[QUOTE=john;193342]I fully agree with you Chief… but I’m not a Chief… so can you explain to us your professional reasoning?[/QUOTE]
I imagine he would say it’s because ‘lube oil’ related failures are not indicative of any common (or uncommon) boiler failures that could lead to main prop failure, much less two independent boilers at the same time. Single HP Turbine failure? Absolutely.
[QUOTE=ombugge;193334] There appeared be have been ample time from the general alarm was sounded, (which should mean; “go to your muster stations and done your immersion suits/life jackets”), until the actual capsize for all/most to have done so. … One more question; is it common practice on US merchant ships to keep immersion suits and life jacket in individual cabins, or in boxes at the muster stations, or both? (I know that on US rigs it is common to have them in the cabins) From the transcript it appeared that getting life jackets for the bridge team was not a clear cut thing. If the first, there may not have been time to return to the cabins to retrieve the immersion suits/life jacket and to done them.[/QUOTE]
The general alarm (ringing continuously), on just about every ship I’ve been on, has meant muster at your muster station for an emergency, ie, usually the DC locker for those assigned to the damage control/firefighting teams, engine room for the senior engine room personnel, bridge for the master and 3rd mate. What you bring with you to general alarm varies from ship to ship, but I’ve yet to sail on a ship where the general alarm meant bringing your survival suit and lifejacket. At the most it has required a hard hat. Abandon ship is a separate signal, usually six or more short followed by one prolonged ring on the general alarm. FWIW, Man Overboard is usually Oscar over the general alarm and security is usually Sierra.
The stowage of life jackets and survival suits has always been in my stateroom in a labeled cabinet or drawer. It’s been an item of contention that I’ve brought up with higher ups that usually ends in a shoulder shrug and the statement that “We meet the minimum requirements for safety equipment”. Conditions in an emergency can deteriorate quickly enough that you can’t plan on being able to go back to your stateroom. I’d personally feel a lot better with a locker near each life raft and boat station with enough survival suits and lifejackets for the capacity of whichever survival craft(s) that it’s next to, plus some extras.
I couldn’t tell from the transcript whether the bridge crew was having trouble finding the life jackets because they didn’t know where they were stowed or if the life jackets weren’t where they were supposed to be, but there should be lifejackets and survival suits for the bridge team, just as there is supposed to be enough in the engine room for the watchstanders.
From the transcript
The capt to the DPA
yea. I’m real good. we have uhh– secured the source of the water coming in to the vessel. uh a scuttle– was blown open uh– by the force of the water perhaps– no one knows. can’t tell. uh it’s since been closed. however– uh– three hold’s got considerable amount of water in it. uh we have a very– very– healthy port list. the engineers cannot get lube oil pressure on the plant therefore we’ve got no main engine . and let me give you um a latitude and longitude. I just wanted to give you a heads up before I push that– push that button.
[QUOTE=john;193342]I fully agree with you Chief… but I’m not a Chief… so can you explain to us your professional reasoning?[/QUOTE]
Jamesbrown answered it well in his post [QUOTE=Jamesbrown;193343]I imagine he would say it’s because ‘lube oil’ related failures are not indicative of any common (or uncommon) boiler failures that could lead to main prop failure, much less two independent boilers at the same time. Single HP Turbine failure? Absolutely.[/QUOTE]
I will add that I spent the majority of my sailing career aboard steam ships.
Just to defend what James brown said: Bravery and Bravado have the same root. You could say he showed courage, but I don’t think anyone is disputing whether or not the choices showed wisdom. If you’re also suggesting he should’ve stayed in JAX I disagree too. He had no reason to not get underway. He should’ve made a larger diversion then what the CM suggested and he had ample opportunity to decide to make an even larger diversion. The way I see it, if he hadn’t started loosing the plant and taking on water from the busted fire main he would’ve made it through.
[QUOTE=Louisd75;193344]
The stowage of life jackets and survival suits has always been in my stateroom in a labeled cabinet or drawer. It’s been an item of contention that I’ve brought up with higher ups that usually ends in a shoulder shrug and the statement that “We meet the minimum requirements for safety equipment”. Conditions in an emergency can deteriorate quickly enough that you can’t plan on being able to go back to your stateroom. I’d personally feel a lot better with a locker near each life raft and boat station with enough survival suits and lifejackets for the capacity of whichever survival craft(s) that it’s next to, plus some extras. [/QUOTE]
Excellent point. In the Alaskan fishing fleet (which remember has vessels up to 600’ long, and quite a few in the 200’ to 300’ LOA range) the norm is keep the survival suits either on deck in totes, or near the WTDs on the way out of the vessel interior, so they can be grabbed as the crew steps on deck on the way to the rafts. NO CFR directs this, but it is common knowledge in the trade. As the OP states, being cut off from your cabin by smoke from a fire, or rapid flooding, is commonplace in the history or marine disasters. Though in Alaska there is always the danger of PFD totes on deck getting covered with ice in a hurry. Sometimes there is no elegant way.
If there is a sudden loss of oil pressure you have until the gravity tank goes empty to bring the shaft to a stop or else there is a grave risk of damage due to the lack of lubrication to the turbines and reduction gear bearings. If this was done you can start back up once oil pressure was reestablished. If not, they may have faced collateral damage. Again from reading the transcript I am guessing they were periodically losing lube oil suction (from the list/rolling) until they couldn’t maintain pressure, so they may have been prepared to bring the shaft to a stop. This reasoning is based on the priorities of dealing with the flooding and reestablishing oil pressure. If they had bearing damage and couldn’t turn the shaft there would have been a call ashore concerning the immediate need for tugs.
This, by the way, is all conjecture based on limited information.
[QUOTE=Jamesbrown;193338]Because it sure ain’t the act of a timid man. Possibly a stupid man, but he was not stupid either.[/QUOTE]
Somewhere along the way the Master lost his Situational Awareness.
Your point being? There is no argument the boilers needed maintenance. The C/E was noting what he saw and was requesting boiler surveys to be done to fully gauge the scope of work required. This is done all the time. That does not mean they can not be operated until the shipyard repair period.
According to the 1 A/E we know the economizer ([B]not boiler[/B]) was tested to at least 1000 psi. Again there has yet to be any evidence any sort of boiler casualty occurred in the loss of the El Faro. BTW, if the economizer developed another leak it (the economizer) would be bypassed and the boiler kept on the line until such a time another repair could be made.
You fucking dimwit go away! You're posting info about boilers the discussion is about the oil pressure in the turbines and gears. I do not recall reading anything in the transcript about losing fires in the boilers or losing an entire boiler due to tube ruptures.
Were the boilers in a state of disrepair? Yes. Was it a factor in loss of propulsion? Not from what I’ve read so far.
Stay out of this discussion you’re in over your head.
[QUOTE=Fraqrat;193359]You fucking dimwit go away! You’re posting info about boilers the discussion is about the oil pressure in the turbines and gears. I do not recall reading anything in the transcript about losing fires in the boilers or losing an entire boiler due to tube ruptures.
Were the boilers in a state of disrepair? Yes. Was it a factor in loss of propulsion? Not from what I’ve read so far.
Stay out of this discussion you’re in over your head.[/QUOTE]
Hey, Fraqrat please calm down and notice I do not have to call you names as I am above that, the boilers are being spoken about above on this thread. You are correct, these are the emails about the boiler subject and it was not in the VDR voice transcript. and by the way, there are parts of the voice transcript that are reported to be not pertinent. I wonder what that, not pertinent stuff really was? I guess we will never know. These are in the engineering report/data. [B][U]Although it does give an overview of the condition of the machinery.[/U][/B] As you agree they were in a state of disrepair.
By the way, the ship never made it to dry dock. In August 2016 I believe they had to get approval to operate from San Juan to Jacksonville on limited power.
Does anybody know whey the polish nationals were aboard and what exactly they were doing? Some type of repair? I am asking?
People can try to figure out exactly what happened which is good, although this casualty is a result of [U]many factors[/U] that lead up to the end. Hurricane, bad decision’s, cargo shift, automobiles bobbing around, and damage to the fire equipment as Kennebec Captain points out, water ingress, and machinery problems, and possible hull breach? I was wondering why was it reported that the water ingress had a black color if I read that correctly in the transcript?
Prayers to all the involved, may you all rest in peace and my thoughts are with you.
[QUOTE=DeepSeaDiver;193365] I wonder what that, not pertinent stuff really was? [/QUOTE]
Then read, study, stop posting.
Do you have another online persona? Is this “Captain J” your other identity?
http://www.yachtforums.com/threads/ntsb-has-found-voyage-data-recorder-of-el-faro.26379/
I don’t know whether to laugh or cry after reading that stuff, it’s sort of like reading your posts. Maybe you should contact Capt J and he can be your new internet friend.
[QUOTE=Steamer;193368]Then read, study, stop posting.
Do you have another online persona? Is this “Captain J” your other identity?
http://www.yachtforums.com/threads/ntsb-has-found-voyage-data-recorder-of-el-faro.26379/
I don’t know whether to laugh or cry after reading that stuff, it’s sort of like reading your posts. Maybe you should contact Capt J and he can be your new internet friend.[/QUOTE]
Thats interesting. I dont know who Capt J is? He and the Older Boater seem to be pretty sharp on that site. Thanks for the lead Steamer.
Let’s get back on topic guys…
Chief(s): From the information so far released… Do we know how much reserve turbine oil was on board? And if any was on order and/or possibly delayed?
[QUOTE=john;193385]Let’s get back on topic guys…
Chief(s): From the information so far released… Do we know how much reserve turbine oil was on board? And if any was on order and/or possibly delayed?[/QUOTE]
John, I believe the reserve talked about is the head tank above the turbine that feeds the turbine’s bearings by a gravity flow and in previous discussions was mentioned as holding something like three minutes of supply. Now I cannot understand why any pump that feeds such tank would not be able to maintain suction at a 15degree list? I would imagine the sump to be a deep one and any suction being from low or right from the bottom of it? This needs to be answered by those here who are experienced steam engineers. In the ABS Rules or CFRs there has got to be design criteria for this situation?
also, in an emergency, there must be a way to open the throttle to the turbine bypassing any shutdown a lack of lube oil would cause? previously was mentioned chainfalls on a lifting beam?
http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=447390&docketID=58116&mkey=92109
This is to the most current set of logs. In the L.O. Section it states 8599 tons. They don’t break it down as to how much and which tank. It appears they are just tracking the total onboard.
Looking at the logs it appears they ran with the sump around 25"-26".
http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=447413&docketID=58116&mkey=92109
http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=447397&docketID=58116&mkey=92109
Down in the bow and listing bad to one side, while running full speed. Between the agitation as it’s pumped through the cycle, the wave action, the heat I would think the oil was foamy as hell. That along with the piping layout at extreme angles can make it hard to keep primed.
Bypassing the shutdown with no LO pressure will wreck the entire turbine and gear set. Within minutes you’d be DIW again. Im guessing the chief was hoping to get control of the flooding correct trim and reprime everything. I’m sure he knew the situation was bad but as things deteriorated quickly he may not have know how bad.
One of the phone conversations was the captain telling the 1st he was gonna ring the general alarm to get everybody up but not abandoning ship just yet. It would seem Most or all of the engineering dept was in the hole trying like hell to dewater and get the engine back online. I can’t imagine any of them knew they were in deaths grip. I hope it was quick as the ship rolled over and their watch ended.
[QUOTE=Fraqrat;193392]http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=447390&docketID=58116&mkey=92109
This is to the most current set of logs. In the L.O. Section it states 8599 tons. They don’t break it down as to how much and which tank. It appears they are just tracking the total onboard.
Looking at the logs it appears they ran with the sump around 25"-26".
http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=447413&docketID=58116&mkey=92109
http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=447397&docketID=58116&mkey=92109[/QUOTE]
The amount aboard was most likely 8599 gallons, not tons. The ship’s lube oil capacity is 51 L/Ts. It would not be difficult to determine how much of that was in the sump given the soundings of 25"-26". Should note that if the lube oil pumps are secured the gravity tank would drain into the sump raising the sump level accordingly.
From the L.O. System Drawing found on the NTSB website: Normal Sump Operating Level: 1426 gal (Low Level is 724 gal and High Level is 2020 gal), Gravity Tank: 3300 gal. If 8599 gallons were onboard the reserve amount in the storage/settling tanks would be in the neighborhood of 3773 gal. These numbers do not take into account the amount in the piping, coolers, or T/G so the reserve maybe less.
In answer to John’s query, In the C/E turnover notes found on the NTSB website there is mention of receiving 1000 gals of (main engine) lube oil.
Agree with Fraqrat in his reply to c.captain’s post.
[QUOTE=Chief Seadog;193394]Agree with Fraqrat in his reply to c.captain’s post.[/QUOTE]
Also in agreement.
It is no surprise that lube oil pump suction was lost with a head down trim and list beyond the 15 degrees defined by the design.
Even in “normal” Alaska style storm conditions the length of time with no overflow showing in the bulls eye is a real attention grabber.
Once the gravity tank is effectively empty the game is over. There is no way to work around a loss of lubrication to the turbine and red gear bearings other than some MacGyver style setup which is not really in the cards given the conditions and time available.