Another reason why the 12-4 is usually the more experienced 2/m.
Also, I always sort of took the CPAs with a grain of salt. But there was usually a line in there about doubt, and if I was in doubt I always called.
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This is true, the second mate can usually be trusted not only to make the call if necessary but also most likely can handle alone.
But Iâm familiar with that area and a lot of mates donât have much experience in traffic, in particular crossing those coast-wise traffic lanes. Sometimes the gaps in traffic are not very large.
If I have a mate thatâs never done it I explain how itâs done. Find the appropriate gap using ARPA relative vectors, then head for that gap by making a good course change to stbd to show the ship you plan to cut behind your red light. Then making sure youâre always showing that ship your red, keep coming left and cut through their wake (not literally, but it will be close astern). Let the give-way ships going the other way take care of themselves.
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There was no study, the 30% is just a statistic.
One thing I never did, however trivial the case, was bust the junior mates ass for calling me if he was in doubt. I woke up more than a few captains and mates in my day. That did not represent failure, either than lack of experience in close quarters and me trying to contact people to stay the fuck away from me. They did the same, damn proud of them. For the most part, I slept well with the mates on board and on watch. One should be so lucky.
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It has not been a week, itâs been three years! Which, btw, is a ridiculously long time for an investigation like this.
And what do you vehemently disagree with? The fact that people have lost interest?
Navy people arenât going to navy websites to read copy of the investigation either. Naval institute and navy timesâ social media numbers on this investigation report are way down too. Nobody cares.
In an effort to make sure weâre not talking past each other, my complaint was the tone and timing of your original article, âThe USS Fitzgerald is at Fault. This is Why.â In your response you said âNobody cares a year or two later. It doesnât matter if I get it 
right, what matters is that we get good relevant information out so people can discuss the incident intelligently before everyone looses interest.â. No one was talking about reporting on the investigation, which had barely begun when your article was published. I disagreed with the notion that people would have lost interest in a week.
As to the investigation, there are probably a lot of factors at play. The biggest being that Navy already performed an investigation (which was flawed, for a variety of reasons) but most of the facts have been known for some time. There arenât any major revelations in the NTSB report that havenât been already discussed ad nauseam in naval circles. What were their numbers on this report?
it takes over 3 years for a port stb to see who is at faultâŚclearly the investigation is being done by the ones at fault?
I think we are going to have to disagree with timing. gCaptian was created 15 years ago out of a recognition that the mediaâs influence was growing and their coverage of maritime issues was getting worse. I can not wait a week to publish because the large media conglomerates do not⌠they start spreading inaccurate information while the bodies are still warm and congress increasingly acts upon those reports rather than waiting for the official ones. Like it or not (for me itâs NOT) speed matters.
Yes, my tone certainly could have been better and I do apologize for being curt and insensitive. There is an underlying sentiment of anger and resentment in all US Mariners that is difficult to suppress and, unlike naval officers, we do not get any training in politics or personal refinement. What we do get it is a constant stream of signals for US Naval officers telling us we are unimportant.
For example âThe Navy isnât like working for Bobâs Shipping Company, where you can quit and go sail for Joeâs Towing.â makes me feel angry and misunderstood. While it is true that we can switch employers we can not escape the harsh realities of life at sea. We can not escape IMO and USCG manning law and competitive market pressures that force us to stand a watch alone on the bridge at 02:00 after already working a full day.
âItâs a culture, itâs a lifestyle. And while it may be dysfunctional at times, itâs still a family. And when that family is pulling together in shock and grief, here comes a smarmy outsider heckling it.â
We are a family too. We have a culture and lifesyste. The US Merchant Marine is a much smaller family, poorer family, and way more dysfunctional but most of our officers attended academies, wore uniforms, and have a deep love for our country. And we consider you guys cousins. Rich cousins who wear fancy clothes and live in $8B houses (USS Zumwalt).
The problem is that while we can be harsh, and say hurtful things, and roll our eyes the vast majority of us do LOVE, you guys, and WILL will have your back in the next fight. But you guys have disowned us, and your lack of support in Congress is at the very root of our relative poverty. The US Merchant Marine is dying because we have no support in Congress and Navy leadership continues to distance themselves from us.
We are Uncle Eddie in National Lampoonâs Christmas Vacation. We are driving the rusted out RV that smells like sewage. We are ugly, uncouth, and politically incorrect BUT we love you. And Iâd like to think that you guys are Clark Griswold but your not⌠Clark Griswold is not a fan of Eddie but he does (if reluctantly) invite him to Christmas dinner and is thankful when Eddie tries in his own Fâd up way to help. You guys donât invite us to shit. You are never thankful.
What is the opposite of Love? Itâs not hate. Itâs not resentment. Many dysfunctional families with deep love and of each other fight. No, Itâs apathy. Itâs totally not caring. Apathy is the opposite of love.
Hereâs the SECNAVâs official statement to congress after the incident:
If you look at the study that I have asked to be stood up,
we are addressing the overall root causes of whatâs going on.
*The CNO is looking at tactical causes. We are going to be *
*looking at root causes. Weâve asked people from BP [British *
*Petroleum] North America to join us. They lived through the *
*Deepwater Horizon tragedy and came out the other side with a *
*very strong plan. We called the Maritime Academy and said, *
*Who is your poster child for maritime safety who's had an * *issue?'' They said,Speak to Crowley Marine. They had a bit *
*of a rash. They have a great program now, called Road to *
Zero.ââ Called Tom Crowley. He said, ``Youâre on it.ââ
The secnav put together a panel of the best minds in the US Merchant Marine and everyone who was called stood up to help. Then the uniformed leadership shrugged off the findings.
And itâs not just this time but EVERYTIME. When the USS Bonhomme Richard caught fire the edison Chouest tugboat immediately called on the VHF to come in and help but where rebuffed numerous times in favor of tiny police boats.
And what frankly pisses me off the most is we know how you feel. We are a very small community and our world was rocked when the El Faro sank. Every US Merchant Mariner I know reached out to their naval buddies and offered to help. How many naval officers offered to help us after the El Faro Sank? How many naval officers attended our hearings? And not only did you not help your family actively obstructed the investigation. The last words of our family members where on a black box in the bottom of the ocean but you refused to let us recover it with commercial assets while you dragged your feet insisting that a USN salvage vessel recovers it. Same for the Deepwater Horizon. You guys refused to help. And donât tell me itâs because we are commecrial mariners because when a commercial airline crashes in the middle of nowhere you guys send teams of people to help.
The bottom line is we love you guys. You donât love us. If I surveyed every naval officer I doubt if 1 in ten would even recognize the name âEl Faroâ.
I do appologize for my tone. None of this is an excuse for my behavior⌠just an explination of why itâs difficult to write in a detached and unemotional manner when it comes to US Naval incidents.
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That statement alone represents the major reason the Navy is held in such contempt by many of us. In my eyes the navy is like a great many fishermen, they just happen to work on a boat but they are not mariners. The navee is nothing more than a modern iteration of the Gilbert and Sullivan farce.
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Having just finished reading the NTSB report on the USS Fitzgerald I have several thoughts. Whilst serving an ACDUTRA in 1978 aboard the USS Edson underway in the Atlantic going from Newport, RI to Bermuda I was assigned as JOOD on the 0000-0400 with a Warrant Officer who was the OOD. At around 0230 we had a contact on the radar, old non-ARPA model, and doing a plot we determined the contact to have a 9600 yard CPA. Per the standing orders the OOD called the Captain to inform him of this. Working in my third season on the Great Lakes where close quarters meetings are very common I asked the Warrant about why he called the Captain at 0230. His answer was simple, itâs in the standing orders, and he followed up with donât you on your ship. My reply was a somewhat snarky if I called the Captain at 0230 to tell him about a contact with a CPA of 4 1/2 miles he would probably come to the bridge wondering what was wrong with me. This just points up one of the differences in operation and for a Naval Reserve ship it made sense since the CO has no idea who the guest actors, like me, were or their experience. Obviously, times have changed regarding standing orders or night orders.
What I really want to comment about though is how Merchant Marine watch standers deal with situations such as the second mate faced. First of all the Fitzgerald presented a small, non consistent target until 0115. If a plot was put on it at that point the Fitzgeraldâs course change at 0124 would not have shown up until later, thus an original plot might have shown a CPA of a 1/2 mile or more, not ideal but for a very small target, fishing boat or sail boat, maybe acceptable. Remember that both the Second Mate and the AB stated they only saw a green light at 3 miles which if that is true would support the sailboat idea even though the speed would be questionable. Why were the masthead lights not visible at 6 miles or more?
Once the Fitzgerald changed course then risk of collision became almost inevitable. The 2nd Mate noticing that the other vessel was not taking early action to avoid tried to signal the Navy ship. Personally, I have often used the spotlight method of waking the other vessel up as once you embarass them for a moment and leave the light in their vicinity they have no doubt who you are directing it at, it works especially well with pleasure craft. Sounding a danger signal relies on the receiver to hear it, understand it and understand that they are the intended recipient. You may meet the requirements of the rules and keep the lawyers happy but it might not solve your problem. Which leads to my final thought.
I do not remember when I took BRM how much we discussed in extremis issues or when you should determine that the other ship is not doing what they should and thus you must depart from the stand on part of the rule. This has to be early enough so that you can turn to avoid and keep the other vessel well outside your turning circle if they do nothing. The Second Mate realized he had to do something and did, it was just not early enough but given that he really doesnât know who or what he is dealing with it is hard to second guess him. We spent a lot of time in BRM discussing communication between people on the bridge but with an AB and a Mate how much communication would there be. What the mate needed was clear cut instructions on when he should depart from the rules to save the situation because I am sure that it had been pounded home in courses he had that you follow the rules and that means you stand on. I am not sure we or the world trains for that as well as it should be done.
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You always make fair points, which is what I like about this site. To your overarching concerns, I donât know what the answer is. Part of the problem on both of our ends is that we are both part of a large entity and specialized branches. It bears repeating that ships are only a part of what the Navy does. Only about 10% of Navy Officers are Surface Warfare Officers; the rest are pilots, SEALs, doctors, chaplains, supply folks, etc. On your end, you might all be part of the âMerchant Marineâ, but there is no US Maritime Service to bind you all together. You have deep water people, coastal people, river people. You are probably right that the Navy is not overly interested in what towboats are doing on the Mississippi. Our merchant mariner friends in MSC have our interest; are we not protecting them from the COVID monster ashore right now? 
We certainly have a strong reaction to outrages against US flagged ships, and I would know - I was part of the Maersk Alabama task force.
I buy into the concept that âthe sea makes us oneâ and I think you give SWOs (as a distinct subset of the Navy) the short shrift by saying weâre indifferent to the tragedies that befall merchant mariners. For instance I would take your 1 in 10 on the El Faro and say itâd be at least 5 in 10 (I wouldnât care of offer odds on the Marine Electric, but the Navy also does a terrible job of teaching its own history, so unless youâre a buff even something as dramatic as the Frank E. Evans collision is not going to ring many bells). I think this attitude is common at the operational level, but I canât speak for flag leadership. I donât know the reasons why cooperation was lacking in any of the incidents you mentioned, but it is certainly unacceptable in my book too.
Most of this is a fight at the strategic level, a debate Iâm not likely to ever have any influence over. If there are more actionable steps to improve merchant marine/Navy relations that can taken down on the deckplates I am all ears.
Well, I think that most of the problems exist at the top. As you mention only a handful of navy leadership are SWOs and, as I mention HERE, we donât really have any strong leaders at all.
That said, at the deckplate level, I think the problem is SEGREGATION and we just need more opportunities to talk. This, of course, happens aboard the MSC ships but there are very few other opportunities to talk.
The USS Bonhomme Richard is an example. In a community like San Diego the harbor pilots, sailors from Scripps, tugboat crews, USCG, harbor administrators, and the rest of the ecosystem all know each-other and have numerous opportunities to meet at the watercooler and talk. Wives also meet at shopping centers and industry picnics, and such. But the majority of Navy Sailors in San Diego hang out with other navy families, shop at the NEX, and attend function inside the base walls.
The information does flow through official channels (Iâm sure there are plenty of emergency documents that list the availability of the Chouest tugs in the harbor) but thatâs not how humans best absorb information. They absorb it best by sharing beers and sea stories.
The last CO of Naval Base San Diego certainly made an attempt (Facebook was alight with photos of him dropping into a party hosted by local harbor pilots on his Harley) and he encouraged his command to join him. But that happened because he attended a maritime academy and felt we were part of his extended family. His efforts were not continued after he left the base and he never got real by-in from his junior officers. If they had then Iâm sure the Chouests boats would have been called immediately after the USS Bonhomme Richard fire ignited. Insteand those tiny police boats were called and I thinkitâs because the police are better culturally aligned with the men on the deckplate calling the shots. Or, at least, they are more of a âknown entityâ.
I donâtâ have the answer but I do know that the Merchant Marine community is highly frustrated, and I do know the best way to settle family disputes is not in the press or paperwork but by bonds created at family picnics.
So thatâs my suggestion. Either navy personnel have to come to us - attend out harbor meetings, come to our industry conferences, ask the local pilots when the next family get-together us. OR they have to invite us inside the walls of the base, let us shop at the NEX, or invite us to planning events and training evolutions⌠NOT for the training or priveledges themselves but for the opportunity to share a coffee and a few sea stories.
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If your ship is showing the other ship a green light and you are seeing a red light from them it is simple, green means go red means stop. The Traffic Officer in your neighborhood will be happy to explain that to you when you run a red light. I am not sure why you would have had anyone arguing against that very stark reality.
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As a second or third mate, never really felt it was any sign of failure to call the Captain - sometimes the work load just demanded another pair of hands, and that was his job. Was always lucky to work with good Captains who also knew and anticipated what areas were likely to be busy - rested accordingly and seemed to miraculously appear on the bridge just about when i needed them.
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Without any fuss - thatâs what a competent captain does.
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Everybody on this board knew you were a Navy guy well before that last paragraph.
Konrad is/was still correct in his analysis at the time he originally wrote & published it.
Your Pompous induced heartburn wonât change.
Good luck going out there on the internet and telling us civilian mariners âhow to do it the right wayâ
Youâll need it.
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Texastanker, very refreshing to know, you will do well sir in your career. I did not sleep well in the areas I expected problems with, and had a casual cup of coffee at those times. They called me at times, I was already awake, but damn glad they did. Good sailors sir. And good captains today as we speak.
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One final comment and that is now that the reports are out with the official play by play and track-lines shown it does point out how this was very different from what was originally reported. No crazy Ivanâs or any other strange maneuvers were noted.
John is a very good journalist, but first and foremost he is seasoned Mariner. We donât always agree, but for the most part do. He hit this story correctly for what it was/is. If it pissed off the powers that be, prove him wrong.
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My last words to the mates when I was captain were âif you are asking yourself whether you need to call the captain or not: call me.â
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