Gladly, after you’ve gone back to Cruisers Forum and don’t let the door hit you in the ass as you’re leaving
From your posts it’s clear you definitely could use some cruising along with some other things. I know you’re Mr. Vitriol (to put it kindly) but that doesn’t phase me pal, not going anywhere, sorry. I know it will be a shocker to you but I actually qualified for and passed my 50 GT (the only female in the exam room might I add) so I am not a total idiot.
The notion that flotation added inside the boat improves the buoyancy of a boat , before the boat floods with water, is one of the most ridiculous things ever said on Gcaptain. Please inform yourself and abandon this misguided belief.
I’m surprised that you have not been flamed a lot more vigorously.
well there are more that this uncouth and vitriolic bastard who will beg to differ with you on that one.
try to understand this Ms. 50GT Genius anything watertight added to the inside of a vessel’s hull will only work to add buoyancy when that hull becomes flooded. the only way to allow any hull to carry more weight is to raise the sides or add watertight chambers to the outside of the hull such as sponsons. Have you ever heard of Archimedes’ Principle? if you watch this video you might begin to understand this painfully basic law of physics
obviously a 50GT license exam doesn’t cover that one
If anything, you compromised an otherwise watertight compartment by cutting an inspection port. How was it sealed? Sheesh. . . .
If c.cap had not asked readers not to derail the thread because of an idiot I certainly would have had a lot more to say. I am glad others are finally saying what I didn’t.
What is it about a marine disaster that brings out the WAFIs and toyboaters?
WAFI’s on GCaptain Forums
This behavior fits the definition of internet trolling. Trolls keep on trolling so long as you pay attention, that is there fuel. Ignore them and stop with feeding them and they will disappear.
Not that tough. “We will know ye by yer posts”.
Notice I managed to misspell “boaters” as “boasters” in my original post.
ST. LOUIS — A certificate of inspection for the Branson duck boat that sank last month, killing 17 people, shows that it was on the lake at a time when the wind speed far exceeded allowable limits.
The Coast Guard on Wednesday announced it has convened a formal Marine Board of Investigation into the accident involving a Ride the Ducks of Branson boat. The vessel sank July 19 at Table Rock Lake.
The lake was calm when the excursion began, but weather turned violent and the boat sank within minutes.
The Coast Guard’s certificate of inspection issued in 2017 prohibited the boat from being on water if winds exceed 35 mph or wave height exceeds 2 feet.
Investigators said the wind speed at the time of the accident was more than 70 mph.
Next question is were all the boat operators and their supervisors aware of that prohibition.
The COI is supposed to be mounted in plain sight where the passenger seating is, so unless the capt was totally oblivious I would hope he had seen it.
I don’t think the accident happened because the boat operators and managers didn’t know what the COI restrictions were or willfully ignored them; they reportedly left under calm conditions.
They switched the normal tour sequence to do the water part first because they knew a storm was coming and thought they could squeeze in one more water tour before it hit.
Whoever made the decision miscalculated both the speed and the intensity of the squall line.
These are serious sponsons! With 8 of these fat boys you are not going to take on water soon. In fact it is all so simple. If only an alert and competent USCG had the foresight to require the same safety measures a lot of incidents, deads and pain could have been avoided.
Looks more like a school bus!
Viking Splash Tours is now opening up in Paris and they plan to extend elsewhere in world but with a much more sophisticated vehicle. They are owned by a company called Salamander Amphibious Vehicles also in Dublin, Ireland who produce a bus type of vehicle. They had to do that because the war time DUKW’s and spares are not obtainable any more and also for safety concerns.
- Built to ships classification standards i.e. DNVGL and S.I 274:1985
- Carries 36 passengers plus 2 crew
- Speed - land = 90km/h water = 7 knots
By the looks of it passengers have ample space here and are not packed like sardines like in the much smaller DUKW with in total 31 persons.
Interesting school bus design.
On the road, the sponsons are stored on the roof’s sides, to reduce the width to 2.50 m.
In water, they are lowered just below the windows.
“110% buoyancy by way of foam compartmentalization, therefore remaining afloat even in a fully flooded state”
I agree that likely the operation as a whole understood the boats had weather limitations of some kind. I also agree that it looks like this weather event “broke” what ever system they were using.
What I wonder is what would the answer be to the question “what are the weather limits” if people at the company were asked? So far I saw the president of the company asked, his answer was something along the lines of “Obviously we don’t go out in severe weather” I also saw someone who used to work as captain there asked, his answer was that “it was left up to the captains”.
It would be of interest to ask to see exactly what that answers would be, maybe “I can’t recall put it’s posted somewhere” or “when it’s gets shitty”? The answers would indicate the how well it was understood.
That looks to me like the COI provided little if any protection but a great deal of latitude for the operator’s judgment (or lack thereof) regarding weather risks. The COI should have stated the maximum sea state and wind with the addition of a time restriction, i.e. " xxxxx wind speed or xxxx wave height or forecast within x hours of the duration of the voyage.
“Obviously we don’t go out in severe weather”. Like the statement that the storm “came out of nowhere”, a more intelligent sounding answer would have been “we can’t comment due to an ongoing investigation”. Maybe their lawyer didn’t get there in time to tell them not to answer questions that might come back to bite them in the ass in a courtroom.
Well, it is the truth, they did not “go out” in severe weather. The severe weather came to them after they “went out.”
That was my point in saying the COI lacked any real value. The FAA words this the way the COI should have been written to the same effect and constraint as 14 CFR 91.527 "… no pilot may fly an airplane into known or forecast severe icing conditions. "
The “Donald Duck” method of salvage works:
But it is a prerogative that the vessel is submerged, otherwise it does not help to apply ping pong balls.(or plastic bottles)
PS> The method has apparently been used when there were no way to make a compartment airtight enough to apply compressed air.
Posted by LT Amy Midgett, Wednesday, August 1, 2018The Coast Guard Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance has issued Marine Safety Information Bulletin 06-18, “Amphibious Passenger Vessel Operations,” following the tragic loss of the amphibious passenger vessel Stretch Duck 07.
On July 19, 2018, the Stretch Duck 07 encountered a storm and sank near Table Rock Lake, Missouri, with loss of life. A Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation (MBI) has been convened and will conduct a thorough and comprehensive investigation to determine casual factors that contributed to this tragic incident.
The Coast Guard and amphibious passenger vessel industry do not have to delay until the MBI has completed their investigation before taking immediate and positive action. It is recommended that all Officers in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI), owners, operators, and masters immediately complete the following:
• Review the routes and conditions listed on the vessel’s Certificate of Inspection (COI). Ensure crews are familiar with and clearly aware of their obligations. Additionally, ensure everyone is aware of all operational limitations of each vessel.
• Review the company’s operations manual recommended by Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) No. 1-01. If there is currently no operations manual, it is highly recommended that one be developed. Additionally, owners and operators may wish to incorporate programs and procedures characteristic of a Safety Management System to effectively mitigate risk and establish a culture of continuous improvement.
• Conduct crew training and drills in accordance with the vessel’s Emergency Response Plans with a specific focus on: crew duties and responsibilities, inclement weather monitoring and response, flooding, methods and locations for beaching, and vessel evacuations.
• Take a proactive approach to vessel oversight to include frequent communications with the master for hazard monitoring, to include changes in weather conditions.
Questions concerning this notice may be directed to the Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance, Commandant (CG-CVC) at 202-372-1135 or CG-CVC@uscg.mil.
Keep in mind that anyone can say a vessel is built to DnV-GL ship classification standards. Unless it is actually certified or classed by DnV-GL, those claims don’t mean anything.