You sound like an accomplished sailor and I would likely welcome you as part of my crew. That being said, I am always worried about any new 3M who “learned it all on his last ship”. Are there 3Ms who could teach a skipper a thing or two? Yes. I also know guys with more coffee time than I have sea time who can’t stand a watch. Do a good job in your position and experience and capability will quickly become apparent. Just remember that some of us “school guys” went to the academy after coming up on fishing boats or other limited tonnage vessels. There are idiots in our ranks but this industry tends to weed them out. I hope I don’t qualify as a “micro-managing no-skill captain.” I guess the new 3M could tell me.[/QUOTE]
I’ve sailed on the same ship in the same area under the same circumstances with two different captains. One captain lets the mate conn in a tight spot and not even come up while the other captain not only comes up and takes over but you can observe him showing signs of stress and making errors. Ironically often these are the ones that don’t believe in BRM. If you just made the last trip through yourself without difficulty your likely not going to be very impressed. However likely the mate that observes this knows better then to say anything.
But yes, there are lots of real sharp mariners out there from various backgrounds.
The errors that were made by the captain and crew of the Bounty are similar to the ones made by the captain and crew of the Costa Concordia.’
In both cases the captains were overconfident in their shiphandleing ability, in the case of the Costa Concordia in handling the ship close to shore and in the case of the Bounty in handling the ship in heavy weather.
Both captains made changes to plans on very short notice and didn’t give time for a proper voyage plan. In the case of the Costa Concordia it was the decision to make a “sail-past” Giglio Island in the case of the Bounty it was the decision to put to sea with only two hours notice.
Neither captain adequately planned, in the case of the Costa Concordia no track-lines, waypoints of no-go areas were used. in the case of the Bounty no max wind speed or wave height was used (no-go area). In both cases the crew failed to adequately point out the departure from proper procedures and good seamanship.
I don’t agree with Andy Chase’s endorsement of the “capstan meeting” where the captain meets with and solicits advice from the crew. There are a couple of problems with that, one being that it puts the captain in charge with all other officers and crew on equal footing.They are pretending to have a flat hierarchy but they don’t. The other problem is the dynamic of forcing people speak up in public or keep silent.
As soon as the captain seriously began to consider going to sea the C/E and C/M have to be told and given a chance to consider the implications etc. There is no need for the entire crew to get involved in the early stages.
It’s been pointed out that there was a overall lack of expertise on the crew anyway so using techniques to extract that expertise would have been of limited use. In this case outside expertise should have been used. to get a “second opinion”.
It’s a mistake to dismiss the poor decision-making as a outlier Andy’s point about learning the wrong lessons is a good one. I’ve sailed with some real no-nonsense guys in Alaska and seen their decision-making fail because it was too primitive. It only has to happen once. Same as the Bounty their experience fooled them into making errors because their confidence was misplaced.
With regards to planning; the plan itself may be of limited use; it’s mostly the process of planning that traps errors.
The Bounty was using weather limits. It was anything less the the worse they’d seen as in “we’ve seen worse” Andy points out that no safety margins were used. That’s a good point. One thing about heavy weather Iit’s not just wave ht and wind speed the amount of time in heavy weather is critical. A few hours is one thing, a few days is another. Another thing is if you are working close to the limit wave direction period, length etc can make or break you.
As far as the criticism that this focus on formal decision-making is new-age bullshit; it’s true that people can parrot buzz words with little or no understanding. However it is an attempt to put into modern language lessons that are as old as mankind .
Diversity in counsel, unity in command. - Cyrus the Great (about 600 BC)
This is very interesting to me because being a commercial pilot I got all this first before it spread to other industries. In airplanes it is more directed at immediate issues. For commercial airline flights the dispatch department are the ones consulting with the captain about the overall voyage plan and issues expected with it. What CRM came from was first officers and flight engineers either sitting on their hands or being ignored while the captain flew them to their demise. The bad old days were very much the captain is GOD and all others speak up at their peril.
Something germane to both the Bounty and the Phantome ( http://www.amazon.com/The-Ship-Storm-Hurricane-Fantome/dp/078623296X ) is that the mates had little experience on any other ship. The institutional or tribal knowledge was very company centric and the Bounty apparently had a pirate/outlway tradition of pushing limits and evading the rules. This was their world, not something new for this hurricane.
[QUOTE=yacht_sailor;129272] What CRM came from was first officers and flight engineers either sitting on their hands or being ignored while the captain flew them to their demise.[/QUOTE]
Gear up flaps up shut up used to be the standard. Going back to the marine industry (Gulf War I)after flying as captain for a very large regional I was amused and a bit frustrated at how the marine industry adopted CRM vocabulary while completely missing the purpose.
[QUOTE=yacht_sailor;129272]This is very interesting to me because being a commercial pilot I got all this first before it spread to other industries. In airplanes it is more directed at immediate issues. For commercial airline flights the dispatch department are the ones consulting with the captain about the overall voyage plan and issues expected with it. What CRM came from was first officers and flight engineers either sitting on their hands or being ignored while the captain flew them to their demise. The bad old days were very much the captain is GOD and all others speak up at their peril.
Something germane to both the Bounty and the Phantome ( http://www.amazon.com/The-Ship-Storm-Hurricane-Fantome/dp/078623296X ) is that the mates had little experience on any other ship. The institutional or tribal knowledge was very company centric and the Bounty apparently had a pirate/outlway tradition of pushing limits and evading the rules. This was their world, not something new for this hurricane.[/QUOTE]
In the case of the Bounty the captain needed information outside his area of expertise. (from the C/E and a ship router).
As far the outlaw / pushing limits, I agree but this can be explained by the overconfidence bias. If you’ve read “Into Thin Air” then this might be an interesting article.High-Stakes Decision Making: The Lessons of Mount Everest
In some ways you have a polar opposite issue.
CRM - you are going somewhere between 1 and 10 miles a MINUTE. You HAVE to speak up when standing into danger[B] right now[/B] because later is too late.
BRM (slow sailing ship version) - You can go single digit speeds. Slower than you can run. You HAVE to speak up WELL BEFORE standing into danger because the ship is not escaping anything at any speed. You pretty much need to speak up before leaving the dock.
[QUOTE=yacht_sailor;129303]In some ways you have a polar opposite issue.
CRM - you are going somewhere between 1 and 10 miles a MINUTE. You HAVE to speak up when standing into danger right now because later is too late.
BRM (slow sailing ship version) - You can go single digit speeds. Slower than you can run. You HAVE to speak up WELL BEFORE standing into danger because the ship is not escaping anything at any speed. You pretty much need to speak up before leaving the dock.[/QUOTE]
I don’t think the Bounty sinking had anything to do with BRM. The root cause errors were made during planning / decision making. The aviation equivalent is this:
For commercial airline flights the dispatch department are the ones consulting with the captain about the overall voyage plan and issues expected with it.
I
There are several good examples of BRM failures, the Cosco Busan,the Porterto name a couple.
The academics would tell you that that planning/decision making you speak of IS “BRM” in its modern incarnation as laid down by the IMO. Obviously practice is very different than theory but still, Andy Chase didn’t just pull this stuff out of thin air.
Good point. I spent a few minutes with google and didn’t find the IMO definition of .BRM, there are a few terms floating around out there.
This is Bowditch:
Bridge Team Management refers to the management of the human resources available to the navigator—helmsman, lookout, engine room watch,
etc.—and how to ensure that all members contribute to the goal of a safe and efficient voyage.
Bridge Resource Management (BRM) is the study of the resources available to the navigator and the exploitation of them in order to conduct safe and efficient voyages. The terms “bridge resource management” and “bridge team management” are not precisely defined. For most, bridge resources consist of the complete suite of assets available to the navigator including electronic and human, while bridge team management refers only to human assets, except for the pilot, who is normally not considered a member of the team.
To be clear I should have said that this wasn’t a BTM issue which seems to the equivalent of yacht sailors use of the term CRM.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;129333]I don’t think the Bounty sinking had anything to do with BRM. The root cause errors were made during planning / decision making. The aviation equivalent is this:
I
There are several good examples of BRM failures, the Cosco Busan,
You are absolutely right. What happened on BOUNTY had a lot to do with psychology, and bad decisions ashore or alongside the dock, but nothing to do with BRM.
Since BOUNTY was a small vessel being operated as a private yacht (only inspected at a dockside exhibit) by unlicensed mariners (or at least not sailing on their licenses). They had no reason to know what BRM is or any obligation to follow it. That is not to say that some principles of BRM could not have been used to advantage. Probably more applicable would be the book, The Psychology of Sailing.
I thought the Bounty was taking on excessive water right after coming out of a dry dock requiring multiple bilge pumps just to keep up. The only decision to be made should have been where to haul out and when. The shit show of insanity by plowing into a hurricane with the vessel in that state doesn’t really warrant serious discussion?
[QUOTE=TSCOTT;129392]I thought the Bounty was taking on excessive water right after coming out of a dry dock requiring multiple bilge pumps just to keep up. The only decision to be made should have been where to haul out and when. The shit show of insanity by plowing into a hurricane with the vessel in that state doesn’t really warrant serious discussion?[/QUOTE]
This thread is about the article by Andy Chase. In the article Andy claims that it was not insanity that led to the loss of the Bounty but the result of learning the wrong lessons from experience.
Presumably nobody on this forum would make mistakes as serious as the errors made by the captain and crew of the Bounty.
The question is how to avoid mistakes, not necessarily of that magnitude but mistakes of the same type. Specifically errors as a result of overconfidence. and of confusing lack of failure with success.
Its a interesting article and perspective with a very personal side that is obviously looking for understanding and rationalization of the events. However I can’t make the logic leap from the initial decision to leave port. There doesn’t seem to be any logical justification for that single decision, everything after that can be analyzed and dissected under the magnifying glass of hind sight and how better officer decision making structure could have prevented X Y and Z, but it still all hinges on the single decision made by the captain that could only be veto’d by the owner to leave port in the face of a hurricane. BRM offers the theoretical life line between a poor decision and crisis vs. mutiny but ships are not democracies, short of relieving a captain of command there is no alternative once a poor decision has been made and implemented.
I don’t think the Bounty sinking had anything to do with BRM.
In the Bounty’s occurrence, If we can’t find any cause and contributing factor that has a direct relation with the BRM Concept, there’s something along the line that I overlooked !
STCW Chapter VIII, Part 3-1 of the “Code B”, Bridge Resource Management (BRM) Concept:
BRM Concept
Interpret marine accident statistics
List methods which can prevent accidents
Identify the human elements in marine accidents which have been cited as contributing factors
Safety, Considerations
-List the ways in which BRM can address safety concerns
Error Chain Analysis and Breaking, Situational Awareness
Define error chain
Analysis and series of events that created the error chain
Describe means and methods of breaking the error chain
Human Error in Accidents
Define human error
Describe the relationship between human error and accident causation
Causes of Error
List and describe some possible causes of error
Stress Management
Discuss the effect of stress and fatigue on individual performance
State some cases of stress
Describe possible means of reducing individual stress
Indications of Development of Error Chain
List and describe some indications of error chain development
Situational Awareness
Discuss the need to maintain positional awareness by all members of the bridge team
State low individual situational awareness in achieved
State how team situational awareness is achieved
Discuss how complacency may degrade the level of situational awareness
Leadership, Bridge Organization and Teamwork
Describe the characteristics of the various management styles
Synergy
Discuss synergy in the content of effective team work
Team Approach
Discuss how the team approach is used on the bridge
Discuss the benefit of using the team approach
Demonstrate the team approach
Communications
Interpersonal
Discuss closed loop communications and its role in effective communications
Define briefing and debriefing and describe how they help to create effective communication
Demonstrate how advocacy and inquiry contribute to good interpersonal communication
Barriers to Communications
List possible barriers to communications
Describe effective means of removal of barriers to communications
Emergency Situation Preparedness
Emergency Procedure Development
List possible emergency situations
Discuss the need for procedures to deal with emergencies
List the steps which must be followed by the bridge team in each emergency
Passage Planning and Execution
Establish Ship’s Route
Identify the factors that must be considered when establishing the ship’s route
Monitor Progress
State the monitoring procedure and technique
Identify the role of the monitoring team person in relation to the other team members and the plan
Contingency Plans
Develop a contingency plan as an integral part of the overall plan
Comparing Policies and Procedures and Check List
Discuss the development of company policies and procedure and check list
Decision Making
Apply decision making in the overall context of voyage planning and execution
[QUOTE=Topsail;129472]In the Bounty’s occurrence, If we can’t find any cause and contributing factor that has a direct relation with the BRM Concept, there’s something along the line that I overlooked ! [/QUOTE]
That’s exactly the point that I was trying to make. BRM encompasses all parts of the voyage, even parts that take place LONG before the voyage even begins (i.e. voyage planning, which is also extremely specifically outlined by the IMO). The sinking of the Bounty had EVERYTHING to do with BRM. The navigational officers of the Bounty, captain and mates all alike, mismanaged the resources that were available to them (including each other!) and the result of their disorganization was the vessel’s demise.
[QUOTE=Topsail;129472]In the Bounty’s occurrence, If we can’t find any cause and contributing factor that has a direct relation with the BRM Concept, there’s something along the line that I overlooked ! ![/QUOTE]
100% BRM issue:
New Chief Engineer: Hey, this thing here I don’t understand all that well doesn’t seem to work and I think it might be really important that it does work.
Everyone Else: STFU, it always does that, it doesn’t matter, etc…
[QUOTE=TSCOTT;129462]Its a interesting article and perspective with a very personal side that is obviously looking for understanding and rationalization of the events. However I can’t make the logic leap from the initial decision to leave port. There doesn’t seem to be any logical justification for that single decision, everything after that …[/QUOTE]
It is hard to imagine what the captain could have been thinking. I just assume he was not irrational and work back from there.
The only thing I can figure is it was a “perfect storm” of ignorance. The “we’ve seen worse” might explain how they justified the encounter and denial may explain how the failed to account for the condition of the pumps but it still seems like a stretch.
One factor may have been that the captain was not accustomed making decisions while under commercial pressure. Dealing with commercial pressure is something that you learn like anything else.
There are several good examples of BRM failures, the Cosco Busan, A good example of BRM is the Cosco Busan. The plan was (or should have been) to pass under the Bay Bridge between the towers. Instead the pilot steered the ship into a tower. Had there been a track-line on the ECDIS or chart, everyone would have been on the same page (shared mental model) and when the ship appeared not to be following that track (which is exactly what caused the C.G. VTS to speak up) someone could have or should have spoken up and asked WTF…
As the Cosco Busan was not an ECDIS vessel but only carry an ECS, so the primary means of navigation was paper charts. The course line and heading was plot on the charts but there was no planning whatsoever (W/O, Margin of Safety, Parallel Index, Radar Conspicuous Navaids, No-Go Zones, Abort & Contingencies, etc.,) The Passage Plan neither inserted in the VMS so the tack was not shown on the Radars.
The navigation techniques teach in most maritime schools stop where pilotage starts. If pilots around the world would be exonerated to follow course lines plot on the foreign vessel’s charts, it would lead to an international cataclysm. I have seen course line plot outside of the channel ! It is also very delicate to question the pilot about the conduct of the vessel when you have absolutely no local knowledge. But I agree that it should be done instead of being sorry. There’s a mate who ounce asked me what was the weather !
The VTS questioned the pilot about the Cosco Busan COG. We have to understand that there is a world between the vessel COG and the AIS-GPS antenna COG. The Bow, the Peripatetic (moving) Pivot Point and the Stern have all their own COG. It must be carefully taken into consideration when you maneuver a 900 ft vessel.
A 900 ft x 131 ft loaded at 40 ft draft authorize to proceed through dense fog, can surprise a foreign crew that has just joined a vessel and a man that has to correct a heading from 245° to 310° (65°) at 3 cables from a bridge when progressing at 10 knots ! Ship Happens …
