Third and final hearing into loss of SS El Faro scheduled Feb. 6, 2017

Professional Mariner Forum
121

Several captains of this class of ship testified at the hearings. None of them said anything about being worried about the GZ. Why would Capt Davidson?

Those ships saw a lot of heavy weather without serious problems, Davidson was not the only captain to feel confident.

This is a quote from one of the captains.

Still, Axelsson said he was never worried about the 41-year-old El Faro’s ability to handle adversity at sea.

“To me the El Faro was a Cadillac,” he testified. “She rode well. She handled well. She wasn’t vulnerable.”

122

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;195416]Several captains of this class of ship testified at the hearings. None of them said anything about being worried about the GZ. Why would Capt Davidson?

Those ships saw a lot of heavy weather without serious problems, Davidson was not the only captain to feel confident.
[/QUOTE]

Well, to be accurate none of the Captains had the GZ to consider, since the vessel’s stability guidance was based on minimum GM. The presentation comparing them was to show the potential weakness of the old standard by showing how it can fail to reveal a limited range of positive stability (among other reasons).

but the loss of stability incident to sinking was an effect more than a contributing factor. Knowledge of the vessel characteristics might have made Captain Davidson more cautious, though there is no way to know how much he understood the difference in GZ or GM based stability criteria from training or operating other vessels. It is reasonable to conclude he was understanding of the difference in some fashion. But he may have relied on his experience of the ship in service and history of satisfactory sailing service of the design over theory.

123

ElFaroConclusion.JPG900×717

Vulnerable she was as this picture shows. “Leaving little flexibility” is what I meant when I wrote earlier about the GZ curve: “Just inside the USCG criteria, no room at all for mistakes or things like running into bad weather or the occasional hurricane.”

The remark about the Cadillac is in this respect a curious one and a little bit over the top, I think.

124

This was covered (or should have been covered) in the leadership and management classes, the ones that a often referred to a waste of time.

No point in trying to seek motivation for decision making without knowing what mental model was being used for sense-making. Earl has pointed this out.

There is a key discussion at 0120 hrs (on page 310 of the VDR transcripts) - Second mate calls the captain with new information - from the sat radio playing on the bridge

uh) I just wanted * * * (runs) south (of the) (island) * * * (old Bahama/weather) channel * * * we’ll be meeting the storm. umm fox news just said it’s up to category * * *. yeah– yes (that’s what I heard) * * *. it isn’t lookin’ good right now .– right now my uh– trackline I have zero-two hundred– alter course straight south and then (we’ll) * go through all these * shallow areas. umm (and the next) course change (will/gunna) be (through the Bahamas) and then (just gunna) turn * * *.

The second mate proposes an alternative route and gives an subjective assessment (isn’t looking good). The objective information - “we’ll be meeting the stormm” and "it’s up to category *** ( presumably cat 3) is included as well.

A more effective message would have challenged the captain’s mental model. The relationship of the ship’s track to the postion of the system, the forecast wind direction (from ahead, not astern as the captain believed) expected wind speeds, wave heights. The captain needed to have his mental model challenged to the point where he came to the bridge. Then propose the alternative track.

This is just one factor out of many however. Point being is no need to “understand” what the captain was thinking.

125

[QUOTE=Dutchie;195433]

ElFaroConclusion.JPG900×717

Vulnerable she was as this picture shows. “Leaving little flexibility” is what I meant when I wrote earlier about the GZ curve: “Just inside the USCG criteria, no room at all for mistakes or things like running into bad weather or the occasional hurricane.”

The remark about the Cadillac is in this respect a curious one and a little bit over the top, I think.[/QUOTE]

“Leaving little flexibility” is what the CG expert states above, but it has nothing to do with the GZ curve which would have been outside CG criteria for GZ curves according to current requirements. Little flexibility meant few options to take steps to improve the situation by lack of available reserve buoyancy by being loaded to marks with minimal ballast to use to change the situation to a more favorable one. In such case, the ability to steer a course and deal with minimizing roll angles is the control available to keep within the limited range of positive stability, if one is aware of the range. The El Faro lost this last measure of control.

126

[QUOTE=Dutchie;195433]

The remark about the Cadillac is in this respect a curious one and a little bit over the top, I think.[/QUOTE]

That quote, from a captain saying the El Faro is not vulnerable, is likely an important clue as to what Capt Davison might have been thinking. The captain’s decison making is based on his perceptions , not your’s from looking at a GZ curve.

I sailed on the same Alaska run as that class of ships (before they were lengthened) back in the 90’s. They were known for sailing at full speed in heavy weather.

127

I was not aware that Davidson or probably any of Tote’s captains, require permission to change course in order to avoid running into a hurricane. That is very strange indeed as a Master and he alone is responsible, I thought, for the safety of the ship, the cargo and the crew members including non-crew members like the Polish work force. Is this general practice with all American companies?

CAPT 14:05:33.9 14:05:36.8 I hope (we get to / that it doesn’t) take the Old Bahama Channel back.

2M 14:05:40.0 14:05:43.1 does the company (want/give) permission now (or) *

CAPT 14:05:42.8 14:05:44.1 (from) management.

CAPT 14:06:03.0 14:06:23.3 that’s why you know I just said hey you know– I would like to take this goin’ northbound. I’ll wait for your reply. I don’t think they’ll say no. I gave them a good reason why because if you should follow this (down) then look what it does on the third– fourth and fifth. and that’s right where we’re going. on the quarter. [during the time the CAPT was speaking, the 2M interjects, “yeah” and a “yeah I saw that.”]

USCG-VHF 14:14:58.0 14:15:40.9 sécurité. sécurité. sécurité. * * * the National Hurricane Center has issued a hurricane warning for the central Bahamas. including Cat Island– Exuma– Long Island– Rum Cay– San Salvador. the National Hurricane Center has issued a hurricane watch for northwestern Bahamas including the Abaco– the (Canary) Islands– Bimini– (Elliotbrook)– Grand Bahama Island and New Providence. the Coast Guard requests all * mariners use extreme caution for * *. the United States Coast Guard aircraft standing by on channel sixteen.

Dramatic is the conversation with the second mate Danielle Randolph.

“Nobody in their right mind would be drivin’ into it,” one crewmember said of the hurricane, the afternoon before the ship sank.

“We are. Yaaay,” second mate Danielle Randolph responded with a sarcastic laugh.

That Tote is running a tight ship is also shown by the following piece of conversation.

Davidson then mentioned that the anemometer, which measures wind speed, was not working. The deficiency was mentioned repeatedly and also surfaced in testimony in the federal investigation.

“And they’re … not gunna buy a new one for it,” Shultz responded.

‘Gunna get slammed’

128

The anemeometer was just one point of disagreement between forum members, the real disagreement was the nature of the incident.

At the time a plausible, very simple chain was: lost propulsion - boiler - ABS inspection (or TOTE) - ABS (or TOTE)

For those that believed there was a single, simple cause, any disscussion that brings up other issues, the anemometer or the error in the weather routing data is seen as a distraction.

129

[QUOTE=Dutchie;195450]I was not aware that Davidson or probably any of Tote’s captains, require permission to change course in order to avoid running into a hurricane…[/QUOTE]

Did you see: He asked permission for the future back trip, from SJU to JAX, on October 3-5? Not for the present deadly trip!

Indeed, at this time, nobody knew where Joaquin could be on October 5; in fact it was >100 NM North of Bermuda.

130

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;195454]For those that believed there was a single, simple cause, any disscussion that brings up other issues, the anemometer or the error in the weather routing data is seen as a distraction.[/QUOTE]

I agree but my only intention was to show that Tote is a very cost conscious company and that a captain, as it seems to me, refrains from asking for a simple repair (CAR) or replacement of a navigational instrument. Well, that is the impression I am getting from his answer. See also what is said about the CAR files in the “open letter”.

131

[QUOTE=Urs;195455]Did you see: He asked permission for the future back trip, from SJU to JAX, on October 3-5? Not for the present deadly trip!

Indeed, at this time, nobody knew where Joaquin could be on October 5; in fact it was >100 NM North of Bermuda.[/QUOTE]

No, he did not ask, as far as we know, permission for an alternate route on the last trip. That was not necessary as he obviously had no intention to choose such a route. The question is if it is normal that a captain has to ask permission to do so in the event of navigational hazards. My idea is that I consider this to be his privilege and responsibility and no one else’s. Just inform the Office about your decision. Well, that is the reality in our neck of the woods.

132

I’ve never understood what was on Capt. Davidson’s mind when worrying about asking the office permission to take a different route on the return trip to Jacksonville when the storm would likely have gone north by then. Why was he not more concerned about his current predicament when he was heading into it?
In any case, as Dutchie said, do what needs to be done and inform the office of your decision. In an emergency situation, screw the office, they’re not the ones risking their lives.

133

[QUOTE=Dutchie;195459]No, he did not ask, as far as we know, permission for an alternate route on the last trip. That was not necessary as he obviously had no intention to choose such a route. The question is if it is normal that a captain has to ask permission to do so in the event of navigational hazards. My idea is that I consider this to be his privilege and responsibility and no one else’s. Just inform the Office about your decision. Well, that is the reality in our neck of the woods.[/QUOTE]

An analogy showing the relasionship between master and shorside is the relationship between the watch officer and captain. In principle the watch officer is authorized in some cases to act alone and in other cases must call the master.

This is just general principle, in practice many variations are possible, hands-off captain / bold mate or miro-managing captain/ timid mate etc. Also some variaton from situation to situation, timid mates during the day may become bold at night.

In this case the one snapshot may tell us something about that particular captain and company in that particular instance but I wouldn’t infer anything more broadly beyond that.

134

It is quite extraordinary that with the help of the S-VDR we are now able to get a minute by minute account of the last hours and moments of a dying ship. Reading it on paper is one thing but to actually having to listen to the audio recordings is another thing and must be difficult, eerie and sometimes heart breaking. Even shifting cargo can heard, cars, trucks and trailers probably dominoing.

M1/M2 06:56:14.4 06:56:16.5 [multiple low frequency thuds and clashes, like metal crashing.]

Another example concerns the list of the vessel.

CAPT-ET 07:17:04.1 07:17:06.1 you think the list is getting worse?

CAPT-ET 07:17:06.2 07:17:07.1 ya me too.

Lashing is a critical thing for the safety of the ship. The chief mate has his doubts as is shown by the recording and that is confirmed by the report here.

CM 07:24:51.6 07:25:01.1 it’s– it’s– they don’t they don’t do the lashing the way it oughta be done.

CAPT 07:30:16.3 07:30:17.4 Bow is down

CAPT 07:30:19.4 07:30:20.4 Bow is down

In that case they also have a trim if about 10°, apart from the ever increasing list which makes it almost impossible to move on the ship. The AB on the bridge, who is in total panick, asks Davidson for a ladder…

It must be said that the captain was very empathic and brave with this man and spends his last minutes trying to help him, not everybody for himself, which is quite special and shows a strong character up to the end.

M1 07:39:32.2 07:39:41.8 [sound of building low frequency rumble until end of recording.]

This is seconds for the final moment, probably water rushing into the holds.

135

Page 189 at time 1851 hrs - capt says he sent the latest weather - presumably the Bon Voyage update data.

on page 218 at 1921, after C/M and capt rework waypoints CM says: “[I]and that looks better it’s in the yellow. as opposed to the pink.”[/I]

  • this most likely refers to the Bon Voyage program, ship’s intended track / at computed SOA and forecasted weather- the colors may be forecast wave heights or wind speed.

Reading further along - seems to be a wave height line between 4 and 5 meters

136

Hi freighterman, I’m a journalist who writes a lot about transportation, would love to know more about your groudings study. If you’d care to tell me more I’m at jeff (at) jeffwise.net. Thank you!

138

08/09/2017 - Additional Documents, Factual Reports, Added to EL FARO Accident Docket.

https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR20170809.aspx

https://www.workboat.com/blogs/offshore/documents-added-el-faro-docket/