Third and final hearing into loss of SS El Faro scheduled Feb. 6, 2017

And now everyone will focus on this

At the end of the day it all boils down to this picture. Not to rest hours, boiler explosions or to defective anemometers and the like. Making a beeline for disaster. I bet this picture was never shown during the hearings…

[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;195114]I have a question that has been nagging me: with regard to the pressure or lack of it placed on the captain to arrive on schedule, has anyone examined the cargo manifest and figured out what there was on board that would account for the perceived need to save a day or two? I ask this because of our experience in examining the similar pressure that was placed on the Deepwater Horizon crew. As in this case, there was all kinds of speculation about the cause, but when we put together the accounting documents and internal correspondence it turned out to something that the speculation missed entirely. Just what was it that had to get there on that given day?

Earl[/QUOTE]

Frozen chicken was mentioned once.

[QUOTE=Lee Shore;195126]Frozen chicken was mentioned once.[/QUOTE]

That’s about as dumb as the boiler explosion idea.

The stuff would be frozen for ever as long as the reefer box had power and didn’t break down. Besides, frozen chicken is hardly a high value cargo. We carried boxes of king crab and other incredibly high value seafood out of Dutch for Japan and Hong Kong and as long as the reefers stayed online no one gave it a thought. Besides, if the box crapped out there was insurance to cover the loss. This trip was hardly the same as carrying serum to Nome …

[QUOTE=Dutchie;194927]The matter of the anemometer keeps popping up. It is a digital instrument and as such suitable to be connected to the VDR’s main unit. In view of the uncertainty as to if it worked shows that it was not connected, otherwise the data should have been available.[/QUOTE]
The data is available. During the questioning of the third mate he was asked about this, he said that the wind direction usually read 180 degrees relative (in error). The board member that was asking the questions said that the data that had been recovered showed the same thing. Not sure what the status of the wind speed data is.

In the same session the third mate was asked about the dangerous vs navigable semicircle, third mate’s answer was the NW quadrant regardless of system movement direction.

Also of interest was the procedure used aboard for handling of SAT-C weather reports. The third mate said that there were marked with the voyage number and then posted on the bulkhead in the wheelhouse The third mate said that the captain would check to make sure they were properly posted.

Capt. Davidson I’m sure trained his deck watches in what he felt was important. We haven’t seen his night orders (have we?) I’m sure he covered conditions, under which, he was to be called in his standing orders. A Mate did call him during the night. Just because a night mate that took a trip once in a while says the Capt was awake one time when he called and sounded like the phone woke him up on the other. Nothing can be proved. Who knows why the Mate said that.I’m surprised why his highly predudicial statement, which leads us to further question the Capt’s. decision making process, without anything resembling a fact to support it. Unfortunately, here say, rumors and unwanted personal reflections by people that should have been held in contempt has been emblematic or these hearings. The CG has dozens of judges on salary, I wonder if there is one present to guide the first chair? All that having been said, I’m sure the Capt. planned on a rough day, putting his feet up for a couple was a good idea. You can’t use hindsight when assessing his decision to look forward being in the best condition to make big decisions.

The Capt. didn’t ignore the crew’s concerns. He addressed their concerns. There were those in the crew that came down from the Alaska run with him. He was the most experienced heavy weather router aboard. If you meant take the crew’s routing recommendations there probably wasn’t any. I was told the first day of meteorology, “boys make your decisions with this in mind, you can always get another job but you’re probably not going to get another license”

I too feel that c. captain’s sixth sense on Tote’s bullying Capt. Davidson is fertile ground, and if the proper conclusions are ever going to be arrived at a thorough examination of management style, the effectivenes of it’s operational routine, it’s human resource conflict resolution, especially every corrective action taken towards Capt. Davidson and have a law firm that has developed psychologicaly, the least damaging resolution processes for senior managers, and let them grade Tote’s handling of day to day business. Was Capt. Davidson depressed or did he just come to the wrong conclusion? Tote the last few years has turned into a company that can only be described as mean? When I saw the choices of the board, I commented that I would much rather have a passed over bouy tender skipper lead this investigation than the rank heavy, totally inexperienced gang who’s there mainly to keep the questions on the seaman they threw, no jettisoned from the chopper from surfacing. The services have men of the same experience and rank as the accused have key roles in determining the resolution of a man’s future. Why, because they are at a place to best visualize the data and turn it into information. they are trying to have the folks that are presently experiencing their most similar career as the accused. It’s the right thing to do. There should be Capt’s and C/Eng’rs vetted for experience dab smack in the middle of these hearings. We haven’t gotten one silver bullet out of the hearings, there’s got to be a couple.

‘Sitting with bent toes’ is a Dutch expression for watching something embarrassing or a totally wrong situation. I always have that feeling when I am looking at the MBI’s military show with the multiple decorated members of the board.

All nice and shiny but I look at it with some amazement as it totally differs from the situation here were the Netherlands Coastguard is responsible for a lot of things but have no say at all or connection with the Disciplinary Court for the Shipping Industry who deal exclusively with evaluating accidents at sea and if necessary the punishment of masters or others. Punishment means for instance that licenses are being revoked for a certain time or all together. .

Members of the Court are seasoned mariners, not an uniform in sight, mainly captains but also a pilot, chief engineers, ship officers and a hydrographer. With these people on board you cannot get questions like ‘is it possible that the bridge, four stories up, can be blown off by a boiler explosion’.

I am planning on attending tomorrows (Monday 2-13-17) hearing. The main reason for attending is I want to hear the DPA testify. He’s the one that had the last communication with the Ship and was also heard on the recorded call with the CG almost joking around with the CG about the El Faro anchoring.

Over 80% of ship accidents are due to human errors. The excellent book titled "Normal Accidents ; Living with high-risk technologies " by Charles Perrow sheds some light on the mental processes which can lead up to such accidents.

Captains simply zig when they should have zagged, and take risks that even high production pressures would not countenance.

Risk taking is part of the human nature but can also be induced by external stimuli such as fear of demotion or firing. El Faro Captain Davidson was fired earlier by Crowley in a row over safety and had to start as third mate again with Tote. Such an occurrence can really put a chill in your bones, up your spine that will not disappear very easily. The humiliation and mental scars of such a demotion are immense.

With that in mind it is thinkable that one’s decisions are knowingly or unknowingly influenced by such an emotional experience and that one will try to avoid another confrontation with the office at all cost but always wiil be keen to deliver flawlessly. It didnot help that the overaged ship and the boilers were in bad shape. The boilers were rubber stamped okay by a Senior Surveyor who never sailed on a real ship and became Senior after being one year with ABS and after school. How Senior is Senior these days?

Interesting in this respect is the open letter published earlier in this topic and which contains some hard truths about the present situation were only profit counts and not human lives.

I only ask, as a United States Merchant Mariner, that the NTSB and USCG do more than ask the cursory questions they have released so far. We, as mariners, ask that the NTSB act in a more detailed and professional in there questioning approach and follow-up.

[QUOTE=Dutchie;195162]Over 80% of ship accidents are due to human errors. The excellent book titled "Normal Accidents ; Living with high-risk technologies " by Charles Perrow sheds some light on the mental processes which can lead up to such accidents.

Risk taking is part of the human nature but can also be induced by external stimuli such as fear of demotion or firing. El Faro Captain Davidson was fired earlier by Crowley in a row over safety and had to start as third mate again with Tote. Such an occurrence can really put a chill in your bones, up your spine that will not disappear very easily. The humiliation and mental scars of such a demotion are immense.
[/QUOTE]

I don’t know if what you’re saying specifically is true with regards to Crowley but I agree in general that experience can sometimes reduce rather than improve decision making ability.

The situation with the changing forecast of Joquin worked like a trap. The decision on the route after leaving JAX was a lose-lose. If the decision was to use the Old Bahama Channel and Joquin turned north as forecast then it would have been seen as the wrong decision. Once the decision was made to use the normal route turning back would have been an admission of error.

The further along the ship continued the higher the cost of turning around, a cost that could be easily measured in miles, hours or tons of fuel. The uptick in risk on the other hand could be rationalized away, “we’ve seen worse” or “it’s no worse then Alaska”.

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;195166]The situation with the changing forecast of Joquin worked like a trap. The decision on the route after leaving JAX was a lose-lose. If the decision was to use the Old Bahama Channel and Joquin turned north as forecast then it would have been seen as the wrong decision. Once the decision was made to use the normal route turning back would have been an admission of error.[/QUOTE]

still with all the potential of catastrophic loss staring one in the face, to just stop and wait seems like a no brainer. The only way to rationalize the decision to proceed when all the warnings were saying they were headed straight into the maelstom was that Davidson did not feel mortal fear. How can someone knowingly push forward against the thought that ahead lies our doom? The simple human drive to not die is very strong and hard to force down. Office demands be damned, I want to live to see my grandkids grow up! Of course, I am trying to never get forced into that position ever again…no more assuming command of vessels manifestly unseaworthy which are so unsafe that peril for all aboard lies behind every corner.

However, perhaps he did feel mortal fear but was more afraid for his career and went ahead in a massive risk that he could get away with it. we all know how that turned out…you can cheat for only so long before you get caught cheating and the hammer falls. If this is the case, then the legacy of Davidson is one terrible and ugly failure.

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;195166]I don’t know if what you’re saying specifically is true with regards to Crowley but I agree in general that experience can sometimes reduce rather than improve decision making ability.

The situation with the changing forecast of Joquin worked like a trap. The decision on the route after leaving JAX was a lose-lose. If the decision was to use the Old Bahama Channel and Joquin turned north as forecast then it would have been seen as the wrong decision. Once the decision was made to use the normal route turning back would have been an admission of error.

The further along the ship continued the higher the cost of turning around, a cost that could be easily measured in miles, hours or tons of fuel. The uptick in risk on the other hand could be rationalized away, “we’ve seen worse” or “it’s no worse then Alaska”.[/QUOTE]

I think your trap theory hits the nail quite accurately. It is probably this economic dilemma that decided him to continue on his present course and gambled on heading off Joaquien. To speak with Charles Perrow he zigged and should have zagged. Human error is written all over it.

[QUOTE=c.captain;195168]still with all the potential of catastrophic loss staring one in the face, to just stop and wait seems like a no brainer. The only way to rationalize the decision to proceed when all the warnings were saying they were headed straight into the maelstom was that Davidson did not feel mortal fear. How can someone knowingly push forward against the thought that ahead lies our doom? The simple human drive to not die is very strong and hard to force down. Office demands be damned, I want to live to see my grandkids grow up! Of course, I am trying to never get forced into that position ever again…no more assuming command of vessels manifestly unseaworthy which are so unsafe that peril for all aboard lies behind every corner.

However, perhaps he did feel mortal fear but was more afraid for his career and went ahead in a massive risk that he could get away with it. we all know how that turned out…you can cheat for only so long before you get caught cheating and the hammer falls. If this is the case, then the legacy of Davidson is one terrible and ugly failure.[/QUOTE]

Why would the crew feel mortal fear? They expected, what, 50 kts winds? The El Yunque reported 100 kt gusts, must have been in excess of 50 kts sustained. Also they had a great deal of faith in the strengh and seaworthiness of the ship.

There is no indication in the transcrips that the captain or the C/M felt any trepidation. Saying they felt in peril is in hindsight.

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;195170]Why would the crew feel mortal fear? They expected, what, 50 kts winds? The El Yunque reported 100 kt gusts, must have been in excess of 50 kts sustained. Also they had a great deal of faith in the strengh and seaworthiness of the ship.

There is no indication in the transcrips that the captain or the C/M felt any trepidation. Saying they felt in peril is in hindsight.[/QUOTE]

MY GOD MAN! With a category 4 hurricane directly ahead how could one NOT feel mortal fear? You can well bet there were plenty aboard who did and there is enough tangential evidence from the voice transcripts of the bridge personnel who were trying hard to not say they were afraid but knew there was peril awaiting them.

Either Davidson was an obtuse fool who irrationally felt no fear of Joachim or he did feel fear about taking on Joaquin but was more afraid of what the suits in Jacksonville were going to do to his job that he was of the storm’s fury. Either way he failed to do a master’s sworn duty to protect his ship and all those aboard her

WHAT A GODDAMNED MISERABLE INDUSTRY!

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Some Tote office weenie getting grilled by CG

[QUOTE=Dutchie;195119]At the end of the day it all boils down to this picture. Not to rest hours, boiler explosions or to defective anemometers and the like. Making a beeline for disaster. I bet this picture was never shown during the hearings…

[/QUOTE]

With all due respect, the picture I would like to see is the one that was in the captain’s mind, generated by the weather advisories he was provided. Only with those inputs in hand, hour by hour, can we understand what the situation looked like from the inside.

Earl

[QUOTE=Dutchie;195169]I think your trap theory hits the nail quite accurately. It is probably this economic dilemma that decided him to continue on his present course and gambled on heading off Joaquien. To speak with Charles Perrow he zigged and should have zagged. Human error is written all over it.[/QUOTE]

“Human error is a symptom, not a cause.” – Prof. Nancy Leveson, who has extended and enriched Perrow’s work. It is incumbent upon the analyst to attempt to determine, to the degree possible, the factors influencing a decision. So far we have speculation about motive, speculation about overt or implicit management pressure, and little in the way of evidence as to what the captain knew and when he knew it. This guy does not seem to have been a cowboy in the mold of Walbridge of the Bounty. Unusual actions demand unusual effort to understand.

Earl

Has anybody joined the Livestream chat, question, and comment feature that is moderated by USCG?

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;195173]Some Tote office weenie getting grilled by CG[/QUOTE]

Lots of gold stripes and medal ribbons to be seen there. Reassuring??

I think it is fair to say that if the vessel had NOT lost power there would have been in a better chance of surviving. Whether she would have survived even then is academical at this stage.

Capt. Davidson probably did not take the possibility of loss of power into consideration. Don’t we all do this mistake at time, but usually get away with it by sheer luck? (Or thanks to clever engineers that save our a**)