I have a lot of experience and knowledge about collisions and ship mishaps. I won’t waste time posting my curriculum vitæ.
I do know a bit about ships in general, standing watch, and the weakness of a military vessel (whether small boat or ship) if the crew is poorly trained, rusty, or there’s a lack of discipline.
In any event, we are not making judgments about what happened. But an investigation always starts somewhere, and before whipping out the magnifying glass, so to speak, assumptions are noted. For example: these are sophisticated ships, but at the end of the day this collision was most likely NOT due to ship malfunction, the officers and crew on watch caused this. And considering the five collisions or mishaps in the past months, this tells me there’s an officer problem in the Navy.
Interesting AIS tracks: http://video.dailymail.co.uk/video/mol/2017/08/21/3793256630306489993/960x540_MP4_3793256630306489993.mp4
Obviously no track for “McCain”.
Looking at three specific ships about to enter the TSS lanes (sec. 43) “Team Osco”, “Alnic MC” and “Guang Zhou Wan”
First, is “Team Osco” maintaining constant speed and heading through the process.
Third is “Guang Zhou Wan”. Just a bit faster than “Alnic MC”, it is just behind on their port side and seems to be willing to pass on “Alnic MC” port side (good practice). At about sec 47 it veers slightly to the right. Maybe two possibilities: It feels squeezed between the “Alnic MC”, the shipping lane inner-border and the fast-arriving “Hyunday Global” or, it makes collision alteration course to avoid a ship arriving on its starboard side (“McCain?”)
Second is “Alnic MC”. It maintains heading and speed until sec 50 then it veers sharply to the left with collision at sec 52 (speed down to 1.4kn). Why veering to the left? It probably realized too late the risk of collision with “McCain” or it thought it would get at a greater risk with the “Guang Zhou Wan”, already on its starboard side and slightly behind.
Key point: All merchant ships were already in the TSS with normal headings and speeds.
Excellent post. I won’t bore people with the foundation to support my comments, but what you say is exactly right.
When I was on ships in heavily traffic areas, EVERYONE, and I do mean everyone, was practically at GQ because no one wanted to collide with a merchant ship.
Moreover, among other things, we did not want to deal with investigators, have our liberty canceled, suffer embarrassment, be disciplined, demoted, and worst of all, have promotions quashed or delayed.
P.S. ++ re: Most officers treat sea duty as “ticket punch” to get the next promotion; i.e., many guys on a ship don’t love the sea and don’t want to be there. To them being at sea is a depressing time and they can’t wait to get back to land.
If there’s no “pride of ownership” being on a ship, that will eventually lead to accidents like this because the ship is crewed by men looking at the service mainly as a meal ticket.
Just looking at their education (Arts degrees) and prior experience (land based), what in the world are these guys doing in the wheelhouse of a (naval) ship!?
That’s the way the Navy does things. Officers aren’t supposed to be technical experts. Theyre “supposed” to be highly educated managerial wizards whose primary job is leadership towards completion of whatever the units mission is. Advanced degrees and shore duty are supposed to advance their leadership and managerial skills.
Enlisted and warrant’s are supposed to supply the technical skill, get their hands dirty and advise the officers of impending situations, so that the officer may make the call.
No flames here. A couple of points I and many others made in the USS Fitz thread.
If the USN wants to navigate in busy waters without transmitting AIS signals, they own a bigger share of the blame when things go wrong.
It’s a warship and no matter how unlikely on any given day, it’s always subject to attack and must therefore always be ready to move out of harm’s way. Further, as a warship, it is far more maneuverable than a cargo/tanker ship. It’s power to mass ratio is much more favorable.
It seems Alnic MC was in ballast with the bulbous bow in the waterline, so the bulbous bow punched a hole in the Cain port side aft centered at the Cain waterline; damage 50/50 above/below water. Alnic MC forecastle was high above Cain weatherdeck and didn’t touch much.
Given the damage to her port side, that would make the McCain a crossing vessel in a TSS ie 90 degrees, in which case she started to cross with numerous vessels bearing down on her and without AIS.
Too many acronyms, too many screens, too many classes, too many simulators. Not enough experience, not enough looking out the windows.
Too many excuses, too many conspiracies, too much paranoia. Too many watchstanders parsing a basic job: keep a good lookout, by eye and by radar. Follow the Colregs. When in doubt, call the other ship on the radio, call the captain.
Maneuvering and Slowing Down? To some, these might as well be cities Denmark.
Things to come: plenty of acronyms, plenty of discussion about screens, classes, simulators, reasons to not look out windows. Conspiracies and paranoia.
The news report mentioned that she was heading to S’pore for a routine visit. Indeed as you pointed out from the AIS tracks it appears that she was crossing the sealanes on a SouthEasterly heading, away from S’pore, cutting in front of a number of approaching ships. If this proofs to be the case then it’s reckless and points to a lack of situational awareness. Assume that the investigators will request and examine the VDR data from the other vessels as well as from the Alnic MC.
Well, have you heard the wheelhouse audio tape of the Porter collision? If not Google it. Confusion and chaos as the officer(s) in charge had no clue what to do with the input from the experienced enlisted…
Not the RN’s finest hour. The Southampton was only saved by the Torbay steaming slowly ahead to support her on the bulbous bow, the damage went within 8 feet of the keel.
I have listened to it. I was not advocating for the Navy’s system in my explanation, simply attempting to explain why the XO/CO had so many shore billets and advanced degrees, as opposed to seagoing positions. I don’t think anybody here thinks it’s a great system by any means…