# Scot Carrier - Karin Hoej Accident Report **URL:** \ **Category:** Marine Incidents\ **Created:** [September 11, 2023, 8:32am UTC](https://forum.gcaptain.com/t/scot-carrier-karin-hoej-accident-report/67097 "2023-09-11T08:32:54Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 3\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![Klaveness](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/forum.gcaptain.com/klaveness/32/7001_2.png) [@Klaveness](https://forum.gcaptain.com/u/Klaveness)\ **Post date:** [September 11, 2023, 8:32am UTC](https://forum.gcaptain.com/t/scot-carrier-karin-hoej-accident-report/67097/1 "2023-09-11T08:32:54Z")
> [@Coasters Collide in the Baltic](https://forum.gcaptain.com/t/coasters-collide-in-the-baltic/61666/24): > > MAIB report now published > > [Collision between cargo vessel Scot Carrier and split hopper barge Karin Høj with loss of 2 lives - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/collision-between-cargo-vessel-scot-carrier-and-split-hopper-barge-karin-hoej-with-loss-of-2-lives) Wow, that’s pretty spicy. Thanks for posting. This one spoke to me on a personal level, because the _Karin Hoej_ is my kinda boat, and the situation is instantly familiar: Trundling along the outer edge of the TSS, lots of big guys moving fast in poor visibility, meticulously maintaining position and hoping everyone else is awake. It creates the kind of slow burn stress that grinds you down over time. The report confirms what most of us have suspected, that this was a classical under manning accident. It’s easy enough to find fault with the mate on the _Karin Hoej_ for not monitoring the developing situation, but given how quickly things developed once the _Scot Carrier_ bore down on her, he would have to bring his A game to avoid disaster. Making passage with a skeleton crew at the end of a hitch doesn’t set the conditions for that. What caught me by surprise was how this went down on the _Scot Carrier_. It’s easy to imagine an overworked mate catching up on administrative duties while keeping half an eye on things, fully task loaded and mis-prioritizing as a byproduct of cumulative complacency. That’s not what happened, though. It turns out that he got drunk, spent his time chatting with strangers on Omegle (or chatroulette or whatever), turned on the bridge lights to show them around, changed course _in congested waters at night in poor visibility_ without so much as a glance at the radar, and kept on trucking until he just happened to see the _Karin Hoej’s_ masthead light on his starboard bow. Now this is where the guy really hit his stride: > [@MAIb Report](#): > > - At 0327:25, Scot Carrier collided with the port side of Karin Høj at an angle of > about 50° and a relative speed of 8.7kts (Figures 10 and 11). Karin Høj’s last AIS > transmission occurred 9 seconds later. Scot Carrier’s 2/O went to the starboard bridge wing, making several exclamations of “Oh, my God!”. The vessel made a slow turn to port with the helm control in manual and the rudder amidships. The 2/O then moved across to the port bridge wing, but saw nothing in the darkness. > - At 0327:55, the 2/O returned to the centre console and put the telegraph to full > ahead. Five minutes later, after pacing up and down the bridge, he steadied the > course (Figure 12) then, shortly afterwards, initiated a slow turn to starboard and > switched the starboard radar range from 12 to 0.75nm. > - At 0329, the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) of the Royal Danish Navy, > received a distress message from Karin Høj’s Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB). > - At 0334:20, Scot Carrier’s 2/O re-engaged the autopilot and the vessel continued a slow turn to starboard. > - At 0335:46 and 0336:24, the JRCC called Karin Høj via VHF6 channel 16 using > callsign Lyngby Radio but did not receive a reply. > - At 0337, Scot Carrier’s unmanned engine room alarm sounded on the bridge and in the chief engineer’s (C/E) cabin. The C/E silenced the alarm and went to the engine room. The 2/O put the helm control to manual shortly afterwards and steadied the course at 305°. At 0339, the C/E called the bridge by telephone and asked the 2/O why two steering pumps were operating. The 2/O told him there was no problem and that he could switch the steering control back to autopilot. > - At 0339:43, Lyngby Radio called the south-west bound cargo ship Fionia Sea, > which was in the Bornholmsgat TSS and approaching the last received position of Karin Høj, requesting details of any sightings of, or information about, the distressed barge. The JRCC also informed the Swedish search and rescue authority about the activated EPIRB and lack of response from Karin Høj to its radio calls. > - At 0340, Scot Carrier’s 2/O adjusted the autopilot to steer a course of 270° and > continued at full ahead. JRCC Sweden, using callsign Sweden Rescue, called Scot Carrier and the 2/O asked for details in response to its enquiry about a vessel in the ship’s vicinity. JRCC Sweden replied with OWHM2, the callsign of Karin Høj, to which the 2/O answered that his equipment was not displaying anything with that callsign. > > On the basis of the AIS tracks in the area at the time of the EPIRB distress > message, the two JRCCs suspected that a collision had occurred between Scot > Carrier and Karin Høj and immediately started a joint search and rescue operation. > Swedish and Danish airborne and seagoing rescue units were tasked to Karin > Høj’s last known position and, because Karin Høj’s last observed position was in > Swedish waters, JRCC Sweden assumed the role of search and rescue mission > coordinator (SMC). > > - At 0342, Sweden Radio asked “So you don’t have anything in your vicinity?” The > 2/O replied “Standby” and paced up and down the bridge for a minute before > affirming: “Sweden control, Scot Carrier. No vessel with that callsign appearing on my equipment”. Sweden Rescue responded, “What was going on? AIS shows you going to port then starboard again”, to which the 2/O again replied “Standby”. > - At 0343:57, Scot Carrier’s 2/O telephoned the master who arrived on the bridge > shortly afterwards. Well damn, those must have been fifteen long minutes. It’s tempting to picture the scene as Homer Simpson responding “steady as she goes” to every challenge, but it was probably more like a scene out of a Lars von Trier film, when the devil quietly appears out of the shadows for a measured conversation. “So what’s the plan? How do you think this plays out? Are you going to slip away into the darkness? This is not a fender bender at the mall, you know. You just killed two people, and they watched it all on their screens. They know your secret, Jack.” Anyway, the pitch black comedy of the _Scot Carrier_ 2M’s shock and denial aside, the report does touch on some interesting stuff. There’s a recap of a whole slew of previous incidents stemming from the same systemic manning issues that plague the industry, with several involving Scotline. Disappointingly, they are content with outlining the state of affairs, and stop short of digging into the root cause. What pressures drove the _Karin Hoej’s_ master to plan the passage with a crew well short of all indicators, including company policy? How did we end up normalizing a state of affairs where crews keep making the same mistakes, overworked in clear breach of regulation? How does a mate keeping sole watch in challenging conditions end up distracting himself with extraneous stimuli? And not least, in a culture where mariners are driven to perform, either out of commercial pressures or a sense of honor, how do we define performance? There’s a lot going on here, tying into many of the most interesting discussions we’ve had on this forum. There’s the issue of regulatory capture driving a race to the bottom, for Molloch compels us to improve the bottom line. There’s the choice of striving for excellence versus mediocrity, and how organizational systems deal with the limits of human nature. Finally, there’s the brain rot epidemic driven by widespread stimulus addiction, which the report leaves entirely unexplored. The final chapter of the report doesn’t bode well, encapsulating the belief that stringent requirements and concrete definitions will prevent this kind of thing. > Intrada Ships Management Ltd has: > (…) > ● Amended its SMS to highlight the requirements for a lookout during the hours > of darkness and revised its alcohol policy to require that any beer available on > board must contain an alcohol by volume of less than 5%. Clearly the problem here was that the beer was too strong. And maybe the SMS didn’t spell out the watchkeeping requirements in enough detail, idk. Well congratulations, you fixed it! At least some form of justice was served: > On 16 June 2022, The Courts of Denmark convicted Scot Carrier’s 2/O > of manslaughter and maritime drunkenness. He was sentenced to 18 > months’ imprisonment. ---
**Author:** ![neutralobserver](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/n/c0e974/32.png) [@neutralobserver](https://forum.gcaptain.com/u/neutralobserver)\ **Post date:** [September 11, 2023, 3:41pm UTC](https://forum.gcaptain.com/t/scot-carrier-karin-hoej-accident-report/67097/2 "2023-09-11T15:41:29Z")
The 2/O sounds like a real piece of work. ---
**Author:** ![BilltheBelt](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/9de0a6/32.png) [@BilltheBelt](https://forum.gcaptain.com/u/BilltheBelt)\ **Post date:** [September 12, 2023, 1:07pm UTC](https://forum.gcaptain.com/t/scot-carrier-karin-hoej-accident-report/67097/3 "2023-09-12T13:07:18Z")
18 months? He’ll be out by now. 18 years would have been more like it