Sea Star's El Faro

[QUOTE=Colston1285;170622]Yea I’ve seen the same many, many times as well even in the GoM where you are fairly close to shore and more communication equipment[/QUOTE]

Marine traffic has terrestrial AIS but it’s uber expensive, otherwise yes, dependant on a shore tower, and each platform has different towers, so coverage varies amomgst them

[QUOTE=+A465B;170629]Useful and seems consistent with the limited data so far publicly available. Not every answer to all things, like which hatch popped open and what got flooded, as in was there water on the vehicle decks, but very insightful. Thank you.[/QUOTE]

Having worked aboard this ship the last 5 years I would like to know which hatch opened as well.

[QUOTE=Colston1285;170622]Yea I’ve seen the same many, many times as well even in the GoM where you are fairly close to shore and more communication equipment[/QUOTE]

Marine traffic has terrestrial AIS but it’s uber expensive, otherwise yes, dependant on a shore tower, and each platform has different towers, so coverage varies amomgst them

I tower the Westward Venture from Baltimore to Brownsville on its final voyage. It fought us the whole way.

Graphic showing approaching storm in relation to approx. position of El Faro, using Weather Underground’s Wundermap (see link to full animation below)


WunderMap® | Interactive Weather Map and Radar
http://wxug.us/1rde7

There was a post back asking what kind of pipe you saw get loaded did I miss the reply? Just curious it could shed light into the boiler mystery

Those 2 graphics sure look like a “navigational incident” to me.

Thank you to all whom have posted here. May we keep our brothers, sisters and those who loved them in our hearts. To me it is unimaginable what they went through. Godspeed.

Another night closes. I pray for survivors and their families. To the one who was found, may Christ be met, the pilot face to face, and the tide high when crossing the bar. Rest well, we will take the watch.

//youtu.be/PAdLYCk83UM

Read the train of statements and interviews this tool box…he is a classic longshore act slip and fall attorney not quite of Marvin Barrish fame, but close, every time a carnival cruise line passenger bumps their head he gets a paycheck

and to think you were saltchuks #1 cheerleader

[QUOTE=texasshipagent;170631]Marine traffic has terrestrial AIS but it’s uber expensive, otherwise yes, dependant on a shore tower, and each platform has different towers, so coverage varies amomgst them[/QUOTE]

FREE Marine Traffic only provides terrestrial AIS but for a fee, Maritime Traffic can provide satellite AIS coverage. On average you will get hourly updates. So as long as El Faro had a functionable AIS system, someone knew its route and last position within 20 NM

There is so much speculation and misinformation posted here that it confuses what may have happened. Any speculation at this point will bear little reality once all of the facts are known. In the early stages of any investigation of an accident, marine or otherwise, little or no facts are known. In this case that is certain. What I can predict is that when the investigation is complete is that:

  1. There was no single act that brought the incident about. Instead, there will be a chain of little things, some seemingly unrelated that culminated in the tragedy we have now.
  2. The riding crew may not have any relation to any of the incidents
  3. The riding crew may have played a part in the incident
  4. Open lifeboats or closed lifeboats, not a factor.
  5. There will be some regulatory changes as a result of this incident. They probably won’t make a difference. That is the way this industry works.

That is it. Let’s pray that some, most or all of the officers, crew and riding crew will be found alive. . . more miraculous things have happened.

With respect to this new forum I’ve waded through the entire thread, for mostly better than worse, before throwing my two cents into the fray. Amidst the hyperbole and bluster, I’ve learned a couple of things of interest: a) what metacentric heights are and the nature of rolling periods, and b) that container ships venture closer to hurricanes than I’d ever previously imagined. The former is a purely academic affair to be pursued at leisure. The latter topic, however, has only served to open a can of worms that this thread frankly has done little to put it into a tight useful perspective.

If this website does a public service, it would clearly be to teach those of us on the outside, like myself, about how things work on the Inside of the merchant marine domain. The standards, codes and practices. Yet it seems to me the core question in this affair has been approached in a very beaten-around-the-bush manner. So I’d like to ask the experienced maritime pilots among you again, if bluntly : With the knowledge at hand what would YOU likely have done in that captain’s shoes as you set out shortly before midnight on the 29th Sept knowing full well there was a hurricane watch 24-36 hours downstream dead on your planned itinerary? Would you have routed left or right as hindsight now declares to be a no-brainer, or barreled straight ahead? The next morning of the 30th, having been informed that the watch on your path had been ‘upgraded’ to a full-blown hurricane warning would you then have negotiated the still relatively easy reroute through the Florida Straits? Or rather would you have opted to push your luck yet further until the point of return that evening when you would then learn that not only had the tropical storm officially become a cat 3 hurricane, but also that you were now already smack in the middle of the warning zone. Would you have exercised your last option and finally bailed out to the west through the Northeast Channel…or, for God knows what reason, persisted in a doomed attempt to thread that maritime needle?

Curiously, the distancing from these questions have been accompanied by a nearly total disinterest of a concomitant question: What did other ships do in the area faced with this storm? And so we learn (nearly buried in this thread) that one boat out of South Carolina bound for Trinidad did indeed go around through the Bahama Channel. Having set sail a full day before the El Faro did. Or most pertinent of all (thanks to CJ Roro) that the El Faro’s very sister ship, the El Yunque, instead of crossing paths with its sibling In Hurricane Alley opted to detour even further afield by going completely around Cuba. If true, this fact alone would seem to put a major dent in the burgeoning conspiracy theory regarding the importance of schedule and management pressure. Why has no one picked up on these facts and tried to put them into the equation?

To be sure, other questions of sea-worthiness, a rogue repair crew and engine room failure also demand answers. To which I’d like to add one : at this point do we suspect that it was a boiler failure that led to the ship taking water and start to list until foundering? Or could it be the other way around— that extreme seas, leakage, broken hatches and/or unsecured cargo followed by the tilting of the vessel somehow put it into a float configuration that led to an engine shutdown? Or is this all just splitting hairs?

One last remark regarding that outspoken member of yours… Mr.C. I’ve got to agree with what others have said: the man’s lack of civility is appalling. Unabashed obscenity, caps and bold letters that scream in your nose. Like some third-rate Valley Girl from Planet Facebook. He apparently even takes to sharing PMs on the forum. I don’t know from where you fished him but on at least two other aviation forums that I frequent someone like him would have been banned or censured at least 6000 posts ago. I suggest he take a pill, or maybe two, and go early to bed. Sleep it off and he’ll be amazed how much better he feels the next morning. He’ll thus be better equipped to taste his own medicine and perhaps even up to apologizing to certain participants of this thread.

[QUOTE=+A465B;170629]Useful and seems consistent with the limited data so far publicly available. Not every answer to all things, like which hatch popped open and what got flooded, as in was there water on the vehicle decks, but very insightful. Thank you.[/QUOTE]

I just did a quick look on IPad Navionics but anyone using google earth and making a few reasonable assumptions could dig in deeper. I wouldn’t want to take it to the bank but the "sailed straight into the hurricane " theory supporters either need to come up with something better or STFU.

[QUOTE=cmakin;170649]There is so much speculation and misinformation posted here that it confuses what may have happened.[/QUOTE]

then let’s try to list the “knowns” here this morning

  1. EL FARO was to the west of San Salvador (Watling Is.) at about midnight and the center of Joaquin was about 100miles to the east moving WSW
  2. There were five workers aboard to do machinery repairs
  3. There was a phone call made at approx. 7:20am to SeaStar’s management offices shortly before the ship disappeared. In that call it was said that there had been flooding and a machinery casualty rendering the ship without propulsion.
  4. No distress call was sent by the master
  5. At least one person on the ship was able to don an immersion suit.

What are the “unknowns” now?

  1. what machinery was that riding gang aboard to work on and did the USCG grant the vessel a Permit to Proceed without all required machinery operable?
  2. what was the nature of the machinery casualty?
  3. at what time did the marine casualty occur?
  4. what caused the ship to go from its last AIS position NW of the Crooked Islands to the reported foundering position NE of the islands?
  5. was the master planning to pass to the west of the Crooked Islands during the morning?

No conjectures or speculations here only questions needing to receive answers which all can be by TOTE if they have the courage to do the right thing?

[QUOTE=eidassan;170652]One last remark regarding that outspoken member of yours… Mr.C. I’ve got to agree with what others have said: the man’s lack of civility is appalling. [/QUOTE]

OW! I got a bad booboo on my bottom now!

[QUOTE=z-drive;170643]and to think you were saltchuks #1 cheerleader[/QUOTE]

I agree, this has rocked me to the core

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[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;170654]I just did a quick look on IPad Navionics but anyone using google earth and making a few reasonable assumptions could dig in deeper. I wouldn’t want to take it to the bank but the "sailed straight into the hurricane " theory supporters either need to come up with something better or STFU.[/QUOTE]

There were better routes, that is a no brainer. Let’s see what NTSB comes up with. Take it from a Floridian, hurricanes don’t look so bad on a weather map, or in Maine, but are much more to deal with in person. That was a big storm.

As a professional sailor (get paid for racing sailboats), search and rescue volunteer, a businessman with merchandise on board, and as a businessman in PR affected by the situation; my first reaction was to pray for the lives of those crewman and officers in the ship, especially their families who allowed them to do what they loved. No one that does not love the sea steps into a ship voyage after voyage when knowing the risks involved. My best wishes to all these families, in the hopes they find comfort and peace.

Now the investigations, solid theories, findings, and surprises regarding this voyage and past voyages start. Mail Online News has a list of those in the ship, a short bio, and nice words about each one, no sensationalism, no dirt about them, a respectful article. I’m sure other news outlets will not follow that example and will try to crush reputations; shame on those who do that.

At the end we will not know the whole truth. In my very personal opinion, knowing the mindset of people who love and respect the sea, this accident was just a series of events that came together to create this “perfect storm”. Im my mind, most probably executives behind a desk pushed too hard to keep an itinerary, and the Capt. most probably was under pressure to present a reasonable plan; I seriously doubt that any Capt. willingly will put his crew and his life in danger. I cannot say the same for bean counting executives sitting behind a desk looking at P&L financial statements. With Horizon no longer servicing PR these shipping companies are being push hard by local government and business’. Lots of Christmas merchandise and holiday groceries in El Faro, it was one of thee most important voyages of the year for them.

Anyways, that is my very personal opinion, and I might be wrong. This reaffirms my belief that you don’t go against Mother Nature. Since I’m no expert merchant marine transportation expert I will not comment in ship’s condition, age, etc. But, I’m an expert when it comes to big business and government mindset.

I have added wind arrows to the Wundermap image to add a bit of clarity to where the ship would have drifted once non under command

yes, I agree now that if there was not a propulsion casualty that EL FARO would have turned south and passed Crooked Island to the east with winds aft. I also agree that it would have drifted to the east if they lost the plant sometime after passing San Salvador. I have not tried to make time/distance calculations to determine what speed that would have been but agree that it was likely drift and not an intentional move to go that way. The question is at what time did the ship lose propulsion and why no distress call once that happened (not like there could be any rescue in those conditions but at least the USCG would have been talking with the master for several hours before the ship rolled over giving us more information today)

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I’m a new member and have read this entire thread after stumbling across the gCaptain forum.

Before I introduce myself, please let me extend my sincerest condolences to the immediate families of the crew of the EL FARO, and also to the broad community of merchant mariners who have lost friends, past shipmates, brothers and sisters in your industry, as well as perhaps some of your faith in the system.

I served in the US Navy 1965-1993. Trained as an enlisted in electronics, nuclear power and submarines, then a mechanical engineering degree, commissioning and a career as a Surface Warfare Officer. I spent 13 years on sea assignments, with most in engineering, including Cheng on a frigate in the mid-70s. Engineering qualified on 1200PSI steam ships as well as gas turbine ships. But in the USN all “unrestricted surface line officers” are bridge watch keepers and I worked my way up the chain there over the years. In 1985 I got an inspected license for auxiliary sailing vessels based on personal recreational use. From 1987-1990 I was in a shore assignment that provided me the great opportunity to work with hundreds of merchant marine officers, in their U.S. Navy Reserve capacity. In 1990 I sat for and was licensed as Chief Mate, Oceans, Unlimited as well as Master, Oceans, Steam, Motor and Sail, 1600-Tons. When I retired I almost sailed with Military Sealift Command, but instead furthered my education and have worked at a university since 1993. While I did some local work on dinner cruise “T” vessels, I never sailed on my license.

I provided all the above not for any bragging rights, as my experience pales in comparison to most on here. Only to show that while I am a newbie on this forum I am not a neophyte with regard to weather, seamanship or most engineering matters.

I have learned a great deal reading this thread, and I look forward to learning more about this tragic loss at sea.

I was going to ask what a “navigational incident” is in the MM community, because it’s usually a grounding or collision in the Navy. Perhaps Knots has it correct in #670.

Again, my condolences to the families and the entire community on this loss.