Oh my god, please stop with the juvenile defense of your beloved Chief Engineer. And please stop continuing to try and provoke a pissing contest between you and C captain.
Wasn’t it enough to have the last thread closed down because of that??
Why can’t you bring something constructive to this thread/forum? Other than strangely repeating like a broken record how fantastic your Chief is.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;135356]Well said and agreed. My post was an oversimplification.
To use your example of the local pilot - that’s a system. Pilotage regs are well known, the routine is understood. Ship master’s don’t have enough local knowledge or shiphandling expertise in close quarters to enter ports so they pick up and drop off a local expert at agreed upon points etc. I don’ t have to decide if I should give it a go or not.
Setting up a high-stakes tow in the prevailing conditions should be done in some methodical manner. How does the warranty surveyor do it?
As far as rig towing in Alaska …not my thing but off the top of my head I would think that the tow master should have a minimum of trips under his belt and there would be other requirements for each captain. All the tug captains should have the tow plan and be able to have the knowledge, skills and tools to be able to evaluate the plan, knowing key points like max sea expected, bollard pull required. Each captain should be able to verify that the tow gear had been planned by pulling specifications out of a table based on past experience instead of someone ass. Responsibilities and authority should be in writing…
It does appear from the report that the crew on the Aiviq fell short in some regards but there is trouble from higher in the planning stages as well. My impression is that someone drew a line on the chart for the Aiviq to follow and that’s what they did, or tried to do.[/QUOTE]
This was something from “Captain Phillips” that bugged the snot out of me.
The producers spent ZERO time explaining why in the world Phillips deviated from the convoy’s course track…the fact that he was more worried about burning fuel and making his arrival window than he was about losing his ship was never even addressed.
Just a little rant about “THAT’S the JOB! THAT’S the JOB!”.
Well, when Phillips was bobbing around in the lifeboat with his new buddies and was hoping for someone to come and rescue his stupid self, I wish the crew had got on the loudhailer and yelled at him:
"THAT’S the JOB, ex-captain! THAT’S the JOB, TOO!
The way the movie treated the unlicensed crew versus how the Chief spoke about them in interviews makes you wonder just how much of an “Ivory Tower”-type Phillips really was.
(Full Disclosure, TMK, I never sailed with Phillips, but I think I recall sailing with the Second A/E…the guy with the Senatorial-quality grey hair who spoke out of the side of his mouth).
I finally found time to read the report and it was about as I had heard anecdotally. The route was poorly planned and a “tow master” with no relevant experience was put in charge and apparently was too arrogant to listen to others. Sadly ECO seems to treasure many arrogant self important people. The chief engineer was either incompetent or offered himself up as a sacrifice, either way he has nothing to be proud of. It is up to the USCG what if any consequences he or the “towing master” and master suffer. The master seems to not have been willing to use his authority or perhaps he didn’t realize he had the authority to refuse such a ridiculous trip with lousy equipment and piss poor management. The thing that surprises me is the USCG seems shocked that the equipment shortcomings and failures before this incident were not reported to them by the master. The USCG in the GOM has to be completely blind not to know that such matters are almost NEVER reported to them and if they are it certainly is not by the master. Perhaps there are OSV masters that have called the USCG about an inoperable generator or engine but I have never heard of it happening. These guys were just carrying on the GOM operating norms and were probably under the illusion that reporting equipment failures or poor design that may affect the voyage to the office on shore was the norm because it IS the norm in the GOM. That the USCG feigns surprise is disingenuous. That ABS lets things slide in the GOM never for one moment surprised me. I recall being told of a particularly meticulous ABS inspector delaying a ECO vessel because of a fault he found. A person in a high position at ECO made the statement that one call to Houston and that guy would not be a problem. I am encouraged that the USCG did not whitewash this affair and I have a feeling it may have been even worse than they portrayed it. Actually the entire matter came out quite well considering the egos and players involved because from the outset it seemed to me that the ingredients of a perfect storm of ineptitude were all in place. I don’t see this matter stopping the exploration in Alaska but the building glut in the GOM may make Alaska exploration not as financially attractive as it was.
[QUOTE=Kingrobby;135367]Oh my god, please stop with the juvenile defense of your beloved Chief Engineer. And please stop continuing to try and provoke a pissing contest between you and C captain.
Wasn’t it enough to have the last thread closed down because of that??
Why can’t you bring something constructive to this thread/forum? Other than strangely repeating like a broken record how fantastic your Chief is.[/QUOTE]
And again… I ask you why you aren’t demanding that Motormouth stop with the professional defamation?
What’s it going to take for him to stop using the Chief and the Captain as punching bags to assuage his apparent mortal butt-hurt at ECO and all things from the Bayou?
A subpoena to the owners of this here not-a-BBS? Do you think that isn’t do-able?
Because as has been related by other posters, the hoods being worn by the members of this lynch-mob/ crowdsource can be ripped off like…that…and then without the mask of anonymity, there may be some Quality Time and Funds spent paying a lawyer to defend you from what that your fingers wrote.
And, BTW, It should also be kept in mind that ECO and the other Oil Patch operators all have IT departments who are pretty good at winnowing out IP addresses and then matching that IP to a specific owner.
Wanna guess how I know this?
Any business in this age of the internet that isn’t jealous about it’s online reputation is going to be at a real disadvantage in the marketplace.
So even if no civil action gets taken further than the subpoena to get the registration data, that would be all that I would need to make you known…and then once the Oil Boom comes to Alaska, you might find yourself shut out of the Big Bucks like you had leprosy…end your days towing a barge of novelty rubber dog-poop from China to Long Beach at 8 knots.
Am I getting through to you?
Do you get it?
You don’t think these Bayou Boys don’t have people who are PAID to monitor places like this 5 days a week?
If YOU were Gary Chouest, wouldn’t you have?
[QUOTE=Bilgeman;135372] You don’t think these Bayou Boys don’t have people who are PAID to monitor places like this 5 days a week?
If YOU were Gary Chouest, wouldn’t you have?[/QUOTE]
Well, if I was Gary I would want someone with a little more class than you to come on here and be his BIG Defender. Also, remember that you also are “hiding” behind a screen name and that I am sure it would not be hard to find exactly who you are. Now think about that as you might just end up working with some of those that post and read these forums.
[QUOTE=c.captain;135317]I disagreed entirely with that. A vessel the size and complexity of the AIVIQ cannot be run by Boudreaux and a similar team who might be completely capable to operate a big mudboat in the GoM. The AIVIQ master requires advanced command management skills as well as specific Alaskan waters knowledge for the vessel to be run safely and effectively. He needs to not just be able to spell SMS but be able to maintain it daily without fail. He needs to have the spine to say NFW to ECO management when he is being pressured to violate the SMS mandates, federal regulations or even the tenants of good seamanship. In other words, he needs to be a man who is diametrically different than any other Chouest master. The same goes for a chief. This does not necessarily mean they must come from deepsea although they should have a deepsea background and of course the big license but they also must be workboat experienced as well due to the nature of the work.
.[/QUOTE]
If what you’re saying about ECO is true then they have no business working in the Arctic. Otherwise the kind of captain you are describing should fit many of the qualified mariners within the company who successfully worked way up from third mate. Obviously this is specialized work and a ship like the Aiviq is going to be a difficult job.
The Gulf of Alaska is not a some exotic location, in fact Unimak Pass is the main route from Asia to the West Coast. And towing is not rocket science. The problem here was the tow wasn’t doable even in theory based on bollard pull and wire size. How hard to figure out is that?
I truly am…aren’t I? Plus I have a lot of good friends here and many followers of the “Legend of the Pointy Stick” as well.
Now you…you are nothing in my eyes and really do not even exist other that for to jab at with said sharp instrument…
poke!
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;135377]If what you’re saying about ECO is true then they have no business working in the Arctic. Otherwise the kind of captain you are describing should fit many of the qualified mariners within the company who successfully worked way up from third mate. Obviously this is specialized work and a ship like the Aiviq is going to be a difficult job.
The Gulf of Alaska is not a some exotic location, in fact Unimak Pass is the main route from Asia to the West Coast. And towing is not rocket science. The problem here was the tow wasn’t doable even in theory based on bollard pull and wire size. How hard to figure out is that?[/QUOTE]
but how many with 15 or more years working in Alaska? Knowledge of the environment and the waters was very clearly lacking according to the USCG and I think the results of the escapade pretty much confirm the finding.
btw, the accident didn’t happen in Unimak Pass, it happened south of the Trinity Islands in an area many old Alaska hands call a toilet bowl rightfully avoided by GoA veterans during summer as well as winter. Alaskan vets use Shelikoff Straits but they don’t let a company man pressure them to stay out of State waters at all costs to avoid taxes!
Shell sure saved a lot of money going the way they did…sure did!
[QUOTE=Tugs;135374]Well, if I was Gary I would want someone with a little more class than you to come on here and be his BIG Defender. Also, remember that you also are “hiding” behind a screen name and that I am sure it would not be hard to find exactly who you are. Now think about that as you might just end up working with some of those that post and read these forums.[/QUOTE]
Probably not…except that I wouldn’t be ashamed to post anything I had written here under my own name.
I’m here defending a friend and long-time shipmate and pointing out holes in the USCG report and certain environmental factors that may have been and may still be in play in Alaska that bear on the incident.
I’ve libelled no-one. I’ve defamed no-one. Not all of our correspondents here can say that.
I may be posting things that contradict the groupthink, and some people, for whatever reasons, don’t want to hear that, (and apparently don’t want other people to hear it either…otherwise why would posts get deleted?).
We’ve had an assertion by another poster here who claims to have known the Chief, and if memory serves, was one of, if not the first to mention him by name,(something you will notice that the Coast Guard didn’t do in their report…guess why?).
Then that person lists job qualifications that exactly match those of the fellow that he claims to know and have sailed with in meatspace.
Riiiiight.
pardone senor el pequeno hermano
Chief engineer says ‘slime’ shut down tug’s engines before Kulluk grounding
Suzanna Caldwell May 23, 2013
An unknown fuel additive that created a “slime” on the Aiviq’s fuel filters likely caused the ship’s engine failures, according to the Aiviq’s chief engineer.
Carl Broekhuis spoke about the failures of the ship’s engines Thursday morning before Coast Guard marine casualty investigators gathered for a hearing in Alaska’s largest city. The engine failures were part of the series of events that led to the grounding of the Kulluk conical drilling rig just hours before the beginning of 2013.
Broekhuis described in detail the problems leading up to the failure of all four of the Aiviq’s engines before Coast Guard marine casualty investigators Thursday.
‘Complex’ vessel
Broekhuis called the Aiviq, specifically designed to tow the Kulluk, a “complex” and “sophisticated” vessel. The trip from Dutch Harbor to Seattle was part of the ship’s maiden season after construction was completed in early 2012.
The 365-foot-long Aiviq was complex because of the sheer amount of equipment aboard the “packed” vessel, Broekhuis testified. There were five thrusters, two drive shafts and a cutting-edge power management system.
But those sophisticated systems weren’t enough to prevent bad fuel from mucking the fuel injectors on the engines in the heavy, rolling seas the ship encountered in the Gulf of Alaska.
Broekhuis found that bad fuel – Broekhuis said samples later showed a “clear, yellowish gel” in the diesel – led to the failure of dozens of fuel injectors on the Shell-owned, Edison Chouest-operated ship.
“I’m not a scientist, but I’m telling you I believe it was something introduced to the fuel (that caused the engine failures,” he said. “I’ve eliminated everything else.”
The chief engineer noted that in normal situations he was informed of any fuel additives added before departure. That didn’t happen before the Aiviq’s left Dutch Harbor on Dec. 21. It’s something, he said, that will be corrected.
“It’s going to be monitored more closely,” Broekhuis said. “I’ll be more insistent on what the additive is because on this batch, I didn’t even know.”
How exactly that will change is still being determined, Broekhuis said. Even months after the incident, he had no indication of what the additive was.
Detailing engine failures
Each engine had 12 injectors – with all or most of them failing shortly after the towline between the Kulluk and Aiviq first broke on Dec. 27.
Engine 2, the first to fail, went down at almost 11 p.m. Dec. 27. Engines 3 and 4 stopped working at 1:45 a.m. the next morning. An hour later, the last engine, No. 1, also quit.
Broekhuis was able to get the No. 1 engine going by 6 a.m., and maintained some control over the Kulluk – via an emergency towline. The Aiviq crew waited for more fuel injectors to be flown to the ship.
By looking at the injectors, and a “slimy” fuel filter, he realized fuel was causing the engine problems and re-rigged the fuel tanks to provide clean fuel to engines.
It was common practice, Broekhuis said, to leave some fuel in a tank after burning. That was to assure that the fuel was good.
“It’s my ‘if I have to’ I know that fuel is good,” he said.
The injectors arrived during the early-morning hours of Dec. 29. By 7:30 a.m., engine No. 4 was up and running, with the other two joining it within hours. By 1:30 p.m. on Dec. 29, all four Aiviq engines were working again.
After the fuel switch and the change of injectors, no further issues with the main engines arose, Broekhuis said.
Broekhuis’ testimony was the first from an Edison Chouest employee on Thursday. The company built the Aiviq tug.
-snip-
All Shell drilling off Alaska in 2013 was suspended earlier this year.
Any recommendations will be passed on to Rear Adm. Thomas Ostebo, who will decide whether or not to make changes to regulations or pursue criminal charges.
how does it feel to be so very very small?
poke…
I won’t copy and paste the entire thing here but for those who hold fast with my position on this, please go to this page to read further truths on what happened om 12/27/2012
it is most illuminating…but you have to take off your rose colored glasses first!
Question… So if there was said bad fuel certainly there would have been a record of how much fuel they took in Dutch? I imagine the Aiviq holds somewhere around 350k+ gallons, so there should have been plenty of fuel to test? Also was all the fuel pumped off her before returning to Seattle? If not it’s likely she still has this “bad fuel” still sitting in her tanks?
In the section of the report I just read it said a sample of fuel loaded onboard the Aiviq tested as being free from water contamination, but “exhibit an unusual and unexplained characteristic wherein a stable emulsion formed when the fuel was mixed with fresh water or seawater”
It didn’t say whether this fuel sample was from the Aiviq itself after the incident or from a sample obtained during loading of the fuel. Could something in the tanks, or something added to the tanks have caused this fuel to react this way with water?
Could someone have added the wrong treatment to the fuel onboard the Aiviq?
anyone hear the rumour that the separators were not big enough to actually supply the engines at full load?
I’m from Alabama so I’m reading through this report very slowly. I will say the list of known and reported maintenance concerns on page 33 of the report gave me a panic attack. The only way I would have departed Alaska is on a plane to go home. I wouldn’t have taken that boat anywhere. You got this list of broken shit and on the other hand the most high profile, closely scrutinized tow op. We’ve all sailed with an assortment of maintenance issues but damn, for a high profile job this was a bit excessive.
Please please please try and refrain from responding to Bilgeman’s trolls. Let’s not let him trash this thread as he did the other one. There is too much good information and analysis going on here to have it silenced by a troll.
C.Captain, please try to hold back. We all know by now that the sycophant apologist has an agenda that does not include an analysis of the multitude of reasons why ECO, its GoM transplants, and its culture have no place in Alaska or the Arctic. Getting in a pissing match only plays into the troll’s agenda.
[QUOTE=c.captain;135387]I won’t copy and paste the entire thing here but for those who hold fast with my position on this, please go to this page to read further truths on what happened om 12/27/2012
it is most illuminating…but you have to take off your rose colored glasses first![/QUOTE]
Yes, I thanked you, and I mean it.
Here’s from the blahhhg post that you yourself cited:
…Todd Case, the Kulluk rig manager for Noble Drilling Corp., told him he had experienced a similar injector issue, and the additive was the culprit. Dutch Harbor fishermen told him of fuel problems, too.
Broekhuis and his attorney, Ken Schoolcraft, declined to say where the Aiviq got its fuel.
EITHER FROM A FUEL SERVICE STATION (I.E. CHEVRON, SHELL, DELTA WESTERN OR PETRO STAR) IN DUTCH HARBOR ELSE IT WAS TRANSFERRED FROM ANOTHER SHIP OR BARGE.
This supports what I had asserted earlier that the Kulluk had injector problems with that fuel also.
Now where does the lynch mob for the Kulluk’s engineers form?
It happens to one ship, I’d buy negligence or ignorance, but the same thing happened to the Kulluk, so this fuel affected at least TWO vessels’ injectors…
What say you to this, O Super-sized one?
[QUOTE=Steamer;135402]Please please please try and refrain from responding to Bilgeman’s trolls. Let’s not let him trash this thread as he did the other one. There is too much good information and analysis going on here to have it silenced by a troll.
C.Captain, please try to hold back. We all know by now that the sycophant apologist has an agenda that does not include an analysis of the multitude of reasons why ECO, its GoM transplants, and its culture have no place in Alaska or the Arctic. Getting in a pissing match only plays into the troll’s agenda.[/QUOTE]
SOB! Oh you’re so right…I fell off the wagon and need to start going back to those meetings.
I’ll try harder…I promise
[QUOTE=Kingrobby;135394]Could someone have added the wrong treatment to the fuel onboard the Aiviq?[/QUOTE]
The report clearly says that the fuel was taken at Delta Western in Dutch Harbor before the departure and that fuel originally came from the AFFINITY which was Shell’s fuel tanker for the season. Unless AFFINITY left some time during the season and took more fuel then I believe it is pretty safe to say that ALL the vessels working for Shell had been taking that same fuel all throughout the season which means the KULLUK, the NANUK, the TOR VIKING, the FENNICA, the Harvey OSVs, the NOBLE DISCOVERER and the tugs supporting the effort. Only the KULLUK has reported some injector problems but not one has reported suffering any massive and catastrophic injector failures. I might well imagine that the lawyers have demanded that everyone preserve their samples so there should be many dozen samples of fuel available to test from the entire fleet. You were there Kingrobby, did the DISCO suffer injector failures during the course of the season?
I will not answer a certain person directly but this mystery emulsion in the report states that it is found when the fuel is mixed with seawater so even to try to use that excuse admits to water in the AIVIQ’s fuel. This of course brings up the question of how and when did that water enter the system and why was that water not either removed with the purifiers or drained from the settling tanks? That is why you have settlers in the first place, to let water “settle out” to a tank bottom so the purifiers don’t have to remove it before sending it to the storage (day) tanks. The sample tested have .05% seawater in it so it did not come from the vendor/AFFINITY. This supposed “yellowish gel” has not been found by a single source throughout this investigation but what was found were injectors frozen by oxidation due to the presence of oxygen and sodium was well as other minerals commonly found in seawater. Even if there was this gel how did it grow in the fuel in the first place? black magic? bad juju? the Borg? No answers whatsoever from any party including ECO who you think would have done everything possible to prove same!
A certain person has made veiled allegations that the vendor added this mystery additive for nefarious reasons to which I can say goes beyond all credibility and is made without a shred of proof to postulate. It is utterly laughable on its face and only shows the level of desperation to attempt to support the failed testimony of the chief engineer before the USCG. ECO has more that enough resources to have their labs test the fuel samples to try to support any theory of bad additive but even they have not been able to in more than a year. There is massive overwhelming evidence to show that the fuel was fine but became horribly seawater contaminated sometime during the tow after the tow left DH on the 21st.
Three facts to not forget here. The stern of the AIVIQ suffered solid green water on its after deck while attempting to recover the emergency tow, the level alarm to the overflow tank was disabled and all the vents to the storage tanks vent to the common header which was shared with the overflow tank. I am not sorry to say but the combination of the three clearly shows how a massive slug of water would be able to enter the vent header that afternoon and how that water would be able to migrate into the storage tanks undetected. Ultimately, that seawater contaminated fuel began to be taken into the injector pumps and as fast as you can say “catastrophic sudden failure” the engines shut down in rapid uncontrolled succession. Contrary to the chief’s belief, seawater will pass through a RACOR if the water is adsorbed in the fuel which we know can happen with Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel.
Not screaming or throwing names out but knowing mariners both deck and engine can clearly make educated evaluation of the sequence of events that took place as well as who would have been responsible for those. It is only simple logic.
.
That would be a VERY GOOD idea…and then test and publish the results from ALL the samples, not just the first set taken, (which is what the USCG did). Thanks for the lead!
I will not answer a certain person directly but this mystery emulsion and slime in the report states that it is found when the fuel is mixed with seawater so even to try to use that excuse admits to water in the AIVIQs fuel. This of course brings up the question of how and when did that water enter the system and why was that water not either removed with the purifiers or drained from the settling tanks? That is why you have settlers in the first place, to let water “settle out” to a tank bottom so the purifiers don’t have to remove it before sending it to the storage (day) tanks. The sample tested have .05% seawater in it so it did not come from the vendor.
So did the Kulluk get a slug of seawater into its tanks too?
And just to clarify something for you “waterboys”, I have never anywhere claimed that there was no seawater in the fuel. It may have come from the overflow tank vents, it may have come from the storage tank vents, it may have come from the Affinity’s tanks, it may have come from Delta Western, but I HAVE shown, and the Coast Guard report supports this from their wording of “absorbed” and “dissolved” that the water contamination may not have been in a form that could be determined by Kolor Kutt or by tank draining…water contamination of hygroscopic refrigeration oils doesn’t work that way, and there’s no reason to think that hygroscopic diesel isn’t similarly affected.
I have also cited an aviation study that Stadic450, which WAS present in the fuel, is itself hygroscopic and exacerbates contamination if it isn’t mixed properly.
And seawater contamination wouldn’t have caused the generator injector o-rings to fail…which the USCG even admits that they did not fail in the same manner as the main engine injectors did.
I have cut and pasted maintenance records from Aiviq that were included in the report detailing a rather extensive set of reported problems with their KRAL flowmeters. I asked if water contamination in and of itself would cause these flowmeters to fail as regularly as these apparently did,( and by the way…those flowmeters and their failures might be a good “canary in a coal mine” thing to keep an eye on in the future).
A certain person has made veiled allegations that the vendor added this mystery additive for nefarious reasons to which I can say goes beyond all credibility and is made without a shred of proof to postulate. It is utterly laughable on its face and only shows to desperation to attempt to support the testimony of the chief engineer before the USCG. ECO has more that enough resources to have their labs test the fuel samples to try to support any theory of bad additive but even they have not been able to in more than a year. There is massive overwhelming evidence to show that the fuel was fine.
There is massive evidence that the fuel was fine is if you willfully ignore any and all evidence that is contrary to what you may WANT to believe…it’s called “Confirmation Bias”.
As to the environmental factors, the possibilities here should not be dismissed out of hand. It is a FACT that powerful eco-groups, both inside and outside of Alaska, do NOT want oil E&P in Arctic waters.
It is a FACT that certain eco-groups have in the past resorted to acts of sabotage and terrorism to further their cause,(go ask loggers about spiked tree-trunks).
It is a FACT that Delta Western has been the target of union organizing drives since 2006, and this campaign continues to the present day. It is also a FACT that the Oil Patch boat operators are virulently anti-union, and that this is known far and wide.
At the least this would suggest…at the least…an unhappy workplace at Delta Western, which usually results in employees not really caring that much about quality of their work product.(By no means is this feature limited to Alaska),
And it is a fact that there is more than a touch of resentment against Louisiana firms 'trespassing" in Alaskan waters by the natives, so someone taking the opportunity to perform a bit of “monkey-wrenching”, either through malice or inattention, isn’t out of the realm of possibility.
Three facts to recall here. The stern of the AIVIQ suffered solid green water on its after deck while attempting to recover the emergency tow, the level alarm to the overflow tank was disabled and all the vents to the storage tanks went to the common vent header which was shared with the overflow tank. I am not sorry to say but the combination of the three clearly shows how a massive slug of water was able to enter the vent header that afternoon and how that water would be able to migrate into the storage tanks undetected. Ultimately, that water began to be taken into the injector fuel pumps and as fast as you can say “catastrophic sudden failure” the engines shut down in rapid uncontrolled succession.
The overflow tank high level alarm, when activated, shuts down the purifiers, because since the usual method to filling the day-tanks is via those purifiers, the circuit was designed with the assumption that some dummy forgot to turn off the centrifuges and overflowed his day tanks to the point where they spilled into the overflow tank. I have already explained this because I talked to the Chief and asked him specifically about this. His reply was to ask if that if you were in that situation, would YOU want to lose your purifiers?
He testified that in rough seas there would be spillage into the overflow tank, and another ECO chief on this board related how HIS purifiers, during start-up and run-down, will piss their fuel load into HIS overflow tank…so if you KNOW that the O/F tank is high, and you are pumping it out, (using a Wilden pump and hosing so as not to possibly or further contaminate your piping), and you need your purifiers, you would open the O/F tank TLI high-level alarm breaker also.
Now, again…what would you say was the problem on the Kulluk?