I remember the manager of a US yard saying he was going out of commercial construction and concentrating on naval construction because it was akin to making a Ferrari as apposed to an 18 wheeler.
HSLA is HSLA. Changing stiffener shapes is a matter of changing roll profiles at the mill. There are some specialty formulations of steel, but that’s more a matter of changing the ingredient mix going into the melt than something requiring a different plant.
Similarly for machinery–an anchor winch or deck crane or VCHT pump for commercial purposes is often directly transferrable to military vessels. Again, specialized equipment adapted for military needs (shock, acoustics, etc) is often more a matter of adjusting the build and test requirements than needing it’s own separate production line.
Naval ships are typically more weight constrained than commercial vessels, and often have different operational requirements, which means the design is different, but the productive process is largely the same.
This is why shrinking or expanding the commercial market affects the economies of scale for both military and commercial construction. While there is also a competition factor for currently available capacity, capacity is elastic in the relative near-term–effectively the lead time required to enlarge any bottleneck.
The answer is only partially “add money.” The money has to be added in a strategic fashion. Japan, South Korea, and China did not gain their market share overnight. Nor did the US, previously. We’ve seen that just saying “build more ships”–whether 2/year SSN construction or claiming a plan for 360/355/300/whatever number of combatants–doesn’t work if we only actually buy ships at a rate of 280 over 35 years. The same applies to the commercial market.
Doug
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How long since a US shipyard built a large merchant ship solely from US design, with all US made machinery and equipment?
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How long will it take to regain the ability to build a totally US designed and equipped large merchant ship?
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Is it worth the cost and effort to develop a complete US supply chain when there are existing suppliers in allied countries that already have the ability to supply what is needed at competitive prices and terms?
National security you say? Maintain the ability to build Naval vessels at US yards, with US machinery and equipment afa possible and at whatever price.
Merchant vessel needed to supply US forces worldwide can be built/purchased from friendly nations, put under US flag, owned and managed by US shipping companies and crewed by US citizens/residents.
Yards don’t typically publicize the extent of their build-to-print vs clean-sheet design efforts. As far as I can tell, NASSCO’s Alaska-class tankers would be a relatively recent example from the mid-2000s that evolved into the ESD/ESB currently being built for MSC. The “all US made machinery and equipment” part is one of the reasons I support the efforts of the SHIPS for America act. The engines for the ESD/ESB come out of Fairbanks-Morse, but to a license design from MAN, as do the engines in the T-AO, which is another merchant vessel design being procured by the Military Sealift Command.
And US shipbuilding is not “deliberately skewed as part of the national strategie”?
Isn`t US shipbuilding “subsidized” by overpriced Government contracts?
Every nation’s shipbuilding is skewed, whether it is the Chinese, Japanese, South Koreans, and Italians boosting their shipbuilders, or the US, UK, and EU ignoring the direct & indirect subsidy schemes. Ignoring that factor is what got us in the situation we’re in, today.
Here’s an example I posted as a comment on one of Sal’s YouTube videos:
The US used to do the same–let’s look at the construction record of Ingalls Shipbuilding as an exemplar, using data from Tim Colton’s site:
From 1971-1980, before the end of the construction differential subsidies, Ingalls Shipbuilding delivered 4 product carriers, 4 SSNs, 4 ammunition ships, 7 C6 freighters, 5 LHAs, 30 DD-963, and one cement barge. 56 hulls @ 676,626 lightship tons.
1981-1990, after the end of the subsidy system, Ingalls delivered 1 LHD, 2 battleships (that we won’t count), 17 drilling rigs, 13 CG-47s, 4 DDG-993s, and 1 DD-997. 38 hulls @ 260,478 lightship tons, not counting the reactivation of the battleships.
1991-2000, the shipyard delivered 6 CG-47, 13 DDG-51, 3 Sa’ar Corvettes, 14 OSVs, 1 liftboat, 5 LHD, and 41 barges. 83 hulls @ 348,963 lightship tons
2001-2010, the shipyard delivered 14 DDG-51, 1 LHD, 1 LHA, most of one cruise ship, 1 LPD-17, and two National Security Cutters. 20 ships @ 263,000 lightship tons
2011-2020, this yard delivered 19 ships @ 263,000 lightship tons, including 7 National Security Cutters, 6 LPD-17 class, 2 LHA-6 class and 4 DDG-51 class.
Note the drastic drop in tonnage coinciding with the end of the CDS/ODS subsidies. This area is one point that I disagree with the position that you and Senator Cruz apparently took at the Subcommittee hearings–we know that the direct subsidy system worked, and worked well, but we’re afraid to use it. I’d also point out the flat-lining of the yard’s production at 263,000LT/decade as the yard became more reliant on the naval dollars.
I think it nicely illustrates the impact ending the CDS/ODS and other subsidies had on the industry, as well as the presence of the Jones Act in preserving a part of the industry (the drilling rigs, OSVs, liftboats, and barges constructed between 1981-2000).
Doug
Sorry, ombugge, I neglected to address these questions:
- How long will it take to regain the ability to build a totally US designed and equipped large merchant ship?
- Is it worth the cost and effort to develop a complete US supply chain when there are existing suppliers in allied countries that already have the ability to supply what is needed at competitive prices and terms?
For the question on how long it would take, I’d say a year, maybe two, to come up with a design and three years to build. If we’re just satisfying the “build a merchant ship, any ship” piece. For one, we could simply dust off the Alaska-class crude carriers. There are still manufacturers in the US that make most of the necessary parts. The problem is that they largely do so at bespoke construction rates and pricing to match. Superior-Lidgerwood-Mundy, Scot Forge, Fairbanks-Morse, Caterpillar, General Electric, Philadelphia Gear, Curtis-Wright, Appleton Marine, TwinDisc, Alro Steel, Niagara-Lasalle, Nucor Steel, L3, Raytheon, and many others still have knowledge, but it’s on life-support due to the limited market.
It should be obvious that I think the answer to the question of whether it is worth the cost and effort to develop the supply chain is a resounding “yes.” Our allies are busy boosting our biggest competitor to their own detriment, as well as ours, and get offended that the US appears to be waking up to that fact.
Doug
Why?
Union Hall: Cheaper ships means more ships and more jobs! Maybe shipyard workers, all 20 of them left, will be on unemployment but we won’t be, not our problem.
Board Room of Big Money Shipping: Get rid of USA manning too and we can make EVEN MORE MONEY 
Who cares about unemployed sailors, not our problem.
US Big Money Shipping operate few ships under US flag.
Yet US companies and finance institutions own the 4th biggest fleet of ships by value in the world:
Source: Top 10 Shipowning Nations by Total Asset Value for 2024 - Veson Nautical
Not only that, but I question the strategic value of these commercial yards given both the extremely long build times for US-built merchant ships and the high dependence on a foreign supply chain. Heck, the last cargo ship built in the US, the Janet Marie, has a Chinese propeller and took darn near six years from the time the order was placed to delivery (2017 to 2023). https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ykht91jEsUQmV-rlFE-lw-8IfGPZDVgu/view
“Dusting of old designs” may have been one of the reasons for US shipbuilding`s downfalls.
New requirements, new technology and new regulations requires NEW designs that can meet modern economical expectations.
In order to compete with foreign shipyards it is also necessary to adopt modern construction methods, reduce costs and increase efficiency.
Trimming the fet in the form of reducing overhead, especially top heavy management and shear holder`s expectations of return on investment.
One way of doing this is to follow the ways other high cost countries manage to stay competitive:
- Building hulls in low cost countries, but carry out final outfitting at domestic yards.
- Buying machinery and equipment from suppliers that offer the best quality at the most competitive price, regardless of supplier`s nationality.
(Of course developing own competitive machinery and equipment manufacturing industries are even better)
Best of luck in your adventure!!
PS: IMHO a global supply chain, where price and quality decides the outcome would be the BEST solution.
IIRC USA was the instigator of free trade back in the days when that was always to your advantage.
The big money shipping in the US (Matson, Crowley, Saltchuk, etc.) all love the US build and crew requirements as competitive moats to competition. Last thing they want to see is any of that go away. The continuing head scratcher is why mariner unions back a build requirement that shrinks the fleet and forces them to sail on rustbuckets.
“Dusting of old designs” may have been one of the reasons for US shipbuilding`s downfalls.
New requirements, new technology and new regulations requires NEW designs that can meet modern economical expectations.
In order to compete with foreign shipyards it is also necessary to adopt modern construction methods, reduce costs and increase efficiency.
Trimming the fet in the form of reducing overhead, especially top heavy management and shear holder`s expectations of return on investment.
You asked how fast a US-designed, -built, and -equipped ship could be done. Not how fast a new, all-singing, all-dancing supership could be developed. Crude oil tanker design hasn’t changed that much in the last 20 years. Considering the original Alaska-class tankers are a known design, were built in 4 years from contract award to delivery of the first ship, and that the complex portions of the ships (bow & stern) are still in production as the ESD/ESB class, it goes to demonstrate what is realistic when it comes to resuming US production. You don’t start at the top, you start where the broadest market is.
Furthermore, the big shipyards delivering the massive tonnage to the world’s fleets are building cookie-cutter ships with minor tweaks, en masse. The only real innovation at the moment the gyrations around alternative fuels.
US shipyards actually do use so-called modern construction methods. What they do not use are capital intensive mass-production automated systems, since those are not suitable for the order intake rate.
As for trimming the “fat” that you take to mean shareholder ROI, Hyundai Heavy’s commercial shipbuilding profit margin in 2024 was 6.4% and their naval shipbuilding profit margin was 8.6%. Ingalls Shipbuilding delivered 7.6% in 2024, and Newport News 4.1%. As far as reducing overhead, that comes with expanding production, which is one of the points of this exercise.
I’d also point out that the South Koreans and Japanese do not build naval vessels notably faster than the US builders. The KDX-III Batch II lead ship took 3.1 years to go from keel-laying to delivery. The Flight III Arleigh Burke lead ship, DDG-125, took 3.7 years. The JMSDF Maya took 2.9 years (Haguro took 3.2 years). These are all Aegis ships of similar capability and tonnage.
IMHO a global supply chain, where price and quality decides the outcome would be the BEST solution.
IIRC USA was the instigator of free trade back in the days when that was always to your advantage.
The global supply chain is what we currently have, and it is garbage. It should be clear that I think the free trade globalists are idiots.
Doug
Which US companies and finance institutions own these ships? Many of which are foreign flagged. Any information on who is who among US ship owners?
Agree that the formula for success goes far beyond money. It’s notable that none of the leading shipbuilding countries impose JA-style domestic build requirements and force their companies to compete in the international market. They also don’t employ CDS-style subsidies either, with most of the subsidies consisting of more indirect assistance such as assisting with worker training and cheap financing to encourage sales.
Don’t know about “overnight,” but the Asian trio all saw pretty dramatic and relatively quick increases in market share (Japan in the 60s, SK in the 80s, and China in the 2000s). Outside of temporary wartime spikes, meanwhile, I don’t think the US has had a substantial share of the international market since about the mid-1800s.
Besides a lot of common parts between commercial and naval ships, it should also be pointed out that a significant proportion of naval ships fulfill essentially the same roles as commercial ships - the destroyers and carriers don’t go anywhere for long without their oilers, ammo and stores carriers. The Marines plan to storm beaches from LHAs and LHDs etc, but they plan to stay on the beaches and move inland thanks to the support of fairly standard ro-ros. The fact that the Navy took a commercial oil tanker and turned it into an amphibious assault ship is a great example of this.
(The ferry-derived Independence class LCS is a not-so-great example of this)
This is a great conversation, though. Refreshing to read all around.
That’s an interesting stat. Can you show the source? I didn’t know HHI breaks out profit margin by naval vs. commercial.
Damn few because no one wants to fly the family to Orlando on a foreign flag rustbucket built or crewed to some unknown standard.
If the current regulations that allow foreign airlines access to American airports were applied to flag of convenience ships there wouldn’t be any ships and crews abandoned anywhere.
Go to the Hyundai Heavy website and you can find their quarterly and annual reports. Specifically “2024 HDHHI Value-up.”
Same for HII.
Doug
This!!!
The first time XYZ Airlines from BFE arrives with a broken transponder and leaking fuel all over the ramp, can’t pay the parking and cleanup fee, and then abandons the plane and crew is the last time they will ever be allowed in US airspace.
A simple (maybe?) question:
Given that a US yard has to pay a decent amount of money for skilled labor and has to abide by various environmental regulations, how much of a per-ship subsidy would put them on par with world costs for shipbuilding?
I tried to google it, but apparently there is no list of “who is who” when it comes to US owners of foreign ship.
Here is the AI answer, however:
Which US financial institution that owns foreign flag ships are also not easy to find.
From memory I know that J.P.Morgan is one of them:
The fact remains that US interest owns the 4th largest fleet of commercial vessels in the world by value. (Some foreign- some US-flagged)
PS: It is also a fact that many US-flag ships are owned and operated by US subsidiaries of large foreign shipping companies.
Let’s be serious. I doubt even a single American — many of whom routinely fly foreign airlines on international trips — is unsettled by the prospect of Singapore Airlines or any other of the foreign carriers that dominate the Skytrax rankings (highest US ranking? Delta at #22) from flying domestic routes.