I just remember; when we checked rigs in the North Sea for weight growth the “rule of thumb” was to expect approx. 50 m.t./year of age, which proved pretty accurate.
This was in the days when every Toolpusher were free to add all sort of “improvements” and keep all sorts of “nice to have” stuff, none of which was accounted for in Lightweight or Variable Load. (The Toolpusher was not the only sinner though)
These being relatively new Aker H4 rigs (3-5 years)it was found that this tapered off a bit with age, but as they got older new equipment was installed and not always accounted for.
After these checks had been done it became a DNV/NMD rule to keep a “Lightweight Change” Log on all MODUs. (Not sure if it was applied to ships)
I should not leave the impression that Cargo Superintendent Ch Officer Master and Commercial Manager covered the various items in committee fashion. Each had a role. Superintendent did the pre stow and advised the Ch Officer of his plans. Practical matter all the Superintendents had sailed as Ch Officer. Some for a very long time, both worked in harmony. Ch Officer could veto never had to. Loading the Ch Officer spent most time with other crew watching the lashing. On a ConRo work on several decks lot of watching to do. Master would get involved if bunkering was a question, how much and were, sometimes sailing with less & bunkering after the vessel passed a draft restricted point. . Master and 3rd occupied with voyage planning. Change of rotation add or drop ports question went to the Master who had final say.
Commercial with profit-loss responsibility would make changes future voyages depending on how she stowed and how the voyage results developed. . We could accept or reject bookings raise or lower rates to adjust cargo flows. Always on future voyages never on the vessel loading and never overriding licensed mariners. . I was in the CG before working for owners, know a lot of CG and ex CG. Never met one that knows how a commercial vessel is operated. All think along Military lines strict chain of command, master responsible. Fact is Master on a liner service vessel has no ability to manage stowage which is the major part of stability on a ConRo. Port time too short advance cargo details late arriving .
From my point of view it seems like being the unfortunate loser in a pro tennis match. The one who vainly tries to return the volleys of a stonger player, racing from one side of the court to the other trying not to lose another point. Changing schedule, changing loads, changing bunker ports, demands from the office, keeping up with port arrival paperwork etc.
It’s intresting you brought up the Hoegh Osaka. That northern European run is amoung the worse, especially in the winter when you have to deal with the weather on top of everything else. Whenever my chief mate hears the words “German Bight” he develops a nervous tick.
If the crew of the Osaka had shifted resources from navigation to stablity they may have gotten out of Southampton upright only to run up on Varne Bank because the rapid schedule changes didn’t allow time to adequately check the track-lines. Then they’d be the poster child for lack of attention to navigation instead of stablity.
[QUOTE=ombugge;194369]
After these checks had been done it became a DNV/NMD rule to keep a “Lightweight Change” Log on all MODUs. (Not sure if it was applied to ships)[/QUOTE]
Rules? Seems this is a normal function of ship management. If the office is of no use, stick a PM in your system to pop out once a year for a lightship review. They installed a BWTS but no weights and centers accounted for? Added a A frame? That PM is your reminder to gather the info and update.
When I read the Hoegh report it reminded me of meetings I attended when Cargo Superintendent competency CoRo vs Car Carrier was discussed. Some said limited cargo variables and the vessels sophisticated ballast systems allowed less experience loading. May be true and a competent Superintendent is hard to find. I did not agree.
Hoegh Osaka voyage had a significant variable with change of rotation, and ships ballast system was not operating properly. Broken gages as I recall . Many personnel failures from commercial forcing the rotation change to the ships manager allowing issues with a key system, Add communication issues between the Superintendent and Vessel crew created a chain of events that led to the incident. Accident is usually a chain of events not a single cause.
What struck me was how fast the U.K. Authorities came up with a conclusion that hit the nail on the head. They know how ships are operated.
[QUOTE=KPChief;194376]Rules? Seems this is a normal function of ship management. If the office is of no use, stick a PM in your system to pop out once a year for a lightship review. They installed a BWTS but no weights and centers accounted for? Added a A frame? That PM is your reminder to gather the info and update.[/QUOTE]
This was in the early 1980s. No electronic Fleet Management System then. The rules only applied to Norwegian rigs, or rigs operating in Norwegian waters.
In fact I did not see any changes in the way Lightweight changes were controlled, or rather NOT controlled, on rigs in the rest of the world for many more years. The “equivalent sisters” principe was upheld for quite some time as well.
The weight problem on Betlehem rigs were found to originate from steel used during building being metric, while drawings were specified in fraction of inches. The nearest equivalent thickness ABOVE was used, while Stability Booklets were copied from previous rigs of the same type built in the US, from US steel.
Only the rig name was changed. This was approved by Class and Flag States, incl. USCG.
This has improved in the last decade or more, but not fully or effectively implemented by all rig owners in my experience.
The captain and the pilot on board the Hoegh Osaka prevented, in a swift action, worse by beaching the ship on the Brambles Bank. Otherwise the ship surely would have capsized totally and flooded. As for the cause of the accident see the quote.
The MAIB’s investigation found that Hoegh Osaka’s stability did not meet the minimum international requirements for ships proceeding to sea. The cargo loading plan had not been adjusted for a change to the ship’s usual journey pattern and the number of vehicles due to be loaded according to the pre stowage plan was significantly different from than that of the final tally. The estimated weight of cargo was also less than the actual weight. Crucially, the assumed distribution of ballast on board, bore no resemblance to reality, which resulted in the ship leaving Southampton with a higher centre of gravity than normal.
This accident is a stark reminder of what can happen when shortcuts are taken in the interest of expediency. It is therefore imperative that working practices adopted by the car carrier industry ensure that there is always sufficient time and that accurate data is available on completion of cargo operations to enable the stability of such vessels to be properly calculated before departure.
A dramatic example of the phenomenon of unchecked weight growth is the El Faro. It underwent notable work over its life, including a lengthening in 1992-93. In 2005-06, the ship was converted from work in Alaska to its last duty on the Jacksonville to Puerto Rico route. Though the ABS did not consider that work major, it increased the draft of the ship by two feet, according to testimony. That raises the question how major is major.
[/QUOTE]
Just curious. According to the MBI testimony, the EL FARO underwent an incline test in 1993 and in 2006, after each modification. Please explain how that is a “phenomenon of unchecked weight growth”. Also, in the interests of accuracy, it is the USCG that makes all major modification determinations for all US flagged vessels, even those under ACP.
Some examples of unchecked, uncontrolled weight growth came to light during the El Faro hearings. These weight additions of for instance the fructose tanks which were welded in 2014 high in the ship, on deck, were not reported to ABS. Trivial probably. For more information click on this link: El Faro operator did not submit weight changes on ship to surveyors
The operator welded 100-ton fructose tanks to the deck in 2014. The structures group at ABS reviewed the tanks, but ship operator Tote Services Inc. did not inform the ABS stability group about the additional weight from the tanks and other weight changes on board due to other work, according to testimony Friday from Thomas Gruber, former head of the Loadline and Stability Group for the ABS. The ABS also was not aware of weight changes made to the ship with ongoing work to convert the El Faro for use on a route on the West Coast.
[QUOTE=Dutchie;194633]Some examples of unchecked, uncontrolled weight growth came to light during the El Faro hearings. These weight additions of for instance the fructose tanks which were welded in 2014 high in the ship, on deck, were not reported to ABS. Trivial probably. For more information click on this link: El Faro operator did not submit weight changes on ship to surveyors[/QUOTE]
Were those tanks accounted for in the ship’s stability program?
[QUOTE=Chief Seadog;194640]Were those tanks accounted for in the ship’s stability program?[/QUOTE]
Good question but I don’t know the answer to that. The transcripts of the second hearings, which may be could have given that answer, are as far as I know not available on the internet. I also would have liked to find out why Tote decided not to hand over the information about the addition of the fructose tanks to ABS. It seems to me that Tote was not even challenged about that serious omission.
[QUOTE=Dutchie;194644]Good question but I don’t know the answer to that. The transcripts of the second hearings, which may be could have given that answer, are as far as I know not available on the internet. I also would have liked to find out why Tote decided not to hand over the information about the addition of the fructose tanks to ABS. It seems to me that Tote was not even challenged about that serious omission.[/QUOTE]
The tanks were probably not regarded as “permanent”, thus not considered “LS addition”.
Welding them to ship’s structure were probably seen as seafastening.
The additional weight, whether full or empty, should be added in the stability calculations however.
As asked; was it???
[QUOTE=ombugge;194651]The tanks were probably not regarded as “permanent”, thus not considered “LS addition”.
Welding them to ship’s structure were probably seen as seafastening.
The additional weight, whether full or empty, should be added in the stability calculations however.
As asked; was it???[/QUOTE]
The various testimonies stated that the fructose tanks and their contents were included in each loading condition in the stability program by the crew. The weight of the tanks and various onboard work would not have triggered another stability test.
[QUOTE=ombugge;194651]The tanks were probably not regarded as “permanent”, thus not considered “LS addition”.
Welding them to ship’s structure were probably seen as seafastening.
The additional weight, whether full or empty, should be added in the stability calculations however.
As asked; was it???[/QUOTE]
Yes the fructose tanks were treated as cargo in the load calculations as can be read here. The Stability and Trim booklet was not updated. I agree that in view of this probably the tanks were not intended to remain on board permanently.
On the other hand no mention is made in the article that the tanks were removed again at some moment.
[QUOTE=Dutchie;194644]Good question but I don’t know the answer to that. The transcripts of the second hearings, which may be could have given that answer, are as far as I know not available on the internet. I also would have liked to find out why Tote decided not to hand over the information about the addition of the fructose tanks to ABS. It seems to me that Tote was not even challenged about that serious omission.[/QUOTE]
I’ve used my “credentials” as a published author as an excuse to ask the USCG when the transcripts of the second hearings will be added to the docket. No answer so far, will post when one comes in.
[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;194669]I’ve used my “credentials” as a published author as an excuse to ask the USCG when the transcripts of the second hearings will be added to the docket. No answer so far, will post when one comes in.
Cheers,
Earl[/QUOTE]
Very good, thank you very much! Curious about their reply. The transcripts of the first hearings became available rather soon so what is keeping them?
[QUOTE=Dutchie;194662]Yes the fructose tanks were treated as cargo in the load calculations as can be read here. The Stability and Trim booklet was not updated. I agree that in view of this probably the tanks were not intended to remain on board permanently.
On the other hand no mention is made in the article that the tanks were removed again at some moment.[/QUOTE]
From that link:
Testimony also revealed that the crew aboard El Faro did take into account the fructose tanks while doing their load calculations by counting the tanks as cargo.
Apparently they did not account for the weight of the tanks.It does not say whether they were full or empty at the time, but regardless if empty the weight of the tanks and fitting should have been accounted for.
I am not familiar with the Cargomax program, but in other stability programs it is allowed for additional “semi-permanent weight”.(The tanks) Any liquid cargo carried in the tanks would be added as deck cargo in a separate post.
