So I take it that ECDIS chart display and chart resolutions on some or all systems is not automatically coupled. In other words, as you zoom in the display does not automatically add detail from the larger scale chart covering the area zoned in on, this is very similar to aeronautical charts and navigational materials as well. That said, in aviation, when one is planning a similar maneuver as the CC planned, you would be very careful to make sure that you had used the chart(s) that contained every detail to insure a “safe” maneuver. It seems to me the fact that the system may not automatically switch isn’t a big issue, and likely not an issue at all, what is in question, is whether or not the “trained” operators understood how to use the system, and did they understand the limitations of the system. Finally, it seems to me that if all the navigational officer on the bridge at the time of the incident, simultaneously or nearly simultaneously failed in this area of technical expertise, there may be a significant problem with training at Costa relating to this system and its operation and limitation. If on the other hand there was a clear understanding of the technical limitations and proper operation of the ECDIS, again the question arises regarding training at Costa, but this time in the arena of bridge resource management. Did someone on the bridge have the information that would have prevented the problem, but didn’t feel sufficiently empowered to speak up? Had Schettino created such a charismatic aura of invincibility that the crew members didn’t engage because of who was at the helm or was he such tyrant that no one wanted to speak up and “pay the price”? Going further was and is the corporate culture at Costa/Carnival one that encourages undue showmanship or creates “caption gods” that no one is willing to cross? Maybe even further, is this endemic within the cruise ship navigational officer culture? The answer to these questions and other in this vein are needed to help in assessing the proper fix(es) to help prevent another such accident. This accident was clearly not a failure of the vessels mechanical system(s), it was clearly and completely a failure of the human operators of the system and/or the human leadership/management system in place. Enjoying the conversation here!