USS Fitzgerald collides with ACX Crystal off coast of Japan

Maritime News
429

Yes, I’m a wire-boat guy and I even pulled hawser back in the day. But that isn’t really relevant.

I’m not suggesting that there’s anything wrong with using north-up or stabilized radar, or anything else, for that matter. There’s a time and place for everything, if used in the right manner in the right circumstances.

But if you want a tried and true way to quickly determine risk-of-collision that essentially can’t lead you astray, temporarily switching to head-up/unstabilized display eliminates virtually all possible ways that you could be fed bad information that would skew how you choose your possible solutions. Gyros are generally very stable and reliable, but they can drift. Going to unstabilized eliminates that as possibility. As long as the heading flash is on or within about a degree of 000 deg. relative on your centerline then WYSIWYG on the radar display. It won’t lie to you. CBDR with this set-up is unmistakable.

That can save you in a bad spot, particularly in restricted visibility. If you find yourself getting into trouble or start to feel yourself losing your overall situational awareness it’s a great way to re-set and start over in a pinch.

One of the most important things I was taught to avoid when I went to ARPA training back at the old SCI in Manhattan was the ARPA-assisted collision. This was reinforced in the simulator by, you guessed it, the instructor inducing a small and gradual drift into the gyro. The display showed no problem, but the view out the windows told a different story. The lesson: if there’s a discrepancy between what the display shows and what your eyes are telling you then you go with the latter. Don’t screw around, act decisively.

It’s way too easy to blindly trust the black boxes, even when they’re obviously lying to you. Much more dangerously, when they just fib a little, or inconsistently. Youngsters of the Information/Digital Age, especially, are prone to this, but no one is completely immune. It takes discipline to consistently cross check.

But the Reagan Doctrine is always appropriate: “Trust but verify.”

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430

This is worth emphasizing!

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431

Yes, very much so. And thank you for doing it.

You kind of need to see RR delivering the line. There’s a bit of a wink-wink element to it that doesn’t really quite ever translate into this medium the same way as the spoken word does when you’re watching the speaker.

I guess I could have gone with “Trust (:stuck_out_tongue_winking_eye: or :joy:) but verify!”

432

I think you’ve pretty much covered all of the bases…

I understand the AIS data shows both course (velocity vector of the AIS transponder) and heading (orientation of the bow of the ship). I understand that the heading at 16:30 was 112 degrees, even though the course was only 88 degrees, i.e. the ship really was turning hard to starboard, i.e. off original track and getting more so. Already by 16:33, the heading was “inside” (to the north) of the course, i.e. the ship was already returning to its original track.

So I think that your speculation of a turn initiated around 16:29… detectable in the AIS data at 16:30… is warranted. I’d offer that:

16:29 = turn initiated
16:30 = AIS ping
16:31 = collision

~2 minutes @ ~18 knots = 0.6nm = 1200 yards… a hundred seconds would be a thousand yards…

So I’d offer that evasive maneuvers were undertaken at a range of a thousand yards or so… is that reasonable?

It seems remotely possible that the warship was heading due east for several hours, paralleling the merchantman… and that the former simply kept going straight east into the collision, after the latter turned NE approximately 10-15 minutes prior to impact… Perhaps the Crystal really was on auto-pilot and simply drove into the warship at a relative angle of 20 degrees? But, if so, I cannot myself imagine how such a grazing impact would spin the merchant vessel to its port, by over 100 degrees – if you connect the AIS data points, with a spline curve, in Microsoft Powerpoint or the Grapholite app, such that you match the curve to both the positions and course headings, then you find that the only way to connect the 16:30-16:33 data points is with a smooth curve which arcs almost due south for some distance between the 16:30-16:33 locations…

You can eyeball that of course also…

So “70 in, 170 out” would be about a 100 degree deflection, for a 40Kton freighter impacting a vessel a quarter of its size… unless the impact spun the ship and/or the autopilot was confused or something, I really cannot see how such a sharp turn is more consistent with autopilot than human intervention as per the Crystal’s crew’s statements.

So I agree that “the ACX version of events is consistent with the AIS track”, i.e. they were awake & manning the bridge, and did intervene to steer hard astarboard, perhaps at a range of 1000 yards or four ship lengths…

And if you accept that, then you have to conclude that the warship really did indeed make a turn maneuver “10 minutes” prior to impact…

Which, given the earlier easterly heading, puts the warship on something around a 135 heading SE…

and you have BOTH vessels turning towards each other approximately 10-15 minutes beforehand

wish there was more info out there to consider

433

“I understand the AIS data shows both course (velocity vector of the AIS transponder) and heading (orientation of the bow of the ship). I understand that the heading at 16:30 was 112 degrees, even though the course was only 88 degrees, i.e. the ship really was turning hard to starboard, i.e. off original track and getting more so. Already by 16:33, the heading was “inside” (to the north) of the course, i.e. the ship was already returning to its original track.”

The AIS data is just a series of snapshots joined together by software. The interpolated ‘join the dots’ trace is what Marine Traffics algorithms stitch together. The orientation of the trace is an approximation of the vessels track over the intervening period. It is not the vessels heading. Also, as there is a lag between the AIS ping and the effect of any helm input trying to analyse on a minute by minute basis if futile.

The Japanese CG will have both the VDR from the Crystal, the angle of impact will be evidential from the damage to the Fitz. They will also have access to coastal radar and will be best placed to produce a clear and unbiased report IMHO.

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434

I agree. I believe that the Japanese investigation report is likely to be the only unbiased report we will see in public.

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435

I think you are correct, and until the Freedom of Information Act requests are filled, the Japanese investigation will be the final word.

In the meantime, I believe the Navy will look like incompetent fools trying to hide its incompetence and eventually the FOIA results will echo the USS Porter debacle.

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436

Even if both the US Navy, USCG and the Philippine investigation report is eventually made public, are they likely to be totally unbiased and factual only?

The Japanese has no “national pride” or “coloured glasses” here, as they are the territorial state and, unless there are any reason to believe that their “voluntary TSS” has been a factor, they have nothing to hide or reputation to protect .

437

Here, I often read about the weight relation containership<>destroyer.
This is a sort of static model, nearly applicable on a billiard table, where one ball transfers its energy to the other one. In a perfectly centered contact, the moving ball stops and the standing ball accelerates to the former speed and direction of the other one.

Her we are in a more dynamic model, in a perfect T-crash the energy of the containership would push the destroyer sidewise away… but the destroyer cannot move sidewise, there are millions of tons of water blocking this movement.

The energy of the containership must transform otherwise. In the first second, the energy is transformed into heat by plying or cutting the hull of the destroyer. Only if the destroyer survives this attack, she would have enough own energy to move the blocking water away by bow and stern or under the hull.

In realty, a perfect T-crash is unlikely, the centers of gravity and of the sideways vertical water surface are not at the same place, unless maybe on an empty barge. Here it seems, the impact was not at 90°.

Then, the first transformation of energy would be the deformation of the hull of the destroyer, and after that, the remaining energy transforms to a forward/backward movement of the destroyer and a turning movement of the containership. Only then, the water off the opposed side of the destroyer could move.

AIS intervals of three minutes may explain the movements into the crash, but never, ever they could explain the ship’s movements only seconds after the crash; AIS was not invented to do this.

I hope that the VDR recordings of the containership may explain a lot…

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438

Going by this information the Fitzgerald was not moving (“5 minutes later the destroyer suddenly starting moving”), the Crystal, with two crew in the wheelhouse put it in hand steering, turn some light off and on (maybe deck lights or Aldis as discussed) and when there was no reaction the Crystal made a hard turn to stbd.

If that’s the case the Fitzgerald may have been increasing speed before the collision while the Crystal was in a hard right turn,

439

I look forward to the info from the VDR, and only hope we get good info from the FITZ side.

The ACX Crystal captain indicates that the Fitz was sighted 40 degree to port at 3nm around 0115. This is about the same time that they altered course to port by approx 20 degrees, from due East to East by Northeast. So, was the Fitz 40 degrees to port before the Crystal turned towards her, or after the turn?

No aspect, or target angle, is given for the Fitz. IF Fitz was 40 degree to port at 3nm before the Crystal turned, AND if the Fitz was also on an East heading, then Crystal was well abaft the Fitz’s beam, would have only seen her stern light, and was an overtaking vessel.

As I have noted previously, I don’t know what happened on either bridge, but as a retired naval officer and surface ship driver, I still can’t grasp how the Fitz got hit, seemingly without warning (i.e. internal).

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440

This is a translation of an article which may have been written in Japanese by a non-mariner, based on his understanding of a preliminary report by the Master of Crystal. (Reuters also have a Japanese division)
The Master may or may not have reached the bridge until a short time before the collision and his statement being based on what his 2nd Mate told him about the events leading up to the collision.

IOW Plenty of room for inaccuracy and misinterpretations here.

441

In either case, range and bearing before or after the turn, the watch officer would likely have been under written instructions to maintain a minimum CPA, or if not able, call the captain.

Also not many shore lights there to speak of, the fishing vessels tend to be inside or closer to the entrance to the bays. I would not expect concentration of fishing vessels in that area.

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"Under strict orders not to talk about what they saw that night, the crew of the Fitzgerald is mostly keeping its counsel while grieving the loss of its shipmates. But one sailor, contacted via social media, offered what may endure as an epitaph for the accident.

“All I can say is,” the sailor wrote to The New York Times, “somebody wasn’t paying attention.”

source: http://www.redstate.com/streiff/2017/06/28/what-happened-aboard-the-uss-fitzgerald/

443

I disagree, shipmate. I heard comments like that a lot in the Navy. You say you have silver dolphins, so I’m sure you’ve heard people say things like “its dangerous down here”, “the sea is a harsh mistress”, “the sea is a [female dog]”, etc.

Captain James Baumstark, USN (Ret.), former Captain of USS Michigan SSGN-727 (at the time, SSBN) said the following on a TV documentary special:

Source is this youtube video here , starting at two minutes and fifteen seconds in the video.

444

I’m just going to remind everyone of my psychic prediction.

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445

It’s almost like they’ve done this before…

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I offer that the best fit to that information is the USS Fitzgerald heading due east at approximately 12 knots evidently heading straight towards Toshima island. The ACX Crystal came up behind her at a much higher rate of speed, and drove into the warship after turning 20 degrees NE onto a crossing course. I don’t understand exactly why the freighter turned almost 100 degrees to its starboard before correcting its own course, but this scenario could also be consistent with the merchantman on pure auto-pilot, with no one aboard the boat aware of much of anything until after the fact.

I say this because, if the ACX was inbound at only a 20 degree relative impact angle, then even the slightest turn to starboard would have avoided a collision… the damage to both ships is consistent with a 20-degree impact angle, maybe more, but not much less…

I offer that the 16:30 AIS ping captured the collision in progress, or immediately after, with the freighter moving on an 88-degree course track, and oriented at 112 degrees heading. If the warship really was heading due east at the time of collision, then the freighter very arguably did not turn at all prior to impact.

ACX Crystal course with USS Fitzgerald track overlaid.jpg1486×1125 339 KB

447

The information that the Fitz was 040 at 3 miles came from the captain of the Crystal. Where would the Captain get that information if nobody was aware that the Fitz was there?

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448

I think there is a very tragic story potentially still on the table, which may account for the delays in any findings being released (I mean c’mon…they know exactly what happened by now). If we accept the Crystal account, Fitz accelerated late to cross the tee. If that’s the case, Fitz had likely lost track of that contact (or at least considered it opening). They rediscover the contact CBDR late. OOD panics and accelerates to cross the tee without calling CO. the only reason you do that is if you don’t want the CO to know what you are doing…or that you have somehow put the ship in that position. I suspect the OOD will say he didn’t have times to call the CO. But he had time to give the “all ahead flank”? Unfortunately I think it’s possible that the OOD realized calling the CO to the bridge in that instance would have been a career-ender…and decided not to call the CO. And if you’re too embarrassed to call the CO to the bridge because you lost track of a contact…I’m not sure sounding the collision alarm was in the solution set either. The OOD–may–have bet the house on getting in front of Crystal and escaping with his job intact. I really hope there is a better story but that’s the only way I can reconcile the lack of a call to the CO or failure to sound the collision alarm. As has been noted in this excellent forum, not all US Navy JOs standing bridge watches are seasoned mariners. They are technically trained well…know the rules…and how to respond to known casualties, but lack the “feel” for maneuvering at sea. And I speak from experience. As a 23-yr-old OOD in the Persian gulf I had to be bailed out by a tanker when I yielded the right-of-way in a crossing situation because I was too concerned about staying in my “box” and not basic ship handling. I never had another stbd/stbd passage in my career!

In any event…the story of the OOD will be the most tragic. He/she failed on multiple levels and will take most of the blame. The CO will be blamed for putting the OOD in that position in the first place. But it would be nice if the Navy could take some of the responsibility too. I’m proud to have been a SWO in my early career, but I also recognized that what I went through for an OOD Underway letter was no where near as rigorous as what my friends in aviation or submarines went through in terms of in terms of handling their machines. Good ship driving is just as hard as flying an airplane and I just wish the Navy would recognize that.

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