NTSB El Faro Accident Report

#41

I totally agree that the Mates did their jobs and the NTSB should have never added that part.

This is the reason for me starting the new thread that I did.

#42

That might insulate the potential employer from claims related to its investigation of the potential employee (its an agreement between them), but it does NOTHING to protect the former employers.

While there are companies that have long hiring processes and throroghly investigate potential employees, it seems to me that most companies think that mariners being hired for seagoing positions are fungible, expendable, and not worth much effort.

At some companies, online employment applications dump directly into HR software. The software does the screening. It screens out 90% of applicants. Next, there is a call from a 20something HR girl who knows nothing about the job or your qualifications. She just works off a script. Your only chance to impress her is to tell her about your gay kids that are married to wonderful Illegal immigrants from Guatemala. After all that, you have maybe a 5% chance of your application making it to a port captain that actually does the hiring.

A few months later, when you are working for someone else, you’ll run into these port captains on the docks, and they’ll tell you that they cannot find any qualified people to work for them. Or a few months after HR screened you out, you’ll get a call from a desperate port captain that is actually reading your resume himself. To which you’ll say, sorry, I would have loved to work for you, but now I’m working elsewhere.

#43

I have never participated in an NTSB investigation, but I have filed a formal dissent to a National Academies study report and I can tell you it’s a big deal. Maybe gCaptain could reach out to her and see if she has more to say.

Cheers,

Earl

#44

This is a cut and Paste from Member DINH-Zarr Dissent.
"Member T. Bella Dinh-Zarr filed the following concurring and dissenting statement on December 18, 2017. As I stated on scene and during the board meeting, I extend my deepest condolences to the families and friends of the crew of El Faro. I assure you that from that first day I had the privilege of meeting many of you in Jacksonville, our NTSB investigative team has worked tirelessly to provide answers and to craft this report in hope that no other maritime families will have to endure what you have endured. I applaud and thank the NTSB staff for completing a thoughtful, evidence-based report. I wholeheartedly concur with the work of the NTSB staff on this report. However, I do not agree with the amendment about adding the mates’ lack of assertiveness as a finding to the report. Therefore, I dissent to the addition of Finding 38 regarding the actions of the mates and the potential effect those actions might have had on the master/captain (an amendment made during the board meeting). Seafaring has existed for thousands of years. The term and position of a professional master has existed for centuries. In the maritime profession, much like in the military profession, a power differential exists that is necessary to maintaining good order and discipline. This power differential has existed for hundreds, if not thousands of years—so in that respect, the power differential is not comparable to that of a pilot and copilot in aviation—an industry which is just over 100 years old. As a master, you oversee a floating city. The ship has its business, its bridge, its engine, its living quarters, its mess hall, and, yes, its brig. The master must balance maintaining discipline and command of the ship with creating an environment where his/her crew will speak up during times of concern. In this respect too, it is far more comparable to the military than to the other modes of transportation we see here at the NTSB. We must be cognizant of those key differences when we talk about bridge communications. We cannot take a one-size-fits-all approach to the modes. While crew resource management (CRM) has helped improve aviation safety and bridge resource management (BRM) has important lessons to learn from CRM, there must be adjustments to accommodate the differences that exist in different modes to be truly effective. BRM in maritime is important—it is important for the crew to communicate and work as a team. However, in this case, the mates “challenging” the master during a storm is more akin to the lieutenant challenging the general’s orders on the battlefield—there is a proper way to do it given the necessary power differential. While I understand, in BRM, there are certain phrases that crew can be trained to say to better or more clearly communicate the urgency of a message. I would note, in the maritime world, a single call to the captain’s quarters in the middle of the night is the equivalent of these phrases. In response to my question in the board meeting as to whether it was unusual that the captain did not return to the bridge prior to 0400, an NTSB investigator and former master of El Faro (when it was named the Northern Lights) stated, “Pretty much industry standard would be if a junior officer, a third mate or second mate, calls and expresses concern, the master would be up on the bridge to address that concern.” "

#45

Member Dink-Zarr’s Doctorate is in Public Health. As a Professional in many aspects I hope that she understood the Human Performance Factors.

#46

Yes, I saw her dissent on TV, I thought it was spot on.

#47

First, Thanks for watching and following. Then, watching and critiquing the report only helps and supports our US Mariners.
Thank You!