The main point is that the Navy has a system they use to navigate ships and that system is deeply embedded, includes shipboard culture, the Navy A schools and the academy. If one part is changed it affects the whole system.
It’s not possible to simply reduce the number people on the bridge.The system doesn’t permit.
A better analogy would be the way a driver and a companion drive in a unfamiliar city.
When I am driving my wife keeps track of our location on a map (and/or GPS) and lets me know when a turn is coming up. I focus on controlling the car as required, keeping a proper distance on the other nearby cars and maneuvering to make the required turns.
When I am in simple situations (the freeway) or in a familiar area (my home town) I do both the navigation and control the car.
Of course splitting the duties is less efficient but it is safer when the entire situation is considered.
I did not marry a navigator unfortunately. I suppose my mistress is the google maps voice. Which is pretty bold on my part because she is in my ear a lot while my wife is in the car.
Same thing happens when the task of controlling a ship is divided between the conning officer and the helmsman.
The cost is the requirement to communicate, which is made easier and more reliable by using standard helm commands. The benefit is the conning officer doesn’t have to use bandwidth to start the ship swinging or steadied up ect as those tasks are farmed out to the helmsman.
“A better analogy would be the way a driver and a companion drive in a unfamiliar city.”
That would only be an accurate analogy if you drove with dedicated personnel for the brakes, accelerator, steering wheel, navigation, somebody keeping a log, somebody operating the radio, a lookout with his/her head out the moonroof, a driver of the day and a junior driver of the day.
I would not venture to say that a Derek Jeter navigator could man the bridge all by himself, but if the Navy could get down to the equivalent of you and your wife driving as a team in a strange city they would be infinitely better than they are now.
The reason we’re having this discussion seems to be because the Navy has a system that needs reform. They replaced sails, the uniforms are different. Systems evolve or die.
That would be going in the opposite direction from a movement to simplify and improve navigation (and combat) by eliminating redundancy, excess and confusion.
I would expect the reasons to be very similar to the reasons why any other vessels suffer accidents.
Human Error top of the list,
Communication.
Complacency.
Planning.
Training.
Experience.
SOP not followed possibly unaware of SOP.
Mechanical or system failure at critical time. Return to top of list.
A ships systems become more complex. Training in the use of systems becomes more critical along with training in the basic fundamentals to appreciate when the complex systems might not be correct.
No personal familiarity with Navy vessels.
I do notice some comments re orders to call which I find strange. Even counter productive.
It is a long tradition. And navies always to things the traditional way.
And as always when people think the Americans always do it better, a little history puts things in perspective…
OK these are a few years old but… They do make you wonder!
Navy always lose ships, the stats just look bad when there isnt any war?
I haven’t seen any statistics but given the two recent incidents and reports about the 7th fleet it seems that the accidents are related to increased tempo, reduced support and training.
This is from the Propublica article
The fleet was short of sailors, and those it had were often poorly trained and worked to exhaustion. Its warships were falling apart, and a bruising, ceaseless pace of operations meant there was little chance to get necessary repairs done. The very top of the Navy was consumed with buying new, more sophisticated ships, even as its sailors struggled to master and hold together those they had. The Pentagon, half a world away, was signing off on requests for ships to carry out more and more missions.
The risks were obvious, and Aucoin repeatedly warned his superiors about them. During video conferences, he detailed his fleet’s pressing needs and the hazards of not addressing them. He compiled data showing that the unrelenting demands on his ships and sailors were unsustainable. He pleaded with his bosses to acknowledge the vulnerability of the 7th Fleet.
Aucoin recalled the response: “Crickets.” If he wasn’t ignored, he was put off — told to calm down and get the job done.
NPR broadcast that aired a couple days ago addressing this:
Transcript & podcast
Wow! They should never let that reporter speak. The actual Pro Publica articles were much better.
I thought they should not have let either one of these jokers speak. Is NPR turning into MSN?Jeez Louise!
Yeah. I’m glad it wasn’t Terry Gross – she’s an amazing interviewer and I’d hate to see her fall down that badly.
And how much safer was the “plotting team” than a local pilot aboard the PORT ROYAL as she ran herself hard aground barely clear of the Pearl Harbor ship channel?
What about the “plotting teams” that ran themselves aground on a reef in the Philippines?
The Navy clings to this suspended reality that a LOT of tired, overworked, stressed people crowded into a space the size of a large bathroom and all talking at the same time and literally “screaming” information at each other…is somehow the best and safest method to navigate a ship in pilotage or coastwise waters. We all understand they do not understand this, but how do we get them to actually learn there is a better way to navigate a ship that is actually safer than what they are doing still today?
Or…
Perhaps we figure out a way to eliminate this “perishable period” of losing skills a well seasoned Commanding Officer SHOULD have, and retain during his career in the Navy. In fact, in’t the constant moving of bodies around in the service, for the purposes of a broad understanding of overall experience and a career path precisely the very thing that actually contributes to the problem of poorly trained people??
Knowing a little bit about a lot of things…is that better than having excellent skills at just a few things?
When it comes to going to sea, I’d put my money on a deep sea Master or Mate that has been standing bridge watches repeatedly on a ship his whole career…as opposed to an individual who has spent a few years assigned to a ship that likely, may have been dockside for much of that time, then assigned to a shore/office billet for a few years. Then back to sea a few years later…
How does that series of events create an “experienced and knowledgeable” bridge officer in charge of the watch of a billion dollar warship???
We need to really rethink how we train people, how we assign them jobs, how we keep their skills up, and how we rotate them around the fleet and provide time off, all with the intent of having highly qualified officers and crew that are functioning at their peak performance when that performance is truly needed.
Perfect.