Thanks Jetryder,
I am willing to share the first two rows of the VDR transcripts submitted to IMO by the Italian Authorities.
"Have a look to see what speed we need to get out of here and approach Giglio… we’ve got to sail past this f***ing Giglio…
Right, let’s chart the route then…”
“Is half a mile OK Captain? There’s [enough] depth of water [there].”
It is 18:27 on 13th January 2012. The Captain of the Costa Concordia is talking with his Second Officer. They are planning to sail past the Island of Giglio by deviating from the planned route to Savona.
The week before, the maître d’hôtel on board had made a special request to the Captain. “Given that I’m due to sign off, I would be grateful if you could pass by Giglio for a sail past”2, he said. The Captain had refused due to adverse weather conditions and postponed it until the next cruise. For this reason when the maître reminds him of his promise on the afternoon of 13th January, the Captain keeps his word. He agrees to meet on the bridge after dinner and gives instructions to plan the deviation.
Change is one of the most powerful error inducing conditions and it should be managed with extreme care. However, a former
Captain of Costa Crociere describes the concept of “touristic navigation” as common practice within the company, so much so that this practice has been included in the passenger programme on many occasions. The former Captain also explains that sail pasts are usually conducted at very low speeds (five knots) and arranged beforehand with local authorities.
Therefore if it is true that sail pasts are part of cruise business, why should the decision made by the Captain be considered an error?
The aim of a sail past is to entertain passengers on board and to promote the Comapany brand for those that watch the event from ashore. On that particular evening however, conditions were not in place: it was late (10pm), it was winter, there was no agreement with local authorities and the passengers had not been informed. Therefore the decision can be classified as a violation that is non-functional to company interests. The description of previous sail pasts seems to imply that the non-functional character on 13th January is also extraordinary. The violation can also be considered incorrect due to the increase in the level of risk associated with the close approach to the island (half a nautical mile) when compared to the one related to a coastal navigation at several nautical miles from the coastline.
Why did the Captain decide to opt for a sail past? What was his interest in modifying the original route only half an hour before departure, interrupting his dinner, going up onto the bridge and carrying out a close approach to a semi-deserted island?
In order to give answers we need to get inside the situation and distance ourselves from the tragic consequences of that decision. Conversations captured by the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) can help us to understand this. When the Captain talks to the Second Officer and says “right, let’s chart this route then”, his tone of voice suggests that he was not at all happy about having to perform “this f***ing sail past.”
Reading between the lines of the Captain’s statement, the possibility emerges that a certain pressure could have been applied by the on-board hotel department, often known for being very influential on a cruise ship. After having already refused an evening sail past, it seems that the Captain felt obliged to go along with the request made that evening. Management of a ship with more than 1000 crew members is based on very delicate social dynamics. Just as is the case for the mayor of a small town, the captain of a large ship cannot ignore this. If present, the excessive influence of the hotel department on the ship’s command can be considered a latent condition and it is linked to cultural aspects rather than specific
organisational processes.
Bearing all this in mind, imagine that we are on the bridge of the Costa Concordia at around 6:30pm. The Captain and Second Officer are working on the plan to deviate from the original route. Does the situation that we are witnessing seem strange? This is something that has been done in the past and has not presented any problems. So what harm can come from making a small concession for the sake of social equilibrium on board, given that there are no company policies that say otherwise? If we take a moment to forget what actually happened afterwards, the Captain’s decision does not seem so absurd. We need rather to analyse a selection of “technical” errors that were committed during the planning itself as well as the control of navigation later on.
Happy to discuss it further.
Antonio
[QUOTE=Jetryder223;155376]Thank you Antonio.
Now that the intent of your book is better understood, you may find this group of mariners a bit more approachable.[/QUOTE]