Captain's Opinion on Mates using BRM to Question Decisions

Sometimes it’s worthwhile (or at least interesting) to go back to the original documents and see what what the guys who cooked this idea up had on their minds. A copy of the proceedings of the original NASA workshop can be found here:

http://bit.ly/2o9wCKL

Enjoy.

Cheers,

Earl

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It’s easy to make the assumption that the right move was obvious.

I’ve asked new cadets to solve a time/speed/distance problem for me and sometimes they will give me an answer out to four decimal places. What the new cadet doesn’t understand is the level of precision of the answer can’t be more then level of precision than the inputs.

In this case we don’t know how precise the information is that we are using to analyze this. One huge factor is how much to discount the information we have but the crew at the time didn’t, that the ship would sink. From reading the transcript apparently they knew they were headed for rough weather but did they expect more than about 50 kts?

We don’ t know. We are trying to answer the question “what would we do” but we have very little idea how much error there is in our understanding. What assumptions are we making to fill in the gaps?

If someone can confidently say what they would do then they are making the same mistake the cadet makes. The precision of answer has to match the precision of the information used to solve the problem.

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Dear Captain Kennebec,

Many thanks for your email. I am sure you also have typos and I hope you will forgive this. I did not read the full 500 pages but read the summaries. I note that you also are a very experienced mariner. I have sailed the ocean for 50 years with 35 years in command and devoted myself to the study of seamanship and safety at sea. I have learnt to have a very healthy respect for hurricanes and their like and for the ships that I commanded. Some good and some poor, the vagaries of seagoing. One point I learnt, was that when taking avoiding action, it should be prompt and broad, in other words course alterations of 90 degrees should not be uncommon.
As in the recent case of the Anthem of the seas where we see yet another failure to appreciate the power of such storms,I believe that the very real danger that this ship was approaching was not appreciated before it was too late.
Now sometimes I would admit that when dealing with Pacific and Atlantic lows which are thousands of miles diameter, it is not always easy to avoid the weather, but in this case the hurricane was not huge in diameter and could have been avoided by either stopping the ship and awaiting the passing or the possible change of direction and then proceeding or taking early and a large alteration of course, even reversing course if required. I have given a considerable section to Hurricanes/Typhoons/Cyclones in my book 21st Century seamanship.
Out of interest, I also publicly rebutted the Costa Concordia inquiry which was a disgrace. Many important items were not put before the court and witnesses were deliberately not called. very few seamen joined in any protest at the Kangaroo court that masqueraded as a true and proper marine inquiry as so many inquiries are today. Incidentally, the US coast guard said that hey were going to have an inquiry into the Anthem of the seas and to this day nothing, I have asked three times for their findings with no reply. We are also still awaiting the flag state which will probably find that the hurricane got in the way of the ship.

Best regards,

Michael

I didn’t send you an email.

I believe he’s talking about your comment, rather than an email.

Yes, I agree, that said…

Because of research into the science of human factors, the view of how ship’s officers and crew should interact has changed in the last few decades. This view has been backed up by the successes of CRM the airlines use.

Basically what mariners trained without the benefits of human factors research are saying is; the old, outdated model of crew interactions would have worked in the case of the El Faro if only it had been used “properly”. Therefore the crew was in error.

Everything else being equal, the odds of the El Faro making a successful voyage would have increased had they taken advantage of what we now know about how crews interact with each other and the environment.

In the post Will the El Faro Cause a Rethink of BRM/MRM* Training?
the point I was trying to make is that the instructors in BRM/MRM type classes that are trying to impose outdated ideas on mariners they are training are part of the problem.

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As a non mariner. BRM should not only engage the Bridge personnel and Mates, but all officers and members of the ships watchstandars. I would think that situational awareness of the ENTIRE ship is part of BRM.
The SS El Faro’s VDR only captured the conversations on the bridge. If the Captain and the CE discussed the next operational period in the Captains cabin, it was not captured on the ships SVDR. Davidson was not aware of the Hurricane. The Engineers were preparing for the last source of wheather from the Captain.
I’m depending on knowledgeable mariners to fill in the blanks for my ignorance of the lack of situational awareness for the plant when the Mates understood their proximity to the hurricane.
Thanks

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There is a lot of good experience and a lot of information on this forum. But at the same time in situations like this there are sound reasons to be skeptical of what is posted here.

Personally, at the first drill heading out into open ocean I will brief the crew on the weather forecast and what is expected for the first few days. If heavy weather is expected I put a written order outside the galley to make ready their living and work spaces. I make a point to talk to each watch about the weather and discuss the forecasts and weather maps we are receiving. This has served me well over the years.

As for the engineers having an interest in weather. I have one Chief who could care less and another who adamantly wants me to forward him the weather everyday. I’m not a closed book so whatever anyone wants to know, they’re welcome to it.

On the subject of questioning the old man. I remember being a third mate with a couple years under my keel leaving out of the English Channel headed westbound for the states in January. The captain decided to take a great circle, keeping us to the north for several days and there were two fairly substantial lows tracking across the North Atlantic but at a fairly mid latitude. I was not enthused looking at our route for the soon to be ass whooping we were going to take on our forward house container ship. I voiced my concern to the second mate who had a lot more Sea time than me and he made the point for the old mans decision. Stay on top of the low in the lower sea state and following winds. When I looked closer it made sense. I just didn’t know any better at the time but that is what more Sea time gets you. Experience. We still got beat up for a few days, but nowhere near what it could have been.

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An example of changing the decision making process to be more falsifiable.

A captain I once sailed with was a one man show. I was C/M. The ship would be approaching the pilot station in heavy cross traffic and the captain would have his head buried in the APRA.

The main engine is slowed down from sea speed gradually by the “load down” program, the required slowdown point can be calculated. Takes about 7 miles from full sea speed to “harbor full”.

I’d be watching the distance to go and when it was time to start the slowdown I’d ask the captain if he wanted to slow down. He’d always say no, then wait 30 seconds or so and then give the order to slow down.

I side-step this problem by marking the slow-down point on the chart and/or ECDIS.

That way when the mate tells the captain that the ship has crossed the line the message from the mate is irrefutable,

I think all of us have been there at one point in our careers.

I was Chief mate for a captain who would continuously forget to stow the pilot accommodation ladder on the inboard side to the berth in a timely manner. At low tide the accom could be crushed against the dock. If I wasn’t on the bridge to remind him, I’d find myself and the deck gang scrambling to get it safely stowed while approaching the berth as he’d be screaming through the radio to make the tug fast.

This was easily remedied by letting the bosun know two hours in advance, while we leisurely made our way up river, to stow the accommodation ladder. I started writing my own little notes/night orders to the other mates to kindly remind him this needed to be done. It helped a bit but was always a source of stress for me and I was happy when I moved elsewhere.

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This is what I’'m talking about. But we can now solve this problem direct, not sailing mate so work-arounds are not needed.

I have a list on the bridge of what needs to be done for arrival, but importantly, the times when it has to be done. And it is things that the mate can actually do, unlike the company checklists.

For example when to call out the bos’n, which the watch can do, as opposed to “clear the anchors” or “rig the pilot ladder”, things the watch cannot do.

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Really good read. For me the best sections was the Session 1 paper by a Mr. Lee Bolman and the workshop summary by Dr. Charles Billings.

Taking a look at where it all started so to speak is enlightening when you think it went from this to the formal airline version and then to the maritime version for Bridge and finally to the engine room version. There are some simple lessons in this early starting point that seemed to have gotten overwhelmed by scope creep, minutia, or just plain poor curriculum or presentation in the early ER versions.

In the Bolman paper he proposes a “theory of the situation” (TOS) vs a “theory of practice” (TOP) concept which seems to me to be a valuable insight. Paraphrasing, mariners TOP would change little over the course of a voyage but the TOS changes continuously.

The paper is rich in simple concepts for example “espoused theory” vs “theory-in-use”. Former is the crews own explanation of their behavior if they are trying to predict what they would do. Whereas the latter is a valid theory that predicts and guides the actual actions of a crew member. I’m thinking this is where Tversky and Kahneman’s work on the biases that are at work inside our minds and allow the in-use theory to diverge from the espoused theory.

Apparently Mr. Bolman went on to bigger and better things for when googled it returns a book he co-authored called Reframing Organizations now in 6th edition. If the summaries I’ve read are reflective that would have been a good reference for ERM course.

The summary by Billings pretty accurately points out issues to watch out for in developing a resource management program - in 1979 even before people went off and developed mature programs - and amazingly some of the pitfalls were not addressed - at least not for the maritime version.

For example he addresses the instructors for such courses - they should NOT have been taken through a cookbook kind of course on how to teach resource management BUT should understand what they are talking about and that there is more than one way pf dealing with a situation.

He also remarks its “easy to become captivated by social and interpersonal issues. There’s a little bit of the psychiatrist in all of us. We’ve heard questions here, generally answered in the
negative, about whether you can change personality. Trieve suggested to me this morning that that probably is a moot point, that it probably doesn’t make a lot of difference whether you can change personality. But one thing we do know, and you people know it very well indeed because it’s one of the things you do for a living, you can change behavior. You can change behavior by making it very pleasant to behave one way and very unpleasant to behave in
another way. Incentives, positive and negative incentives.”

He also asks “are we teaching command skills or social/communication skills” which he says would govern when/where in a career you place such training.

There are also some worthwhile comments in the “calculated risk vs blind assumption” attachment by Bruggink of the NTSB.

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Having been on both sides of this question for over 30 yrs. the best answer i think is the experience and and reliability in the one questioning a decision. I will give more weight to someone questioning my decision if they have reliable experience and have been in that situation before. Similarly I would question a decision and how vehemently based on my own experience.

The way this is framed, to “question decisions” is very narrow. It depends upon the situation.

For example on deck, in a dynamic, time limited operation, the tug needs a line, the mate points to a line and tell the crew to pass it down to the tug. An AB points out the line is in poor shape and there is a second better one, further away available.

The mate can say good idea, use the other line, say no, need to get this tug fast quickly or he say I’ll call and ask the captain. In any case once the question is asked and answered that should be the end of it.

On the other hand say schedule slack allows the ship to anchor outside the departure port or, depart and anchor instead at the arrival port.

In this case instead of the captain making a decision and then having the C/E and C/M “question” in some circumstances it might be better to make the dept heads aware of the scheduling options before the decision is made so they can consider the various implication so they can provide input.

I have always told my mates that I expect them to question me. That practice allow me to sometimes make a better decision. It’s good training. It builds the competence and confidence of the mates, especially those who aspire to become captains themselves. It makes me a better captain by being willing to listen to mates who might disagree with me for good reasons.

I learned this myself from the excellent mentors that I had coming up. The foundation of this is that I’m not afraid to be wrong. Being a captain should not be a power trip. It must be about the safety of the crew, the vessel, and the cargo. A one-man show almost always has a detrimental impact on safety, and always has a negative impact on crew morale. A one-man show is an indicator of a person who is terrified to reveal that he is as human as everyone else on board.

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BRM?
As in bridge relationship management?.

Having read the entire discussion, I am still none the wiser.

Bridge Resource Management - BRM.

A little reference material :


Some methods of escalating a conversation when you/they have a concern :

https://gcaptain.com/graded-assertiveness-captain-i-have-a-concern/

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Why are you guys making this so complicated? When I have a new mate sign on, one of the first things I make sure they understand is that they can come to me with any concern or suggestion and I won’t be Captain Bligh when they do. I want to hear problems and concerns!

And if there’s a reason I do something a certain way, I’ll explain it to them, either right then, or take them aside once things calm down and there’s time again if it’s in the middle of something that has to be done a certain way for a reason. If we can train our mates to use stop work authority-esque “hey we need to take a step back and look at this differently,” then we’d have a whole lot less Exxon Valdez’s, Deepwater Horizons, and El Faros. Somewhere in the chain of command in all three of those, there was a breakdown somehow of “I can’t go against my superior” or “I’m the boss, I’m right, you’re wrong.” Neither of those scenarios work to promote the safe operation of a vessel.

So to my fellow Captains, whether on tugs or supertankers, quit being obstinate jackasses and listen to your crews!

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Well said.

One other point, don’t be a decision-making black box. Open up the box and show your work. Lay out the plan so everyone can see it.

In the case of the El Faro not “follow these waypoint” but instead lay out explicitly what the plan is, for example to avoid the 35 kt wind field.

That way subordinates don’t have to point out the captain’s decision is wrong. They can work the problem themselves and show the solution has changed.

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