Ship traffic had piled up that Saturday at the Texas City Y, and three barges coming from different directions were preparing to turn toward the Bolivar Peninsula at about 12:30 p.m.
The captain of the Miss Susan radioed the others to alert them he’d cross first, but even as the trio hammered out strategies, the Summer Wind headed steadily upstream in the Houston Ship Channel toward them.
“Are you going to beat the in-bound ship into the intersection?” the skipper aboard another towboat asked the Miss Susan via radio. He asked twice, sounding concerned.
“Roger that,” the Miss Susan’s captain answered, according to the recording obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request.
The [U]fog hung so thick [/U]over Galveston Bay … The [U]fog was so severe [/U]only a few hours before the collision that the Galveston-Texas City and Houston-based pilot associations temporarily had suspended operations … But [U]no fog warning was in effect [/U]at the time …
Even with the Summer Wind hidden from view, the skipper aboard the towboat Miss Susan could use [U]high-tech equipment [/U]to track the larger ship as it approached a complex intersection of waterways known as the Texas City Y.
It never should have happened, experts say.“Most of us are astonished with the technology and the implementation of the rules [U]that it would happen[/U],” said Ron Campana, an experienced captain and safety consultant. “The technology and the equipment is there to prevent this, and on top of that, you have the [U]U.S. Coast Guard monitoring[/U] — it just doesn’t make sense.”
Documents, data about the ships involved and interviews with captains and government officials suggest that [U]multiple factors [/U]likely increased dangers on the day of the accident in an area already considered one of the busiest and most hazardous shipping intersections in the world. Even with [U]radio[/U], radar and on-board electronic navigation systems at the disposal of the Miss Susan, it’s possible that the [U]Summer Wind was traveling faster [/U]than expected or that foggy conditions and [U]communication mix-ups [/U]played a role, experts said.
The answer could be still simpler: The Miss Susan’s captain was in [U]too much of a hurry[/U]. Joseph Pyne CEO of Kirby said he hopes his captain didn’t rush. “We [U]try[/U] not to put that kind of pressure on people. It should be his [U]own judgment[/U]. We say if it can’t be done safely, don’t do it.”
Kirby Corp. owns and operates one of the [U]industry’s top training centers [/U]for its employees, in Channelview. The center includes a simulation that allows [U]pilots-in-training [/U]to [U]virtually[/U] steer their ships right through the Texas City Y. The goal of that exercise — which shows just [U]how chaotic radio traffic [/U]can get in the Y — is to learn [U]how to keep calm under pressure[/U], avoid accidents and obey the rules of the road, said Capt. Rene Mayer, a chief trainer for Kirby.
A special Coast Guard service known as the Vessel Traffic Service provides assistance to captains along the Houston Ship Channel and 12 other areas in the United States. But there’s[U] nothing like air traffic control on waterways[/U]. Coast Guard traffic officials who monitor the Ship Channel [U]do not give ships permission to proceed[/U], [U]even in particularly dangerous areas such as the Texas City Y[/U]. And the [U]Coast Guard can’t see ships that it’s advising [/U]on the bay because [U]it’s based in an office building at Houston’s Ellington Field.[/U]
Despite all the technology, [U]captains rely heavily on radios to negotiate passing each other in often rapid-fire exchanges that can be confusing[/U], especially with heavy traffic, fast-moving vessels, fog or equipment glitches (a short-lived fault in a system).
It appears from a cellphone video (?) taken by a witness that the Miss Susan pointed its barges downstream as it prepared to turn into the Intracoastal Waterway, possibly trying to turn behind the Summer Wind.
“I still cannot believe the tugboat captain took [U]no evasive action[/U]. He had to have [U]seen[/U] (?) the ship at some point,” said Geoff Webster, a [U]marine safety expert [/U]who reviewed a short accident video taken by a witness.
Confirmation Bias + Multitasking + Inaction Syndrome + Confusion + Reduced Visibility + Speed + Traffic + Relying Heavily on Radios + Basic Nav Equipment + No VTS Control + Tug & Tanker Barge Regulation Relaxation + Economic Pressure = Birds Swimming In Oil Spill & Lawyers Income …
It never should have happened, experts say.“Most of us are astonished with the technology and the implementation of the rules [U]that it would happen[/U],” said Ron Campana, an experienced captain and safety consultant. “The technology and the equipment is there to prevent this, and on top of that, you have the [U]U.S. Coast Guard monitoring[/U] — it just doesn’t make sense.” .[/QUOTE]
It only “doesn’t make sense” if you are unaware of modern accident theory. Here is some suggested reading material for the safety “experts” Perrow’s Normal Accidents (written in 1984) , Vaughn’s The Challenger Launch Decision, and Sagan’s Limits of Safety, Chiles’ Inviting Disaster
[QUOTE=Topsail;134393]
“I still cannot believe the tugboat captain took [U]no evasive action[/U]. He had to have [U]seen[/U] (?) the ship at some point,” said Geoff Webster, a [U]marine safety expert [/U]who reviewed a short accident video taken by a witness.
.[/QUOTE]
Another expert who can’t believe things that happen in the real world. So called 20/20 hindsight is a real thing. It’s called hindsight bias. The chain of events is much clearer after then during. Believe it.
[QUOTE=Topsail;134363]To perfect your inherent total omniscience, you should not overlook …
Rule 1 a) - R2 a) b) - R3 k) l) - R5 - R6 a) i ii iii b) i vi - R7 a) b) c) d) i ii - R8 a) b) c) d) f) i ii iii - R9 d) - R15 a) - R16 - R17 a) i ii b) c) d) - R34 a) d) - R39 b) and the case be, R19 b) c) d) i ii e) and R35 c) f) !!!
But to give narrow-minded effortless answers to complex problems have its advantages. The NTSB could make a substantial economy by releasing a 1 page accident report instead of a 75 one. ;)[/QUOTE]
You are almost correct. There are 2 rules. 1. Don’t hit anyone. 2. Don’t get hit by anyone. When this was first explained to me I thought “How naive”, but after l lengthy discussion it began to make sense. You can study the rules, carry them in your back pocket, have them tattooed on your forearm for quick reference, however, as soon as you break one of these rules, you hand over your interpretation, even if it is the best in the world, to attorneys and admiralty judges who have nothing but time and man power to pour over case law from hundreds of years to find your faults and shortcomings. The rules are simply there to have a place to start when judgement day arrives. Case law and maritime history will have the final say on your actions or lack thereof (Pilot included).
Well just the safe speed rule alone is worded so that if anything ever happens then it’s your fault. If you hit something or fail to avoid someone else, then you were going too fast.
[QUOTE=Ea$y Money;134405]You are almost correct. There are 2 rules. 1. Don’t hit anyone. 2. Don’t get hit by anyone. When this was first explained to me I thought “How naive”, but after l lengthy discussion it began to make sense. You can study the rules, carry them in your back pocket, have them tattooed on your forearm for quick reference, however, as soon as you break one of these rules, you hand over your interpretation, even if it is the best in the world, to attorneys and admiralty judges who have nothing but time and man power to pour over case law from hundreds of years to find your faults and shortcomings. The rules are simply there to have a place to start when judgement day arrives. Case law and maritime history will have the final say on your actions or lack thereof (Pilot included).[/QUOTE]
That’s it, the people who take for granted a clean 0800 cargo start will not be with you at the deposition.
[QUOTE=LI_Domer;134423]Well just the safe speed rule alone is worded so that if anything ever happens then it’s your fault. If you hit something or fail to avoid someone else, then you were going too fast.[/QUOTE]
That’s the gist of my take on Rules beyond the books and into the realworld…always be making speed where you can make the case that you [I][B]did[/B][/I] something about it. It won’t get you out of trouble if you hit someone, but if you normally steam @10 kts, and god forbid you have a problem in heavy traffic, a machinery casualty, restricted viz, or whatever and are only going 6 knots you look like way less of an fool and should carry that much less portion of fault as you proactively took action to prevent an accident due to prevailing conditions.
I would not focus on a single link of a chain of event or Safe Speed alone. I think that we have to view that occurrence as a whole. Findings as to causes, risks and contributing factors. Unless regulated and enforce, Safe Speed is a variable that you can stretch one way or the other to suite your convenience.
If you’re lost in acceptable visibility, you would wish all nearby traffic a speed reduction to allow you more time to assess the situation. Especially when I presume by experience, that you’re alone at the wheel of a cramped bridge of a pusher tug and tanker barges, auto pilot control in the hands, observing a 3cm head-up relative motion non-stabilized Radar without Arpa, a basic ECS on the same configuration aligned on COG instead of Gyro HDG, 2 nonstop screaming VHF, that a 20° rudder feels like everything to shake and fall apart and will confer a huge 10° rate of turn hope and corresponding advance & transfer, not to mention astern power, while drinking a tepid Nescafé.
On the other end, pilots that all maintain a common safe speed practice for decades that is well known and agreed by authorities and industry and that have to do the job of the VTS pertaining to navigation-related instructions or sophisticated navigational advices to tugs & pleasure crafts to maintain safety in a privileged narrow channel.
It that particular case, I would rather be in the pilot shoes than the tug’s captain ones.
[QUOTE=Ea$y Money;134405]You are almost correct. There are 2 rules. 1. Don’t hit anyone. 2. Don’t get hit by anyone. When this was first explained to me I thought “How naive”, but after l lengthy discussion it began to make sense. You can study the rules, carry them in your back pocket, have them tattooed on your forearm for quick reference, however, as soon as you break one of these rules, you hand over your interpretation, even if it is the best in the world, to attorneys and admiralty judges who have nothing but time and man power to pour over case law from hundreds of years to find your faults and shortcomings. The rules are simply there to have a place to start when judgement day arrives. Case law and maritime history will have the final say on your actions or lack thereof (Pilot included).
The time for taking all measures for a ship’s safety is while still able to do so. Nothing is more dangerous than for a seaman to be grudging in taking precautions lest they turn out to have been unnecessary. Safety at sea for a thousand years has depended on exactly the opposite philosophy.[/QUOTE]
I don’t understand what do you mean by; " Safety at sea for a thousand years has depended on exactly the opposite philosophy."
Besides, I hope that I am “almost correct” by stating that there is “nothing more dangerous for a seaman” to alter course to port into so so visibility, afterward to starboard, followed by taking a chance back to port, subsequently to starboard as agreed, then warned to back full astern double rings all she got and some more … in the face of an approaching cargo vessel proceeding in a narrow channel at common practice speed.
I think that prior to be allowed to cross a compulsory pilotage channel with a petroleum product carrier, the conning mate should hold a pilotage endorsement delivered in most part by the local pilotage authority. Pray God that I’m not part of such board committee because it will be soon realized that it will not be an administrative formality.
[QUOTE=Topsail;134458]I don’t understand what do you mean by; " Safety at sea for a thousand years has depended on exactly the opposite philosophy."
Besides, I hope that I am “almost correct” by stating that there is “nothing more dangerous for a seaman” to alter course to port into so so visibility, afterward to starboard, followed by taking a chance back to port, subsequently to starboard as agreed, then warned to back full astern double rings all she got and some more … in the face of an approaching cargo vessel proceeding in a narrow channel at common practice speed.
I think that prior to be allowed to cross a compulsory pilotage channel with a petroleum product carrier, the conning mate should hold a pilotage endorsement delivered in most part by the local pilotage authority. Pray God that I’m not part of such board committee because it will be soon realized that it will not be an administrative formality.[/QUOTE]
The safety at sea… Is my signature, not a comment on your response.
My note that you are almost correct was intended to expand on your lengthy list of rules and note the fact that once a mariner hits someone or gets hit by someone his interpretation and assessment of the event will now be under scrutiny from lawyers, judges, and the case law history. Now we add the gCaptain forum to the list of assessors. I was not saying that you were wrong, only that you can list every rule in the book and still not entirely address the legal interpretation of those rules, as that is driven by large sums of money with seemingly unlimited man power to show your fault to the maximum degree.
It cracks me up when I hear someone say something in regards to a close call that “If he hits me I would tell the judge…” He ain’t going to tell the judge nothing. He will hope he can afford enough lawyer to defend all the statements he made on the accident reports while he sits there quietly trying not to shit his pants.
Also, I was not commenting on any of the events or actions. Just making an observation. I do enjoy the discussion, I only hope it will be as active months down the road when the final reports and lawsuits are resolved. The we can compare our ideas and comments to that of the capitalist overlords.
Do the impossible to avoid any accident … to the extent that if it can be done safe, it is with no doubt preferable to beach than to collide together with another vessel, particularly against a tanker vessel.
Rule 2 - Responsibility
Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner, master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to comply with these Rules or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case.
In construing and complying with these Rules due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances, including the limitations of the vessels involved, which may make a departure from these Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger.
[QUOTE=txwooley;134490]According to the Houston Chronicle, US Marshals have arrested the Summer Wind so she can’t sail off and avoid potential lawsuits.
The NTSB determined that the vessels collided because the towing vessel crossed the Houston Ship Channel, impeding the passage of the bulk carrier that was transiting inbound, which could only transit within the channel.
Contributing to the accident was the failure of the Summer Wind’s master and the Houston pilot on board the Summer Wind to set a safe speed or discuss the tow traffic in the waterway. Also, the captain on the Miss Susan and the Houston pilot failed to establish early radio communication as they transited through Bolivar Roads Precautionary Area, a high traffic area which includes several intersecting waterways and requires vessels to navigate with caution.
The report also notes that leading up to the accident, the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service staff was monitoring several radio channels simultaneously. The watch standers missed the radio communications about the developing close quarter’s situation.
