USS Fitzgerald collides with ACX Crystal off coast of Japan

As I said, they don’t have specialist officers. But the core of the navy is the enlisted personnel, and there are a LOT of specialists there. The crew of an Arleigh Burke class DDG is about 32 officers, 27 Chief Petty Officers, and 270 other enlisted. Those CPOs, and the senior Leading Petty Officers (LPO are usually E-6) are the folks with lots of experience and knowledge in their specialty area, as well as experience in training and leading the more junior personnel. Another major responsibility of the CPOs is training the JOs.

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Maybe the OOD should be a Navigation specialist CPO?

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I have been on several ships where some CPOs had qualified as OOD. I believe they were QMs and OSs. Not much different than CPOs standing Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW), and that was very common in my day.

CIVMAR mates do just that, and even a 3M could have more experience than CO of a warship doing that.

Not to hard to roll down a check list and steer for correct winds and deck. Cadets could do that out of maritime academy no problem.

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I guess my point is that OODs should be ALL quartermasters that specialize 100% in navigation. They can train the new ensigns as JOODs so they get their basic navigation training in order to move up the ladder but cut the officers out of the OOD loop.

Nah I think they seriously need to re evaluate there training track, underway time, and mentality to get competent officers standing watch. They need to model themselves after European navies, who normally meet and attain STCW credentials, and specialize like the merchants in either deck or engineering. That is the solution.

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That would be the best solution but if the Navy is unwilling to give up their current “Jack off all trades, master of none” mentality then they should have QMs as the OOD at all times.

Now this is really getting good. We are to change our command and training structure as the European Navies. Oh how soon we forget. Let our navy have the this type of training so when we go to war against islands like the Falkland’s. Hopefully the USN can have the same results. LOL!!!

Granted I may not have clicked on some link to read about something but surely to god if you were in the USN during this time you read the USN reports and memos that they, UK Navy, depleted or just about depleted all their torpedo’s shooting at a submarine that wasn’t even within 100NM, but hey, they didn’t hit a cargo ship!!!

Tuesday, 4 May 1982

FALKLANDS WAR

FAA, 800 Sqn, Hermes (right - MOD (Navy)), aircraft carrier, flying Sea Harrier shot down over Goose Green, Falklands

TAYLOR, Nicholas, Lieutenant §, C020574N, died

Sheffield, destroyer, hit by Argentine Super Etendard-launched Exocet missile SE of Falklands, sank on 10 May

BALFOUR, David I, Lieutenant Commander, C013406T

BRIGGS, David R, Petty Officer Marine Mechanic, D1348157, posthumous DSM

COPE, Darryl M, Catering Assistant, D168369Y

EGGINGTON, Anthony C A, Weapon Engineering Artificer, D76798T

EMLY, Richard C, Sub Lieutenant, C027074H

FAGAN, Robert, Petty Officer Cook, D073064N

GOODALL, Neil A, Cook, D180188Q

KEUNG, Lai Chi, Chinese (Unclassified), (service number not given),

KNOWLES, Allan J, Leading Marine Engineering Mechanic, D106285M

MARSHALL, Tony, Leading Cook, D0101325D

NORMAN, Anthony R, Petty Officer Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D126569P

OSBORNE, David E, Cook, D158914V

SULLIVAN, Kevin R F, Weapon Electronics Artificer 1c, D082300A

SWALLOW, Andrew C, Cook, D178106E

TILL, Michael E G, Act/Chief Weapons Mechanic, D099091A

WALLIS, Barry J, Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D135931G

WELLSTEAD, Adrian K, Leading Cook, D134889L

WELSH, Brian, Master at Arms, D088134X

WILLIAMS, Kevin J, Cook, D176707S

WOODHEAD, John S, Lieutenant Commander, C021900A, posthumous DSC

Thursday, 6 May 1982

FALKLANDS WAR

FAA, 801 Sqn, Invincible, aircraft carrier, two Sea Harriers lost in bad weather, SE of Falklands

CURTIS, William A, Lieutenant §, C027154R, died

EYTON-JONES, John E, Lieutenant Commander §, C016085B, died

Wednesday, 19 May 1982

FALKLANDS WAR

FAA, 846 Sqn, Sea King crashed after bird strike NE of Falklands, 18 members of the Special Air Service, one Royal Signals and one RAF also lost

LOVE, Michael D, Corporal Aircrewman, RM, P035079S, posthumous DSM

Friday, 21 May 1982

FALKLANDS WAR

Ardent, frigate (right - MOD (Navy)), badly damaged by Argentine bombs and near misses in Grantham Sound and off North West Island, Falkland Sound, sank next day

ARMSTRONG, Derek, Able Seaman (Sonar), D171126C

BANFIELD, Richard W, Lieutenant Commander, C019615Y

BARR, Andrew R, Able Seaman (Sonar), D171207C

BROUARD, Peter I H, Engineer Mechanic, D089826M

DUNKERLEY, Richard J S, Cook, D155376N

FOOTE, Michael P, Act/Leading Cook, D150936G

FORD, Stephen N, Marine Engineering Mechanic, D189624P

HANSON, Shaun, Act/Steward, D191828F

HAYWARD, Sean K, Able Seaman (Sonar), D190628Y

HEYES, Stephen, Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D166439B

LAWSON, Simon J, Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D1833557S

LEIGHTON, Alistar R, Marine Engineering Mechanic, D187927E

MCAULAY, Allan, Air Engineering Mechanic, D065361N

MULLEN, Michael S, Act/Leading Seaman, D140637W

MURPHY, Brian, Lieutenant, C022353P

NELSON, Gary T, Leading Physical Training Instructor, D141680P

PALMER, Andrew K, Act/Petty Officer Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D134200P

ROBERTS, John R, Cook, D138481K

SEPHTON, John M, Lieutenant Commander, C021253B

WHITE, Stephen J, Act/Leading Marine Engineering Mechanic, D177273B

WHITFORD, Garry, Act/Leading Marine Engineering Mechanic, D152859L

WILLIAMS, Gilbert S, Marine Engineering Mechanic, D169265K

Argonaut, frigate, hit by Argentine rockets, cannon fire and finally two UXB’s in Falkland’s Sound, damaged

BOLDY, Ian MacD, Able Seaman (Radar) ®, D184194V

STUART, Matthew J, Seaman, D187549X

RM 3 Commando Brigade Air Sqn, two Gazelles of C Flight shot down by Argentine Army small arms fire near Port San Carlos, Falklands, crashed

Gazelle number one

EVANS, Andrew P, Sergeant, RM, PO25446U

Gazelle number two

FRANCIS, Kenneth D, Lieutenant, RM, N023442U

GIFFIN, Brett P, Lance Corporal, RM, P033537T

Sunday, 23 May 1982

FALKLANDS WAR

Antelope, frigate, hit by two UXB’s in San Carlos Water, Falklands, sunk that evening when one bomb exploded killing Sergeant Prescott, Royal Engineers

STEPHENS, Mark R, Steward, D184547G, died

Intrepid

COLES, Peter C, Petty Officer Marine Engineering Artificer (M), D160354T, died

FAA, 800 Sqn, Hermes, aircraft carrier, Sea Harrier crashed into sea shortly after take off NE of Falklands and exploded

BATT, Gordon W J, Lieutenant Commander §, C015622P, died, posthumous DSC (died early evening of 23rd, but listed as 24th)

Tuesday, 25 May 1982

FALKLANDS WAR

Atlantic Conveyor, aircraft & helicopter support ship (right), hit by Argentine Super Etendard-launched Exocet missile NE of Falklands, burnt out and sank in tow on the 31st, Captain and eight other crew also lost

ANSLOW, Adrian J, Air Engineering Mechanic, D76381K

FLANAGAN, Edmund, Chief Petty Officer Writer, D058206K

PRYCE, Donald L, Leading Air Engineering Mechanic, D137112E

Coventry, destroyer, sunk by Argentine bombing north of Pebble Island, Falklands

ARMES, Frank O, Marine Engineering Mechanic (M) 1c, D170136A

CADDY, John D L, Act/Chief Weapons Engineering Artificer, D075562M

CALLUS, Paul B, Marine Engineering Artificer, D145600D

DAWSON, Stephen R, Act/Petty Officer Catering Accountant, D155633A

DOBSON, John K, Act/Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D183607L

FOWLER, Michael G, Petty Officer (Sonar), D094740D

HALL, Ian P, Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D170776F

HEATH, Rodney R, Lieutenant, C025065S

KYU, Ben K, Laundryman, (none given)

OZBIRN, David J A, Act/Weapon Engineering Mechanic, D088253K

ROBINSON-MOLTKE, Glen S, Lieutenant Commander, C013530H

STILL, Bernard J, Leading Radio Operator, D183504T

STOCKWELL, Geoffrey L J, Marine Engineering Artificer, D154502T

STRICKLAND, David A, Act/Weapon Engineering Artificer, D138928M

SUNDERLAND, Adrian D, Able Seaman (Electronic Warfare) (E.W.), D187550T

TONKIN, Stephen, Marine Engineering Mechanic, D192370P

TURNBULL, Ian E, Act/Cook, D189147F

WHITE, Philip P, Act/Weapon Engineering Artificer, D154510D

WILLIAMS, Ian R, Weapon Engineering Artificer, D178859U

Isn’t that a rewarding career path of its own? They would go from baby mate to master if they chose to remain in the service, just like merchant marine deck officers.

Are you saying that merchant mariner deck officers don’t have a career path or that their career path is somehow unsatisfying or doesn’t prepare them for a shore based job when they get tired of sailing?

And they can stay long enough to retire after 20 years, instead of being pushed out after 10.

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You are right, sorry.

To become insurance salesmen.

If they got pushed out after 10 it would be because the Navy places little value (and certainly no glamour) on safely and efficiently running a ship, evidently not enough to make that a rewarding career path.

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Maybe you should move this to another thread?

Yeah I was wondering about this too. A very long time ago during a layoff I actually approached the Navy and found out about something they called an EDO or LDO engineering duty officer or limited duty officer program. Memory may not be 100% on this but I recall it described as you are NOT a line officer, had a different insignia on your sleeve not a star. You would go through a bunch of training, work in shipyards in various Supship offices and there were going to be at least 2 at sea assignments. One early in the carrier on a smaller vessel and one later when you achieved higher rank on a larger vessel. The path was to eventually become a Supship or who knows something at NAVSEA. Anyway it appeared a fullfilling path for a marine engineer.

Seems a good specialty program for navigators/ ship handlers would have similar potential paths with in the Navy with shore side assignments if you wanted to stay in - such as training others, planning and procedures for the Navy Bridge, keeping an eye on IMO goings on, outreach to merchant marine partners, conduct investigations into mishaps, perhaps even consult on bridge design and layout.

Seems there is a bit of variability in the captain’s endorsement of an officer as an OOD method that could be improved on with a professional corp of OOD’s. As someone else said this would not affect the cross training of JOOD’s division officers or department heads in the fine points of the nautical sciences as they move up their chosen path to command.

And there lies the main issue: the American military (including the USCG), generally, is a human system geared towards regular, constant advancement in rank. For officers especially, when “advancement” in rank finally stops the career is on death watch. While that system may work well for maintenance of military promotion & hierarchy it leaves some big holes in the various areas of critical mission performance. The enlisted ranks are damaged by this mostly up-or-out principle, too.

The USCG, as an agency, performs numerous jobs that, when done ashore, would normally be performed by career civil servants of some sort: fire, police, EMT/ambulance, game warden, pollution response oversight, marine inspection, etc. The military structure is often ill-suited to cultivating and maintaining the experienced personnel essential to perform these jobs. Just as the USN’s system will never maintain a large percentage of experienced bridge & engine room personnel for

The results of putting the military’s need/desire for an attractive career path for JO’s over the demands of navigating their ships in a consistently “safe” & professional manner are apparent.

The results of commercial pressures to cut corners and take unnecessary risks with weather (SS El Faro) are equally apparent.

And the beat goes on.

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There are absolutely some people out there who just enjoy being good at a certain task. Militay is no different. Not everyone has to be gunning for CO.

WO’s are utilized as subject matter experts who assist their units with technical expertise and do not pursue command.

No reason WO’s couldnt be utilized in navigating ships, other than institutional pressure/momentum. Have at least somebody on the bridge who’s not part of the up-or-out routine.

The US Navy has nearly unfathomable resources and manpower, compared to basically any organization/company on this planet. Any excuse about training, resources, manpower, etc. seems really just an excuse. If the US military cannot do it, then literally, who in this world can?

My question about career path was in response to the suggestion by Fraqrat that there be a few junior officers to stand bridge nav watch. This might be manageable in the scope of USNR active duty for new MM academy graduates, without a major reorganization of the surface navy.

I meant nothing negative about the career path for MM deck officers and it would certainly be a worthy path from baby mate to Sailing Master, on larger and larger naval vessels. But that is a reorganizational change that I don’t foresee happening in the USN.

As an aside, these proposals to place MM trained junior officers on USN decks as OICNW haven’t addressed what I believe is a large difference in level of compensation. An Ensign (O-1) makes $3,020/month basic pay, going to about $3,960 as a LT(jg) over two years service. Even with sea pay and other allowances, I think a good bit less than a baby 3rd?

The CG 378’s in the 1980’s did, in fact, have a CWO Bosun as deck department head, and they were an underway OOD as well. But there was only one and, depending on the individual, they may or may not be an asset to the bridge. Same as everybody else.

Fair enough. Seems doable to have at least one qualified Warrant Officer on the bridge for each sea watch of the day. Seems reasonable to think some career BM’s/QM’s would like the oppurtunity to move up to CWO and ensure the safe movement our warships. Think about how much better that would be to have one man/woman with 10-15 years of nav and ship handling experience on the bridge alongside all the line SWO’s who may or may not feel totally confident?

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Responding to all those navy guys trying to confuse the issue.
Way too many acronyms in the command center and bridge, no one watching, not realizing that with their stealth technology they have the radar signature of a small FV. Got their ship almost cut in half. Just listen to the audio tape of the Porter collision: http://gcaptain.com/intense-bridge-conversation-porter/ . Utter confusion, apparently nothing learned from that accident!