# High-reliability organizations - Understanding Society Blog

**URL:** <https://forum.gcaptain.com/t/high-reliability-organizations-understanding-society-blog/53707>\
**Category:** Marine Safety\
**Created:** [December 30, 2019, 12:24pm UTC](https://forum.gcaptain.com/t/high-reliability-organizations-understanding-society-blog/53707 "2019-12-30T12:24:10Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![Kennebec\_Captain](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/flex016/user_avatar/forum.gcaptain.com/kennebec_captain/32/13_2.png) [@Kennebec\_Captain](https://forum.gcaptain.com/u/Kennebec_Captain)\
**Post date:** [December 30, 2019, 12:24pm UTC](https://forum.gcaptain.com/t/high-reliability-organizations-understanding-society-blog/53707/1 "2019-12-30T12:24:11Z")

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> **[High-reliability organizations](https://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2019/12/high-reliability-organizations.html)**

> Charles Perrow takes a particularly negative view of the possibility of safe management of high-risk technologies in [Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691004129/ref=as_li_tl?tag=gcaptaincom-20). His summary of the Three Mile Island accident is illustrative: “The system caused the accident, not the operators” (12). Perrow’s account of TMI is chiefly an account of complex and tightly-coupled system processes, and the difficulty these processes create for operators and managers when they go wrong. And he is doubtful that the industry can safely manage its nuclear plants.

A post about High Reliability Organizations in the context of Charles Perrow and Nancy Leveson