USS Fitzgerald collides with ACX Crystal off coast of Japan

Here is a “Live” plot of the AXC Crystal’s movements: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m1b58yelh_c
Nothing new can be learnt from this. i think, but it is the first I have seen which also show the other vessels in the vicinity.

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The training mentioned should certainly be a minimum, and will also help those retiring from the naval service to go to sea in a civilian manner if the courses are USCG approved (to reduce duplicate courses). As far as AIS and low radar cross sections, I can see the point but have no issue with the lack of AIS transmission so long as the warship does something to give visibility (procedural or technical) to the vessels around it.

It does state the container ship contacted the Japanese Coast Guard. As far as timing, an initial call by them would have been ideal, followed up by more details after doubling back.

An officer and a seaman inattentive and asleep at 0130 local time? Nahhhh…

I would say that three to four days after the collision and interviewing the crew coupled with a good chance that the VDR data has been reviewed by the Japanse Coast Guard would give them sufficient time and information to include those contributing causes in a working theory of the incident if that is what they have done.

I doubt vhf would work to contact them at greater than 50 miles off the coast. The bridge to bridge vhf did work I’m sure, due to the mention of the radio contact post-collision. I saw in one report that the naval vessel used portable satphones since the main radio room was flooded, that sounds like a good backup plan to me.

It’s a little hard to explain. One example is that military ships use “standard rudder” the execution of which is calculated by another crewman. A merchant ship might use 10, 20 or 30 degrees of rudder to steer through an anchorage or up a channel. The military protocol is different, involves more people making assessments and reporting those assessments prior to execution. It gets the job done, which is what I meant about “guarantee”, but it is more mechanical in it’s style. It’s like there is a chain of assessment and command for every maneuver. I think this was part of the issue with the Blackthorn disaster from many years back. I’m not arguing what anyone else is saying I just think the point I am attempting to make might be relevant to the discussion.

Got it on the standard rudder explanation. It’s what helps our navy do things when many of those “doing the doing” might be only one to three years out of high school yet they by and large still function safe (with some notable exceptions).

They were not 50 miles off the shoreline, but away from Yokosuka Base. The nearest shore were within cellphone coverage.
Besides, there were "numerous " other ships around who could relay a message, if they had declared an emergency by DSC on VHF, or issued a “Pan Message”.

Question; Does US Navy ship have GMDSS? If so, separate from their military communication ??

I think another reason for the delay in transmission by the naval vessel was due to prioritizing things. They may have a different priority, dealing with the issue, prior to communication regarding it.

I don’t know if they have a full GMDSS suite. If so, most of it may have been in the flooded space and would for certain be different equipment. While effective, GMDSS is based on fairly old technology and built for different requirements than most other communications equipment. I’m fairly sure it’s not mandated on US Navy ships. They did have backup communications, they were just communicating with others instead of the Japanese Coast Guard.

Standard rudder is not calculated by another crewman, “Standard rudder is the amount required to turn the ship on its standard tactical diameter.”

Your explanation seems to indicate that “standard rudder” is calculated by ‘another crewman’ on the fly with each helm order. Not so. On a USN ship, Standard Rudder is defined as that amount of rudder that will turn the vessel within (at) its tactical diameter at standard speed. Standard speed is specified for each ship type, and is generally 15 kts. Tactical diameter is defined for each ship type and is usually 1000yds for a destroyer. So, standard rudder is usually 15 degrees - but it is a known, set amount used by all conning officers and all helmsmen.

A conning officer may give an order of “Left 20 degrees rudder”, and get a response of “Left 20 degrees rudder, aye, no new course given”. Having gotten the turn started, the conning officer may order “Ease your rudder to left standard, continue left to new course xxx”, and get the confirming reply from the helmsman.

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Looks like as of 2009 they had not adopted and had no plans to at that time: pdf I’ll update this post if I find more recent information.

The collision took out their radio room. They were pulling the injured captain back inside, he was thrown out when his stateroom was destroyed. They were also trying to manage flooding and rescue sailors from flood-ing? bunk rooms. I think it’s clear why they didn’t transmit (except maybe VHF) as they didn’t have the capability even if they would’ve had the desire.

Maybe the navy should go back to the days of sail when the ship had a “sailing master” this officer would be sort of comparable to a modern day navigator. He (and his mates) would con the ship and do the maneuvering and most of the navigation. The CO would still be in overall command but the sailing master would navigate and maneuver the ship.

I also think the navy needs to have specialty lines. A deck line where these sailing masters would come up from, an engineering line for the engineers, and weapons/tactics line where the guys who fight the ship would come from. Of course all would be cross trained but they would specialize in one of the tracks.

I’m not sure how you would pick COs and XOs to be in overall command out of those lines but I’m sure a way would be figured out.

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What I meant to indicate is the time and position that the “standard rudder” command is executed has been calculated by another crewman.

I do the same thing on my current ship, charter’s requirement.

I think he’s trying to use the El Faro to back up his earlier statement that the ocean is the enemy. Unforgiving? Certainly. Unpredictable? Sometimes. Enemy? I’ve never felt that way.

I disagree. He finished a post with a parting shot at the Jones Act. Several people returned fire. His response was to post “El Faro”. Pretty sure he’s trying to say in a pithy way that the Jones Act is a problem and the El Faro disaster is the result. Not sure why he went in this direction other than to deflect and obfuscate the current discussion of yet another USN collision. I hope he will correct me If I’m wrong.

When a mistake takes place in the air or at sea it is magnified by the environment. The last communication from Captain Davidson said that they had lost power and were taking on water perhaps from an unfastened scuttle. Neither of these mistakes would have been fatal on shore. At sea or in the air such are fatal. Management might make a mistake that costs dollars, maybe a lot of dollars, but it the crew makes mistakes it might well cost their lives and their ship. gCaptain is replete with such examples of the sea as enemy.

The environment may be beautiful or productive but it is dangerous and needs to be considered the entire time at sea or in the air.

ELTON C. "JEFF” OBYRNE

9802-12 Baymeadows Rd
PMB#179
Jacksonville, Florida
32256-7987
910-545-5768
obyrnejeff@mac.com

of course…you know they would all be aviators

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the sea is neither enemy or friend…it is only an environment and to try to imbue it with personal characteristics is for stoopid romantic poets and other useless types[quote=“jeffobytne, post:222, topic:45129”]
ELTON C. "JEFF” OBYRNE

9802-12 Baymeadows Rd
PMB#179
Jacksonville, Florida
32256-7987
910-545-5768
obyrnejeff@mac.com
[/quote]

for the love of God! stop adding this to all your posts…you looking for someone to mail you a card telling you that they are a secret admirer?

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You’re points are valid and taken, but that doesn’t make the sea my “enemy” per se and I don’t think that’s a mindset I would ever want to teach my crew.

I go for a walk in the woods. A snag that has stood for decades could let go, noiselessly, and easily kill me. There may be bears. Or a puma. Or a rattlesnake. Or disease-bearing insects. Or a river with very cold water. Or “bad” weather. Or any number of other potential hazards. Any of them may injure or kill me. Or not. They may also provide for me. In the end I’m simply in an environment that contains risks and rewards that I’m responsible for learning how to recognize, evaluate and manage to whatever degree possible.

When I’m at work, whether at sea or on a lake or river, I’m responsible for teaching those same principles to my crew.

The sea isn’t the enemy. The sea is just there. Same as the woods, or the desert, or the mountains, or wherever you find yourself.

In this case the sea was simply the medium upon which two groups of humans managed to find a way to interact with fatal results. It should have been easy enough to not collide had even just a portion of the people involved been paying due attention and willing to act in time.

Pogo said it best: we have met the enemy and he is us.

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