I studied that case a bit when I designed a car carrier at school. Once I managed to get my ship stay upright (which took a while), the damage stability calculations were… interesting. It took a while to convince our assistant that it’s perfectly possible. One of my favourite design features in that particular vessel was that if the side ballast tanks were penetrated at waterline, the ship would list to the other side, allowing repairs at port without drydocking. Those were the days… Nowadays I just design boring tugboats that stay upright right from the drawing board and sink in an uninteresting way when you hole them.
[QUOTE=c.captain;136042]Here’s a diagram which shows angle of loll. It is where the upward force through B’ shifts to where it is inline with the downward force through G zeroing out the negative or capsizing righting arm to halt the further heeling over. At this point the vessel has neutral stability. Won’t go back up but won’t continue to heel.
Once angle of loll is reached the ship can be inclined further and still return (but never upright)…what kills so many vessels is that the angle is past the point where downflooding commences.
This is a terribly dangerous condition if not recognized. To add or shift weight to the high side will now move G from the centerline to offcenter. What usually then happens is the ship will flip and assume an even greater heel to the other side. Often it is so far off center that any point of loll will be so far that the vessel is already on her side by the time it is reached and flooding is well underway. I believe the only safe way to recover from a negative GM list is to flood double bottom tanks very slowly and carefully making sure that G never shifts off the centerline or at least only minimally.
No major ship accidents like that in Puget Sound in the last couple decades. Lots of fires though. I do recall the WESTWOOD RANIER
having a ballast control accident at Terminal 5 and heeling way over but not rolling on its side.
There was the STELLAMARE in Albany, NY that did roll over at the dock seven years ago. Is that the one you are thinking of?
remember the COUGAR ACE?
Just shows if the cardecks don’t suffer progressive flooding how a ship can survive a major stability event.
.[/QUOTE]
There was an old crab boat, may an ex-YO, that rolled over in the Lake Washington Ship Canal, at the former Marine Power & Equipment shipyard next to Gasworks Park in Fremont. I cannot remember why I was there or exactly when it was, but it was about 20 to 30 years ago.
The took on a big load of crab pots and stores over a couple of days. All of a sudden she was upsidedown and surrounded by an oil boom. I seem to recall that she rolled while taking fuel.
[QUOTE=tugsailor;136057]There was an old crab boat, may an ex-YO, that rolled over in the Lake Washington Ship Canal, at the former Marine Power & Equipment shipyard next to Gasworks Park in Fremont. I cannot remember why I was there or exactly when it was, but it was about 20 to 30 years ago.
The took on a big load of crab pots and stores over a couple of days. All of a sudden she was upsidedown and surrounded by an oil boom. I seem to recall that she rolled while taking fuel.[/QUOTE]
I do recall when that ex incinerator ship took a big heel there…something about the ballast system going haywire all by itself.
An interesting read. Having served up to and including Chief Officer with Class 1 foreign going on passenger/Ro-Ro ferries larger than this one, find that there are a number of questions to be answered.
The answer is not to arrest and blame the Master directly, as this is the simplistic route. The fact the Master was not on the bridge at the time it all started to go wrong, is not uncommon. The company has designated/employed a qualified officer (Master has final say on whether they are happy for the officer to be left alone on watch) to take the watch who would have other seamen on the bridge with them. The Master would have (we assume) left standing orders for his team to follow. In turn the company would in turn have issued standing orders to the Ship’s Master for him to follow when structuring the chain of command on the vessel. In my previous companies, this would have included courses in crisis management for senior officers for all eventualities.
Regarding loading and handling of freight, IMO Dangerous Goods etc, there should only be certain cargoes allowed to be carried below decks, was all cargo correctly classified (we know of many on container vessels where this is not the case), an inspection of the vessel below the (angle of Lol) waterline will quickly give an answer to the theory of an explosion.
IACs will have all the calculations for the increase in superstructure and the change in GM etc. There are guidelines for this and they should (I imagine were) be followed. So was this a contributing factor, almost certainly towards the end, but this would have been secondary or maybe even further down the chain causing the loss.
The weather was calm and bad weather not expected during the passage. What were the standing orders regarding the chaining of freight (how well were the containers secured to the trailers, and any heavy break bulk freight within soft tilt trailers) for the voyage. If the vessel took a large roll, and the freight was not secured, this could be a major contributing factor if the vessel took a large roll and was slow to come back upright.
Also what was the situation with the vessel’s tanks. One of the main losses of a positive GM is free surface effect in tanks. If a vessel was listed with an Angle of Lol, would be accentuated, and suspect it this was a contributing factor. If this was known, pressing up tanks, can be a way of bringing back a positive GM if time allows and is done in the correct manner (shifting freight may override this).
The ship appears to be in good condition, so wonder if the car deck drencher system overboard none return valves were in good working order, which would mean that ingress of water into the car decks would have to come from quite high up on the vessel, possibly through vent trunkings as the vessel settled.
So there are many questions and the chain of responsibility goes all the way back to the Company’s Board of Directors as a contributing factor will be within the company’s training program and standing orders. Part of the investigation will be looking at the vessel’s maintenance program, company standing orders, Master’s standing orders, training/recruitment etc.
What we do know and from my understanding/experience, was that as soon as they knew the vessel was in trouble, they should have called all passengers to emergency/lifeboat stations, calling all passengers to arrive with any warm clothing they had to hand, run out the lifeboats and prepare to abandon ship with passengers on the outside decks. One thing you never have enough of, is time, and this is the message that should be drummed into the senior management time and again in any emergency, but unfortunately we see many cases where this has not happened and resulted in unnecessary loss of life. Passengers inside the vessel except when a deck fire, is bad news. Get them out and at least they have a fighting chance. Inside cross alleyways (main way out to outside accesses) become shafts etc resulting in death traps. Yes, you may still lose some to the cold, but the percentage game would be greatly in your favour and with a bit of luck, loss of life will not occur. Loss of face is easy to restore but you are a long time dead.
The Master may well have left the officer of the watch in charge of all navigation/anti-collison issues and taken control of the emergency side of things which may, with the time constraints be a way of focusing on the primary issue to hand. Something has gone seriously wrong with the response to the situation and evacuation process. Hopefully, this will lead to changes in attitude in certain regions within the global community, but I suspect we’ll be revisiting issues like this time and again in the future.
Lets hope that the families get closure and that we get a clear and concise report of what actually happened, and that the ship’s Master is not used as the fall guy.
[QUOTE=c.captain;136042]
remember the COUGAR ACE?
Just shows if the cardecks don’t suffer progressive flooding how a ship can survive a major stability event.
.[/QUOTE]
In the case of the Cougar Ace, when a PCC rolls the cargo (often light new cars) frequently stays lashed down, the Sewol may not have lashed the vehicles at all for a 12 hr trip in good weather. That would mean a cargo shift was likely. Looks like the boxes on the forward deck all slid.
The other issue is the PCC is not going to experience deck edge submersion the same way a traditional vessel would, In the photo of the Cougar Ace the vents to the E/R, fuel tank vents and cargo hold vents are still clear of the water. The ramps as well are not submerged (both on the stbd side). Likely the ballast tank vents are submerged, flooding the port ballast tanks might not hurt the stability situation significantly??? plus the ballast tank vents, which may be on the same deck as the mooring station, would be equipped with float check valves.
[QUOTE=tugsailor;136057]There was an old crab boat, may an ex-YO, that rolled over in the Lake Washington Ship Canal, at the former Marine Power & Equipment shipyard next to Gasworks Park in Fremont. I cannot remember why I was there or exactly when it was, but it was about 20 to 30 years ago.
The took on a big load of crab pots and stores over a couple of days. All of a sudden she was upsidedown and surrounded by an oil boom. I seem to recall that she rolled while taking fuel.[/QUOTE]
That sounds like it, it was loading to go north and she took on a list and the crew attempted to correct by shifting ballast if I recall, wrong move and she rolled over. I didn’t see it and I can’t recall where I heard of it. Heavy deck load.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;136062]In the case of the Cougar Ace, when a PCC rolls the cargo (often light new cars) frequently stays lashed down, the Sewol may not have lashed the vehicles at all for a 12 hr trip in good weather. That would mean a cargo shift was likely. Looks like the boxes on the forward deck all slid.
The other issue is the PCC is not going to experience deck edge submersion the same way a traditional vessel would, In the photo of the Cougar Ace the vents to the E/R, fuel tank vents and cargo hold vents are still clear of the water. The ramps as well are not submerged (both on the stbd side). Likely the ballast tank vents are submerged, flooding the port ballast tanks might not hurt the stability situation significantly??? plus the ballast tank vents, which may be on the same deck as the mooring station, would be equipped with float check valves.
That sounds like it, it was loading to go north and she took on a list and the crew attempted to correct by shifting ballast if I recall, wrong move and she rolled over. I didn’t see it and I can’t recall where I heard of it. Heavy deck load.[/QUOTE]
For some reason, I was walking by Marine Power every morning and afternoon and saw her loading to go north. She had a green hull. I seem to recall hearing that she rolled while taking fuel. There was no fuel dock there so it must have been from a truck. I remember seeing the divers and a small derrick barge working on her, but I left Seattle before they got her refloated. As a guess, I’d say about 1990.
[QUOTE=Barnsieb14;136061]Lets hope that the families get closure and that we get a clear and concise report of what actually happened, and that the ship’s Master is not used as the fall guy.[/QUOTE]
But the master MUST be the fall guy! It is his ship and he is responsible for the lives of all aboard…it is the ancient law of the sea when you entrust your life to the perils of the sea. Whether this is the result of his personal failings or the failings of others, he MUST answer to the families of the young people who died. Not some board of directors or person on the bridge. I do believe he has personally failed in how the events played out leaving so many aboard inside with no way out. His departing the vessel with passengers aboard is no different than Shittino doing the same from the COSTA CONCORDIA! When one is entrusted with command comes a heavy weight and to toss that off when you jump in that rescueboat is trading your moral life in exchange to be tried in both a court of law and the court of public opinion. An honorable man will stay aboard until a ship sinks out from under him and if that means dying in the sea then that is the price for doing the RIGHT THING!
I’m fine with him being tried, it doesn’t seem to me that he should be criminally negligible for anything though. Civilly negligible perhaps, depends on what mistakes were made. By your logic, the captain of the General Slocum should’ve been executed, and while he did serve some time in jail, it certainly wasn’t a life sentence.
The worst I could see as a criminal punishment for this cap would be revocation of his license and possible convictions with the sentences commuted.
[QUOTE=LI_Domer;136081]I’m fine with him being tried, it doesn’t seem to me that he should be criminally negligible for anything though.[/QUOTE]
I think the miserable emmeffer should kill himself after he gives all the relevant detailed information to the investigators!
Admittedly if it was me, I probably would with that amount if guilt and shame weighing on me, I’m surprised schittino didn’t.
[QUOTE=LI_Domer;136089]Admittedly if it was me, I probably would with that amount if guilt and shame weighing on me, I’m surprised schittino didn’t.[/QUOTE]
Shittino is too much of a coward to kill himself. The commit suicide takes courage.
I am obviously not alone in my feelings on the conduct of the master in this accident
[B]South Korean President Says Conduct of Sewol Crew Amounts to Murder[/B]
By Reuters On April 21, 2014
JINDO, South Korea, April 21 (Reuters) – South Korean President Park Geun-hye said on Monday the actions of the captain and crew of a ferry that sank last week with hundreds feared dead were tantamount to murder, as authorities arrested four more officers of the vessel.
Sixty-four people are known to have died and 238 are missing, presumed dead, in the sinking of the Sewol ferry last Wednesday. Most of the victims are high school children.
Captain Lee Joon-seok, 69, and two other crew members were arrested last week on negligence charges, with prosecutors announcing four further arrests – two first mates, one second mate and a chief engineer – on Monday.
Several crew members, including the captain, left the ferry as it was sinking, ahead of the passengers, witnesses have said.
Park said the crew’s desertion was tantamount to murder.
“Above all, the conduct of the captain and some crew members is unfathomable from the viewpoint of common sense, and it was like an act of murder that cannot and should not be tolerated,” Yonhap news agency quoted her as saying during a meeting with aides.
Lee, the captain, said in a promotional video four years ago that the journey from the port city of Incheon to the holiday island of Jeju was safe – as long as passengers followed the instructions of the crew.
He also told a newspaper that he had been involved in a sea accident off Japan years before.
The irony of the video is the crew ordered the passengers to stay put in their cabins as the ferry sank. As is customary in hierarchical Korean society, the orders were not questioned.
However, many of those who escaped alive either did not hear or flouted the instructions and were rescued as they jumped off the deck.
Of the 476 passengers and crew on board, 339 were children and teachers on a high school outing.
“Passengers who take our ship to and from Incheon and Jeju can enjoy a safe and pleasant trip and I believe it is safer than any other vehicle as long as they follow the instructions of our crew members,” Lee said in the 2010 promotional video, according to transcripts broadcast by regional cable station OBS.
The Jeju Today newspaper interviewed Lee in 2004 when he spoke of close shaves at sea including passing through a typhoon and a previous sinking off Japan.
“The first ship I took was a log carrier vessel and it capsized near Okinawa. A helicopter from Japan’s Self-Defence Force came and rescued me. Had it not been for their help, I wouldn’t be here now.”
The newspaper did not give further details.
“I KNOW HOW HE SAID ‘DAD’”
Parents of the children missing in the accident in what is likely to turn out to be one of South Korea’s worst maritime disasters sat exhausted from days of grief on Monday, waiting for the almost inevitable news that their loved ones had died.
The have spent all their time since the accident in a gymnasium in the port city of Jindo, taking it in turns to vent their anger at the crew’s inaction and slow pace of the rescue operation.
One of those waiting in the gymnasium was Kim Chang-gu, whose son Kim Dong-hyup is among the missing.
“I dream about him and hear hallucinatory sounds,” he told Reuters. “Somebody told me he was alive but I now have given up. I know how he said ‘Dad’. I keep hearing that.”
Divers are retrieving the bodies at a faster pace and some parents have moved from the gymnasium to the pier to await news.
Others stay put on their mattresses in the gym, where one by one, parents are informed that a body matches the family DNA swab, prompting wailing and collapses.
Two U.S. underwater drones have been deployed in the search for bodies, a coastguard official said. Strong tides hampered operations overnight but the weather was better on Monday.
A clearer picture has started to emerge of the time around the accident after coastguards released a recording of a conversation between vessel controllers and the ship.
Witnesses have said the Sewol turned sharply before it began listing. It is still not clear why the vessel turned.
It took more than two hours for it to capsize completely but passengers were ordered to stay put in their cabins.
According to the transcript, the controllers told the captain to “decide how best to evacuate the passengers” and that he should “make the final decision on whether or not to evacuate”.
Lee was not on the bridge when the ship turned. Navigation was in the hands of a 26-year old third mate who was in charge for the first time on that part of the journey, according to crew members.
The transcript shows crew on the ship worried there were not enough rescue boats to take all the passengers. Witnesses said the captain and some crew members took to rescue boats before the passengers.
Lee said earlier he feared that passengers would be swept away by the ferocious currents if they leapt into the sea. He has not explained why he left the vessel.
Pupils at the children’s school in Ansan, a gritty commuter town on the outskirts of Seoul, set up shrines to the dead and posted messages for the missing.
The vice-principal of the school, who survived the accident, hanged himself outside the gymnasium in Jindo in another blow to the school. His body was discovered by police on Friday.
I know I am a hard man but there are close to 300 fatalities here which I believe were all avoidable if the master had done his duty and gotten those kids outside before he left the ship.
"Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.’’
Questions:
By IMO regulations;
- was the ferry Sewol authorized to sail with unlashed deck containers, unlashed or unfendered tween deck cars and trucks in such a manner to avoid sideway shifts,
- was the ferry Sewol require to carry a cargomax program to ascertain intact stability criteria prior getting underway,
- at what exact point of a peril of the sea is a captain in the obligation to order an abandon ship according to IMO protocol,
- what is the exact IMO regulated sequence of a passenger vessel abandon ship,
- at what point of an emergency is the master of a vessel relieved from his obligations and responsibilities to render rescue,
- does the master have the obligation to endanger or sacrifice his life in conducting a rescue.
By answering those simple questions, would you please attached official IMO SOLAS or any other official conventions or resolutions, so to prove without the shadow of a doubt the provenance of your answers. Thank you.
[QUOTE=Topsail;136113]"Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.’’
Questions:
By IMO regulations;
- was the ferry Sewol authorized to sail with unlashed deck containers, unlashed or unfendered tween deck cars and trucks in such a manner to avoid sideway shifts,
- was the ferry Sewol require to carry a cargomax program to ascertain intact stability criteria prior getting underway,
- at what exact point of a peril of the sea is a captain in the obligation to order an abandon ship according to IMO protocol,
- what is the exact IMO regulated sequence of a passenger vessel abandon ship,
- at what point of an emergency is the master of a vessel relieved from his obligations and responsibilities to render rescue,
- does the master have the obligation to endanger or sacrifice his life in conducting a rescue.
By answering those simple questions, would you please attached official IMO SOLAS or any other official conventions or resolutions, so to prove without the shadow of a doubt the provenance of your answers. Thank you.[/QUOTE]
[B]Here is your answer.[/B]
[B]International Safety Management (ISM) Code 2002[/B]
Preamble
1 The purpose of this Code is to provide an international standard for the safe management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention.
2 The Assembly adopted resolution A.443(XI), by which it invited all Governments to take the necessary steps to safeguard the shipmaster in the proper discharge of his responsibilities with regard to maritime safety and the protection of the marine environment.
3 The Assembly also adopted resolution A.680(17), by which it further recognized the need for appropriate organization of management to enable it to respond to the need of those on board ships to achieve and maintain high standards of safety and environmental protection.
4 Recognizing that no two shipping companies or shipowners are the same, and that ships operate under a wide range of different conditions, the Code is based on general principles and objectives.
5 The Code is expressed in broad terms so that it can have a widespread application. Clearly, different levels of management, whether shore-based or at sea, will require varying levels of knowledge and awareness of the items outlined.
6 The cornerstone of good safety management is commitment from the top. In matters of safety and pollution prevention it is the commitment, competence, attitudes and motivation of individuals at all levels that determines the end result.
PART A - IMPLEMENTATION
1 GENERAL
1.1 Definitions
The following definitions apply to parts A and B of this Code.
1.1.1 “International Safety Management (ISM) Code” means the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention as adopted by the Assembly, as may be amended by the Organization.
1.1.2 “Company” means the owner of the ship or any other organization or person such as the manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for operation of the ship from the shipowner and who, on assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over all duties and responsibility imposed by the Code.
1.1.3 “Administration” means the Government of the State whose flag the ship is entitled to fly.
1.1.4 “Safety management system” means a structured and documented system enabling Company personnel to implement effectively the Company safety and environmental protection policy.
1.1.5 “Document of Compliance” means a document issued to a Company which complies with the requirements of this Code.
1.1.6 “Safety Management Certificate” means a document issued to a ship which signifies that the Company and its shipboard management operate in accordance with the approved safety management system.
1.1.7 “Objective evidence” means quantitative or qualitative information, records or statements of fact pertaining to safety or to the existence and implementation of a safety management system element, which is based on observation, measurement or test and which can be verified.
1.1.8 “Observation” means a statement of fact made during a safety management audit and substantiated by objective evidence.
1.1.9 “Non-conformity” means an observed situation where objective evidence indicates the non-fulfilment of a specified requirement.
1.1.10 “Major non-conformity” means an identifiable deviation that poses a serious threat to the safety of personnel or the ship or a serious risk to the environment that requires immediate corrective action and includes the lack of effective and systematic implementation of a requirement of this Code.
1.1.11 “Anniversary date” means the day and month of each year that corresponds to the date of expiry of the relevant document or certificate.
1.1.12 “Convention” means the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended.
1.2 Objectives
1.2.1 The objectives of the Code are to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury or loss of life, and avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular to the marine environment and to property.
1.2.2 Safety management objectives of the Company should, inter alia:
.1 provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment;
.2 establish safeguards against all identified risks; and
.3 continuously improve safety management skills of personnel ashore and aboard ships, including preparing for emergencies related both to safety and environmental protection.
1.2.3 The safety management system should ensure:
.1 compliance with mandatory rules and regulations; and
.2 that applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administrations, classification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account.
1.3 Application
The requirements of this Code may be applied to all ships.
1.4 Functional requirements for a safety management system
Every Company should develop, implement and maintain a safety management system which includes the following functional requirements:
.1 a safety and environmental-protection policy;
.2 instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection of the environment in compliance with relevant international and flag State legislation;
.3 defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, and amongst, shore and shipboard personnel;
.4 procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the provisions of this Code;
.5 procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations; and
.6 procedures for internal audits and management reviews.
2 SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL-PROTECTION POLICY
2.1 The Company should establish a safety and environmental-protection policy which describes how the objectives given in paragraph 1.2 will be achieved.
2.2 The Company should ensure that the policy is implemented and maintained at all levels of the organization, both ship-based and shore-based.
3 COMPANY RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY
3.1 If the entity who is responsible for the operation of the ship is other than the owner, the owner must report the full name and details of such entity to the Administration.
3.2 The Company should define and document the responsibility, authority and interrelation of all personnel who manage, perform and verify work relating to and affecting safety and pollution prevention.
3.3 The Company is responsible for ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based support are provided to enable the designated person or persons to carry out their functions.
4 DESIGNATED PERSON(S)
To ensure the safe operation of each ship and to provide a link between the Company and those on board, every Company, as appropriate, should designate a person or persons ashore having direct access to the highest level of management. The responsibility and authority of the designated person or persons should include monitoring the safety and pollution-prevention aspects of the operation of each ship and ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based support are applied, as required.
5 MASTER’S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY
5.1 The Company should clearly define and document the master’s responsibility with regard to:
.1 implementing the safety and environmental-protection policy of the Company;
.2 motivating the crew in the observation of that policy;
.3 issuing appropriate orders and instructions in a clear and simple manner;
.4 verifying that specified requirements are observed; and
.5 reviewing the safety management system and reporting its deficiencies to the shore-based management.
5.2 The Company should ensure that the safety management system operating on board the ship contains a clear statement emphasizing the master’s authority. The Company should establish in the safety management system that the master has the overriding authority and the responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and pollution prevention and to request the Company’s assistance as may be necessary.
6 RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL
6.1 The Company should ensure that the master is:
.1 properly qualified for command;
.2 fully conversant with the Company’s safety management system; and
.3 given the necessary support so that the master’s duties can be safely performed.
6.2 The Company should ensure that each ship is manned with qualified, certificated and medically fit seafarers in accordance with national and international requirements.
6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new assignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarization with their duties. Instructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.
6.4 The Company should ensure that all personnel involved in the Company’s safety management system have an adequate understanding of relevant rules, regulations, codes and guidelines.
6.5 The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying any training which may be required in support of the safety management system and ensure that such training is provided for all personnel concerned.
6.6 The Company should establish procedures by which the ship’s personnel receive relevant information on the safety management system in a working language or languages understood by them.
6.7 The Company should ensure that the ship’s personnel are able to communicate effectively in the execution of their duties related to the safety management system.
7 DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS FOR SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS
The Company should establish procedures for the preparation of plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the ship and the prevention of pollution. The various tasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
8 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
8.1 The Company should establish procedures to identify, describe and respond to potential emergency shipboard situations.
8.2 The Company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for emergency actions.
8.3 The safety management system should provide for measures ensuring that the Company’s organization can respond at any time to hazards, accidents and emergency situations involving its ships.
9 REPORTS AND ANALYSIS OF NON-CONFORMITIES, ACCIDENTS AND HAZARDOUS OCCURRENCES
9.1 The safety management system should include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations are reported to the Company, investigated and analysed with the objective of improving safety and pollution prevention.
9.2 The Company should establish procedures for the implementation of corrective action.
10 MAINTENANCE OF THE SHIP AND EQUIPMENT
10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the Company.
10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:
.1 inspections are held at appropriate intervals;
.2 any non-conformity is reported, with its possible cause, if known;
.3 appropriate corrective action is taken; and
.4 records of these activities are maintained.
10.3 The Company should establish procedures in its safety management system to identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may result in hazardous situations. The safety management system should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of such equipment or systems. These measures should include the regular testing of stand-by arrangements and equipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.
10.4 The inspections mentioned in 10.2 as well as the measures referred to in 10.3 should be integrated into the ship’s operational maintenance routine.
11 DOCUMENTATION
11.1 The Company should establish and maintain procedures to control all documents and data which are relevant to the safety management system.
11.2 The Company should ensure that:
.1 valid documents are available at all relevant locations;
.2 changes to documents are reviewed and approved by authorized personnel; and
.3 obsolete documents are promptly removed.
11.3 The documents used to describe and implement the safety management system may be referred to as the Safety Management Manual. Documentation should be kept in a form that the Company considers most effective. Each ship should carry on board all documentation relevant to that ship.
12 COMPANY VERIFICATION, REVIEW AND EVALUATION
12.1 The Company should carry out internal safety audits to verify whether safety and pollution-prevention activities comply with the safety management system.
12.2 The Company should periodically evaluate the efficiency of and, when needed, review the safety management system in accordance with procedures established by the Company.
12.3 The audits and possible corrective actions should be carried out in accordance with documented procedures.
12.4 Personnel carrying out audits should be independent of the areas being audited unless this is impracticable due to the size and the nature of the Company.
12.5 The results of the audits and reviews should be brought to the attention of all personnel having responsibility in the area involved.
12.6 The management personnel responsible for the area involved should take timely corrective action on deficiencies found.
PART B - CERTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION
13 CERTIFICATION AND PERIODICAL VERIFICATION
13.1 The ship should be operated by a Company which has been issued with a Document of Compliance or with an Interim Document of Compliance in accordance with paragraph 14.1, relevant to that ship.
13.2 The Document of Compliance should be issued by the Administration, by an organization recognized by the Administration or, at the request of the Administration, by another Contracting Government to the Convention to any Company complying with the requirements of this Code for a period specified by the Administration which should not exceed five years. Such a document should be accepted as evidence that the Company is capable of complying with the requirements of this Code.
13.3 The Document of Compliance is only valid for the ship types explicitly indicated in the document. Such indication should be based on the types of ships on which the initial verification was based. Other ship types should only be added after verification of the Company’s capability to comply with the requirements of this Code applicable to such ship types. In this context, ship types are those referred to in regulation IX/1 of the Convention.
13.4 The validity of a Document of Compliance should be subject to annual verification by the Administration or by an organization recognized by the Administration or, at the request of the Administration, by another Contracting Government within three months before or after the anniversary date.
13.5 The Document of Compliance should be withdrawn by the Administration or, at its request, by the Contracting Government which issued the Document when the annual verification required in paragraph 13.4 is not requested or if there is evidence of major non-conformities with this Code.
13.5.1 All associated Safety Management Certificates and/or Interim Safety Management Certificates should also be withdrawn if the Document of Compliance is withdrawn.
13.6 A copy of the Document of Compliance should be placed on board in order that the master of the ship, if so requested, may produce it for verification by the Administration or by an organization recognized by the Administration or for the purposes of the control referred to in regulation IX/6.2 of the Convention. The copy of the Document is not required to be authenticated or certified.
13.7 The Safety Management Certificate should be issued to a ship for a period which should not exceed five years by the Administration or an organization recognized by the Administration or, at the request of the Administration, by another Contracting Government. The Safety Management Certificate should be issued after verifying that the Company and its shipboard management operate in accordance with the approved safety management system. Such a Certificate should be accepted as evidence that the ship is complying with the requirements of this Code.
13.8 The validity of the Safety Management Certificate should be subject to at least one intermediate verification by the Administration or an organization recognized by the Administration or, at the request of the Administration, by another Contracting Government. If only one intermediate verification is to be carried out and the period of validity of the Safety Management Certificate is five years, it should take place between the second and third anniversary dates of the Safety Management Certificate.
13.9 In addition to the requirements of paragraph 13.5.1, the Safety Management Certificate should be withdrawn by the Administration or, at the request of the Administration, by the Contracting Government which has issued it when the intermediate verification required in paragraph 13.8 is not requested or if there is evidence of major non-conformity with this Code.
13.10 ‚Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraphs 13.2 and 13.7, when the renewal verification is completed within three months before the expiry date of the existing Document of Compliance or Safety Management Certificate, the new Document of Compliance or the new Safety Management Certificate should be valid from the date of completion of the renewal verification for a period not exceeding five years from the date of expiry of the existing Document of Compliance or Safety Management Certificate.
13.11 ‚When the renewal verification is completed more than three months before the expiry date of the existing Document of Compliance or Safety Management Certificate, the new Document of Compliance or the new Safety Management Certificate should be valid from the date of completion of the renewal verification for a period not exceeding five years from the date of completion of the renewal verification."
[QUOTE=+A465B;136115][B]Here is your answer.[/B]
[B]International Safety Management (ISM) Code 2002[/B]
[/QUOTE]
The IMO would hire you right away cause like them, you cannot give any practical answer to any of those questions apart BS paper work. Kind of proof that you never ever have a command and be the ultimate responsible.
The ISM Code only answers questions by more questions. It only delegates the burden of finding answers to complex questions down the shoulder of the master which will be at the end, the one to be decapitated.
[I]’‘The safety management system should ensure compliance with mandatory rules, regulations, applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization push pen government people.’’[/I]
So where are those mandatory rules and regulations pertaining to:
- sail with unlashed deck containers or unsecured tween deck cars and trucks,
- carry a cargomax program to ascertain intact stability criteria prior getting underway,
- exact point of a peril of the sea where a captain is in the obligation to order an abandon ship
- exact sequence of a passenger vessel abandon ship,
- relieving the master from his obligations and responsibilities to render rescue,
- exonerate the master from a rumored obligation to sacrifice his life in conducting a rescue.
I didn’t bother reading through all that. Last thing I want to do on my time off is read pages of regulations. It’s a wonder anyone still bothers to go to sea with the amount of things which, though I agree with most of it, are codified to pass legal blame onto the crew while dismissing the companies and regulators.
[This is from the Wikipedia article Looks like some wight was added in 2013
Modifications included adding extra passenger cabins on the third, fourth and fifth decks, raising the passenger capacity by 181, and increasing the weight of the ship by 239 tons
Those decks maybe were car decks previously?
For a voyage of that length they should’ve had a safety drill shortly after departing, whether or not it’s required.
[QUOTE=LI_Domer;136131]Those decks maybe were car decks previously?
For a voyage of that length they should’ve had a safety drill shortly after departing, whether or not it’s required.[/QUOTE]
What is the standard here? I mean if what ever initiated this incident had happened on 100 Sewols how many would have done better? Is the Sewol the only ferry who’s crew is composed of potential criminals and and all rest would have done better in this situation?
We would all like to think we would do better but who really knows? I am going to stick to my story that I’m Joe average mariner, so far I’ve gotten out of a couple scrapes but I going to be careful and hope to God I am not put to the ultimate test.
I have to mostly agree with you there. It should be the company’s ultimate responsibility to foster a safety culture, to have the crew do things properly, etc. the companies management IMO should e every bit as Culpable if you are going to hold the crew culpable. However they operated that boat I’m sure it’s not much different from other operators in the region and certainly other vessels owned by the same company. It was different when there was less of a connection to management in olden times when the captain had full purchasing power and only talked to the owners in port. Now management should have to shoulder a greater share of any wrongdoing.