their best and most expensive tugs, but shipowners want to use the least expensive tug possible.
Should the master of the sailing ship have considered that extra precautions were necessary and asked for two tractor tugs with lines up?
With 200 kids up in the rigging just uptide from a bridge, and with the benefit of hindsight, the answer now seems obvious.
Above I mentioned several problems I experienced with CPP’s or similar type hydraulic equipment. The vanes going bad was the same as my problem # 2. Whenever the bridge team reports slow CPP response the 1st thing I do, & tell my engine room crew to do, is turn on the CPP/Servo electrical standby pumps. A CPP oil leak, low CPP oil level, dirty servo filter & even extremely hot oil can cause lose of pressure & slow CPP response. As for the standing orders of starting the electrical standby pumps, the next step afterwards is to go to the CPP/Gearbox & see if there’s any obvious signs of why the mechanical pump isn’t producing enough pressure by itself. Those pumps & their couplings do go bad.
The degree of towage assets assigned to a visiting vessel should be set by the Port Authority irrespective of the shipowner’s commercial desires or the interpretations of other parties.
Edit: Plus the allocated asset(s) should have a line up.
Don’t confuse the “accident” which involved a mechanical engine failure and the concept of using a sail training vessel to improve seafaring skills. We’re discussing two different things here.
As a Pilot, my instinct first off is to “order a stop bell”. NOT to give any more power in any direction. Always turn it all off until you figure it out. Meanwhile, I’ll do something with the tugs and or anchors.
Similarly when giving rudder orders, If I tell the helmsman “Port 10” and he puts it on “Starboard 10” The next words out of my mouth are “MIDSHIP”.
These are basic concepts Pilots are trained to know and do. At least thats what I was taught 30+ years ago and have survived AMPLE number of actual similar events over the years to put these concepts into practice.
The Valencia marina is more constrict than the area surrounding Pier 17. The wind at the time was blowing more moderately than gently, making the three-masted barque heeling over down wind. Consequently, two Z-drives were ordered. Nevertheless, both tugs were securely fastened to the Cuauhtémoc.
On the other hand, the ARM Cuauhtémoc (BE-01) had much more room than within a constrict marina. However, a flood tide amplified by the wind drove the barque toward the close by bridge. Nevertheless, a conventional 25-ton bollard pull tug appeared to be sufficient and called in. Yet, for some reason, the tug was not made fast to the barque.
I agree that two 50-ton bollard pull Z-drives were not required. But I do believe that the three-masted sail training barque of the Mexican Navy, cherished as a national treasure while showing off on departure, did deserve one 50-ton bollard pull Z-drive, sturdily made fast.
It was possible to handle the job along with a 1967 conventional tug. But the practice is not to show how fine we are, but to assure safety within reasonable expenses range. A 1,800 tons displacement vessel clutched astern at 6 knots will developed 6.3M ft/lbs of kinetic energy. A 56,000 lbs bollard pull tug will thus require over 100 ft at same speed just overcome that energy. If the hawser is not made fast … then simply make a persuasive prayer!
It seems some of us haven’t learned anything with regard to “risk assessment” even after the DALI disaster in Baltimore. Months after the DALI hitting the bridge, I participated in a meeting with local Port Authorities regarding the numerous “what if” scenarios and what “we” could do to avoid a similar economic catastrophe.
I provided insight into some very basic and effective suggestions, which could be implemented overnight, right now. Yes, there would be some added costs increases to our basic movements. But largely, this would impact only a relatively few ships. The simple answer was to make the use of more and better tugs on more jobs that had a higher level of risk (compared to other jobs).
To me (a casual observer from afar) backing a medium size sail training ship, a high profile job, a “national treasure” with many cadets aboard and numerous public in attendance, with environmental conditions such as they were, with a vessel that was maneuvering within a short distance of a bridge that had no vertical clearance given the height of her masts, if anything should have gone wrong … this all seems painfully obvious, yes? At least it does now, after the fact.
Did ANY of these issues come up in discussion between the Docking Pilot, Master, and Agent prior to the job order? Yes, cost is “absolutely” a factor, that cannot be denied. But once again, didn’t we address that specific issue post-DALI accident? Given the high profile risk assessment of this job, in the wake of the DALI, how much more effort might this scrutiny of potential risk actually take?
Not to whine about the tugs, but just 1 conventional tug on this departure definitely appears to be a “cost saving” order to me. That’s my very own professional opinion. But I wasn’t there and don’t work there. I understand (from discussions with other Pilots) that the Docking Pilot and Bar Pilot arrangement in New York is very unique to this port, So there’s that. I’ve been in the middle of many discussions between Master, agent, and vessel owner about my insistence on a tug(s) order that the owner/Master may disagree with. So be it. It’s my job to do what is most safe and efficient, with due regard to the port (first) and the vessel (second) … in that order.
I didn’t see that concept happening here in the move involving this sail training ship. Thats too bad. It’s exceptionally horrible, given that 19 were injured, many critically, and 2 died. So far.
Did we learn any more about our decision making and risk assessment process?
My bet is … no. Thats a bigger tragedy.
Well said kapena. Well said…….
The other glaring shortcoming, which has now been addressed in new buildings post Jan’25, is the lack of an audible alarm when requested pitch does not align with actual pitch.
The regulators recognised the need for a wrong way alarm on fixed pitch installations yet, previously, totally neglected CPP installations……
Two tractor tugs would have been 1.8 tractor tugs too many for this job. Sometimes too big a tug is just as much of a problem as too small of a tug.
On a tiny 1200 teu vsl with 6920 KW M/E i got in Antwerp the tug so powerful that I was under the impression the tail is waging the dog. ( 1995) right handed CPP fitted and with BT .
Re Regulators. have You checked SOLAS?
Another issue: quote: It’s my job to do what is most safe and efficient, with due regard to the port (first) and the vessel (second) … in that order. end quote.
The US pilots were discussed here sometime ago. Above quote reflects 100% their filosophy which seems to be diffierent then in Europe .
While one may accept it in relation to cargo vessels , then a training ship with 200+ people on board seems to me sth different.
Wonder if same approach is practiced in US aviation . Protection of state property, environment and other blah blah first vs life of paxes second.
Added:
Solas does not apply to navy ships and it seems to sailing ships but surely the vessel had some Class and is engaged in international voyages . Will check Class rules time allowing.
Here are Solas rules for cargo vessels regarding control of propulsion , alarms and other stuff.
A)
Chapter II-1 , Part C Reg . 31
SOLAS 2020 consolidated edition 96-98.pdf (532.2 KB)
B)
Chapter II-1 , Part E, Reg. 49 & 52
SOLAS 2020 consolidated edition 120-121.pdf (525.7 KB)
