Problems with TOTE emergency call center were reported well before El Faro’s sinking
by: Lorena Inclan, Action News Jax Updated: Feb 13, 2017 - 10:43 PM
JACKSONVILLE, Fla. - Problems with TOTE’s emergency call center were brought to light at least a month prior to the sinking of El Faro.
That’s just one of the new details to come out of the Marine Board of Investigation hearing into the casualty.
The board has brought back executives who have previously testified for follow-up questions now that they have the benefit of the voyage data recorder transcripts.
The former director of marine services and safety for TOTE Services, Lee Peterson, was the first to testify Monday. He is now the director of operations for TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico.
On the morning of the sinking, Capt. Michael Davidson called the company’s emergency call center asking to be transferred to a “QI,” or qualified individual. Action News Jax reported in February 2016 how Davidson sounded frustrated on that call as he was asked to repeat things and was placed on brief holds.
In early September 2015, El Faro reported what the board called a “minor oil spill,” which also resulted in a phone call to the emergency call center. According to the board, Davidson met with the same problems on that call.
“Capt. Lawrence reached out to the call center to try to rectify the problem. It was never rectified. Can you explain why that might not have happened?” asked board member Keith Fawcett.
“He realized that they weren’t reacting as quickly as we would’ve liked and we were being proactive trying to rectify that. I don’t have an answer as far as your particular question,” said Peterson.
Questions concerning a potentially fatigued crew were some of the first to be asked in Monday’s hearing.
When it comes to oversight on rest hours for the crew, Peterson said auditors would go aboard vessels to check logs, and those reports would go to his office.
“Would you see the audit reports so that as director of safety that you would ensure that the mariners are in compliance?” asked Fawcett.
“The reports would come to the office. I don’t know that we looked at that particular one,” said Peterson.
Peterson said that the captain also looks at the reports and makes sure his crew is in compliance. Capt. John Lawrence, the director of fleet safety for TOTE Services, who also testified Monday, said the captain is responsible for controlling rest hours but crew members can report issues with the company.
In previous testimony, we heard from former El Faro crew members who said that Davidson was strict about rest hours and often took on watches so that his crew could get proper rest.
The board also questioned why a safety coordinator position was never filled despite someone being interviewed for that position.
Peterson said ultimately the president of the company decided not to fill that position. Lawrence later added that at the time they were looking to hire a safety coordinator the company was undergoing some layoffs.
Peterson spoke highly about El Faro’s engineering crew, referring to them as “competent” and “enjoyable to be around.”
He said El Faro’s chief engineer, Richard Pusatere, was very competent and “holds a special place” with him.
Pusatere’s father, Frank Pusatere, has been a steady presence at the Marine Board of Investigation hearings. He said he appreciates the transparency on the part of the Coast Guard in the process so far.
“It’s the truth and anytime you’re informed of the truth, it just helps you put things in better perspective,” said Frank Pusatere.
The hearing will reconvene on Tuesday at 9 a.m. at the Prime Osborn Convention Center.
© 2017 Cox Media Group.
Loss of lube oil pressure probed in El Faro sinking investigation
By Stephanie Brown
Jacksonville, FL —
During the same portion of the investigation where the likely sequence of how El Faro sank was detailed, we’re now also getting a clearer idea of the events that may have led to the ship’s mechanical problems.
Multiple witnesses spoke Monday about the impact of lube oil on the ship’s engine operations, and the fallout on that as the result of a sustained list. El Faro is believed to have been listing some 15 degrees before sinking, killing all 33 people on board.
TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico Director of Operations Lee Peterson says intermittent sounding of the lube oil pressure alarm is not in itself concerning. If it stays intermittent, the ship could still have enough pressure to operate.
“The worry for the engineering staff is, this is not something that normally happens, so it’s going to get their attention as to why it’s happening,” says Peterson, who was TOTE Services Director of Safety and Marine Operations at the time of the sinking.
The impact of the sustained list depends largely on the level in the lube oil sump. Testimony presented to the Board says El Faro was able to operated anywhere between 18 and 33 inches. An analysis conducted by the Marine Safety Center at the request of the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation shows that, at 18 inches, a 15 degree list could mean a complete loss of suction. It’s not believed El Faro was that low on what would become her final departure, although the engineering logs are lost with the ship. Readings from earlier in the month show the level between 25 and 26 inches. Following a question from an MBI member, Peterson says putting more oil in the system before heading out in heavy weather could have helped.
If, in fact, there was a total loss of pressure, Peterson says there wouldn’t have been much time.
“Eventually, you’re going to start destroying your pump, not having any lubrication in there,” he says.
While it’s unclear what lube oil sump level El Faro was at on her final voyage, further testimony showed a “non-standard drop” in the level in July, about three inches during one watch shift. TOTE Services Port Engineer Tim Neeson says it’s “probable” that was the result of a loss in the seal of the lube oil purifier- a mechanical issue that wasn’t caught. No record confirming that has been presented, but Neeson says he wouldn’t expect to have been told about it.
Neeson has never heard of a problem with lube oil on a vessel like El Faro while the ship was underway. Upon questioning from a TOTE Incorporated attorney, Neeson said he believed handling that type of issue would be “second nature” for engineers.
Despite some comments from the Captain that were captured by the ship’s Voyage Data Recorder, Peterson doesn’t think El Faro lost one or both or her boilers, believing that would have impacted power as well.
Another portion of the VDR transcript shows that, not long before the sinking, engineers were “blowing tubes”- basically clearing soot from an engine room component, which requires the ship to slow down. It’s a routine and scheduled procedure, but Peterson questions whether it should have been postponed.
“Given the circumstances, I don’t know that it would have been a priority. I’m not sure there was anything wrong with doing it at the time. I found it surprising too, it wasn’t something I would have expected,” he says.
Neeson confirmed that the procedure doesn’t risk ship operations, and that it’s the Chief Engineer’s discretion on whether to perform the procedure.
He also told investigators it’s a “valid possibility” the fire main ruptured, based on information from the VDR transcript. He also said, while cargo wouldn’t generally pose a risk to the emergency fire pump sea chest suction piping, it’s possible the bobbing cars indicated in the VDR could have worked their way over to the area and caused damage. Loose cargo or rigging could also have impacted the ability of the bilge alarm to sound.
WOKV continues to follow the latest from the MBI.
By Sebastian Kitchen
Company official on last call with El Faro: ‘I didn’t take it that their lives were in danger’
U.S. Coast Guard Capt. Jason Neubauer (left), and Mike Kucharski, of the National Transportation Safety Board listen as Raymond Thompson, who once served as chief mate on the El Faro, answers questions about procedures on the cargo ship. The third hearing into the sinking of the El Faro began at the Prime Osborn Convention Center on Feb. 6. The El Faro sank during Hurricane Joaquin, on Oct. 1, 2015, killing all 33 members of the crew.
With the calm demeanor of the captain and second mate, a key official with the company operating the El Faro cargo ship did not realize the dire circumstances for the ship and its 33 crew members.
“It was far more serious than it first came across to me,” John Lawrence, then-manager of safety and operations with Tote Services Inc. said of his final conversation with El Faro captain Michael Davidson. “He was extremely calm and professional, along with the second mate when she gave the position” of the ship.
Lawrence did not realize the seriousness even with Davidson telling him they were in survival mode and would sound an alarm to alert the crew. Davidson told him they planned to stay with the ship, although they attempted to abandon the ship within 30 minutes because of the deteriorating situation.
“I didn’t take it that their lives were in danger at the time,” said Lawrence, who is now director of fleet safety with Tote.
Lawrence was one of the last, if not the last person, to talk to those on board the El Faro. Davidson and his 32 crew members died when the ship sank about 7:40 a.m. on Oct. 1, 2015, during Hurricane Joaquin.
Lawrence expected to talk to Davidson again. He was wrong.
Lawrence testified Monday before the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation holding a third two-week hearing into the tragic incident. The board is in its last week of hearings, which are in Jacksonville.
Lawrence testified a year ago and depicted his side of the conversation with Davidson based on his notes and recollections, but investigators have since recovered the ship’s voyage data recorder which has Davidson’s side of the conversation and hours of other conversations from the ship’s navigation bridge.
After hanging up with Davidson, Lawrence called the U.S. Coast Guard.
PREVIOUS FRUSTRATION
On the morning of the El Faro sinking, Davidson called and could not immediately reach Lawrence as the ship was in distress. He left a voicemail for Lawrence, the designated person on land for the ship to contact.
He then called an emergency call center. Davidson grew increasingly frustrated during the conversation, which was played during a previous Coast Guard hearing, as the operator asked repeated questions. Davidson told her he had a marine emergency and “the clocking is ticking.”
When Davidson called the emergency call center, he was placed on hold four times for 20 to 30 seconds each.
“The system was working exactly like it was designed at the time,” Lawrence said. He said the operator keeps the captain on the phone while sending an email and text to Tote’s emergency response team. The operator is also supposed to collect basic information from the caller and then connect the caller to a member of the company’s emergency response list, which had Lawrence at the top.
This was not the first time Davidson was frustrated with the call center, according to Monday testimony. Exactly a month earlier, Davidson called the center following a minor incident and became frustrated with the questions.
Lawrence contacted the call center attempting to rectify the problem, according to Lee Peterson, director of safety and marine operations for Tote at the time. Marine board member Keith Fawcett asked why the issue was never rectified before the accident voyage.
Peterson said he knows Lawrence was working on the issue and the company was proactively trying to address it.
SAFETY COORDINATOR
Board members asked Peterson and Lawrence about Tote deciding against hiring a safety coordinator. Tote interviewed a candidate for a position listed on the organizational chart, but the company president then declined to hire and the position was open at the time the El Faro sank.
Lawrence said he understood the reason for not hiring a safety coordinator since Tote was facing a minor layoff at the time. He said there was concern with the perception of making a new hire about the same time as a layoff. Instead of hiring a safety coordinator, other personnel assumed the duties.
CREW REST
Fawcett said he found three areas of noncompliance with the crew failing to meet required rest in his limited review of the relevant documents. Tote attorneys did not dispute his assessment.
“That is the captain’s responsibility” to ensure crew members are taking proper rest, Lawrence said. He said the ultimate responsibility is with the individual crew member.
Fawcett asked Peterson who would ensure the crew is meeting regulations and taking the required rest. Peterson answered the review would be part of the audit process with auditors reviewing the records and ensuring staff is adhering to those requirements. However, Peterson said he was not part of the audit process, and even if his office received the audit he did not review it.
The ship’s captain would also monitor and ensure his crew is complying with regulations, Peterson said. Peterson has since become director of operations for Tote Maritime Puerto Rico, which oversees the company’s trade route between Jacksonville and San Juan.
SAFETY MEETING
When asked about recorded comments of the crew discussing how safety meetings were not taken seriously and comments were discouraged, Lawrence responded “I would say it is a lack of safety culture for that person.”
“I was disappointed to read that that someone feels they can’t speak out at a safety meeting,” he said, but speculated that was an isolated concern.
SCRAPPING A SISTER SHIP
Tote officials decided to scrap El Faro sister ship the El Yunque for commercial reasons, Peterson said. He said he was not aware of any safety concerns leading to the decision, which was made after the El Faro sank. He was responding to questions from a Tote attorney who said there were reports the Coast Guard ordered the ship to be scrapped.
“The Coast Guard does not order the scrapping of vessels. It is a commercial decision,” said Capt. Jason Neubauer, chairman of the marine board.