dream on talk to someone that works in a simulator about flying in asia
Look at Lion Air’s record, Koreans record etc etc…
Both sets of crew flew into overspeed for no reason creating a very dangerous situation
exactly and try failing a pilot in a sim when he is related to the guy buying the planes…
The story of Asia
Another take.
https://www.askthepilot.com/plane-and-pilot/
There are also issues with the 737 MAX sims’ ability to replicate the plane’s MCAS behavior:
From here:
Lastly, some threats may not be directly obvious to, or observable by, flight crews immersed in the operational context, and may need to be uncovered by safety analysis. These are considered latent threats. Examples of latent threats include equipment design issues, optical illusions, or shortened turn-around schedules.
I thought Capt Sully was good on this. With regards to his incident he mentions that he was self-aware enough to recognize he was getting tunnel vision. This is why discussions that involve human factors shouldn’t be limited to pilots. On pilot forums about Air France flight 447 there were many that couldn’t understand w hy the audio stall alarm was disregarded but human factors experts say it’s normal in emergency situations for the brain to filter information.
Another related topic is the subject of “satisficing”.
Satisficing in split-second decision making is characterized by strategic cue discounting.
Much of our real-life decision making is bound ed by uncertain information, limitations in cognitive resources, and a lack of time to allocate to the decision process. It is thought that humans overcome these limitations through satisficing, fast but “good-enough” heuristic decision making that prioritizes some sources of information (cues) while ignoring others. However, the decision-making s trategies we adopt under uncertainty and time pressure, for example during emergencies that demand split-second choices, are presently unknown…
We found that under low time pressure, participants correctly weighted and integrated all available cues to arrive at near-optimal decisions. With increasingly demanding, subsecond time pressures, however, participants systematically discounted a subset of the cue information by dropping the least informative cue(s) from their decision making process. Thus, the human cognitive apparatus copes with uncertainty and severe time pressure by adopting a “drop-the-worst” cue decision making strategy that minimizes cognitive time and effort investment while preserving the consideration of the most diagnostic cue information, thus maintaining “good-enough” accuracy. This advance in our understanding of satisficing strategies could form the basis of predicting human choices in high time pressure scenarios.
This is part of the reason hindsight is so powerful. Sitting at a computer sorting through only the salient facts is not the same as being in the wheelhouse in real time.
and there is very few MCAS sims around the world, none in Asia
that was all part of boeings faa con job that the airlines requested, no sim upgrade and no extra training would be required.
Hence there will be guys flyiing them without knowing its fitted for sure when you look at who the operators are…
List of Boeing 737 Max 8 operators from around the world FYI:
https://www.planespotters.net/operators/Boeing/737/737-MAX-8
Boeing and its investors appear confident the problem will work itself out despite the fact that the cost of their misadventure is climbing toward $10 billion. The production line is still cranking the planes out, albeit at a reduced rate.
add 2 more sensors and its DP2 redundant, too easy
Oh and the companies buying them need to tell the pilots what it is and happens to be onboard…
With regards to the alarm cascade it seems similar to what happens on the ship when for example the gyro fails. All the equipment that requires a heading input starts alarming at the same time which makes it difficult to quickly sort out that there really only a single failure.
CFM engines are flattened at the bottom to cope…
The problem is the landing gear. The 737s were deliberately designed low to the ground (when on the ground) so they could be used at airports without jetways or mobile stairs. Some 737s have a pullout stair built into the aircraft.
Right. To get the ground clearance they needed, they had to move the engines forward, and it all went to Hell from there.
Cheers,
Earl
The lower engines heights also made it easier for mechanics to access and the lower cargo doors made it possible to offload baggage directly onto a conveyor belt at small airports. Southwest had a deal with Boeing to buy only 737s and it turned out to be a huge factor in the airline’s success.
The attractive stewardesses (don’t shoot me, that’s what they were called back then) doubling as stand up comics didn’t hurt.
MCAS issues on the MAX had already been solved a decade ago on the 767 derived tanker sold to the Air Force. It consisted of multiple AOA sensors with a temporary single nose down response easily overridden by the pilot pulling back on the yoke.
It’s hard to find words in response to this.
Loss of institutional memory is a symptom of total organizational breakdown.
Earl
