Thanks. The reason I’m curious pertains to your description of the crash stop process and possible modifications to the Crystal. MAN offers a camless conversion for the ME-C. The camless engine has a different crash stop sequence in which start air is used to brake the engine and the programming adjusts the exhaust valve and fuel valve timing to reverse the engine faster.
I only mention this because it appears that the Crystal went through a yard period in 2015 in which they changed the bulbous bow. Take a look at pictures prior to 2015 and pictures after and you’ll see that the stem is different. I could see them making modifications to the engine at the same time, especially if they’re trying to increase efficiency.
I honestly don’t think that any of this speculation really matters. I think we just have a situation where a couple of ships were cruising along and nobody had their eyes open.
Webster’s definition of clickbait: “something (such as a headline) designed to make readers want to click on a hyperlink where the link leads to content of dubious value or interest”
Was the content of dubious value or interest?
I will admit that I do not have a high level of expertise on Navy watchstanding, nor have I ever been on the bridge of a navy ship underway. But two areas I do have a relatively high level of expertise in are watch-standing aboard merchant ships and journalism. Backing up these credentials are the USCG who issued my Master Unlimited tickets and Harper Collins who published my book.
Most of you guys know this already but what I find troubling are that the majority of the critical comments are focus on two subjects:
Journalism - editorial decisions such as publishing time, research methods, title selection (the list goes on an on) and other choices I made as a journalist.
Naval Expertise - my lack of experience as a watch stander aboard a Navy ship. Few of the comments can point to anything I specifically got wrong, instead most point out nuances that prove I haven’t stood watch on a destroyer.
Does anyone see the hypocrisy here? I can’t write because I don’t have experience on the bridge of a navy ship but they can write about my publishing choice despite never having published an article. Do they think the editor of the NYTimes or Wall Street Journal has stood watch on a Navy ship? Can anyone find me a major publication that sits and waits for the “appropriate time” to publish an article?
I’d also like to point out another thing… none of the Navy commenters have asked any questions that could easily win them the argument they are trying to make. Questions like “Do merchant ships always respond to VHF?”, "Why is the ship flagged in the Philippines? What is the track record of Class NK ships that have been booted from the “big 3” flags? I realize both are at fault but who do you think has the biggest percentage of blame? (…and the list goes on). Or simply “Hey John, can you share some arguments why the Containership might be the one at fault?”
And none of the 200+ comments have asked the one question I hoped would be asked… “Hey John, the Navy spends millions every year on press tours and embedded journalist programs, have you ever asked the Navy if gCaptain could spend some time on the bridge of a destroyer?” Because the answer to that question is… yes, repeatedly.
Has anyone else noticed that, when a Navy commander screws up the fleet circles the wagons around him and post angry comments about gCaptain being too aggressive… but when a ship captain screws up we get angry comments merchant fleet about being too soft on the guy?
I was on a vessel with the camless ME engine and you are right with the different crash stop sequence . The main problem with this engine is not to exceed the firing pressure which might quickly happen by misfiring especially in crash reversing. MAN omitted the safety valves on the cylinders and justified this with the flexibility of the studbolts. They had their reasons but we found out that the short lifting of the cylinder cover while misfiring blew the soft iron gasket between cover and liner out of its position and after a while we had a blow by and were forced to repair quickly otherwise the exhaust gas would have caused seat corrosion. To your last sentence I might add in favour of the merchant marine community. Even if the WO was on the loo and the lookout cleaning the staircase from bridge to lower quarters - The US Navy should never sleep !
The discussion would have been in terms of “What is your intention Captain?” and that would be in terms of turn left or right, no reason for distance to come into play from the facts advanced so far.
The USN fights wars. Driving ships is only one of a myriad of skills needed to prosecute a modern war. To accomplish this requires specific organizational and training tracks. Therefore, watch standing functions are divided up. Engine room and Bridge obviously, but since 1943 radar has been integrated into a single agency, the Combat Information Center which is a war fighting agency. They have dedicated scope dopes and the responsibility to evaluate all contacts and recommend courses and speeds to meet the CPA standards established by the Captain’s Orders. The bridge team also has repeaters and eyeballs/runs grease pencil plots to maintain their own situational awareness which most definitely includes the view out the window. Similarly, the Quartermaster of the Watch is keeping a navigational plot by the best available means as well as the detailed log of the watch which includes helm orders, courses and speeds. While only the Captain and the Navigator can direct the OOD, per Navy Regs, in a good bridge team, all hands are encouraged to raise questions.
The knowledge base of a Naval ship is not only in the head of the people involved. It is a corporate knowledge base and maintained in the brains of the crew, but also in Navy Regs, Type Commander Instructions, Fleet orders and the Captain’s guidance, both written and demonstrated. This is demonstrated in how the ship looks and performs. That the Bridge Team of the Fitz allowed the ship to be hit on the starboard running light indicates that they did not perform up to the Navy’s expectations. Since the Captain had signed the qualification letter for every officer on the bridge, he bears the ultimate responsibility.
The Navy would probably be well served to start an aggressive recruiting program for new SWO’s out of the recently graduated Mates from the state academies and KP.
A signing bonus, amended service agreement, ship selection, previously mentioned deck specific service track, possibly even a special designator/warfare pin. Make them Navy subject matter experts on navigation. Leave department head, shore tour mumbo jumbo to career SWO’s who want to do 20+ years. Perhaps just bring them on for a 4 year stint as a Warrant Officer specifically to ensure our warships have navigation specilalists on the bridge, then they can head on out into civilian merchant service, staying on as reserve SSO’s for future help if needed? Now is the perfect time as there are hundreds of hungry new mates with no job prospects graduating every 4 months.
A mate fresh from the academy spent 4 years learning how to avoid merchant ships, knows the COLREGS largely by wrote because of exam study, and has spent at least 210 days at sea, much of it hanging out on the bridge helping out and observing during maneuvering, arrival/depart, etc. That is a LOT more than one can say for OCS/ROTC ensigns who did 90 or so days doing pushups and a few months at SWO school with no real sea time and much of it spent on subjects besides NAVIGATING!
Everyone has to learn somehow, but losing sailors lives and catastrophic sums of money to our most valuable military assets due to totally avoidable navigation blunders has to be dealt with. Why does this seem to happen to a Navy warship every few years, everyone grumbles for a little while then its forgotten. In 2-3 years we will all be here again arguing when our next warship collision occurs!
Lots of very interesting comments about the differences in education, training, experience and qualification between USN bridge watch standers and merchant marine officers. All of my U.S. Navy experience is from decades ago and, as a ‘mustang’ (or hausepiper)’ I had a lot of different obstacles to hurdle on my way to some qualifications.
My shore tour from 1987-1990 had me working with over 1000 USNR officers who were merchant academy grads, i.e. USMMA, Mass, Maine, etc. Few were still sailing, but working with them and talking to them was a great experience. During that period I got interested in pursuing licensing, and that was another interesting process. Since I didn’t attend an ‘academy’ I needed 1080 days underway as a bridge watch stander to sit for 3rd Mate, and an additional 360 days for each step up. The Bureau of Personnel provided a transcript of sea service, the Baltimore REC evaluated it and I was eligible to sit for an original Chief Mate license. I spent SIX MONTHS studying all the applicable reference material, then took my four days of exams in Norfolk. Having passed, I sat the next month for 1600-ton Master. I also needed to be a licensed AB, and that meant launching the lifeboat at the Baltimore REC before my license was issued in 1990. I was still in the USN, on my final shore tour before retirement.
I was going to sail with Military Sealift Command after I retired, but my second wife didn’t want me going to sea. So I worked at a university and served as a relief Captain on some local “T” boats in Norfolk. Still nice being on the water, with lots of shipping and tug traffic, but didn’t even count for license renewal.
Sorry for the long story. Suffice it to say that I have a LOT of experience on one side of the divide, and a great appreciation for the other side as well.
How many of you know how to operate your ship in a convoy? How many know how to maneuver to avoid a mine or submarine? How many know how to communicate with the submarine protecting you from Torpedo during war? How many know how to use a maneuvering board to track contacts? How many know how to use encrypted radio equipment or otherwise communicate with a naval vessel securely?
“U.S. Flag commercial ships constitute hundreds of mobile U.S. bases which can be utilized by our government in many ways for furtherance of our national interests.”-Admiral Zumwalt, From the Book Fourth Arm Of Defense by Salvatore R. Mercogliano
I sure as hell don’t and not because I haven’t tried to learn (I’ve sent numerous requests to the Navy to join their PR tours on active navy ships) but because they have made zero attempt to teach us these skills. And the few worthwhile programs that do exists have been left to slowly atrophy (e.g. Mariner Outreach System (MOS)) or simply canceled (e.g. navy ops classes offered by the, now defunct, GMATS).
Naval destroyers have never been, and never will be, the first American ships to be attacked during times of war… that distinction has always been, and will always be held by the US merchant fleet.
The Navy flew me literally half way around the world last year to advise them on why this YOU (on this very forum) often get on scene information before Naval Intelligence does. And the reason is YOU (merchant mariners and offshore workers) are the eyes and ears of the ocean and we simply give you a platform to share that information. If the navy wants you to send them the information before posting it to gCaptain (which I assure you THEY DO) then they must start by acknowledging the fact that the US Navy does not have the market corned on the subject of naval war, combat and national defense because WE also play a vital role in both.
Some on this forum want to shut down MARAD and Kings Point. Personally, I disagree. I would like congress and the US Navy to increase support and funding of both and return them to the core mission for which they were established… to supply and protect this island nation called America during times of war.
P.S. And they can start down this road by giving our WWII veterans full combat benefits and status.
P.S.2 The number one critical comment on my article about the USS Fitzgerald was that I have no clue how the Navy operates. Ok well, they might be right but having 4 years as a navy midshipman, having worked aboard a ready reserve ship, having obtained a Master’s ticket issued by the US Military (yes, the USCG is military), having patriotically registered for MOS and having spent my career eagerly looking for opportunities for naval education and training… who’s fault is it that I still have “no clue how the navy operates”?
This has been one of the most interesting discussions I can remember, in particular John thanks for your participation.
One key point you made was both captains were to blame. One of my mentors told me a long time ago that if lightening strikes the boat its still the captains fault. Taken literally of course that seems a bit over-the-top, but what I got out of it is the burden of responsibility is ultimately in the captain’s lap.
Regardless of whatever the outcome of the investigation is as far as liability, I would think the CO and master of the crystal are both feeling responsible for this tragedy, neither will feel any absolution.
I would actually do this too. It’s been hard trying to find work myself. Sometimes I regret not doing the MMR/SSO program, but classmates of mine who did, suffer from trying to find work to stay in compliance with their MARAD/USNR obligations. If they had a
Direct Commissioning opportunity for Licensed Mariners, where they send you to SWO school, then out into the fleet to have responsibilities in the underway watch, I’d put in my application. Currently I’m working below my qualifications.
In the age of sail that’s how some British ships worked. I haven’t looked too closely into it, but you usually had a Sailing Master, and his Master’s Mates all from the merchant service, in addition to the Vessel’s Commander, and his LTs.
If the Navy handed out cat o’ nine tails to new recruits that might be enough to tempt @c.captain to join up… which would be awesome because I’d love to see a picture of him in full uniform saluting the flag carrier of the US Navy band
I prefer that incidents and casualties not get swept under the rug so to speak. That way a rigorous investigation can be carried out and I can study it and hopefully not make the same mistakes. I think most professional mariners feel the same.
We need a maritime administration that works for US maritime matters, not the military or an old boy’s club. We need MARAD to fulfill its stated purpose of:
“… dealing with waterborne transportation. Its programs promote the use of waterborne transportation and its seamless integration with other segments of the transportation system, and the viability of the U.S. merchant marine. The Maritime Administration works in many areas involving ships and shipping, shipbuilding, port operations, vessel operations, national security, environment, and safety. The Maritime Administration is also charged with maintaining the health of the merchant marine, since commercial mariners, vessels, and intermodal facilities are vital for supporting national security, and so the agency provides support and information for current mariners, extensive support for educating future mariners, and programs to educate America’s young people about the vital role the maritime industry plays in the lives of all Americans.”
Well so far MARAD has failed miserably in all but the self serving role of keeping KP alive while it slowly murders the only reason it can put forward for keeping the place going. There is no need for KP to pump out little military officers, especially baby ensigns when Annapolis spends $400K apiece to pump them out. We don’t need KP or MARAD to train astronauts or Air Force pilots. We need MARAD to do its job of making jobs for American mariners by protecting American flag ships from the race to the bottom of the world’s maritime transportation barrel.
If MARAD cannot or will not support, promote, and fund a strong and vital US merchant fleet and defend that fleet and its crews against those (including elected officials) who would sell us out for campaign dollars and corporate profit then it is time for MARAD to go the way of the War Shipping Administration … neither MARAD or KP serve any purpose more than those or other defunct government agencies whose time has passed.
Thanks for the gracious response to my humble comments. Your article and most of the comments on this subject and others in the forum show a great deal of animosity between the Merchant Marine and the USN. As you point out, all four sea services are vital parts of the nation and complementary rather than adversarial. My response to your article and the others that I’ve offered today are in the spirit of collegiality among all four sea services. Our common enemy is the sea and whoever the President directs. If I can explain the Navy perspective a little bit it is a worthwhile expenditure of my time.
My point was simply to cut to the chase in the Fitz case and identify the probable fault by the Navy bridge team. They did screw up. It was not organizational and as I tried to show with my personal experience close quarters steaming can be dangerous.
P.S. Perhaps the combination of President Trump and shale oil will lead to abrogation of the Jones Act and a resurgence of the American Merchant Marine. We surely hope so!
PPS The previous versions of this are the result of Apple thinking too much. This is the final and complete copy. Sorry!
Well for a start that is a bizarre assumption. The sea is our workplace, not our enemy. We are far more likely to lose our livelihood because of domestic politics than the nature of seafaring or the sea itself. We are professional seafarers, not “warfighters” who happen to get assigned to a ship once in a while.
Please don’t use the term “we” when writing that kind of garbage. Speaking for most of the US readership I can assure you that your wish for an end to the Jones Act places you in very slimy and disgusting group of those who apparently wish to turn the US into a 3rd world republic.
I know absolutely nothing about the subject but it seems to me that the Crystal is a large, lumbering cargo vessel with limited personnel and, due to its size, lacks the ability to rapidly change direction or stop. It has been reported that their engine requires significant time and complex procedures to reverse. Further, it appears they are required to and obviously do report position through AIS. On the other hand the US warship Fitzgerald has significantly more bridge resources and, as reported, a myriad of sensors – sonar, radar, access to AIS, etc., etc. and I’m sure top secret xxx as well as radio. Fitzgerald also has the ability to significantly out accelerate the cargo vessel. Regardless of what the Crystal did, even if it didn’t follow some maritime procedures, how could the US vessel not avoid being hit. I would be interested to hear how significant blame could be placed on the Crystal and wonder if the Fitzgerald, was either playing hide and seek or the bridge crew was totally incompetent.
