As I said, they don’t have specialist officers. But the core of the navy is the enlisted personnel, and there are a LOT of specialists there. The crew of an Arleigh Burke class DDG is about 32 officers, 27 Chief Petty Officers, and 270 other enlisted. Those CPOs, and the senior Leading Petty Officers (LPO are usually E-6) are the folks with lots of experience and knowledge in their specialty area, as well as experience in training and leading the more junior personnel. Another major responsibility of the CPOs is training the JOs.
Maybe the OOD should be a Navigation specialist CPO?
I have been on several ships where some CPOs had qualified as OOD. I believe they were QMs and OSs. Not much different than CPOs standing Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW), and that was very common in my day.
CIVMAR mates do just that, and even a 3M could have more experience than CO of a warship doing that.
Not to hard to roll down a check list and steer for correct winds and deck. Cadets could do that out of maritime academy no problem.
I guess my point is that OODs should be ALL quartermasters that specialize 100% in navigation. They can train the new ensigns as JOODs so they get their basic navigation training in order to move up the ladder but cut the officers out of the OOD loop.
Nah I think they seriously need to re evaluate there training track, underway time, and mentality to get competent officers standing watch. They need to model themselves after European navies, who normally meet and attain STCW credentials, and specialize like the merchants in either deck or engineering. That is the solution.
That would be the best solution but if the Navy is unwilling to give up their current “Jack off all trades, master of none” mentality then they should have QMs as the OOD at all times.
Now this is really getting good. We are to change our command and training structure as the European Navies. Oh how soon we forget. Let our navy have the this type of training so when we go to war against islands like the Falkland’s. Hopefully the USN can have the same results. LOL!!!
Granted I may not have clicked on some link to read about something but surely to god if you were in the USN during this time you read the USN reports and memos that they, UK Navy, depleted or just about depleted all their torpedo’s shooting at a submarine that wasn’t even within 100NM, but hey, they didn’t hit a cargo ship!!!
Tuesday, 4 May 1982
FALKLANDS WAR
FAA, 800 Sqn, Hermes (right - MOD (Navy)), aircraft carrier, flying Sea Harrier shot down over Goose Green, Falklands
TAYLOR, Nicholas, Lieutenant §, C020574N, died
Sheffield, destroyer, hit by Argentine Super Etendard-launched Exocet missile SE of Falklands, sank on 10 May
BALFOUR, David I, Lieutenant Commander, C013406T
BRIGGS, David R, Petty Officer Marine Mechanic, D1348157, posthumous DSM
COPE, Darryl M, Catering Assistant, D168369Y
EGGINGTON, Anthony C A, Weapon Engineering Artificer, D76798T
EMLY, Richard C, Sub Lieutenant, C027074H
FAGAN, Robert, Petty Officer Cook, D073064N
GOODALL, Neil A, Cook, D180188Q
KEUNG, Lai Chi, Chinese (Unclassified), (service number not given),
KNOWLES, Allan J, Leading Marine Engineering Mechanic, D106285M
MARSHALL, Tony, Leading Cook, D0101325D
NORMAN, Anthony R, Petty Officer Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D126569P
OSBORNE, David E, Cook, D158914V
SULLIVAN, Kevin R F, Weapon Electronics Artificer 1c, D082300A
SWALLOW, Andrew C, Cook, D178106E
TILL, Michael E G, Act/Chief Weapons Mechanic, D099091A
WALLIS, Barry J, Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D135931G
WELLSTEAD, Adrian K, Leading Cook, D134889L
WELSH, Brian, Master at Arms, D088134X
WILLIAMS, Kevin J, Cook, D176707S
WOODHEAD, John S, Lieutenant Commander, C021900A, posthumous DSC
Thursday, 6 May 1982
FALKLANDS WAR
FAA, 801 Sqn, Invincible, aircraft carrier, two Sea Harriers lost in bad weather, SE of Falklands
CURTIS, William A, Lieutenant §, C027154R, died
EYTON-JONES, John E, Lieutenant Commander §, C016085B, died
Wednesday, 19 May 1982
FALKLANDS WAR
FAA, 846 Sqn, Sea King crashed after bird strike NE of Falklands, 18 members of the Special Air Service, one Royal Signals and one RAF also lost
LOVE, Michael D, Corporal Aircrewman, RM, P035079S, posthumous DSM
Friday, 21 May 1982
FALKLANDS WAR
Ardent, frigate (right - MOD (Navy)), badly damaged by Argentine bombs and near misses in Grantham Sound and off North West Island, Falkland Sound, sank next day
ARMSTRONG, Derek, Able Seaman (Sonar), D171126C
BANFIELD, Richard W, Lieutenant Commander, C019615Y
BARR, Andrew R, Able Seaman (Sonar), D171207C
BROUARD, Peter I H, Engineer Mechanic, D089826M
DUNKERLEY, Richard J S, Cook, D155376N
FOOTE, Michael P, Act/Leading Cook, D150936G
FORD, Stephen N, Marine Engineering Mechanic, D189624P
HANSON, Shaun, Act/Steward, D191828F
HAYWARD, Sean K, Able Seaman (Sonar), D190628Y
HEYES, Stephen, Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D166439B
LAWSON, Simon J, Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D1833557S
LEIGHTON, Alistar R, Marine Engineering Mechanic, D187927E
MCAULAY, Allan, Air Engineering Mechanic, D065361N
MULLEN, Michael S, Act/Leading Seaman, D140637W
MURPHY, Brian, Lieutenant, C022353P
NELSON, Gary T, Leading Physical Training Instructor, D141680P
PALMER, Andrew K, Act/Petty Officer Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D134200P
ROBERTS, John R, Cook, D138481K
SEPHTON, John M, Lieutenant Commander, C021253B
WHITE, Stephen J, Act/Leading Marine Engineering Mechanic, D177273B
WHITFORD, Garry, Act/Leading Marine Engineering Mechanic, D152859L
WILLIAMS, Gilbert S, Marine Engineering Mechanic, D169265K
Argonaut, frigate, hit by Argentine rockets, cannon fire and finally two UXB’s in Falkland’s Sound, damaged
BOLDY, Ian MacD, Able Seaman (Radar) ®, D184194V
STUART, Matthew J, Seaman, D187549X
RM 3 Commando Brigade Air Sqn, two Gazelles of C Flight shot down by Argentine Army small arms fire near Port San Carlos, Falklands, crashed
Gazelle number one
EVANS, Andrew P, Sergeant, RM, PO25446U
Gazelle number two
FRANCIS, Kenneth D, Lieutenant, RM, N023442U
GIFFIN, Brett P, Lance Corporal, RM, P033537T
Sunday, 23 May 1982
FALKLANDS WAR
Antelope, frigate, hit by two UXB’s in San Carlos Water, Falklands, sunk that evening when one bomb exploded killing Sergeant Prescott, Royal Engineers
STEPHENS, Mark R, Steward, D184547G, died
Intrepid
COLES, Peter C, Petty Officer Marine Engineering Artificer (M), D160354T, died
FAA, 800 Sqn, Hermes, aircraft carrier, Sea Harrier crashed into sea shortly after take off NE of Falklands and exploded
BATT, Gordon W J, Lieutenant Commander §, C015622P, died, posthumous DSC (died early evening of 23rd, but listed as 24th)
Tuesday, 25 May 1982
FALKLANDS WAR
Atlantic Conveyor, aircraft & helicopter support ship (right), hit by Argentine Super Etendard-launched Exocet missile NE of Falklands, burnt out and sank in tow on the 31st, Captain and eight other crew also lost
ANSLOW, Adrian J, Air Engineering Mechanic, D76381K
FLANAGAN, Edmund, Chief Petty Officer Writer, D058206K
PRYCE, Donald L, Leading Air Engineering Mechanic, D137112E
Coventry, destroyer, sunk by Argentine bombing north of Pebble Island, Falklands
ARMES, Frank O, Marine Engineering Mechanic (M) 1c, D170136A
CADDY, John D L, Act/Chief Weapons Engineering Artificer, D075562M
CALLUS, Paul B, Marine Engineering Artificer, D145600D
DAWSON, Stephen R, Act/Petty Officer Catering Accountant, D155633A
DOBSON, John K, Act/Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D183607L
FOWLER, Michael G, Petty Officer (Sonar), D094740D
HALL, Ian P, Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D170776F
HEATH, Rodney R, Lieutenant, C025065S
KYU, Ben K, Laundryman, (none given)
OZBIRN, David J A, Act/Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D088253K
ROBINSON-MOLTKE, Glen S, Lieutenant Commander, C013530H
STILL, Bernard J, Leading Radio Operator, D183504T
STOCKWELL, Geoffrey L J, Marine Engineering Artificer, D154502T
STRICKLAND, David A, Act/Weapon Engineering Artificer, D138928M
SUNDERLAND, Adrian D, Able Seaman (Electronic Warfare) (E.W.), D187550T
TONKIN, Stephen, Marine Engineering Mechanic, D192370P
TURNBULL, Ian E, Act/Cook, D189147F
WHITE, Philip P, Act/Weapon Engineering Artificer, D154510D
WILLIAMS, Ian R, Weapon Engineering Artificer, D178859U
Isn’t that a rewarding career path of its own? They would go from baby mate to master if they chose to remain in the service, just like merchant marine deck officers.
Are you saying that merchant mariner deck officers don’t have a career path or that their career path is somehow unsatisfying or doesn’t prepare them for a shore based job when they get tired of sailing?
And they can stay long enough to retire after 20 years, instead of being pushed out after 10.
You are right, sorry.
And they can stay long enough to retire after 20 years, instead of being pushed out after 10.
To become insurance salesmen.
If they got pushed out after 10 it would be because the Navy places little value (and certainly no glamour) on safely and efficiently running a ship, evidently not enough to make that a rewarding career path.
Maybe you should move this to another thread?
Yeah I was wondering about this too. A very long time ago during a layoff I actually approached the Navy and found out about something they called an EDO or LDO engineering duty officer or limited duty officer program. Memory may not be 100% on this but I recall it described as you are NOT a line officer, had a different insignia on your sleeve not a star. You would go through a bunch of training, work in shipyards in various Supship offices and there were going to be at least 2 at sea assignments. One early in the carrier on a smaller vessel and one later when you achieved higher rank on a larger vessel. The path was to eventually become a Supship or who knows something at NAVSEA. Anyway it appeared a fullfilling path for a marine engineer.
Seems a good specialty program for navigators/ ship handlers would have similar potential paths with in the Navy with shore side assignments if you wanted to stay in - such as training others, planning and procedures for the Navy Bridge, keeping an eye on IMO goings on, outreach to merchant marine partners, conduct investigations into mishaps, perhaps even consult on bridge design and layout.
Seems there is a bit of variability in the captain’s endorsement of an officer as an OOD method that could be improved on with a professional corp of OOD’s. As someone else said this would not affect the cross training of JOOD’s division officers or department heads in the fine points of the nautical sciences as they move up their chosen path to command.
What career path would you offer these junior officers that are strictly bridge nav watch? While they would likely excel at that skill set, they would have no path for advancement.
And there lies the main issue: the American military (including the USCG), generally, is a human system geared towards regular, constant advancement in rank. For officers especially, when “advancement” in rank finally stops the career is on death watch. While that system may work well for maintenance of military promotion & hierarchy it leaves some big holes in the various areas of critical mission performance. The enlisted ranks are damaged by this mostly up-or-out principle, too.
The USCG, as an agency, performs numerous jobs that, when done ashore, would normally be performed by career civil servants of some sort: fire, police, EMT/ambulance, game warden, pollution response oversight, marine inspection, etc. The military structure is often ill-suited to cultivating and maintaining the experienced personnel essential to perform these jobs. Just as the USN’s system will never maintain a large percentage of experienced bridge & engine room personnel for
The results of putting the military’s need/desire for an attractive career path for JO’s over the demands of navigating their ships in a consistently “safe” & professional manner are apparent.
The results of commercial pressures to cut corners and take unnecessary risks with weather (SS El Faro) are equally apparent.
And the beat goes on.
There are absolutely some people out there who just enjoy being good at a certain task. Militay is no different. Not everyone has to be gunning for CO.
WO’s are utilized as subject matter experts who assist their units with technical expertise and do not pursue command.
No reason WO’s couldnt be utilized in navigating ships, other than institutional pressure/momentum. Have at least somebody on the bridge who’s not part of the up-or-out routine.
The US Navy has nearly unfathomable resources and manpower, compared to basically any organization/company on this planet. Any excuse about training, resources, manpower, etc. seems really just an excuse. If the US military cannot do it, then literally, who in this world can?
Isn’t that a rewarding career path of its own? They would go from baby mate to master if they chose to remain in the service, just like merchant marine deck officers.
Are you saying that merchant mariner deck officers don’t have a career path or that their career path is somehow unsatisfying or doesn’t prepare them for a shore based job when they get tired of sailing?
My question about career path was in response to the suggestion by Fraqrat that there be a few junior officers to stand bridge nav watch. This might be manageable in the scope of USNR active duty for new MM academy graduates, without a major reorganization of the surface navy.
As mentioned by someone in an earlier post why not have a few Jr officers that are strictly bridge nav watch?
I meant nothing negative about the career path for MM deck officers and it would certainly be a worthy path from baby mate to Sailing Master, on larger and larger naval vessels. But that is a reorganizational change that I don’t foresee happening in the USN.
As an aside, these proposals to place MM trained junior officers on USN decks as OICNW haven’t addressed what I believe is a large difference in level of compensation. An Ensign (O-1) makes $3,020/month basic pay, going to about $3,960 as a LT(jg) over two years service. Even with sea pay and other allowances, I think a good bit less than a baby 3rd?
No reason WO’s couldnt be utilized in navigating ships, other than institutional pressure/momentum. Have at least somebody on the bridge who’s not part of the up-or-out routine.
The CG 378’s in the 1980’s did, in fact, have a CWO Bosun as deck department head, and they were an underway OOD as well. But there was only one and, depending on the individual, they may or may not be an asset to the bridge. Same as everybody else.
Fair enough. Seems doable to have at least one qualified Warrant Officer on the bridge for each sea watch of the day. Seems reasonable to think some career BM’s/QM’s would like the oppurtunity to move up to CWO and ensure the safe movement our warships. Think about how much better that would be to have one man/woman with 10-15 years of nav and ship handling experience on the bridge alongside all the line SWO’s who may or may not feel totally confident?
Responding to all those navy guys trying to confuse the issue.
Way too many acronyms in the command center and bridge, no one watching, not realizing that with their stealth technology they have the radar signature of a small FV. Got their ship almost cut in half. Just listen to the audio tape of the Porter collision: http://gcaptain.com/intense-bridge-conversation-porter/ . Utter confusion, apparently nothing learned from that accident!