Missed this, it’s from Febuary but it’s by Frump.
US Coast Guard told storm intensity surprised El Faro captain, TOTE
JACKSONVILLE, Florida – Neither the captain of the ill-fated American flag ship El Faro nor the company shore representative seemed to believe the ship was in danger of sinking when the captain first made contact, according to testimony and recordings played during the fifth day of a U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation into the sinking of the ship and the loss of all 33 crew.
“He (El Faro Capt. Michael Davidson) said he did not plan to leave the ship,” said Capt. John Lawrence, the shoreside TOTE Marine expert or “Qualified Individual.” “Due to his calmness and the second mate’s calmness…I felt there was no immediate concern.
“When I hung up, in my opinion, in my mind at the time, I felt that he was able to pump out the hold,” Capt. Lawrence continued. “I felt the ship would not have the list and he’d get his engines back and I would talk to him further…”
Tapes of Capt. Davidson’s last calls provided an emotional backdrop to Saturday’s hearings in Jacksonville. The captain spoke in a calm and professional manner at all times — except for one moment when the TOTE Services, Inc. emergency line first placed him on hold and then asked the most basic of questions.
“Give me one second, I am going to check who is on duty today and put you on a quick hold,” the emergency system operator said. She then placed Davidson through a series of basic questions.
“Ship?” she asked.
“El Faro,” Davidson replied.
“Spell, please,” she replied. “El?”
“Ho, man!” Davidson replied in frustration, his voice cracking slightly.
“The clock…the clock is ticking! Please! Speak to the QI (Qualified Individual)!
“Ship is El Faro! El Faro! That’s Echo! Lima! Foxtrot! Alfa! Romeo! Oscar! El Faro!”
A full three minutes passed as the emergency operator was able to forward the call to Capt. Lawrence. Even then, the call went to Lawrence’s voicemail. He immediately returned the call, however, and received an assessment from Davidson.
Lawrence said he felt the officers were handling the situation and it was best for him to get out of the way and alert the Coast Guard. Davidson assured Lawrence that the crew had not panicked, and there was no reason to send the crew to the boats or life rafts. Neither captain made reference to Hurricane Joaquin and Lawrence said he was not aware the ship was directly in the storm’s way. Davidson described high winds, but swells of only ten to 12 feet.
A scuttle, or hatch had come lose, flooding the holds, Davidson reported initially, but the crew seemed to have secured the hatch and was pumping out water. The engine had lost power and the ship was listing at around 15 degrees.
Michael W. Carr, a sea captain and former U.S. Coast Guard officer, has been observing the hearings in the audience and said that in his opinion there seemed to be "a huge lack of situational awareness. There appeared to be no comprehension of Hurricane Joaquin’s position (On top of El Faro), or the seriousness of El Faro’s condition. Essentially, at the time of these calls, TOTE’s impression was El Faro was disabled, but not in distress.”
In fact, by overlaying Hurricane Joaquin charts with the position of the El Faro, Carr concluded that the ship was "inside Hurricane Joaquin’s strongest wind field.” Moreover, hurricane data showed that in this area winds increasing "from 64 knots (74 miles per hour) to over 100 knots (sustained with higher gusts to 120 knots) within a distance of 20 to 30 miles.
"Changes in wind and seas (of that magnitude) were likely significant during the time El Faro lay without power and/or propulsion,” Carr said.
Another missed item is that Davison told Coast Guard Norfolk that the ship had been dewatered.