Third and final hearing into loss of SS El Faro scheduled Feb. 6, 2017

[QUOTE=Steamer;195240]46 CFR 56.50-80 - Lubricating-oil systems dictates that "The lubricating oil system shall be designed to function satisfactorily when the vessel has a permanent 15° list and a permanent 5° trim. "

Note the term “permanent.”

The pumps will not burn out or destroy themselves when sucking air during normal operation when rolling in bad weather. The gravity tank holds enough oil to keep the machinery going for at least 3 minutes if both pumps fail. That is supposed to be long enough to crash stop the engine and save the bearings in the red gear and turbines. That is the theory anyway, I’ve never seen the shaft stop and stay stopped unless the jacking gear is engaged and that is really hard to do if there is any rotation at all.

There is a sight glass (bulls eye) visible from the control room or console that shows oil overflowing from the gravity tank back to the sump. In bad weather the length of time when no oil is visible can get scary.[/QUOTE]

Thank you for the explanation! The 15°and 5°, in my view, are rather small values for a non-stationary object like a ship. The link here shows the lube oil system on board the El Yunque.

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;195228]This is not harsh or unfair it’s nonsense. If the person “calling the shots” is going to get fired if he doesn’t do what his boss wants him to do than he’s not the one calling the shots.

By this measure the lowliest messman is “calling the shots”, he’s free to do whatever he wants but if he doesn’t do what the Steward tells him to do he’ll get fired.[/QUOTE]

It’s a simple concept. The mess man answers to the steward. The master is the ultimate authority on board. He doesn’t get to pass the buck. We’re not talking about dirty coffee cups. What’s your point?

I just got back from attending Monday and Tuesday’s hearings.

It did seem to me that they were harping on some points and not going after others.

When the DPA testified, he seemed not to remember very much about his conversation with the Captain! Also, I was hoping that they would discuss his phone call to the CG where they kind of joked about having Her Anchor!

The biggest thing that I took away from attending those meetings was how the Families have come together. I have no idea how they can sit there day after day and not get frustrated!

I personally spoke to one past crew member, we both smoked so we would be outside during breaks. After B.S.ing, he said I wonder if I will be able to sail after what I have to say. He also mentioned another crew member that testified after getting a Lawyer and a new suit from TOTE, he was very pissed that this crew member seemed to change his story. He was also told me that this other crew member was given a job on the new ships. When this Crew Member testified, I was more than a little surprised by what he said as it was very different from our talks. He went from saying “I would never sail for TOTE ever again” to answering TOTE’s question of “Would you work for TOTE again?” To which he said yes.

Earlier while he was sitting next to me during the hearings he showed me his cell phone. It had at least 4 missed calls from TOTE. After listening to him testify, I had to wonder if he called them back.

Yesterday, I took a ride down to the El Faro Memorial at Dames Point. They have installed 33 bollards in a straight line, which is supposed to be the course they normally steered from Jacksonville to San Juan. While I was there, I saw 5 guys walking and reading the plaques at each bollard as I had just done. Each and everyone of them had tears in the eyes as did I.

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[QUOTE=Tugs;195246]I just got back from attending Monday and Tuesday’s hearings.

It did seem to me that they were harping on some points and not going after others.

When the DPA testified, he seemed not to remember very much about his conversation with the Captain! Also, I was hoping that they would discuss his phone call to the CG where they kind of joked about having Her Anchor!

The biggest thing that I took away from attending those meetings was how the Families have come together. I have no idea how they can sit there day after day and not get frustrated!

I personally spoke to one past crew member, we both smoked so we would be outside during breaks. After B.S.ing, he said I wonder if I will be able to sail after what I have to say. He also mentioned another crew member that testified after getting a Lawyer and a new suit from TOTE, he was very pissed that this crew member seemed to change his story. He was also told me that this other crew member was given a job on the new ships. When this Crew Member testified, I was more than a little surprised by what he said as it was very different from our talks. He went from saying “I would never sail for TOTE ever again” to answering TOTE’s question of “Would you work for TOTE again?” To which he said yes.

Earlier while he was sitting next to me during the hearings he showed me his cell phone. It had at least 4 missed calls from TOTE. After listening to him testify, I had to wonder if he called them back.

Yesterday, I took a ride down to the El Faro Memorial at Dames Point. They have installed 33 bollards in a straight line, which is supposed to be the course they normally steered from Jacksonville to San Juan. While I was there, I saw 5 guys walking and reading the plaques at each bollard as I had just done. Each and everyone of them had tears in the eyes as did I.[/QUOTE]

Thank you for attending, Tugs.

[QUOTE=Tugs;195246]

I personally spoke to one past crew member, we both smoked so we would be outside during breaks. After B.S.ing, he said I wonder if I will be able to sail after what I have to say. He also mentioned another crew member that testified after getting a Lawyer and a new suit from TOTE, he was very pissed that this crew member seemed to change his story. He was also told me that this other crew member was given a job on the new ships. When this Crew Member testified, I was more than a little surprised by what he said as it was very different from our talks. He went from saying “I would never sail for TOTE ever again” to answering TOTE’s question of “Would you work for TOTE again?” To which he said yes.

Earlier while he was sitting next to me during the hearings he showed me his cell phone. It had at least 4 missed calls from TOTE. After listening to him testify, I had to wonder if he called them back.

Yesterday, I took a ride down to the El Faro Memorial at Dames Point. They have installed 33 bollards in a straight line, which is supposed to be the course they normally steered from Jacksonville to San Juan. While I was there, I saw 5 guys walking and reading the plaques at each bollard as I had just done. Each and everyone of them had tears in the eyes as did I.[/QUOTE]

As always courage is rare. It is not easy for a guy not to take the bribe [there’s not another word for it] and change his testimony when there’s a family to feed. There are also those whose character is such that they could not live with themselves if they did not speak the truth when it could save lives.I suppose that’s why we give medals and remember those with the courage to do what is right regardless of the consequences to themselves.

Thank you for being there.

A bribe I agree - [B][U]this is truly incredible.[/U][/B] And he was so straight forward during his testimony.

Posted February 15, 2017 11:45 am | Updated 07:10 pm
By Sebastian Kitchen
Expert: El Faro crew likely did not launch lifeboats

Even though the captain of the striken cargo ship El Faro ordered the crew to abandon ship in a powerful hurricane, its lifeboats were never launched, an expert has concluded. They were heavily damaged as they were ripped from the ship by the deadly storm.
Tio Devaney of Harding Lifeboat Services told federal investigators probing the ship sinking he was not aware of a crew surviving a hurricane in a lifeboat or life raft, enclosed or not.
“I cannot think of any scenario of survivability in hurricane conditions,” said Devaney, who said there are features in enclosed lifeboats that would help. These include better protection from the elements, how they launch from ships, and their ability to self-right if they capsize.
Devaney testified Wednesday before the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation established to determine the cause of the Oct. 1, 2015, sinking that killed all 33 crew members.
Earlier Wednesday, a Polish worker formerly on the ship testified about the ship’s officers not informing the Polish crew about safety measures on board. He said they not told where to go in an emergency, were not shown the lifeboats, and did not know about abandon ship and fire alerts.
An official with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration also testified about issues surrounding the distress alert sent out by the El Faro.
Lifeboat damage extensive
Devaney said the difference between the open lifeboats like those on the El Faro and enclosed lifeboats is “night and day.” Most ships built after 1986 are expected to have enclosed lifeboats.
With the crew already having difficulty maintaining their footing on the ship, getting to the lifeboats and launching them in those weather conditions would have been extraordinarily difficult.
Coast Guard officers previously testified that if the El Faro crew members had been able to successfully abandon the ship, they likely would have only survived a few minutes at most in the hurricane conditions. Devaney and the Coast Guard captain who oversaw the search and rescue mission have testified the enclosed lifeboats, which are launched from the ship instead of lowered, would have given them more of an opportunity, although the situation was dire.
Devaney and others have noted the best opportunity to survive in those conditions, if it was possible, was on the ship, which speaks to the grim outlook with the captain ordering the crew to abandon the El Faro.
Devaney said in a hurricane he would want to be in an enclosed lifeboat launched from the ship, although as a surveyor he once participated in a launch, which he said is jarring when hitting the water.
“I have done it once in my life and that was more than enough for me,” he said.
Investigators showed Devaney photos of damage to El Faro lifeboats, including one of a battered boat recovered by the Coast Guard during the search and rescue mission.
“Green seas could have given such a force to completely destroy” the boat with the apparent damage in one photo, he said.
Devaney said he has been involved with some ship operators considering transitioning from open lifeboats to enclosed, but changed their mind after seeing the proposed cost.
No life vests or immersion suits
Marek Pupp, who worked with a crew of Polish workers on the ship in August 2015, testified Wednesday he and his crew were never given a safety briefing, were not included in drills, and never tried on life vests or immersion suits. He testified from Poland using Skype with the help of a translator.
Five members of a Polish crew of electricians were aboard the El Faro preparing the ship for a route in Alaska when the ship went down.
Investigators have questioned whether the workers could understand English and how to respond during an emergency. They are questioning if the crew would have known how to respond during the hurricane and subsequent emergency when the captain ordered the crew to abandon ship.
“We did not participate in those drills because they did not apply to us, but whenever there was a drill it was posted … for everybody to see,” according to the translation.
Pupp’s English is “quite weak,” according to a translator. He indicated an El Faro officer overseeing the conversion work would instruct an English speaker in the Polish crew and he would translate the instructions.
Pupp, who arrived in Jacksonville and boarded the ship, also testified he did not know it was hurricane season in the region, according to his translator.
The workers received goggles, gloves and head lamps, but were not informed about work safety procedures, he testified.
“The overall condition of the ship was not 100 percent. There was a lot of rust on the ship,” Pupp said through a Coast Guard translator.
Distress alert
A search and rescue satellite system received a distress alert from the El Faro, but the alert was not capable of sending a GPS location, according to testimony.
When the El Faro sent a distress alert, it was received by the Search And Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking, or SARSAT, system operated by the NOAA.
SARSAT lead satellite systems engineer Mickey Fitzmaurice of NOAA said he does not know why the El Faro’s beacon stopped transmitting after 24 minutes. Normally a signal would be sent every 50 seconds for 48 hours.

Lifeboats likely didn’t launch ahead of El Faro sinking
Expert unaware of any successful abandon ship in hurricane conditions

By Stephanie Brown
Jacksonville, FL —
Based on photos of El Faro’s lifeboats, it’s unlikely either of them were able to launch before the ship sank, according to an official with Palfinger Marine.
And even if they had, the odds were stacked against the crew.
“I can’t think of any scenario of survivability coming out of hurricane conditions,” says Palfinger Marine Operations Director for the Americas Tio Devaney, when asked if he had seen a successful abandon ship in conditions like El Faro was facing.
He testified to the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation probing the sinking by walking through various pictures of the lifeboats pulled from the water, and speaking to the extensive damage they experienced.
Devaney says the damage to the side of the lifeboats indicates, to him, that neither were able to launch. Instead, the damage likely came from El Faro herself, or later, from the sea, when the lifeboats were ripped from their rigging.
“If you were in a hurricane conditions and forced to abandon ship from about 96 to 112 knots of wind, would you recommend abandoning ship in an open lifeboat or a life raft, why and why not,” asked NTSB Investigator Jon Furukawa.
“My first choice would be to stay with the ship, and the reason is, there have been a lot of studies done within the IMO and the industry alike to design ships so that they would become their own best lifeboat,” Devaney says.
Asked whether there’s anything that could have helped the crew survive, Devaney says a lot depends on the Captain call to abandon ship, and the ship overall.
“The first thing could have been, maybe, the vessel not being there, but if we were to take that approach then all global trade would stop. The life of a seafarer is a challenging one,” he says.
El Faro also had life rafts on board, and the ship’s Voyage Data Recorder captured the Captain’s order to put the life rafts in the water, but Devaney believes those would have been incredibly difficult to load in to with the weather and sea conditions El Faro was experiencing.
Speaking more broadly on the style of lifeboat El Faro had, Devaney says the open design, conventional davit launch is not as survivable as more modern, enclosed lifeboats or freefall launch life boats. While regulations in the 80s shifted to the enclosed design, El Faro’s age allowed her to keep the older lifeboats.
In his career, Devaney says he’s only investigated one freefall lifeboat incident or accident, and it didn’t involve an injury. He has had four conventional launch warnings in the last few months alone
Devaney says upgrading one lifeboat and the required rigging could cost a half-million dollars.
We’ve previously learned through the MBI hearing sessions that El Faro had some work done on the lifeboat system just ahead of leaving on what would become her final departure, but it was never fully surveyed by the American Bureau of Shipping. An official with the ship’s owner/operator says he forgot to notify the surveyor of the work, and the technician who performed the repair later confirmed the repair itself wasn’t fully surveyed, because the dock-side boat wasn’t tested. Devaney told the Board that, in his time as a surveyor, he would use his discretion about the safety of testing, adding that surveyors don’t always launch lifeboats to test these things out.
Safety and survivability was once again the theme of the hearing session Wednesday. A former El Faro Polish riding crew member told investigators that he hadn’t been involved in safety meetings or lifeboat drills while on board, nor did he know where he was supposed to respond in the event of an emergency. He says there was no formal training, which is a contradiction to the testimony the MBI has heard until this point.
NOAA’s Principal SARSAT System Engineer Mickey Fitzmaurice further spoke about a different piece of survival gear- the ship’s emergency beacon. An analysis he presented to the MBI showed that El Faro’s EPIRB alerted for 24 minutes, and he wasn’t sure why it stopped. In that time, a satellite did pick up the beacon, but because it’s not GPS encoded, the alert came through as “unlocated”. The positioning of the other satellites were such that they were not able to ultimately get a location reading off the beacon.
Fitzmaurice says there was an experimental program operating at the time of the sinking, and analyzing the data after the fact, he believes that program would have been able to locate the beacon. That experimental program has since been launched.
WOKV continues to update the latest from the MBI.

[QUOTE=tengineer1;195252]As always courage is rare. It is not easy for a guy not to take the bribe [there’s not another word for it] and change his testimony when there’s a family to feed. There are also those whose character is such that they could not live with themselves if they did not speak the truth when it could save lives.I suppose that’s why we give medals and remember those with the courage to do what is right regardless of the consequences to themselves.

Thank you for being there.[/QUOTE]

If this is true, and I donot doubt that for a moment, then the hearings are a total sham. It tells us something about how much Tote cares for their seafaring personnel and how they morally stand in this world. I suppose that bribing a witness in a court is a serious legal offense but then this is not a court…

[QUOTE=Dutchie;195261]If this is true, and I donot doubt that for a moment, then the hearings are a total sham. It tells us something about how much Tote cares for their seafaring personnel and how they morally stand in this world. I suppose that bribing a witness in a court is a serious legal offense but then this is not a court…[/QUOTE]

This needs to be investigated immediately - and not by this board of inquiry.

I agree. There needs to be a thorough investigation by the US Attorney of these allegations of witness tampering and bribery.

TOTE Jacksonville was convicted of price fixing and fined a few million dollars about five years ago. As I recall, senior TOTE officers got fired and one or two of them may have done a little prison time. Did TOTE learn its lesson, or not? An investigation is necessary.

The government doesn’t care enough to do an actual investigation. The one definitive fact of American politics is that more than enough of those in power have been bought and paid for.

Who then from the press could do some actual investigative reporting and get anyone to talk? Not any of the bullshit rags that are in the office lobby.

This entire incident is a perfect example how at the end of the day we are well and truely fucked as mariner’s. Eventually you’ll find yourself in a down market with s replacement waiting, and some smug fuck on the end of the phone line letting you know who’s decision it is whether the vessel sails. Then when the odds catch up with you, they’ll slander your name, drag your family through hell, and dangle enough cheese at the end of the line to have a line of cowards praising their name.

My mother was right, I should have been a bartender.

[QUOTE=tugsailor;195104]New hydrostatic releases for life rafts have nothing to do with the incident. Loss of propulsion and water ingress are important links in the chain of causation, but not the root cause.
[/QUOTE]

I agree that the replacement of the hydrostatic release for the life rafts is not in the direct chain of causation. It may show to some extent how effective the ship was at taking care of routine safety chores including updating the documentation. Or maybe it was just a question the CG couldn’t help but ask out of habit. Doesn’t seem like big deal one way or another, might be just a stupid question.

But with regards to the chain and root cause; the way I see it questioning should not focus on a search for a single cause but instead search for factors that cut into the ship’s safety margin.

The most obvious factor cutting into the safety margin is the high winds from Joaquin. Another very important factor was the low righting arm. There is the possible wastage on the cargo ventilation ducts which may have allowed sea water entry at lower angles of heel then designed. Low GM margin may have been a factor. The scuttle left open.

These would be the first order causes of lowered safety margin. When the chain of each factor is followed the end point is not going to be a link in a single error chain.

Your safety margin hits the nail on the head. By any test the ship was operating with mimimal safety margins in every system. She should have been operated with real fear of the hurricane . Complicity due to long service on the run and the belief that large fast ships are safe led to steaming close to the storm. Only thing ElFaro had in her fsvor was speed. When that was lost she was doomed.

Tug and barge same route operated with experience would have never been in that position. Low speed master would have kept far from the storm.

Boats3

Agreed, lack of fear/respect for a tropical cyclone is a puzzle.

In the transcripts where routing near the TC is disscussed by captain and mate they are saying that 50 kts is expected. The captain says that the ship can handle that, the mate however mentions that it’s not the ship but the “bits and pieces”. An astute observation you’d expect from the more experenced officer.

Two people most likely to have accidents. New guy who does not know anything, and experienced guy than knows it all.

Boats3

Show me a transportation sector where the driver/pilot/skipper is not required to keep maintain a tight schedule. Show me a driver/pilot/skipper that isn’t worried about losing his/her job if a schedule isn’t kept. It’s a capitalist world. Did Captain Davidson feel more pressure than any other captain? Has TOTE fired other captains for not maintaining schedules because of weather? Can the NTSB interview other captains on similar routes, in private, to see if there is a history of extraordinary pressure being put on them? There are legitimate lines of inquiry. Lots on innuendo on the subject. In a hypothetical sense, does that mean company officials should be off the hook for applying undue pressure? No, but extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof.

I side with those people who say the captain has the ultimate responsibility. He or she is paid to make tough decisions, and must suffer the consequences for those decisions. It is unfair, yes. The people in the office don’t have that sort of pressure thrust on them, true. But I really can’t see how the system can work otherwise.

If there was no pressure on drivers/pilots/skippers to maintain schedules, schedules would not be kept. Simple human nature. Imagine a world where schedules weren’t kept. All sorts of forum-writers would lather at the mouth about how no one in the USA can keep schedules any more, and how planes are always delayed in flying or arriving, and how their package took too long to get to their house, or how the lousy cable guy was 2 hours late…

Pressure to keep schedules has always been a part of a sailor’s life. Time and tide wait for no man. The invention of the railroads and telegraphs in the first part of the 19th century just made it worse. As long as we get our stuff on time, and our asses at the hotel on time, we don’t complain about some poor bastard sweating it out to make our life “richer”. But when we’re the poor slob maintaining the schedules it’s the crime of the century apparently, filled with John Grisham subplots.

By the way—“jury tampering”? A serious charge by a poster. If you truly believe it, gather names and facts and pass them on the appropriate prosecutor. If they take no action then we have a legitimate gripe.

From a guy who regularly watches 260’ boats cross the Gulf of Alaska on a strict 24-day SCHEDULE, year round, some observations:

Weather forecasting software works. Haven’t read—did El Faro have any? If so, why not followed? (Rhetorical question now, I know).
Organizations (captains and companies both) who routinely operate in areas where hurricane force winds/ 40 foot seas/icing are a common occurrence think in terms of delaying sailings, weather courses, and making use of ports of refuge early and often. Being on a 260’ long ship in 40 foots seas is no fun, but if that’s the world you live in, you have a completely different mindset than a person in more benign seas. You respect the heavy weather just as much, you fear it just as much, but you become adept at working around it. It’s part of the skill set of being a captain, and the Home office realizes that slowdowns will occur when the weather goes to Hell, because it seemingly always go to Hell. Expectations are set accordingly.

I am going to go out on a limb here and suggest that a FRACTION of organizations who routinely operate in more benign seas and on larger ships do not have the same amount of expertise in heavy weather avoidance. That doesn’t make them dumber, or less professional. It’s just a gap in their knowledge base.

(Analogy: I live in Seattle. Snow is rare. When it happens, drivers crash because they can’t drive on snow. People from Minnesota laugh at us. We’re idiots. But we’re not idiots. We just don’t drive on snow that much. No experience, and we are wise to acknowledge there’s a knowledge gap there. Maybe we should go to snow driving school in Duluth. Or maybe we should listen to what Duluth drivers have to teach us. Or maybe we should just agree not to drive when the snow comes down, because we’re not good at it. That last one is an example of a GOOD POLICY. The driver decides he’s going to take the light-rail to work that day because he’s no good at snow driving. The company he works for agrees he will be late to work because everyone is bad at snow driving. Policy, agreed on by all. No drama. )

To avoid accidents caused by a systemic or momentary lack of good judgement on the part of the captain or the company, we create policies. Or standing orders. What were TOTE’s policies in case of severe weather? I would like to read them. Probably very detailed. Maybe not. What were Captain Davidson’s standing orders in case of severe weather? In the strategic sense, not the tactical. I’d like to read them, too, if there’s a copy ashore somewhere. Or perhaps the ORGANIZATION was like a Seattle driver in snow. Competent, careful, but inexperienced in a situation.

I know certain captains are screaming at me for besmirching their considerable expertise. Well, after looking up the word “besmirching”, educate us all on standard severe weather policies on the particular run EL Faro was on. From what I’ve read the standing orders /policies in place in this particular organization settled what to do if there was a problem, not how to avoid the problem in the first case. Namely, how do we ease the inter-company tension between schedule-keeping and ship safety in severe weather?

Here’s my suggestion for a bit of FUTURE policy on that route. Policy for the entire ORGANIZATION, not just the captain:

• Satellite-based weather-routing software should be referred to at all times, and deferred to unless the captain is absolutely sure he has a better plan.
• When operating within X miles of a hurricane track matters of avoiding the hurricane takes priority over schedule. Then the Traffic Department must run interference with the customers, and the CEO make known to the office troops that for the time being it’s not business as usual.
• When operating within x miles of a hurricane track captains should think in terms of ports of refuge or avoidance of worst winds, rather than keeping a schedule.

A final comment:
Let me be honest and state that what I fear from the El Faro investigation is the USCG coming up with a one-size-fits-all plan for dealing with heavy weather that may suit some side of the industry but not the other. As I have said, the vessels I deal with navigate heavy weather and severe conditions a great deal more often than vessels in other trades. Our trade has been in existence for 44 years. We have sailed through innumerable storms and icing situations and have never lost a ship to weather. When I read a poster write, as I did months ago, that ships should never be allowed near storms, I worry. Knee-jerk reactions like that, if listened to by government organizations, could kill the Trade I love, because our environment IS heavy weather. We dislike it, we’re damn good at steering around it,
at times we sail into it and let it pass over us, and still we get back to port, limbs intact and cargo sound, because we know what we’re doing, and get a little better each year at doing it.

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Just completed a 44-year study of groundings a collisions in a particular part of Washington, British Columbia, and Alaska, on a particular subset of vessels. Prior to 1990 the #1 reason for these accidents was drugs/alcohol. #2 was fatigue (relatively few). After 1990 drugs/alcohol nearly disappears as a cause. 1990 and on the reasons for groundings were: #1 inexperience of OOW (almost invariably the mate), and #2 poor judgement of the captain (for example allowing an inexperienced mate as OOW in a navigationally challenging area). By the way, after 1990 fatigue plays nearly no role in this history of 29 accidents. In most cases, there was an underlying cause to the proximate cause. Examples: Proximate cause: Incompetent mate runs aground. Underlying cause: company providing an incompetent mate. etc.

In the post-1990 accidents COMPLACENCY on the part of the captain becomes a problem. Definition: when an otherwise experienced, skilled captain decides his knowledge and skills are so great he no longer needs to pay attention. So, Boats3,historic data backs you up for the period of 1990 on, for this one cohort: #1 cause, inexperience on part of mate, #2 cause, complacency, or poor judgement, on part of captain.

(For young people: why 1990? 1990 was the year the USCG imposed mandatory drug/alcohol regulations.)

To argue over: fatigue plays virtually no part in causing accidents in this historical subset of vessels accidents over 26 years. (I would estimate that 50% of the vessels in these accidents had a 3-watch system and 50% had a 2-watch system). I’m not saying the officers were not fatigued. I’m not saying fatigue doesn’t play a part in similar accidents elsewhere. I’m not saying that a clever person couldn’t theorize that, because fatigue causes burn-out, and burn-out causes job turnover resulting in experienced officer being hired, that fatigue WAS the ultimate cause of the accident. All I’m saying is, for this historical subset of accidents, fatigue plays virtually no role since 1990 as a proximate or underlying (at first assay) cause .

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That the master is the ultimate authority on board is not in dispute, this is a professional mariners forum, to me it seems condescending to use it in an argument.

Should the master take steps that might get him fired to keep the ship safe? Again, not in dispute, not even among non-mainers.

Same with balancing risk with schedule.

As far as TOTE procedures with tropical cyclones, yesterday the retired TOTE captain said that there used to be a guide that showed the different routes. Now however the procedures are to follow Bowditch (if I heard correctly). Bowditch says to avoid tropical cyclones.

Puerto Rican trade always been competitive barge operations vs vessel operations. Vessel operators use transit time as a selling point over the barge services. Many of the shipping publications intended for cargo interest rank carriers according to reliability. No consideration of risk taken to obtain reliable transit times. I have no doubt reluctance to divert and avoid was a factor in the accident.

Boats3

[QUOTE=freighterman;195295] By the way—“jury tampering”? A serious charge by a poster. If you truly believe it, gather names and facts and pass them on the appropriate prosecutor. If they take no action then we have a legitimate gripe.[/QUOTE]

If this was aimed at me, I stand with what I said. Now, did he lie or just remember things a little differently? Did TOTE do anything illegal, most likely not as I’m sure thy are smarter than that but if anyone thinks that lawyers would not reach out to people to offer there “assistance” you are very naïve.

He did voice his opinion at the end of his testimony but…