Not the ideal spot to mess with the steering.
The original plan was to call out the crew an hour earlier and get these tasks done before getting into traffic. The captain changed the plan at the last minute to allow the crew more rest.
I used to plan early morning arrivals on the bridge with the C/M the evening before (4x8). During the actual arrival it’s sometimes tempting to change the plan based on something that just pops into your head but often it’s a mistake.
When you’ve dug yourself a hole, keep building LCS “sea frames” and throw in a Zumwalt or three. Hold the ammunition, we can’t afford it. Paint? What’s that? <weep>
As awful as the Fat Leonard thing was, at least it’s understandable.
I have written a lot about marine accidents on my website, but don’t advertise it much. There is no money in it, I just do it hoping to inform fellow mariners. If you read the timeline you will find yourself gripping the edge of your desk. So if you are not familiar you might like to have a look at my summary which can be found here http://www.shipsandoil.co.uk/the-uss-john-s-mccain-accident .
Technology is grand, but confusing & fragile. I can’t fathom how the “new navy” bridge will survive battle damage, much less concussion shock from explosions close-aboard.
Y’know, a simple helm & lee-helm arrangement from a FRAM-CAN. Idiot-proof & durable. Put the wizard’s tools elsewhere.
I’m trying to get around all these people on the bridge. Looking at the console it presented far more information than the helmsman needed to know but I would hazard a guess that the people in this forum could have operated it with a little familiarisation. During the Indonesian Confrontation I was OOW doing patrols in a Frigate in the Malacca Strait area. At times we were doing speeds in excess of 25 knots and fully darkened. On the bridge were a signalman, bosuns mate, midshipman and myself. Above us were 4 lookouts, each with sector with binoculars clamped to a frame. Squeezing a trigger opened a mike for a report to the CIC and the bridge together with an automatic bearing to the CIC. The CIC was manned by an officer and 5 ratings. The helmsman was below the bridge with two ratings on rotation with the lookouts.
The equipment consisting of a wheel, two telegraphs, a revolution order box that the engine room and boiler room obeyed when the telegraphs were at half ahead and a dedicated mike to the bridge plus a voice pipe in emergency’s. There was no window, just the gyro indicator and stabilised magnetic compass indicator. The Quartermaster was a leading seaman. Junior seaman steered under his direct supervision. It was reported to me directly what machinery was on line by the department concerned. I can’t see how having the bridge looking like a stadium at a football match contributed anything.
This is irreverent, the level of familiarization required to cope with a rare situation which arose as a result of an unforeseen combination of events is understood now only in hindsight.
Perhaps.
But the interface wasn’t going to be used by our forum members. Equipment needs to be made for the expected user, or the users need to be properly trained to use the equipment.
When the steering / throttle control was split normally it would be expected there would be three crew members in the wheelhouse with the requisite experience, the helmsman, the lee helmsman and the BMOW.
In this case the helmsman had only been aboard a month and both the lee helmsman and BMOW had been borrowed from another ship which did not have this steering system.
From the report it seemed that the BMOW was correctly splitting the helm but was interrupted mid-process when the first error was made by one of the others because he was ordered to begin the loss of steering procedure.
0523.16. The Helmsman takes control of the steering at the HELM station in Backup Manual mode.
0523.24. Someone matches the throttles at the Lee Helm. The ship heading south speed 13.8 knots.
0523.27. Aft Steering take control of the steering for the second time. The fifth change of steering station. Probably at this time the person taking control did not check the rudder position and it is hard aport, increasing the turn to port before the rudders are returned to the midships position.
In the report:
At some point, the helmsman, who was now being helped by the sea and anchor detail BMOW who had arrived on the bridge (but had not yet taken the watch), realized that he had control of steering. The oncoming BMOW stated, “we announced that we had positive rudder control at the helm.”
While steering was being shifted between stations, the CO and the conning officer moved to the port bridge wing. They saw the Alnic MC off the port side and, after hearing the steering control was at the SCC helm station, the CO ordered “right standard” (starboard 15 degrees) rudder.
The helmsman acknowledged the conning officer’s rudder order, but before he could move the rudders to right 15 degrees, control was again transferred to aft steering.
After this shift to after steering the rudder went over to 15 port for some reason but was corrected to 15 stbd… but it was too late.
However, several watchstanders on the bridge stated that the rudders reached as far as 15 degrees to port. Aft steering watchstanders immediately corrected the rudder input to 15 degrees to starboard, and the next steering log entry, at 05:23:43, recorded the rudder input and rudder positions at 15 degrees to starboard. The rudders remained there until after the collision.
If this was a scene in a movie it would be laughed at as being inauthentic.
It needed Curly, Moe and Larry to make it complete.
From an error-trapping point of view this has some similarities to the loss of Air France 447. In that case the junior officer was making an error that stalled the plane but because the Airbus uses a side stick instead of a yoke the error was not readily apparent to the other crew members.
Sully explains at 4:04
Likewise on the McCain the design of the helm/engine controls made crew errors both more likely and more difficult to catch and correct.
The Navy should consider implementing the K.I.S.S.or Keep It Simple Stupid Principle at sea. The simple wheel and throttle controls have served us well for decades. Simple can be be infinitely more robust. Simple requires less training. Even the advent of the “Iron Mike” or autopilot kept it simple. Simply switch back to “Hand” when something went wrong like an unexpected veer off course. The Navy and ultimately the U.S. Taxpayer got sold a very over priced steering wheel. Ten sailors paid the ultimate price for that fancy steering system.
The touch screens I own tend to flip out when wetted. Like “crazy mouse” behavior. I recently cleaned a touch screen laptop with Windex and it was basically unusable due to erratic cursor movement until I redid the cleaning with plain water. I hope the Navy’s equipment is more robust.
I think Star Trek’s Enterprise has lever throttle control, and that’s way in the future.
You can not find a better sailor on the wheel hand steering then a old school ab from the nmu sup siu or msc
Doubt that, hear all kinds of excuses current , wind or the sun why they have hard time steering. See more zig zagging on American ships than similar foreign flags.
I wonder who steers during an underway replenishment?
I joined the crew of a supply ship when it came out of the yard after a long refit so 80% of the crew was new. A handful of the new ABs were to able to steer well enough to be trusted during unreps. After sea trials and some practice runs with a DDG, a few of them were selected to join the unrep crew. I had full confidence in them but it never occurred to me that the next DDG coming alongside might be steered by a clueless teen-ager fresh out of boot camp.
To be fair, I never had cause to suspect it so maybe it’s only part of the “new” navy.
In the case of entering port which the McCain was doing the so-called “special sea and anchor detail” would be used. That includes a change in bridge manning. That was a major factor here, the captain delayed calling out the sea and anchor detail. In my experience a QM rating would relieve the seaman helmsman.
Same for underway replenishment, not the normal steaming watch, might be a BM now but when we did UNREP it was a QM at the wheel.
Also in the case of the CG cutters the steering is very responsive, easy to correct an error. Twin screws, big rudders, powerful steering pumps, steering is quick, they are much easier to steer than a heavy merchant ship with standard steering set-up.
From the NTSB report:
According to the John S McCain’s plan of the day, reveille for applicable personnel was at 0500, breakfast was served between 0500 and 0600, and the “sea and anchor detail”—the condition of augmented manning used for arrivals and departures from port— for the entry in to Singapore was set to begin at 0600. The sea and anchor detail included a master helmsman, a designated lee helmsman, and a helm safety officer.12
The five P’s: Proper Planning Prevents Poor Performance. Changing the plan at the last minute was the undoing.
