[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;195166]…The further along the ship continued the higher the cost of turning around, a cost that could be easily measured in miles, hours or tons of fuel. The uptick in risk on the other hand could be rationalized away, “we’ve seen worse” or “it’s no worse then Alaska”.[/QUOTE]
Here are some numbers to help imagine the rising costs at stake >>>
JAX >> SJU direct = 1100 NM
JAX >> SJU via Old Bahama Channel (OBC) = 1260 NM = 160 NM more
1510Z El Faro leaves JAX, direct course to SJU (on September 29)
0110Z change of course, more southerly, nearer to the Bahamas islands
At this time, a radical change to an OBC track would have added 40 NM on top of the initial OBC track or 200 NM to the direct track.
1540Z at latitude 27.5°, the northern limit of the Little Bahama Bank
A radical change westwards to the OBC track would have added 150 NM on top of the initial OBC track or 310 NM to the direct track.
2200Z at 26°N / 76°W, at the latitude of the Hole in the Wall
A radical change westwards through the Providence Channels and to the OBC would have added 300 NM on top of the initial OBC track or 460 NM to the direct track.
At least, the 180 NM through the Providence Channels would have given time to see the further developments and to decide whether to go on for the OBC or to return to the open Atlantic. However, the possibility that the poorly predicted Joaquin could even have crossed to the Florida Straits, seems not to have been on the map on board.
After the Hole in the Wall, short of a very soon return to Northeast Providence, there was no secure place, only hell.