Conflicting Reports on Hormuz Blockade

Maritime News
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LLoyd’s List: At least 26 Iranian shadow fleet vessels bypass US blockade

  • More than 10 vessels have transited past the US blockade line since the terms were expanded last week
  • Eleven tankers laden with Iranian cargo have left the Gulf of Oman or Middle East Gulf since April 13
  • A Greek-owned bulker left an Iranian port on April 15 and passed the blockade line on April 19

The rest is behind a paywall - Link from Naked Capitalism

From gCaptain / Bloomberg: Hormuz Traffic Grinds to a Halt After Iran Seizes First Vessels

Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz ground to a halt on Thursday after Iran fired on commercial ships and said it had seized at least two vessels — a first in nearly eight weeks of war.

On topic posts only this thread.

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This what Grok says:

As of April 23, 2026, very few ships have successfully “gotten past” the US naval blockade of Iranian ports in the Strait of Hormuz area in a meaningful way. The blockade (announced April 12–13) specifically targets vessels entering or departing Iranian ports/coastal areas, not all traffic through the strait. However, the overall situation has created a near-standstill for most commercial shipping due to enforcement, Iranian countermeasures, high war-risk insurance, and mutual restrictions.

Key Numbers from US and Shipping Data

• US CENTCOM reports:

**•  In the first 24 hours (April 13--14), no ships breached the blockade; 6 vessels were directed to turn around.**

**•  As of April 20--22, the US has turned back or forced to return 27--31 vessels trying to enter/exit Iranian ports.**

**•  One high-profile Iranian-flagged cargo ship (MV Touska) was fired upon, disabled, boarded, and seized by US forces (including Marines) on April 19 after ignoring warnings. It was carrying dual-use materials linked to missile production.**

• Independent shipping data (Reuters, Lloyd’s List, Kpler, Bloomberg, etc.):

**•  On the first full day (April 14): At least 8 ships transited the strait, including 3 Iran-linked tankers --- but these were mostly not heading to/from Iranian ports, so they were not directly subject to the blockade.**

**•  Subsequent days: Traffic has been extremely low --- reports of 3--15 vessels per 24 hours in various snapshots, compared to the pre-war normal of \~100+ per day.**

**•  Some shadow fleet/Iranian-linked vessels (estimates of 7--26 in various reports) have slipped through, especially early on or via evasion tactics, but many were turned back or operated outside the strict blockade rules.**

Overall Picture

• Commercial traffic is at a virtual standstill for ships tied to Iranian ports/oil exports. The US blockade, combined with Iranian restrictions and attacks on some vessels, has reduced flows dramatically.

• Non-Iranian traffic (e.g., ships going between other Gulf ports or transiting without Iranian calls) continues at low levels but with high risk and insurance costs.

• Total transits since the broader war began (Feb 28) are around 279 ships up to mid-April, a tiny fraction of normal volume.

The blockade is effective at choking Iranian oil exports and revenue but is not a total seal on the strait itself. Tensions remain high with the fragile ceasefire, recent ship seizures, and mutual accusations. Shipping data can vary by source due to real-time tracking challenges and shadow fleet tactics. For the absolute latest, maritime trackers like MarineTraffic, Lloyd’s List, or official CENTCOM updates are the best sources, as the situation changes daily.

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Saw a couple on VesselTraffic this morning sneaking around Musandam along the rocks

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I suppose if the blockade runners keep very close to the Iranian coast they will be OK until they get to the Pakistani border.

It is a risk because the surveys are incomplete.

7

I hear odd things about this being secondarily a proxy war with China, which seems believable, if you are willing to consider that the attack on Iran was thought out beforehand; and to extend some faith in credit on our ability to predict and manage 2nd/3rd order effects of policy decisions (which seems a tall order)…

I’ve also heard it suggested that this is also a probing assault on London’s insurers, to see what they do… There’s some bigger names attached to that last idea, but I haven’t seen a good explanation of the why of it. What’s the point if so?

Knowing that the larger insurers had ‘Fixers’ in Somalia for the entirety of the piracy plague, who played active strategic roles in arms procurement and logistics in battles between warlords, I’m biased against maritime insurers, which makes me leery of my own inclination to view them as Bond Villains.

Simply offering up a cynical or boilerplate parroting, on party lines, or indulging in our usual biases doesn’t do much, but I’d like to hear thoughts.

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That, to me, sounds akin to the law enforcement practice of parallel reconstruction aka. finding justification after the fact. The “4d chess argument” doesn’t hold water. Who is developing this “deep” strategy? Trump? Miller? Kegsbreath? Kushner? Erik Prince? All the top brass that are being forced out for having some integrity and wisdom?

I’m more inclined to think it has something to do with the…files…files…what was that name again?

Some more evidence of 4d chess:

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Whatever negative impact this might have on China economically in the near term, in the end this likely strengthens China’s standing in the rest of the world.

With the U.S. acting unilaterally (with Israel) in a manner that impacts the entire world, it paints the U.S. as a stubborn aggressor who is unpredictable and uncaring.

China in contrast appears as a caring and benevolent investor with their whole “belt and road” activity. China’s reliance on energy sources similar to the rest of the world makes them appear less as an isolationist and more as a willing participant in the global economy. China can seem like a “one of us” especially to poorer nations throughout the world that have no say or recourse to this crisis that the U.S. just decided to put into motion.

U.S. stubbornness and go-it-aloneness and even our new found oil riches that make us more independent of energy drama impacting the rest of the world, all can make us seem like a rogue nation more likely to go it alone or take action that might have broad and lasting impacts on people, while we enjoy the fruits of our isolation, self reliance, and very big stick.

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Bloomberg must have had to do some deep background investigation to dig up this information.

The US blockade may encourage Iran-linked ships entering or leaving the Persian Gulf to switch off their tracking signals to avoid detection, making it harder to get an accurate picture of traffic through the waterway. This means transit figures may sometimes be revised higher when vessels reappear far away from the riskiest waters.

Ships attempting to run the blockade may be shutting off their AIS.

It was common, even before the US imposed its latest restrictions, for Iran-linked ships to stop sending signals as they headed into the Strait of Hormuz to exit the Persian Gulf. They generally didn’t enable them again until well into the Strait of Malacca in South East Asia, about 13 days sailing from Iran’s Kharg Island.

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Yes, as I’ve said elsewhere today on this forum and recently. Primarily it’s a war on the finances of not only Iran/IRGC, but also China, and the deep state bankers including insurers such as Lloyds.