Why the gcaptain forum sometimes gets it wrong


#77

I was talking about when I was there. Didn’t know Chalos was on campus recently.


#78

I had never seen that video before and it raises many more questions. The body language is interesting, it is dismissive. Captain Hazelwood alters course from a line of “reported” icebergs with no real de-liniation, towards the Bligh Reef and then goes down below to do paperwork and weather leaving the 3rd to carry out orders. What?

Why? This was a crucial piece of navigation with a supertanker loaded with crude in confined waters? The ship was put on autopilot by Hazelwood, against company policy by the captain. The third mate was over confident. A series of errors waiting to happen.

Once again, Hazelwood admitted to having tow or three vodkas. The report states that he had consumed a considerable amount of alcohol before he left port. ? His blood level was 0.061 12 hours after the incident. A fact removed by the lawyer by legalese but ask him, how much did you have and when?

I too have been in a situation of command as you state where I stopped juniors running my ship aground. They were rebuked. They learned but no report was made outside the bridge. My personal radar was on in a difficult navigation situation. That is what skippers do. We also train the leaders of the future for when we shall be boring the pants off fellow bar members.

Hazelwood takes liability but there is much more he leaves unanswered.


#79

That may have not been the case.

I wonder if these points have been brought up in discussions?

The assumption that the third mate was going to solve the navigation problem by eye likely is not correct.

In the video it’s demonstrated how easy it is for an experienced, fully rested tanker captain, in familiar waters, in daylight, to wait for abeam and then turn, all by eye.

There is huge difference between how comfortable an experienced tanker captain in a familiar area is going to be navigating by eye and the comfort level of a third mate doing the same thing.

In my experience most third mates will not be confident enough to trust navigation by eye, especially at night, and will instead want a fix on the chart. But this would have been difficult if he didn’t know the position of the tanker, no fix, no track, no DRs. The third mate had just walked into the bridge from dropping off the pilot.

Also I know from experience it’s difficult to get a fix when you feel under time pressure, a hasty fix sometimes doesn’t help and if a fix is a bust a second one has to taken.

Also it difficult to judge how much additional difficulty it was to interpret the radar picture with the tanker crossing the inbound lane at an oblique angle. It’s far easier to visually determine position just by looking at the radar if you’re familiar with what the picture looks like. Being in the “wrong” position is going to add difficulty. Plus if there was ice in the lanes that would have made the radar picture even less recognizable.

Another puzzle is why a captain would go below and lose all awareness of the situation. Missing the turn was a high consequence event regardless of how likely/unlikely it was judged. It’s very possible to work on messages, weather etc and still track the vessel progress by have a quick look out the window, or at the time. Or just by feel, if the ship is turning or not.

That scenario would have been a very anxious, inexperienced near-panic third mate in the wheel house and a captain in his cabin totally unaware of the situation.

I don’t know what happened but the video by itself is just one side of the story, a fair assessment would include other views.


#82

http://heiwaco.com/news8.htm is the biggest piece of nonsense you have written on this incident since you disappeared from shipsnostalgia. “No rock or reef marked here.” ??? Oh yes there are and very clearly. Despite it being a small scale chart,

Nobody died??? Some were in their cabins below the waterline and almost certainly dead.

What was a ship of this size with a cargo of humans doing approaching shallow, rocky shores at full speed to a closing distance of less than 0.5 nm?

Schettino was in charge and showed a complete disregard for the safety of his ship, crew and passengers. Had he not hit that rock through gross negligence, the conspiracy theories you expound would not even have been considered.

Nobody died you repeat. I would like you to say that face to face to the friends and families of the 32 souls that lost their lives.

For any avoidance of doubt:

"Captain Schettino stated that, before approaching the island, he turned off the alarm system for the ship’s computer navigation system. “I was navigating by sight, because I knew those seabeds well. I had done the move three, four times.” He told investigators that he saw waves breaking on the reef and turned abruptly, swinging the side of the hull into the reef. “I have to take responsibility for the fact that I made a judgement error. This time I ordered the turn too late.” The captain initially stated that the ship was about 300 metres (330 yd) from the shore (about the length of the vessel) and hit an uncharted rock. However, the ship’s first officer, Ciro Ambrosio, told investigators that Schettino had left his reading glasses in his cabin and repeatedly asked Ambrosio to check the radar for him. "


#84

Of course Schettino was in overall charge but each crew member had defined responsibilities as per ISM.

HUMAN Error.

Crew and staff took the lifeboat seats and 300 passengers were left aboard when the ship suddenly capsized and sank the next day. The life rafts were not used.

HUMAN FAIOLURE. As professional seamen we all know where that goes…

Iin my opinion the proximate cause of capsize and sinking killing people were the illegal watertight doors being opened during Abandon ship
HUMAN Error

that could not be closed afterwards. Progressive flooding of undamaged compartments through these doors produced loss of buoyancy and stability. The shis electrics were damaged due flooding. No power available to shut them, Why did they open them?
HUMAN Error.

Now. Again:

"Captain Schettino stated that, before approaching the island, he turned off the alarm system for the ship’s computer navigation system. “I was navigating by sight, because I knew those seabeds well. I had done the move three, four times.” He told investigators that he saw waves breaking on the reef and turned abruptly, swinging the side of the hull into the reef. “I have to take responsibility for the fact that I made a judgement error. This time I ordered the turn too late.” The captain initially stated that the ship was about 300 metres (330 yd) from the shore (about the length of the vessel) and hit an uncharted rock. However, the ship’s first officer, Ciro Ambrosio, told investigators that Schettino had left his reading glasses in his cabin and repeatedly asked Ambrosio to check the radar for him. "**

All the design and risk assessments in the world could not cope with the incompetence and stupidity of the like of Schettino. You are the naval architect, how do you protect the hull of a ship with 30,000 plus tonnes being thrown against a jagged pinnacle of rock?

I also recall your arguement that watertight doors should be banned on ships. That means that every crewman and passenger have to go to deck level and back to move between compartments?

Suggest you study my website again. Life is too short for such drivel.
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#85

Go back to the threads on the Fitzgerald and McCain accidents. He’s the gCaptain forum’s Alex Jones.


#86

According to this book Bridge Resource Management: From the Costa Concordia to Navigation in the Digital Age that view is based on a superficial, media driven narrative. The book’s argument is that the Costa Concordia was normal human error.

How is this different from the argument that the commonly accepted media narrative of the Exxon Valdez is wrong and should be corrected?


#89

Thanks for replying to my posts. Sorry I cannot reply. gcaptain,forum just removes it.


#90

Absolutely and when normal human error slams 30,000 tones of cruise liner into a jagged outcrop then there is little that can save it.
The Exxon Valdez was left with junior officers navigating around icebergs and the Bligh reef at a critical time requiring experience and a cool head. That was missing. Again the human failure could not be coped with by any engineering design.