According to the NTSB the ship may have gone DIW at around 0600 hrs. This was the forecast at the time:
HURRICANE CENTER LOCATED NEAR 23.4N 73.7W AT 01/0900Z
POSITION ACCURATE WITHIN 25 NMPRESENT MOVEMENT TOWARD THE WEST-SOUTHWEST OR 240 DEGREES AT 4 KT
ESTIMATED MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE 948 MB
MAX SUSTAINED WINDS 105 KT WITH GUSTS TO 130 KT.
64 KT… 25NE 30SE 20SW 20NW.
50 KT… 40NE 60SE 30SW 40NW.
34 KT…100NE 120SE 100SW 80NW.
12 FT SEAS…220NE 180SE 100SW 180NW.
WINDS AND SEAS VARY GREATLY IN EACH QUADRANT. RADII IN NAUTICAL
MILES ARE THE LARGEST RADII EXPECTED ANYWHERE IN THAT QUADRANT.FORECAST VALID 01/1800Z 23.1N 74.2W
MAX WIND 115 KT…GUSTS 140 KT.
64 KT… 35NE 40SE 20SW 20NW.
50 KT… 60NE 70SE 40SW 60NW.
34 KT…120NE 130SE 100SW 90NW.
The postion of the system center is given with a 25 mile error. The postion of the ship as given by the NTSB is 39 miles NE of Crooked Island. They may have been in the SW quadrant. That might put them just close to the edge of the 64 kt wind field which was also reported elsewhere.
The 64 kt wind field extends only 20 miles from the center, at the center the winds were 105 kts with gusts to 130 kts.
The ship may have been on track to cross south of Joaquin as planned, just not the 65 miles they planned. Considerably less.
Depending upon which forecast the were looking at they may have believed that they had already cleared Joaquin or that it was pulling away.
Possibly the ship went DIW at around 0600 and then sometime between then and 0700 when the first call was made and as Joaquin approached the incident(s) which caused the flooding and the list occurred?
With a 15 degree list and other problems (possibly flooding and/or shifted cargo) and with serious problems in the E/R the El Faro would have been in bad shape to face reported 30 foot seas and 105 kts winds with 130 kt gusts.
Here is the first phone call again
Audio 1: Voicemail left by Capt. Davidson to John Lawrence, designated person a shore
Captain Lawrence, Captain Davidson, Thursday morning 0700. We have a navigational incident. Umm,
I’ll keep it short. A, uh, scuttle popped open on 2 deck and we were having/had some free
communication of water go down the 3… 3-hold. Have/getting a pretty good list. I want to, uh, just
touch – contact you verbally here. Everybody’s safe, uh, yeah but I want to talk to you.
Here is the second call:
Capt. Davidson: I have a marine emergency and I would like to speak to a QI. We had a – a - a hull breach. A scuttle blew open during a storm. We have water down in 3-hold with a heavy list. We’ve lost the main propulsion unit. The engineers cannot get it going. Can I speak with a QI please?
Here is the summary of the the call between the captain and the DPA. Evidently on the second call Davidson was put through to DPA Lawrence.
The operator then transferred the call to Lawrence, who had been trying to dial back to the captain. That part of the call on Lawrence’s cell was not recorded, but he recounted it to the Coast Guard board from his notes.
“Once I was connected to Captain Davidson he said, ‘We’ve secured the source of water,’” Lawrence said. “He told me the crew was safe.”
Lawrence asked for the ship’s position, and heard Davidson speaking with a female crew member, probably second mate Danielle Randolph.
“She also spoke in a very calm voice, and said there were 48 miles east of San Salvador” in the Bahamas, Lawrence said.
Davidson said he thought the crew would be able to pump out the No. 3 hold, Lawrence said.
“He told me, ‘No one’s panicking,’” Lawrence said. Davidson described conditions with wind from the northeast and 10’ to 12’ swells.
“What kind of list are you talking about, Cap?’ Lawrence asked. Davidson replied it was about 15 degrees.
Davidson told Lawrence “he would push all his buttons” to initiate distress signals, Lawrence said he would notify the Coast Guard, and the men ended the call.
The first call was at 0700 and and the CG received the electronic distress signals at about 0715.
According to electronic alert system data sent by the vessel at 7:17 am EDT on Oct. 1, its last reported position was about 20 miles from the edge of the eye of the hurricane.
The master ordered abandon ship and sounded the alarm about 7:30 a.m., Oct. 1, 2015. The recording ended about 10 minutes later